action. The centre from which the reaction derived its strength supplied the Governmental circles with the energy in their anti-Semitism. This centre was the frank, and, to a greater degree, the concealed, activity, of the so-called Coun- . cil of the United Nobility, which introduced in the Governmental circles the policy of limitations on the rights of Jews.

To Bar Jews From Army Immediately before the war the United Nobility began to take the initiative, to put through a law excluding Jews from the army, and substituting for military service in the case of Jews either taxes in money or a special form of military service. This project of the law naturally met with the approval of the former Minister of War Sukhomlinov, who was acting under the direct influence of the Chief of the General Staff, General Yanushkevich, one of the most active members of the Council of the United Nobility. Perhaps in no other branch of public life has anti-Semitism been imposed from above with such insistence as in the military.

The documents on this side of the question are unbelievably eloquent. During the last years before the war there was no instance of the promotion of a Jewish soldier to the rank of non-commissioned officer; Jewish volunteer recruits were unable, without the help of special protection, to gain admittance to regiments of their choice; and the attitude of the regimental officers toward the Jewish soldiers was tinged with hate, and inspired constant animosity toward them in the army. Just as the attitude of the Minister of the Interior always went rapidly down the hierarchic ladder to the very lowest steps, so the attitude of the Minister of War, and, particularly, that of the Chief of the General Staff, was passed on to the lowest commanding ranks in the army.

Thus Governmental anti-Semitism reached its highest point during the last few years, and, similarly, the legislative bodies showed the same degree of antiSemitism. To one who knows Russian political life it is quite clear that both the

Third and the Fourth Dumas, in their majorities, performed simply the wishes of the Government and were under the exclusive influence of the Governmental policy. Though there could be difference of opinion on any general question among the parties forming the majority of the Duma, nevertheless, on the Jewish question-the main axle of reaction -unanimity prevailed. The Octobrist Party, trained to obedience from the time of the late Stolypin, never had the courage to give evidence of its comparative liberalism when it came to the Jewish question.

Masses Sound at Heart

On the other hand, the better section of Russian public opinion remained true to the best traditions of genuine liberalism. It always recognized, as did the Jews, that the Governmental anti-Semitism. It always recognized, as did the weapon of reaction, that reaction and anti-Semitism were Siamese twins. Therefore, not by reason of any agreement, but by a common, similar understanding of the political situation, the Jews always went hand in hand with the genuinely liberal groups of the public. The latter, struggling against reaction, also struggled against the Governmental policy toward the Jews; and the Jews, fighting for their civil and national rights, fought reaction. If one adds that anti-Semitism in Russia has never had any roots, or at least any deep roots, in the psychology of the broad popular masses, it becomes clear that the Jews of Russia had no ground for refusing to believe in a brighter future, and confidently to wait till the gloom of reaction should be dispelled, and with it the limitations for the Jews.

Such was the situation in the Jewish question when the war broke out. Contemporaries will never forget, and history will certainly note, the general enthusiasm which seized also upon the Jewish population of Russia in August, 1914. It would have been hard to presume a few weeks before that the Jewish population, so oppressed and exhausted morally and physically, would be able to show such enthusiasm for the

common cause of Russia. But such was the fact. Instinctively, the whole Jewish population felt that events of world importance were beginning, and that these events must lead to a general, radical change and to a revaluation of all values.

Jews, together with others, felt instinctively that this was a war of liberation. The Jews also showed every variety of public enthusiasm. The general state of mind of the Jews was reflected in the declarations of representatives of various parties and national groups in the Imperial Duma, not excluding Jewish representatives.

But the army that went to the front did not witness this general state of mind; it went off to the war, educated during the preceding years in the policy of Sukhomlinov and General Yanushkevich.

Propaganda in the Army

Military operations began in Poland, and from the very first day one was made to feel the extremely aggravated Jewish-Polish relations. I shall not stop to describe in detail these relations. By indisputable documents and facts it is, however, established that there was an unheard-of propaganda in the army of calumnies against the Jews-calumnies which gradually developed into legends of Jewish espionage. These legends found a solid backing, already prepared, and, in the main, they were supported by the fact that the army met in the Jewish population of Poland, as well as of Galicia, a society quite strange to it, differing from the Jewish population of Russia both in language and in external appearance.

The customary and inevitable occurrence of separate instances of excesses, which in many places reached the point of destruction of property, immediately terrified the local Jewish population. This state of mind supported the estrangement, which, in turn, kept alive the legends which were being spread along the whole front. The very same stories, all absolutely absurd, were spread everywhere, finding an echo in the orders of the higher army commanders, under

the direction and leadership of the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Commander in. Chief, General Yanushkevich, the author of the law to exclude Jews from the army and a member of the Council of the United Nobility.

The result of all this was the issuing of military orders referring exclusively to the Jewish population. The wholesale expulsion of Jews from various cities and towns laid the foundation for the socalled fugitive movement. Fugitives began to rush to Warsaw from the localities near the line of battle, and very soon there were gathered in Warsaw more than 120,000 fugitives, left without roof or food. Gradually the attitude toward the Jewish population began to influence the attitude toward Jewish soldiers and, in general, toward all Jews having to do with the army. Hundreds of documents, absolutely authentic, testify to the constant issuing of orders by commanders of armies and by the staff of the Commander in Chief, referring not only to the Jewish population, but also to the Jews in the army. The Jewish population was literally dumfounded by the events which followed, feeling them with particular sensitiveness because of the crisis just experienced. The next events -the wholesale expulsion of Jews from the provinces of Kovno and Courland even before military operations had reached these localities-created an atmosphere of complete perplexity and dejection.

One must note that by this time the difference between the attitude of the military and the civil authorities toward the Jews had become clear. Not as the result of a weakening of Governmental anti-Semitism, but by reason of the realization of the economic and social consequences of the policy adopted by the army commanders in their relations to Jews, the Government, in a series of representations, attempted to temper the severity of the military orders. The Government was able to stop the wholesale expulsions of the Jewish population from the western provinces, gradually substituting an expulsion of the entire population from localities threatened by the enemy.

Breach in So-Called Pale Under the influence of the expulsions, and as the result of the occupation by the enemy of certain portions of the western provinces, a breach was made in the so-called Pale of Settlement. At first Jews were forcibly transferred to eastern provinces, (Voronezh and Penza.) On Aug. 4, 1915, came the well-known order of the Council of Ministers, and, in a circular, the Minister of Interior, Prince Shchebatov, stopped temporarily, until a general revision of the laws on Jews, the application of the restrictive law on residence of Jews in the interior provinces of Russia, not excluding Siberia, except the capitals, Petrograd and Moscow, regions under the authority of the military, the Territory of the Don Armies, the Ter and Kuban Territories in the Caucasus, and cities under the control of the Minister of the Court.

This measure, which at any other time would have meant a considerable reform in the field of the Jewish question, could not, however, make a serious impression when expulsion of Jews from western provinces continued to be the practice. One cannot deny that the Jewish population received this measure, essentially one of beneficence, with distrust, which has not been dispelled at this moment of writing. For the Jews this was simply a measure called forth by the war. It was felt that, if the attitude toward the Jews was not radically altered, this measure might be repealed after the war, if it were not sanctioned by the legislative authorities.

The present phase of the Government's policy with regard to the Jews is, therefore, somewhat different from that which we had before. If a few months ago, as I have pointed out, the Governmental authorities opposed, to a certain degree, the spreading of malicious calumnies against the Jews, and repealed certain measures taken by the military authorities, now, however, there is no such attitude of opposition, and the best evidence of this fact is the well-known circular of Jan. 9, 1916, of the former Minister of the Interior, Hvostov, which gave rise to an interpellation in the Duma.

It is clear to any one acquainted with

the internal life of Russia that a bitter internal struggle is going on, with the war as a general background, between the Government and the various organizations of Russian society. In this struggle, which is a struggle of reaction against liberal tendencies, the Jewish question continues to play the same rôle which it played before the war-the rôle of a lightning rod, all the more necessary because the war has introduced notable complications into the internal life of the country. Now here, now there, attempts are being made to put off on the Jews the responsibility for the high cost of living and for various other manifestations of disorder.

[The circular, addressed to local Governors, suggested that the Jews were responsible for the increase in the cost of living because of speculative operations conducted by them, and urged that local officials keep their eyes open to this possibility. The circular was not made public at the time, and the Minister interpreted this as indicating that it was simply a measure of precaution, and not in any sense a measure of anti-Semitic propaganda.-Translator.]

Aid from Duma Progressives

A very important factor bearing on this Jewish question was the formation in the Imperial Duma of the Progressive members; apart from its general political significance, the Progressives indicated the practical isolation of the Government in the popular representative bodies. The Progressives had a direct relation to the Jewish question, for its program included certain points indicating a desire and tendency to relieve the weight of the restrictive laws on Jews. But unfortunately the expectations inspired by the Progressives expectations, however, which not all had entertained-were not realized, and at the present moment it has become clear that the Jews cannot expect from the Progressives in the near future, in view of the policy being adopted by the Government, any amelioration of their position.

But at the same time one must note that there is no Jewish group, representing this or that political tendency, which would not recognize that the events that are taking place today, so far as they affect the Jews, are simply the fruit of the policy of the last ten years,

and that neither the war itself nor the events connected with it-that is, all that preceded the war-created that strained situation which is now felt. All recognize that now, as formerly, the solution of the Jewish question is closely connected with the solution of the general question of the internal policy in Russia. Reaction will be accompanied by anti-Semitism. All thinking Jewish groups, who are able to understand the political events that are taking place, are absolutely unanimous on this point. They are unanimous in the belief that after the war reaction must give way to a liberal régime, and that therefore the Jewish question, though at the present moment in a most difficult situation, is not, however, without hope.

Concerning the attitude of the Jews toward the war itself, one must note that there is not a single category among Russian Jews which would not bind its lot to the lot of Russia in general and see in a Russian victory the guarantee of well-being for Russia, and, in particular, for the Jews within Russia. This attitude is dictated especially by the realization that the 7,000,000 Jews of Russia are so closely attached to Russia in their moral and material interests that it is quite impossible for them to think of their own welfare except in terms of the welfare of Russia. Thinking Jews have always recognized that Germany is the home of anti-Semitism, and that the most reactionary elements in Russia have been the officials of German origin. Thinking Jews believe that the more decisive the victory the quicker will Russia proceed along the road of progress in her internal life.

Victory in this war will not be a victory of the Government, but a victory of the people, a victory of the social forces, and, in view of the constant opposition of Government to society, the coming victory will mean the victory of these same social forces.

The social

forces of Russia have always been opposed to reaction, and, by this same fact, opposed to the main flag of reactionanti-Semitism.

Recognizing all this, we are now passing through a very complicated state of

mind. Jews are experiencing great bitterness; they are outraged by the injury to their national and human feelings and their feelings of common citizenship. This bitterness increases as the attitude dictated by the spheres of the commanding personnel of the army does injury not only to their material and civil rights, but also to their national rights. The prohibition to publish newspapers in the Jewish popular language has made a crushing impression, equal only to the impression resulting from the wholesale expulsions from the provinces of Kovno and Courland. The Jewish population has been deprived of proper leadership, and it is therefore very difficult for an outside observer to grasp the actual state of mind of the Jews.

To what has been said I must add that Jewish political circles were astounded by the impudence of two Jews who took part, it would seem, in some kind of declaration against Russia, addressed to the President of the United States, drawn up in Stockholm in the name of all non-Russian elements of the empire. I stand very close to all Jewish political spheres, and must testify directly that these persons are unknown to Jewish political leaders in Russia and that they had no authorization from any Jewish groups or circles.

[Maxim Gorky, the distinguished Russian author, discusses the situation of the Jews in Russia from a different viewpoint; his brief article will be found on Page 275 of this issue of CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE. The two articles are especially interesting as evidence of the transition period through which Russia is now passing, as proved by the recent sudden changes in the Cabinet. Νο parallel to this situation is found in modern European history. Apparently the Russian Government has difficulty in finding reactionaries in the bureaucratic circles who are strong enough intellectually to meet the demands due to the war. After having tried nearly all the eligible bureaucrats in the last two years and having found them wanting, as their frequent dismissals show, the Government finally turned to the public. The latest appointment, that of M. Prototopov as Minister of the Interior, is a distinct departure from the old policies of the Czar's Government. While Prototopov is a man of no unusual ability or reputation, he is still neither bureaucrat nor reactionary, and his appointment encourages the liberals-EDITOR CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE.]

T

HE new great surprise of the weeks from Sept. 15 to Oct. 15 was the extension of the theatre of the world war to the extreme western waters of the Atlantic, close to the American coast. This was brought about by the appearance and activity of the German submarine U-53 under command of Captain Lieut. Hans Rose. From a military viewpoint, the opening of a new war theatre in these waters must be considered in connection with the general situation. That Lieutenant Rose did not make this long and dangerous journey merely to leave his card at Newport as a polite gentleman, or to convey the official mail to the German Ambassador, must have been clear to every one at the moment. That the submarine intended merely to destroy a few ships, then to return to her home port, is equally improbable.

The real purpose of this unique trip becomes apparent, however, when one recalls the words of the German Imperial Chancellor in his recent speech in the Reichstag with regard to the effective weapons "" that must be employed against England, the "most selfish, bitterest, and most tenacious enemy." The U-boat which carried the war to this side of the Atlantic belongs to these "effective weapons." It is effective because its employment complies completely with the stipulations of international law as far as it covers the present case, and with the assurances which Berlin gave in reply to the Washington note of April 18 of this year.

It is an effective weapon, from a military standpoint, because it menaces England's communication with the principal source of munitions, supplies, and every other sort of war material. This menace brings a grave shock to England. Britain

had anticipated this danger. It was concern on this point that prompted the recent allied memorandum to neutrál Governments, protesting against the admission of submarines to neutral ports.

In order to understand the inner connection between this submarine achievement and the main situation the words quoted from the German Chancellor's speech must be regarded in connection with certain statements made by The London Times. That newspaper has warned its readers against unjustified jubilation over the successes recorded thus far by the great allied offensive on the western front. It asserts that the tremendous questions at issue cannot be solved upon one war theatre alone. Concerning the general situation it admits that the plan of the Allies to bar Germany's way to the Near East has miscarried. The London organ has designated Rumania as the theatre where a decision must come, and the establishment of the Balkan "through-route" as the principal aim for which Germany took up arms. Thus, the present military situation is, as The London Times itself concedes, favorable for the Central Powers.

the

enemy

England, however, is against which the U-boat weapon must be employed. As long as England is not hit harder than she has been hit thus far, prospects of peace will not improve. Not until England feels in her own body the pangs of this terrible war plague, will the manifold rumors of peace develop into tangible possibilities. Not until then will the most selfish, bitterest, and most tenacious foe be forced into a desire for peace.

The Plight of Rumania

As for the speed, or lack of it, of the general military development in Europe,