visions made for the working class which as yet are unknown in their homes. These men may prove to be a valuable element in the work of bringing about a mutual understanding.

A big step toward improving social conditions was taken in Brussels when some 3,000 disorderly girls were forced to go to work under the threat of deportation in case they refused to avail themselves of the opportunity to work at sewing machines in the light rooms of a bag factory at good wages.

An industry the revival of which was really the least to be expected was the diamond-cutting business of Antwerp. Before the war this industry employed about 10,000 men. When Antwerp fell 400 were still at work. Under the control of Senator Sthamer, Captain Baron Plettenberg took the lead in handling the situation with skill and hearty interest. Raw material was brought in from the large stocks in Berlin that had come from West Africa, and one after another . the employers slowly resumed operations, so that today about 5,000 persons are earning their bread in that industry-of course at smaller wages than before-and some 12,000 carats are being cut per month, with a value of about $1,000,000.

The iron and steel industry of Belgium has always suffered from the fact that it is split up into a large number of comparatively small plants and that its concentration into great concerns has only made good progress in a few cases, such as the Cockerille plant and the arms factories; and furthermore its technical equipment is not up to the German standard.

In connection with the revival of industry and of domestic trade, plans for the reopening of foreign commerce have already been worked out. Such men as Senator Sthamer in Antwerp and his circle of gentlemen from the German seaports are studying all the possibilities of a traffic that shall go from the interior of Germany through Antwerp to the lands beyond the seas. It seems strange to find in more than one office maps of the canals of Belgium and Germany and their connections via the Main

and Danube with Austria, enriched with all sorts of new and personal sketches and suggestions; or to learn that both projects for the development of the harbor of Antwerp have met a competitor in the shape of a new German plan.

In the great basin of the harbor of Antwerp lie the thirty-five German steamers whose engines were destroyed by the English before they fled from the city with complete and perfect engines again installed and with the coal bunkers filled ready to steam out into the Atlantic with German goods the moment the peace bells begin to ring.

There has probably never been a case before where the conquerors devoted such an amount of force and energy to the internal rejuvenation of a conquered land, without regard to what sort of bonds were to connect victors and vanquished in the future. It would be a mistake to believe, however, that we have won over a large part of the Belgians. What we have been able, in favorable cases, to give, is very little in comparison with what the country has lost, and what, in the opinion of the inhabitants, would be lost forever if the connection with Germany were to become closer. To people like the Belgians, who have grown up under the protection of neutrality, and in whom the sense of individual freedom has been developed to a remarkable degree, the thought of being joined to Germany, with its subjection of individual interests to those of the community, with its military service and social provisions, must be infinitely unsympathetic. Besides, there are all sorts of little annoyances to which the broad masses are subjected, such as the trebling of the railroad rates, which seriously interferes with the workers' habit of living a long distance from their place of business, the strict rule requiring each in person to report to the police, &c.

The well-to-do classes in many ways feel themselves menaced in their very existence, for they plainly see that the great income from the founding of exotic companies will be cut down, like that from the Congo colony, and that through

the better education of the laboring masses and through the introduction of sickness and accident insurance-in short, through the social provisions developed in Germany-the economic foundation of many a concern that is technically backward would be shattered or destroyed. Therefore, the propertied classes use every means to maintain and revivify anti-German sentiment among the masses, and in this struggle the clergy stands steadfastly at their side, for annexation to Germany would cause the Church to lose some of its enormous influence. *

A case in which a girl was accused of having assisted the flight of a number of young fellows who joined the Belgian Army caused considerable comment. The defender assigned to her by the military court, with an impartial sense of justice, fought hard for his client, and, after an eight-hour struggle with the military lawyer, won her acquittal. A large number of Belgian Judges sent him

letters of thanks. So the longer the German administration lasts the more there penetrates into broader and broader circles an understanding of its excellent intentions and of the strength and energy it is devoting to the good of the country. But we dare not cherish expectations that the rapprochement will become genuinely deep and hearty, because, aside from their history and development, the inhabitants of Belgium, be they Walloons or Flemish, have been impressed with customs and ideas that lead them into entirely different ways from those which are natural and right to Germans. However things may turn out during the next year, the civil administration has done its best to make the sufferings of war endurable for the Belgians just back of the battle front and to revive the rudely interrupted development of their national life, of their trade and industry, and to lead them into paths that are bound to conduct them to new heights after the war.

MONG the historical problems raised by the great European war, the question of the invasion of Belgium remains one of the most absorbing. The German official theory, of course, lays the responsibility upon the Belgians themselves, in that they violated their own neutrality and thus forced the German Army to protect itself against the trap they had laid, by occupying forthwith their territory. It

is interesting to examine whether strategical principles (and the German doctrine of their application) will help to support this theory.

Let us, first of all, remember that, apart from a detailed examination, the manoeuvre of 1914 across Belgium gave a striking first impression of being a thoroughly organized and long-considered operation, and showed, outwardly at least, every sign of perfect production and stage management. Of course, in such a judgment, formed without serious documentary evidence, imagination may perhaps play a large part, but we cannot get away from the fact that this judgment coincides exactly with what the Germans themselves affirm to be the reason of that superiority which confers on them the right to world hegemony, namely, in the words of a great German scientist, the chemist Ostwald: "That faculty for organization which has allowed Germany to attain a higher stage of civilization than the other nations and to which only the war will raise them, (the others.) The French and the English are still at a stage of civilization which the Germans left more than fifty years ago, the stage of individualism. Germany today is at the higher stage, that of organization.”

The Dominant Idea

If this had been the opinion of a single

man, however influential, it would have been more or less negligible. It was to be found, however, in a multitude of writings; numberless and most varied circumstances go to prove that the opinion of the chemist Ostwald was a current, or rather dominant, opinion in Germany. The idea inspired the German people and, surely to a much higher degree, the German Army. Thus the General Staff was to organize victory by virtue of this superior stage of civilization, just as the Government would organize the nation's labor by suppressing the inferior principle of individualism.

Of course, at present we can only deal in hypotheses. The study of this subject must be resumed at a later date, when it can be approached in a calmer spirit. We can none the less seek to find to what extent the campaign of 1870 influenced, in Germany, that of 1914, for it is beyond doubt, and this applies to France no less than Germany, that the preparation for the war of 1914, excepting, of course, the fixing of its date, began as soon as the Treaty of Frankfort had laid down the new frontier line.

An Infallible System

At that moment the Prussian General Staff started work on what one might call the scientific or dogmatic history of the war of 1870-71, for the famous work, so well known to all military men, was intended not merely for a summarization of facts, but more for a justification of methods. An attempt was made in this work to show how warfare should be scientifically organized, leaving nothing, or practically nothing, to chance, and securing victory by its very perfection of theory and practice; in short, the German method of warfare, as impeccable and infallible as German science and German truth.

The victorious Moltke of 1870 was thus made a prototype for the present war, being proclaimed superior to Napoleon, not only by virtue of his military prowess, but also by reason of that amazing German superstition of race superiority. Napoleon's equal in military genius, Moltke had the advantage of belonging to a superior race.

This puerile belief, however, does not prevent Moltke being inferior to Napoleon, and indeed to many more in one respect-he concluded but two great campaigns, as against Napoleon's fourteen. Less by many were the occasions on which he had to solve intricate strategical problems and, in the few cases when he was called upon so to do, circumstances always led him to repeat the same manoeuvre. Sadowa, the attempted French envelopment on the Sarre, St. Private, and Sedan, all these four battles were of a similar type.

Successes of such a lightning character proved irrefutably (to the German mind) the worth of complete organization, and the German theory of warfare, based first and last upon superior organization, would, therefore, infallibly lead to a complete German victory. Forty years of military literature impressed this view upon the minds of officers.

A Military Necessity

This hypothesis of a long and minate preparation of the German manoeuvre on the western front leads logically to the conclusion that the invasion of Belgium was premeditated. As a matter of fact, it is incredible that any one with the slightest knowledge of German strategical science should have any doubt on the subject, despite the subsequent denials by the Imperial Government. The only man to be frank on this point was von Bethmann Hollweg himself, (at first,) when he declared to the Reichstag that Belgium was being crossed in defiance of all treaties, as a military necessity.

The manoeuvre through Belgium was not only a consequence of the systematic study of Moltke; it was writ large in the local geography. The development of the intention could be followed from 1870 to 1914 by noting the variation in the

zones of concentration for the armies as betrayed by strategic railways, stations, and platforms. As and when the French strengthened their eastern frontier, so the Germans tended to abandon their original bases at Strassburg and Metz and to develop their preparations for concentration on the frontier of Luxemburg, and even further north, right up to the Dutch frontier. Many writers in France followed this evolution closely, so much so that the large and interesting work by Senator Maxime Lecomte and Lieut. Col. Camille Levi, "Neutralité belge et invasion allemande," published in 1914 on the eve of hostilities, prognosticated the operations almost exactly as they took place.

A Remarkable Prediction

To the question, "When the Germans invade France, will they pass through Belgium?" these authors answer most clearly, "The Germans will pass through Belgium." In a chapter thus headed, they examine the why and the how. Why? Because of the weakness of the northern French frontier compared with the eastern, (for the French had long relied on Belgian neutrality to cover their northern flank.) How? Through the whole of Belgium, for the size of the first-line armies would involve a crossing of the Meuse, without which, indeed, this right wing would hardly succeed in its attempted envelopment of the French. "Their right wing," wrote Messrs. Lecomte and Levi, "will advance across Central Belgium, making in force for Paris and moving chiefly along the valley of the Oise, approximately along the line Brussels-Mons-Paris."

It is obvious, too, that so enormous an operation could not be improvised on the spur of the moment. In order to be carried out with the regularity which no military man can but admire, the movement must have been prepared in its most minute details with the utmost foresight. The success of the whole plan depended upon a torrential overflowing of the Belgian territory; it is hardly to be expected that Realpolitik would have omitted to stock its hand with all the available trumps and that

in this particular case, therefore, above all (where only success could justify the iniquitous means) Germany would fail to employ what has always been her ace of trumps, namely, her minute organization.

Yet another argument: Germany has never shone in the realms of improvisation, but always as regards analysis and elaboration. Germans have always known how to use and develop to the best advantage the invention of others. To take a recent example, look at aviation; aviation originated in France, but at the outbreak of the war the German air service was very much better adapted than the French. In France, on the other hand, a certain indifference seems always to follow on the heels of a crisis of enthusiasm. Who, for instance, would have thought that, after the hard experience of 1870, the French would have been so little prepared for 1914? Germany, however, tends to sin on the other side, by an exaggeration of minute organization which would often compromise a situation brought about by novel and unexpected circumstances. This is another reason why an improvised invasion of Belgium would seem to conflict with all the most stable qualities of the German character.

Plan Long Matured

Lastly, an argument still less assailable, although lack of documentary evidence causes it to be hypothetical: Having taken Moltke as strategic mentor, it would be most extraordinary had the German staff departed from his most masterly quality, namely, an unceasing reviewing and improving of the plans he meditated for future campaigns. Moltke prepared the campaign of 1870 for thirteen years, from 1857 onward. During this period he prepared no less than twenty detailed memorials addressed to the King and his Ministers, Generals, &c. Upon every political change in Europe, upon every modification of inferior conditions in Prussia, upon every increase in the strength of the army, he

improved and perfected the details of the offensive against France. In 1869 the twentieth plan was ready, and when, faithful to his tradition, Moltke re-examined this plan, he found it satisfactory and wrote in the margin "Gut auch für 1870." ("Good also for 1870.")

Is it possible that the staff which copied all from Moltke would neglect the method of working which was his most shining success? Out of the question. For many years past the violation of Belgian neutrality must have been written in the dossiers of the German staff. And again, not only would they thus be following Moltke, but all great warriors. Napoleon wrote much on this subject.

Letter to Berthier Oct. 2, 1804: "At the moment of declaring war there is so much to do that it is wise to start some years beforehand."

Letter to Eugene Sept. 18, 1806: "Matters must be considered months before they come to pass."

many

Letter to the staff Sept. 8, 1808: "Only solid and well-conceived plans can succeed in war."

Journal at St. Helena: "A plan of campaign must foresee all that the enemy can or may do, and must contain in itself the antidote."

That which Napoleon and Moltke emphasized as necessary would not have been neglected by the German staff of the twentieth century, self-styled superior to these. From the moment when the German Government decided to violate the treaty it had signed, the staff had no alternative but to prepare the said violation; the more so as Government and staff are one and the same in Germany.

Everything contradicts, therefore, the puerile excuse, that the Belgians had violated their own neutrality, and, on the other hand, proves that the passage through Belgium was premeditated, probably more in the light of conquest than of mere passage. But this last question will remain for history to answer more fully.