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power in opposition to industrial Europe. been able to insure the security of the And this includes its strong interest in highway of the seas to a very high degree seeing that Germany especially does not since August, 1914. If at that time he again become dangerous as a competitor had placed the United States at the head in the export trade.
of neutral seafaring powers, and, in arThe entire Anglo-Saxon element in the cord with them, had demanded the obUnited States is thoroughly convinced servance of the Declaration of London, that Germany is the disturber of the &c., with threats and, in case of necespeace. German world commerce, the sity, with the application of the means German Navy, and, consequently, Ger of force at hand, he would have obtained man international policy, are red rags it. Great Britain could easily have been for every Anglo-Saxon American. From forced to do this by the United States. this proceeds the manner in which By doing this and by putting a ban Wilson wants to bring about “ the future upon the exportation of munitions of war guaranteeing of peace "—that is, through Wilson would, furthermore, have brought “ a universal association of the nations about that which he characterizes as his to maintain inviolate the security of the dearest ideal for the future--peace. The highway of the seas for the common and interests of a quick peace, which Wilson unhindered use of all the nations of the emphasizes again at the close of his reworld." Up to the time of “the knock marks, would also have been served ing down” (“Niederboxung") of Germany through the German underwater trade in the negotiations Wilson took pleasure in talking about the freedom of the seas He did not wish all that. His idea of and repeatedly emphasized in his notes the future on the seas is a state of af. how dear to his heart this freedom was fairs in which no can be begun and how his efforts were directed, even unless “ the public pinion of the during the war, in combination with Ger world” has first passed a favorable many, toward putting the freedom of the judgment upon it. We Germans have seas into practical operation. Now, after confidence in this public opinion he is convinced that he has obtained from of the world, because up to now, and Germany a definite abandonment of the especially during this war, the public submarine war against merchant vessels, opinion of the world, under the influence he no longer talks about the freedom of
of anti-German lies, of hate, and of the seas, but about the “security of the
jealousy, has been opposed to a peacehighway of the seas.” This new turn is
fully progressive German people and openly directed toward having the ban
empire, though this empire simply deon submarine warfare erected into a
manded the place in the world to which principle of international law; otherwise
it was entitled by its daily proofs of its the words are only an empty phrase. In
right to exist. The public opinion of the time of peace no internationally guaran
world will continue to make itself felt teed security of the highway of the seas
against Germany, be it in a military way, is needed, as they are free eo ipso. But
in a political way, or in an economic way, the nicest kind of international confer
as long as those who are envious of us ences and treaties will not succeed in
fail to comprehend the entire hopelessguaranteeing the security of the high
ness of their efforts. The only way and way of the seas in a future war, and, in
the only means of arriving at that end deed, in the sense that Germany needs it
and thus insuring a peace, sound in a --through the guarantee of the German
German sense, lies in the maintaining connection with the oceans and their and the increasing of German power. free use both coming and going by Ger
Certainly that does not stand upon Mr. man and neutral trading ships. If Pres
Wilson's program; on the contrary, the ident Wilson had honestly, entertained
Anglo-Saxon powers and their friends the wish that he emphasizes now and
and vassals aim at holding it down and has formerly emphasized he would have
By Professor Brander Matthews *
Of Columbia University
ITH the doubtful exception of
Porto Rico, there is scarcely a square mile of all the millions
of miles over which the Stars and Stripes now float that was originally won by the sword and continuously held by arms. Texas revolted from Mexico, proclaimed its independence, applied for admission to the United States, and was admitted. In like manner Hawaii came under our flag by the free choice of its inhabitants. And all the rest of our territory, beyond that in our possession when the Constitution was adopted in 1789, was bought and paid for.
We have never rectified our frontiers by forcible annexation. We purchased Louisiana from France in 1803; we purchased Florida from Spain in 1819; and we purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. At the close of the war with Mexico in 1848 we purchased California and what are now its sister States on the Pacific—although it is only honest to admit that this cession was consented to under duress. And at the close of the war with Spain in ,1898 we kept Porto Rico, which we had captured, and we paid a price for the Philippines, which the Spaniards were not sorry to part with—if we may credit the report that the islands would have been sold to Germany in case we had not insisted on buying them ourselves. And then finally in 1904 we purchased the Canal Zone from Panama-although it must be admitted that we were very prompt in recognizing the independence of the revolting State. This is a fairly clean reco
ecord, in that we have taken little or nothing by forcible annexation. What we have acquired since we became a nation we have paid for in cash. And the cleanness of this record is still further emphasized by our withdrawal from Cuba, which we had
promised not to take, which most European nations expected us to take, and which we did not take in spite of the fact that we had to be invited to return a second time to set its affairs in order.
These successive accretions of our domain were not the result of any predetermined plan of expansion, and they all of them came about more or less unexpectedly. What is more, and what shows the abiding attitude of a large part of our population, is the significant fact that every one of these increases of territory was bitterly opposed by an influential section of the American public. The Federalists, for example, were loud and fierce in their denunciation of Jefferson for the Louisiana Purchase.
Forty years later the hostility to the admission of Texas and to the purchase of California was almost as intense. The frequent proposals made before the civil war for the purchase of Cuba never succeeded in winning popular approval; and even after the civil war, when President Grant negotiated the annexation of Santo Domingo, in 1870, the treaty failed of ratification. And it is within the memory of us all that the opposition to the retention of the Philippines was equally bitter and that it has been even more persistent.
In the Philippines we can never be at home, and we cannot people them. We may continue to possess these islands and to rule their inhabitants, but we must do it always as aliens even if we refrain from rapacious exploitation, and even if we seek to govern solely for the good of the natives.
We must never allow ourselves to forget that everywhere and always men dislike being governed except by men of their own race and of their own choice, tacit or expressed. All men detest the rule of the alien, no matter how richly endowed with good intentions the foreign governors 'may believe themselves to be.
* Condensed from a paper prepared for The New York Times Sunday Magazine.
When all is said the fact remains that the territory of the United States has immensely increased since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and that the area of the British Empire has been mightily expanded during the same period, whereas the more recently founded German Empire has had to be satisfied with the snapping up of a few unconsidered trifles, far inferior in value.
It is no wonder that there are many Germans who resent this and who ascribe the exclusion to the underhand intrigues of rival peoples. They see that the Monroe Doctrine debars them from acquiring territory in South America, where there are already tens of thousands of Germans, and they see also that the British and the Russians recently outmanoeuvred them in what seems to amount almost to a partition of Persia. Yet an American may wonder whether the German desire for colonies is not largely imitative and whether it is in accord with the best interests of Germans themselves. Germany has now no surplus population. In consequence of its soaring industrial development emigration has almost ceased, and in 1913 half a million laborers had to be imported to gather the German harvests.
Moreover, it may be suggested that the German insistence on rigid organization is a hindrance to effective colonization. What is needed in a new country is freedom of individual initiative, liberty to turn around swiftly to meet novel conditions, and little more administration than is requisite for the maintenance of peace and order. It is significant that the Germans themselves do not flock into the existing German colonies, and that the German settlers in Brazil have never been heard to express any desire to be incorporated in the German Empire.
We have not the political machinery for ruling alien races; and to attempt to rule them is not in accord with our political ideals, which compel us to base our form of government on the consent of the governed. So long as the people of any community are fitted for self-government by descent or by long training, we can make them welcome,
as we should gladly receive the Canadians, if they wished to join us and if the British were willing to release them from their allegiance to the crown. To admit the Canadians upon an equal footing with ourselves would put very little strain upon our political fabric. But we are not likely ever to be willing to confer full citizenship upon the Mexicans, if they were to clamor at our doors for admission into the Union. That they should ever so clamor is most improbable; but it is even more improbable that we should yield to their appeal.
The Mexican peon is at present as unfit or as ill-prepared for American citizenship as the Filipino. And it is for the Mexicans, as it is for the Cubans, to work out their own political salvation as best they can. Quite possibly it would be better for the Mexicans if we controlled Mexico; but it would certainly be worse for us.
And in matters of so much importance we have a right to be selfish and to refuse to endanger our own political ideals for the sake of strangers without the gates.
Furthermore, if the opinions expressed in this paper are those of a majority of the citizens of the United States, if it is a fact that we have no desire to go on increasirg our possessions, either by annexing territory adjoining our borders or by acquiring distant colonies, if we really shrink from rivalry with the European empires in the game of greedily grabbing alien lands, then it would be wise for us to let the whole world know this so plainly that there would be no doubt about our intentions. The economic competition of the leading nations is not likely to be relaxed in the immediate future, in fact, it will probably be furiously intensified; and economic rivalry is ever an existing cause of international jealousy and international suspicion. It is not enough that we should be resolved to keep our hands clean, as we have done in Cuba; it is needful also that we should at least try to make rival and jealous and suspicious peoples believe that our hearts are pure and devoid of vain desire to despoil any State weaker than we
By The Editor
The Monroe Doctrine receives a fresh vitality and new significance in consequence of the great European war and the general political unrest which it produces throughout the world. The actual text of the doctrine appeared in the annual message of President James Monroe, communicated to Congress Dec. 2, 1823, and is as follows:
.... In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been deemed proper for asserting, as a principle in which rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." HE origin of the Monroe Doctrine detached position]? Why quit our own to begins with the preliminary dis
stand upon foreign ground? Why by inter
weaving our destiny with that of any part cussions in the Continental Con
of Europe entangle our peace and prosperity gress. As early as 1776 Benjamin in the tasks of European ambition, rivalFranklin declared it a bad policy to send ship, interest, humor, or caprice? * American agents abroad
The policy was laid to seek foreign alliances
down also by Jefferson and warmly opposed the
and Madison that there proposition. Although he
should be no “entangling was defeated, he later
alliances with any foreign himself became the effi
nation," but it was not cient agent who consum
until after the war of 1812 mated our subsequent al
that international ques
tions a rose liance with France.
which conGeorge Washington, in
vinced our statesmen that his farewell address in
to this general prohibition 1796, enunciated the doc
must be added a warning of trine America for
European Americans in these words:
ference with this continent
would not be tolerated. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us
The principal events have none or a very remote
which brought about the relation. Hence she must be
enunciation of the doctrine engaged in frequent contro
were twofold. versies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our
In the early days of 1800 Hence, therefore,
a dispute arose between it must be unwise for us to
the United States and implicate ourselves by arti
Great Britain and Russia ficial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her polities or the ordinary
over the boundaries of the Northwestern combinations and collisions of her friend Territory, (now Oregon, Alaska, and ships or enmities.
British Columbia,) and there was conIt is our true policy to steer clear of per
siderable uneasiness that there might manent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. * Why forego the ad
arise from this controversy serious convantages of so peculiar a situation [our sequences.
July 2, 1823, John Quincy Adams, it, and Austria, Prussia, Spain, and then Secretary of State, communicated Russia did actually interfere, though as follows to Richard Rush, who was England held aloof at first, but finally our Minister at the Court of St. James's, became involved. in discussing a possible solution of the
After Waterloo, Russia, Austria, and question:
Prussia entered into an alliance, known These independent nations (that is, those of
* The Holy Alliance." It has been South America and Mexico] will possess
generally believed the main purpose of rights incident to that condition [settlement
the agreement was to suppress revoluof the controversy) and their territories will of course be subject to no exclusive right tionary movements and the spread of of navigation in their vicinity or of access liberal ideas. In September, 1818, the to them by any foreign
congress of Aix-lanation. • A necessary
Chapelle convened, consequence of this state of things will be
Great Britain, that the American con
France, Austria, Rustinents henceforth will
sia, and Prussia parno longer be subject to colonization by civilized
ticipating nations; they will be
here decided to reaccessible to Europeans
move the army of ocand each other on that footing alone; and the
cupation from France Pacific Ocean, in every
and uphold Louis part of it, will remain
XVIII. on his throne, open to the navigation
and there was a supof all nations in like
posed understanding, manner with the Atlantic
though no specific On July 17, 1823,
agreement, that whenMr. Adams is quoted
ever absolutism was GEORGE CANNING JOHN QUINCY ADAMS in George R. Tucker's
Photo Underwood & Underwood
imperiled there should History of the Monroe
AnDoctrine (1885) in an interview with other congress was held in 1820, and it the Russian Ambassador regarding the was then proposed to interfere in the territorial dispute as follows: “We (the affairs of Naples, where a revolution United States) should contest the right had broken out. England protested, and of Russia to any territorial establishment would have nothing to do with it, yet on this continent, and we should assume Austria proceeded and restored the distinctly the principle that the American monarch at Naples. continents are no longer subjects for In 1822 another
of the any new European colonial establish powers was held at Verona to consider ments.
an insurrection which had broken out in Portentous occurrences in Europe Spain the year before, and it is here hastened the proclamation of the doc that the interests of the United States trine, the germ of which appears in the became seriously involved. England's preceding paragraph.
envoy at the Verona Congress was the For centuries the right was conceded Duke of Wellington. Spain was in sore among European powers to interfere straits with rebellion at home and the whenever the ambitious designs of any flames of revolution were alight in all her of the rulers tended to disturb the "bal South American and Central American ance of power,” but it was not conceived colonies, which declared their independas applying in any way to the acquisi in rapid succession. She tion of territory outside of Europe. powerless to suppress the revolt, and it The autocratic Governments adhered to was proposed that the powers come to this agreement and used it as a basis her assistance. All agreed except Engfor a further extension. When the land. She again refused to interfere, French Revolution began it was supposed but, disregarding her protest, the others that they should all intervene to suppress
went ahead; France sent an army into