Spain and suppressed the uprising there.

The question now arose regarding the American colonies of Spain. Spain was unable to re-establish her authority, and, without England's co-operation as mistress of the seas, the other powers were disinclined to proceed. England was beginning already to feel the influence of the liberalism which was pervading her domain and which resulted within a few years in the Reform bills. Moreover, by the restoration of the South American colonies to Spain her trade would undoubtedly be reduced and imperiled.

Canning was at the head of British Foreign Affairs. In August, 1823, a few months after the Verona Congress and before any steps had been taken with reference to the South American republics, Mr. Canning proposed to our Minister, Mr. Rush, that

the Governments of England and of the United States should publish a joint declaration before Europe in opposition to the designs of the alliance in regard to the Western Hemisphere, the substance of which should be that, while the two Governments desired no portion of those colonies for themselves, they would not view with indifference any foreign intervention in their affairs or their acquisition by any third power; that a proposal be made to the other powers for a congress to consider the affairs of Spanish America, and that Great Britain would not participate in its councils unless the United States was also represented.*

Minister Rush explained the traditional policy of non-interference by the United States in European politics. He stated that the United States had already recognized the independence of the South American States, and that if England Iwould do likewise he would unite in a "joint declaration." This Mr. Canning declined to do, but he did inform France that England would not permit European interference in Spanish American affairs, and France surprised him by readily acquiescing in the opinion that the new republics in South America were forever lost to Spain.

The suggestions of the British Foreign Minister to the American Minister brought matters quickly to a head. President Monroe regarded the situation as

*Tucker's "The Monroe Doctrine."

very grave, and asked for opinions from the two living ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison.

Madison was brief. He thought that there was a call "for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade."

Jefferson wrote as follows:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom.

The President's message bears date Dec. 2, 1823. Shortly after its beginning appears the following passage:

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the Minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the Minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

Later on, just before the close of the message, the President says:

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries,

and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellowmen on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for Our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere; but the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what ex

tent such interposition may be carried on the same principle is a question in which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote; and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and these new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

The doctrine remained quiescent, after 1824, being regarded rather as an academic utterance, especially as the European powers in 1830 had abandoned the system of forcible interference, but it was reasserted by President Polk in 1845 as a settled and definite policy of this Government. In 1845, when the dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon boundary flared up, the President in his message to Congress, referring to this dispute as well as to the hint that if the United States annexed Texas, (which was then being discussed,) Europe might intervene, said:

In the existing circumstances of the world. the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe. It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American Continent.

It will be noted that President Polk confined the inhibition to North America, but added that word "dominion," which in international usage implies the volun

tary acquisition by purchase or transfer of allegiance.

Again, in 1848, he was even more definite. Yucatan, which was then independent of Mexico, being unable to suppress an Indian revolution, offered to transfer "its dominion and sovereignty" to the United States, and made similar offers to Great Britain and Spain. The President in a message to Congress did not recommend its acceptance by the United States, but added: "We could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power."

It was thus proclaimed to be the American policy that:

(A) European powers could not exchange or transfer to each other colonial possessions on the Western Hemisphere.

(B) They could not acquire either dominion or sovereignty over any territory on the Western Hemisphere not already possessed, even where there was a voluntary cession.

(C) The policy was not limited to North America, but embraced the entire hemisphere.

Nothing further occurred to revive the doctrine until 1866, when a serious question arose over the ambitions of France to establish Maximilian on the throne of Mexico.

Oct. 31, 1861, England, France, and Spain agreed to invade the Republic of Mexico in order to collect certain claims due subjects of the three nations and to chastise Mexico for her delinquency. The invasion took place, but Spain and England withdrew; Napoleon III. persisted, and the French landed an army and overthrew the Mexican Government. An election was held under bayonet rule, and Maximilian, a scion of the Austrian Hapsburgs, was placed upon the throne. The United States protested, but was too busily engaged at that time with its own troubles to go further, but as soon as our war ceased, an army of 40,000 troops was mobilized on the Mexican frontier, opposite Matamoros, where the French Army had its headquarters. Napoleon did not wish a clash with the United States, which was inevitable if his troops remained, and in utter disregard of his

pledge to uphold the throne of Maximilian he withdrew his army; the Mexicans revolted and overthrew Maximilian, and subsequently executed him.

The first recognition by Congress of the Monroe Doctrine arose out of the Mexican situation. On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives resolved unanimously that:

The Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and that they think it fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical Government erected on the ruins of any Republican Government in America under auspices of any European power.

the

This is the nearest express legislative sanction that the doctrine had so far received. At the time it was proclaimed Mr. Clay offered in the House of Representatives in January, 1824, a joint resolution by which it was declared that the people of the United States "would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain," to reduce her colonies to subjection, but no action was taken upon this resolution. Congress, however, took definite action in the Venezuelan crisis in 1895, referred to below, and again in 1912, when a resolution of Senator Lodge was adopted, with but four dissenting votes, by the United States Senate, which was a formal reaffirmation of the doctrine, and at the same time notice to Japan that this Government would not tolerate the establishment of a naval base on the Mexican Coast, it being then reported that Japan contemplated such action at Magdalena Bay.

The resolution was as follows:

Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American Continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government not American as to give that country practical control for national purposes.

This not being a joint resolution, it did not require the concurrence of the House

or the signature of the President; it was a formal expression of the Senate alone. The House took no action.

This resolution goes further in the application of the original Monroe Doctrine in that it commits the United States henceforth to prohibit acts by foreign corporations or associations which heretofore only foreign nations have been forbidden to do.

Prior to the Maximilian episode and after the Polk Administration, thạt is, during the decade preceding our civil war, Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, in 1851, in view of a proposed engagement between Spain, Great Britain, and France to guarantee Spanish possession of Cuba, sent this notice to Great Britain:

"It has always been declared to Spain that the Government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to any European power."

Again, during the civil war, Spain attempted to recover Santo Domingo, but failed, and afterward Santo Domingo, unable to secure itself against possible European aggression, sought annexation to the United States, and a treaty was negotiated, but not confirmed. In sending the treaty to the Senate President Grant wrote:

"The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power."

It was, however, in 1895, during the Administration of President Cleveland, that the doctrine received its most specific and menacing import.

For nearly half a century there had been a dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela over certain boundary lines. In 1887 the dispute had become so acute that diplomatic relations between the two countries ceased. Great Britain extended the area of British Guiana until in 1887 the territory of Venezuela south and east of the Orinoco River was reduced about two-thirds, 70,000 square miles. The controversy had proceeded many years; in fact, in 1876

Venezuela asked the United States to aid her in the discussion. When the last demand by England was made and the enormous slice of territory lopped off, Venezuela again appealed to the United States to intercede, and England was requested by our Government to submit the matter to arbitration, which was refused, and matters were at an impasse and there was constant danger of a break between the United Kingdom and the South American republic.

When Cleveland assumed office in 1895 Ambassador Bayard was again instructed to request England to arbitrate the matter, but he was curtly informed that Great Britain "could not consent to any departure from the Schomburgk line," which line cut off much Venezuelan territory. Congress approved the President's recommendation of arbitration, and on July 20, 1895, Secretary of State Olney dispatched his historic instructions to Ambassador Bayard. In this communication he asserted the right of one nation to intervene in a controversy to which other nations are directly parties "whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious menace to its own integrity, tranquillity, and welfare." He then discussed the Monroe Doctrine and affirmed that, while it did not establish a protectorate over other American States, it did not relieve any of them from "obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them," but that its "single purpose and object" was that "no European power or combination of powers should "forcibly deprive an American State of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." He argued that this principle was involved in the present controversy, because territory was involved, and this meant "political control to be lost by one party and gained by the other." He said that "the United States, being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know

whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on." He affirmed: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." He closed with the statement that it was the "unmistakable and imperative duty of the President to ask" for a definite decision upon the point "whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration."

Lord Salisbury in his reply claimed that the United States was insisting upon a new and extended interpretation of the doctrine. He said: "It is admitted that he (President Polk) did not seek to assert a protectorate over Mexico or the States of Central or South America. Such a claim would have imposed upon the United States the duty of answering for the conduct of these States, and consequently the responsibility of controlling it. ** * It follows of necessity if the Government of the United States will not control the conduct of these communities, neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences attaching to any misconduct of which they may be guilty toward other nations."

"If a European power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be danger

President Cleveland, on receipt of England's refusal to arbitrate, submitted the entire matter to Congress in a startling message, in which he declared "the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement tends to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures.

ous to our peace and safety,' and it can make no difference whether the European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise." Congress provided for a separate American commission to investigate the boundary question, but before it could report Great Britain receded and signed an arbitration agreement with Venezuela.

Though she was awarded practically all the disputed area, she yielded to the American interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine rather than go to war with us, and Congress specifically upheld the widened scope of its interpretation by fully indorsing the position of President Cleveland.

The Spanish-American war of 1898 gave a new significance to the Monroe Doctrine. The acquisition by the United States of colonial possessions in the remote Pacific, 3,000 miles from our shores, and in the Atlantic, nearly 1,000 miles from the continental boundary; the establishment of a virtual protectorate over Cuba, and a universal acknowledgment that by this war the United States had emerged from its provincial isolation into a world power, invested the doctrine with a more portentous meaning. The first manifestation was the need for the Panama Canal, but before it could be proceeded with it was felt that a treaty with England negotiated in 1850, known as the Clayton