VI THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE FORCED UPON THE ALLIED WORLD IN N the earlier years of the great war Great Britain, France and Russia were compelled to carry on what practically amounted to three separate wars against Germany. The three great States had different types of munitions, separate supply systems, separate military command. When Italy came into the war she added a new type of munitions, another independent supply system, and another independent command. It has always been difficult for an alliance properly to co-ordinate and exercise the joint strength of its members. When the inner history of this war has been written it will be disclosed that it has been no exception to wars carried on by alliances.1 In modern warfare a supply system stretches 1 See the Paris speech of Mr. Lloyd George, November 12, 1917, reprinted in A League of Nations, Bimonthly Pamphlets of the World Peace Foundation, Vol. I, No. 7. literally to the ends of the earth. The Allied Governments were necessarily in active competition for raw materials, without which they could not successfully wage the war. Cruel experience taught the Allies the lesson of cooperation; German strength compelled them to put the teaching into practice. At first, cooperation was necessary to reduce the great financial burden imposed upon the Allied Governments by the rapid advance in prices resulting from competitive buying. When the German submarine campaign reached its climax in the spring of 1917 the scarcity of shipping necessitated a much closer co-operation. It was no longer a question of what things cost, it had become a question of whether the necessary materials and food could be obtained at any price unless the several governments arranged to bring those commodities from the nearest source of supply. Very early in the war the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, composed of representatives of Great Britain and several countries buying war supplies in England, was formed. This body rendered a useful service in bringing the purchases of the various Allied Governments in England under a centralized supervision. The body was not, however, an international body in the same sense as were the Program Committees created later in the war, inasmuch as the position of Great Britain on this Commission was quite different from that of the other members. Great Britain was the party that furnished the supplies and the ships which enabled them to be transported. The Commission was, therefore, a body representing Great Britain and the several applicants for help from her. It permitted the apportioning by Great Britain of her surplus resources as equitably as possible among the various applicants. The increasing pressure of the war made it necessary to get supplies from all over the world, and a more comprehensive plan of co-operation was rendered necessary. Moreover, the principle on which the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement operated was hardly satisfactory for an international war body. It did not call for submission of Great Britain's program to her Allies, but only of the programs of her Allies to Great Britain. However much economic aid Great Britain rendered her Allies, there was always the possibility that the lack of knowledge on the part of the various applicants of just what the other applicants were getting, as well as how much England was retaining for her own use, would cause suspicions and jealousies and impede the joint war effort. And, what was more important, the machinery of the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement was not adequate for testing the relative need of the various governments desiring materials and transport from all quarters of the globe. In 1916 and 1917 a body known as the Wheat Executive, upon which England, France, and Italy were represented, was formed. This body met in London; it made programs of the cereal needs of the three countries involved, and the source of supply from which the needs of each country should be met. The principle of the Wheat Executive was that each of the partners was to submit to the others cereal programs for criticism, the belief being, and the result proving, that if each country knew the sacrifices that the other countries were making, friction in waging the common war could be avoided. The programs having been made, the Wheat Executive also undertook to carry them out. To this end it created a common buying organization. Great Britain from the beginning had made allocations of tonnage to France and Italy. After the Wheat Executive was formed she continued to furnish the tonnage necessary to transport the agreed cereal requirements. America came into the war in the early part of 1917 and assumed the position, which Great Britain had theretofore held, of the principal reservoir of Allied credit. America from the outset extended very liberal credits to all the nations allied against Germany, and this, of course, involved her at once in the same difficulties which had confronted Great Britain at the beginning of the war. The problem had to be met of reconciling the conflicting needs of the several governments in the American markets. When the American Mission went to the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris in the latter part of 1917, a general conference on the question of international co-operation was held. One result was that an Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance was established. This Council sat in London and Paris. It was made up of representatives from America, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Council was created to deal with war purchases made in America, and especially with the credit to be extended by the American Government to cover payment therefor. It was, therefore, the same type of international council as the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement. The position of the United States in this Council was analogous to the position of Great Britain on the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement. With the increasing pressure of the war this Council on Finance and War Purchases became more and more an exclusively Finance Council, and |