lent moral effect, to the profit of Ger

many.

The United States faced a novel and delicate problem: Was the Deutschland really a merchant ship? Was she not rather a disguised warship, and even, from an absolute point of view, could a submarine ever be regarded as anything else than an engine of war?

It is known that the Washington Cabiret decided that the Deutschland was really a merchant ship, since neither weapons nor emplacements for them were found on her. * *

Perhaps the Entente Powers had counted on an attitude less inspired by the desire to keep on good terms with both sides; but they do not seem to have made decisive efforts to press their views, which were intended to establish the point that a submarine cannot be, and is not, anything but a warship. Let us examine this contention.

To begin with, it is evident that the carrying of a cargo is not enough to make any vessel a merchant ship. Nothing would prevent a cruiser from taking on board goods of high value filling a small space. The cruiser would be none the less a war vessel. Yes, but would she cease to be one, and could she enter a neutral port to remain there more than twenty-four hours, if she proved that her guns had been disembarked? Perhaps; but the port authorities would not require very strong evidence to make them believe that her guns had simply been put away, on board another ship lying out at sea, all ready, on signal, to rejoin the pseudo-merchant vessel and restore them as soon as she had left territorial waters.

Now, if this operation is not at all impossible, applied to guns of moderate calibre, it would evidently be even easier to restore automobile torpedoes to a submarine. Our American friends would surely grant this, if the question were put to them. They believe they have settled the difficulty by proving that the Deutschland had no torpedo tubes. Unfortunately, this guarantee is a delusion, for the good reason that the German submarine might be armed with torpedoes inclosed in simple skeleton tubes

which could easily be fixed to the deck by means prepared in advance.

To these automobile torpedoes it would be quite a simple matter to add automatic mines. These could be placed on the deck, out of the axis of the torpedo tubes. Or they might be taken aboard like simple packing cases and lowered into the hold through scuttles. They could easily be thrown overboard at favorable points, since they would probably be floating mines.

There remains the question of guns. I admit that it would not be easy to install these aboard a submarine on the open sea, and that, in any case, the necessary preparations could not have escaped the scrutiny of competent examiners. But the fact seems to be that the Deutschland already mounts, and quite openly, two light guns, of 57 millimeters (24 inches) according to some, of 76 millimeters (3 inches) according to others. But the Captain affirms that they are only "for defense" against armed merchant ships, and-why not?-against English or French submarines, such guns as are allowed by the new jurisprudence of the United States to the most consistently pacific steamship or sailing ship of commerce. One could not, without crying injustice, refuse to the innocent submarine the privilege granted to the ships of the Allies. Agreed. But, unfortunately, nothing so resembles a gun "for attack" as a gun for defense"!

66

Perish the thought! cried the pro-Germans; the Deutschland carries only blank cartridges. She wishes only to fire signals of alarm, in case of imminent peril! So be it, but even supposing that there are no shells hidden in a double bottom, a convoy ship supplying torpedo tubes would not have the slightest difficulty in supplying the necessary munitions for guns.

Now, let us note this well, for it touches the root of the matter: Once they are placed aboard a submarineessentially an engine of surprise, which can emerge within a few yards of a liner taken at short range—these light guns are much more dangerous and have a much greater offensive power than if they were mounted on a surface ship.

The latter can be seen approaching at a great distance, and precautions can be taken at leisure against an eventual attack. And nothing shows better how great an error is committed, no doubt in good faith, by those who consent to accept the Deutschland as an ordinary merchant ship.

But I go further and affirm that the submarine, even if she had been absolutely devoid of weapons, might still have the offensive character which is the essential mark of the military instrument. For this it would be sufficient to have supplied her with a reinforced bow, backed by a shock compartment well supplied with bulkheads. This submersible, which suddenly emerges, as I said a moment ago, at a few yards distance from a

liner-what prevents her ramming the thin-skinned hull and ripping it up below the water line? Oh, this would be quite accidental, of course, and due to poor steering, or to the whim of an engine that would not back in time. But meanwhile the hapless liner would go to the bottom, with the Allies' munitions or other useful cargo, which had come under the notice of the submarine's commander while in American ports.

I insist again, and I beg that it shall not be forgotten, in all discussions as to applying to a submarine the rules of international maritime law: By its very character a submersible is always "in itself" an engine of offense, which can be instantly used as a warship. Therefore it should be so considered.

FOLLO

OLLOWING is the text of a joint memorandum sent to neutral nations last August by the Entente Powers, apropos of the Deutschland episode, urging the exclusion of all submarine vessels of belligerent nations from neutral waters:

In view of the development of submarine navigation and by reason of acts which in the present circumstances may be unfortunately expected from enemy submarines, the allied Governments consider it necessary, in order not only to safeguard their belligerent rights and liberty of commercial navigation, but to avoid risks of dispute, to urge neutral Governments to take effective measures, if they have not already done so, with a view to preventing belligerent submarine vessels, whatever the purpose to which they are put, from making use of neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports.

In the case of submarine vessels, the application of the principles of the law of nations is affected by special and novel conditions: First, by the fact that these vessels can navigate and remain at sea submerged, and can thus escape all control and observation; second, by the fact that it is impossible to identify them and establish their national character, whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or noncombatant, and to remove the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such vessels.

It may further be said that any place which

provides a submarine warship far from its base with an opportunity for rest and replenishment of its supplies thereby furnishes such addition to its powers that the place becomes in fact, through the advantages which it gives, a base of naval operations.

In view of the state of affairs thus existing, the allied Governments are of the opinion that submarine vessels should be excluded from the benefit of the rules hitherto recognized by the law of nations regarding the admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral waters, roadsteads, or ports, and their sojourn in them. Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be detained there.

The allied Governments take this opportunity to point out to the neutral powers the grave danger incurred by neutral submarines in the navigation of regions frequented by belligerent submarines.

Reply of the United States

The full text of Secretary Lansing's reply to the foregoing is given below. It is a refusal, with reasons therefor:

Washington, Aug. 31, 1916. The Government of the United States has received the identic memoranda of the Governments of France, Great Britain, Russia. and Japan in which neutral Governments are exhorted to take efficacious measures tending to prevent belligerent submarines, regardless of their use, to avail themselves of neutral waters, roadsteads, and harbors."

These Governments point out the facility possessed by such craft to avoid supervision or surveillance or determination of their national character and their power "to do injury that is inherent in their very nature as well as the "additional facilities afforded by having at their disposal places where they can rest and replenish their supplies. Apparently on these grounds the allied Governments hold that "submarine vessels must be excluded from the benefit of the rules heretofore accepted under international law regarding the admission and sojourn of war and merchant vessels in neutral waters, roadsteads, or harbors; any submarine of a belligerent that once enters a neutral harbor must be held there," and therefore the allied Governments "warn neutral powers of the great danger to neutral submarines attending the navigation of waters visited by the submarines of belligerents."

In reply the Government of the United States must express its surprise that there appears to be an endeavor of the allied powers to determine the rule of action governing what they regard as a "novel situation" in respect to the use of submarines in time of war, and to enforce a compliance of that rule, at least in part, by warning neutral powers of the great danger to their submarines in waters that may be visited by belligerent submarines. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the allied powers have not set forth any circumstance, nor is the Government of the United

States at present aware of any circumstances, concerning the use of war or merchant submarines which would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable to them. In view of this fact and of the notice and warning of the allied powers announced in their memoranda under acknowledgment, it is incumbent upon the Government of the United States to notify the Governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan that, so far as the treatment of either war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned, the Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action in all respects, and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a power which may be said to have taken the first steps toward establishing the principles of neutrality and which for over a century has maintained those principles in the traditional spirit and with the high sense of impartiality in which they were conceived.

In order, however, that there should be no misunderstanding as to the attitude of the United States, the Government of the United States announces to the allied powers that it holds it to be the duty of belligerent powers to distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality, and that responsibility for any conflict that may arise between belligerent warships and neutral submarines on account of the neglect of a belligerent to SO distinguish between these classes of submarines must rest entirely upon the negligent power. LANSING.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

S

British Embassy, Washington,
Oct. 12, 1916.

IR: In comformity with instructions re-
ceived from Viscount Grey of Fallodon,

his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of the memorandum, agreed upon by his Majesty's Government and the French Government, embodying the joint reply of the Allies to your note of May 24 regarding the examination of the mails.

1. By a letter of May 24 last the Secretary of State of the United States was pleased to give the views of the American Govern

ment on the memorandum of the allied Governments concerning mails found on merchant ships on the high seas.

2. The allied Governments have found that their views agreed with those of the Government of the United States in regard to the postal union convention, which is recognized on both sides to be foreign to the questions now under consideration; post parcels, respectively, recognized as being under the common rule of merchandise subject to the exercise of belligerent rights, as provided by international law; the inspection of private mails to the end of ascertaining whether they do not contain contraband goods, and, if carried on an enemy ship, whether they do not contain enemy property. It is clear