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German gains in land, men, and wealth in Europe would be very small, even if the cost of the war was not taken into account. Her colonies would be handed back to her, and in return for the surrender of Belgium and of occupied France she would receive considerable extensions of her possessions in tropical Africa. The addition of some one hundred thousand square miles in tropical Africa would be an important gain to a country like Germany, whose colonial endowment was rather meagre; it would not affect considerably the balance of the world's power.

The cost of such a peace would fall mainly on Russia; a large part of the foreign races which she had oppressed systematically would be freed; her efforts to settle the affairs of the Balkan people in her own selfish interest would be defeated for good. If Turkey ever lost Constantinople, Bulgaria or Greece, which have a racial or historic right to it, would get it. Russia's claim to a warmwater port by the territorial control of a country whose inhabitants are not Russian is a flat negation of the muchvaunted principle of nationality. It is no better than would be a German de mand for the Orkney and Shetland Islands and the Strait of Dover, which bar her from the free sea so long as they are occupied by the British. It would be a useless sacrifice of the principle of nationality, as well as of common sense. For the Mediterranean is quite as much an inland sea as the Black Sea, so long as England holds Egypt and the Strait of Gibraltar. And it is not very likely that the British Government will prove its faith in the principle of nationality by handing back Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta to their rightful

owners.

Russia, no doubt, will feel somewhat sore, but, as none of her own people are taken away from her, she will be able to organize them according to their own wants. She has been the great incubus on European politics for many years. That will be removed for some time to

come.

But she will gather strength as time goes on and, let us hope, use it in a wise way. She will always be a neighbor of Germany and Austria, though Poland as a buffer State may intervene. If Poland is successful and continues to live in friendly co-operation with Germany and Austria, the Russian danger will be considerably reduced. But the Polish problem is not easily solved. However well organized an autonomous Poland may be, she cannot ever compromise all Poles within her borders; she will always contain many non-Poles-Ruthenians, Lithuanians, and Jews. It is scarcely fair to expect such an amount of constructive statesmanship from Polish leaders as to avoid all pitfalls. Whatever is going to happen, Germany will be confronted by new problems in the east, the solution of which no victory in battle can assure.

The alliance between Germany and Austria has grown much firmer during the war. Austria may be weaker than Germany, but she is a big and powerful empire which has shown marvelous vitality. She has her own problems and her own ideas. The majority of her people are not Teutons. Even without important new annexation, the Slavic influence in Austria will grow notwithstanding German and Hungarian resistance.

Austria is not a vassal State of Germany. If the Central Powers had been defeated she might have been shorn of her Slavic provinces and brought into a sort of dependency. As it is, she has been rejuvenated; she will be a faithful partner to Germany in European questions, but she would not sacrifice her manhood for wild plans of German world supremacy, the effects of which would fall on her own people.

France no doubt will be saddened, as she cannot recover Alsace and Lorraine; her losses in men and material have been awful; her military valor is shining more brightly than it ever did.

As to England, she is engaged in the first really costly war that she ever has waged. But, as far as the number of human lives is concerned, she will come off fairly well. Her organization of commerce and finance has been excellent. She would deserve nothing but praise for

the great organization she has evolved, if it were not for the loquacity of her statesmen, who have continually promised goods which they were unable to deliver.

She has shown the world at large that the weapon on which she chiefly relied, sea power, is an excellent secondary instrument, incapable of producing decisive results when used against a strong Continental power. The combined fleet of the Allies has cut off the Central Powers from most of their overseas trade. This is not due to the superiority of the British fleet. It is partly due to geographic position. England holds the keys of the Mediterranean; England and France control the Strait of Dover; the only outlet for German shipping, not directly under the Allies' guns, is the mouth of the North Sea between Norway and Scotland. This opening can be easily patrolled by a fleet stationed in Scotland. Measured by the velocity of modern patrol boats, there is scarcely a greater distance between the Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast than the width of the Strait of Gibraltar in the days of the sailing vessel. Germany's position here is somewhat similar to that of Russia in relation to the strait at Constantinople. Where geography does not favor British sea power, it has achieved nothing. It has not effected a landing on German soil; it has not kept the German flag away from the Baltic.

Geographical position is but one of the causes of the partial success of the allied blockade. Direct overseas trade in war times is not essential to a country like Germany. The real success of the blockade is due to Russia and France. If they were neutral, Germany could draw from them all the provisions which she might want. The few overseas goods which Europe does not produce would be imported indirectly via France or Russia. Neither of these countries could be forced to prevent the re-exportation of imported goods, as small countries like Holland and Denmark have been for fear of having their own supplies stopped.

It was the custom in other wars to get such supplies in an indirect way; international law specifically provided for the

continuation of this practice, until the Allies broke it. The British Navy has done a great deal of important subsidiary work for the Allies; it has closed a stretch of about 300 miles, stopping Germany's approach to the ocean. The chief blockading is done by the armies on the Continent.

This is not due to want of efficiency on the part of the British Navy. It is due to the inherent limitations of sea power, which this war has clearly brought out. An island country, depending on sea power, can greatly annoy a Continental power. It can destroy its direct overseas trade and interfere with its indirect trade, if the neutrals permit it. It cannot defeat land power except by an alliance with other land powers. While an island power like England or Japan can be crushed on the sea, a Continental power can only be broken on land or in her outlying possessions.

England is a very dangerous enemy if allied to some Continental power; isolated she cannot deal a decisive blow. As her empire is insular, she will always be dependent on sea communications and liable to collapse when they are cut. She can prevent invasion by maintaining a big army; she cannot strike with that army abroad, if no allied or neutral country gives her a chance to land it. The safety of a Continental power cannot be destroyed by sea power; her foreign trade may suffer and her foreign possessions can be kidnapped; only if she embarks on an aggressive oveaseas policy in foreign lands does she become exposed to decisive blows.

So far as these questions are concerned the war has undoubtedly diminished England's prestige; she will no longer be the proud arbiter in the world's councils. But her own strength has not dwindled; she will be knit more closely with her dominions in a "United Empire” than she ever was before. And since she has learned the art of military organization from the hated Prussian, she will be able to defend herself against all invasion. If she accepts the principle of the free sea, which she herself advocated until lately, she will not be exposed to a policy of starvation.

Mediator

By Count Ernst zu Reventlow

Leading unofficial spokesman of the ruling classes in Germany

Since this article was written Count Reventlow has been forbidden to publish anything without submitting it to the censor. His attack on President Wilson reveals the state of mind underlying the German opposition to American mediation. It also indicates the extent to which the President's motives have been misunderstood in Germany.

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N the course of the last few weeks the motives that guide the policy of President Wilson must have become clearly apparent even to those who had been skeptical up to then. If we look back to the beginning of the great war we see that this Wilson policy has followed an unbroken line from the time when, in the interest of England, American wireless stations were forbidden to transmit German news and news for Germany, to the knocking down of Germany in the submarine question, so characterized by Wilson himself and so joyfully lauded by him. This straight line of policy always is aimed at the same object: To injure and cripple Germany in this war, so as to enrich and strengthen the United States, and, furthermore, to aid the British Empire along every line and with all means in its military operations against Germany.

From month to month in this war the solidarity of the two Anglo-Saxon powers has constantly become more clearly apparent; a solidarity in all matters that affect the German Empire as an opponent, and, consequently, concern its injury and crippling. Beyond this there are naturally many questions where the two Anglo-Saxon powers are opposed to each other and where their paths of interest conflict. These, however, are troubles that can wait until after the war. The war finds them of one mind regarding all the main questions and in league with each other. Besides, in order to make a correct appreciation of persons and things possible, it must be remembered that Wilson in his day was elected with the strong participation of the financial world of Great Britain; therefore, to put it more simply, with English

money. This has been acknowledged in the United States for years, and they justly ascribed the attitude of President Wilson in the Mexican question after his assumption of office to the obligations he had thus incurred.

Unfortunately, we in Germany are still in many instances not free from the delusion that Wilson is an "unworldly scholar," and we allow ourselves to be deceived through the intrigues of the scholar and man of principles into forgetting the fact that these are only superficialities and that behind them stands a shrewd American, free from illusions, and a convinced partisan of the Anglo-Saxon way of looking at the world. But it is understandable enough that Wilson gladly allows himself to be regarded as an unworldly stickler for principles, for tactically this cannot be anything else than useful to him. has been said, however, his financial connection with Great Britain must not be forgotten, as well as the fact that in this case the interests of British capital and British policy coincide and that already, as a consequence, the policy of the United States must, without more ado, be completely and sympathetically affected.

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Mr. Wilson, shortly after he had publicly lauded the knocking down of Germany, delivered a speech in May before a great meeting of the Peace League, in which he declared that he had resolved, as President of the United States, to take an energetic part in the peace negotiations. The United States, he said, was constantly becoming more interested in an early ending of the war, but when the end of the war was seen at hand, then the United States would have the same interest as the belligerent nations in

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shaping the peace that was then to come. These alone are weighty utterances. They let the fact be recognized that Wilson wishes to obtain admission to the peace negotiations through his influence as a mediator. However, when the negotiations are begun America's rôle as a mediator ceases, and it will take part in the negotiations on the same footing as every one of the belligerent parties—that is, as the representative of nothing but the interests of the United States. It is self-evident that such a rôle on the part of a State that has taken no active part in the war would be very unusual. We merely wish to draw attention to the main facts in the case: First of all, the United States wants to institute a general peace conference in order then to enter into the negotiations upon the same footing as the belligerents and to throw the entire weight of the United States into the scales in favor of its interests in every question that comes up, without being bound in any way, not even by the rôle of mediator; consequently, it will be in the position constantly to exercise its influence through threats or through direct economic pressure.

From the German point of view the first stumbling block is to be seen in Wilson's declared intention to effect peace at a general conference. We do not know whether it will come about that way, but it certainly would not be desirable so far as German interests are concerned. Therefore, if the United States is working toward bringing such a conference into being, as a matter of course it is working against the interests of Germany. Granting further that the general peace conference is here and that the United States has the position there for which Wilson is wishing and working, there can be no doubt-in view of the attitude of the United States during this war-that the policy of Wilson would work for Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro and against everything that the German Empire imperatively needs for the guaranteeing of its political and economic future. Consequently, the conference would present the picture of our former enemies, who would fight against us in

the peace negotiations with the same energy as they formerly did with arms, being reinforced by a new enemy who would have to be regarded in the peace negotiations as much more dangerous and serious than if he had been one of our opponents during the war.

It is as regrettable as it is remarkable that there are such broad circles in Germany where this simple truth is not recognized. These circles appear to remain rocked to sleep in the illusion that Wilson's ambition is merely "to restore peace to the world" and nothing more. There even arose a sort of "storm" in the German Reichstag recently when the speaker for one of the parties of the Right rejected Wilson in the rôle of a peacemaker and said that the German people had no confidence in the President. Apparently there are wide circles in Germany in which it is not yet understood that the manner in which peace negotiations are begun and the division of forces while they are under way constitute a very weighty part of the war itself, a part whose formation and development can bring about the loss of a mighty part of the gains that have been made by the sword.

The manner in which the peace negotiations are entered upon is not less important than the position assumed by an army or a fleet at the beginning of a battle. These same German circles also do not understand that the peace negotiations will have a direct bearing upon the strength of the respective parties, and that consequently the joining in of the United States, in view of the tendency of its interests and in consideration of its attitude up to the present, would, under all circumstances, signify a great hardship for Germany.

In his speech the President drew a sketch of the foundations upon which he would like to see a future peace erected. The United States wants a permanent peace, and Wilson asserts that such a peace is only possible if the place of the present diplomacy is taken by "the principle of public right." In other words, he wishes to have all questions involving the honor and life of nations settled by international courts. We do not need to waste many words over this. As long as

men are not angels, and as long as a goddess of justice equipped with all the means of executive power does not act as judge, the idea of an international court of arbitration is not adapted to any important problems of international life. As a matter of course, the leading men of the United States regard the rôle they play toward the European nations as that of the powerful and impartial and as the deciding factor in these negotiations. This consideration alone would be enough to cause a general refusal in Germany. The United States, no matter under what President, has never concealed the fact that it regards all Germany's efforts along international lines, both political and economic, as inadmissible and unfriendly act toward the Anglo-Saxon nations. A strong German navy has always been treated in America as a challenge to England and the United States; Germany's possession of Alsace-Lorraine has never been looked upon as anything but robbery; in short, the modern German Empire and the work of the German people which it needs in order to maintain its life in the world are looked upon in the United States as something disturbing to peace and quietness, as something that ought not to exist.

In outlining his foundations Wilson also comes pretty plainly to the decisive points. He wishes "that every nation have the right to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live," and further that the small States shall have the right to enjoy the same respect, &c., as the big ones. The first point is exactly the same as has been handed out by Asquith, Grey, et al., since the beginning of the war. It is aimed at Belgium, AlsaceLorraine, North Schleswig, Poland, Montenegro, Serbia, &c. The former attempts to extend American influence in Belgium and Poland are now already working in the same direction. About

Ireland and India, on the contrary, we have heard nothing so far, and it is significant enough that an honest little pamphlet, which the former American Secretary of State, Bryan, had written about English maladministration in India, was forced to submit during

this war to an order forbidding its exportation. This brochure is not allowed to be sent out of the United States. [Of course this statement is absurd. -Ed. CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE.]

Besides, this Wilson "foundation" stipulates, even if not in so many words, the introduction of democratic constitutions. Here again, therefore, we have the same effort as is being made by Great Britain, which at the bottom proceeds from the desire to see the German power, both at home and abroad, ruined through a democratic régime.

Furthermore, Wilson wants to have the basic principle laid down that, "the world to be free from any breach of the peace," and the United States would form part of any imaginable combination that would serve this end. Consequently, Wilson is thinking of some sort of a great international " peace league," similar to the Holy Alliance of a century ago. It is well known that that Holy Alliance was a high-sounding phrase and a big fraud in which supposedly great men were employed, and which, indeed, finally worked out merely to the advantage of England. The English statesmen did not allow themselves to be deceived by these high-sounding phrases, but made use of them. This would also be the case if the Wilson idea were realized, with the single exception that then both Anglo-Saxon powers would talk, with serious faces, of making the world happy, and in the meantime would make themselves masters of the world. When Wilson, in the same connection, repeatedly says that the United States is not selfish and seeks nothing for itself, this is in sharp contradiction with his prevous utterances to the effect that when the war should come to an end the United States would have the same interest in the forming of peace as the belligerent nations and that also "humanity" is just as much the affair of the United States as it is that of the

other powers. It is possible that the United States does not seek any extension of territory through the war, as it has enough and more than it needs. What it wants is the unrestricted possibility of exploiting its wealth and economic

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