the Austrian as commanding adviser. As Serbia chose to be Russia's tool instead of Austria's, Russia proclaimed this guardian of her own imperialistic interests the guardian of Slavdom's interests in the Balkans. Of necessity Russia's Balkan policy now demanded the subordination of Bulgarian to Serbian interests. The bridge of advance could be neglected, but the wall of defense was carefully kept in repair and fortified. And then came the Balkan Alliance-a distinct trump card in Russia's hand, for through it Russia expected to acquire diplomatic mastery at Sofia and Athens as well as at Belgrade. Bulgaria's obstinate independence alone blocked the success of this Russian plan. Her whirlwind campaign against the Turk riveted the world's attention on herself. The Balkan Alliance, which Russia had construed as an anti-Austrian coalition and which she regarded as an addition to her own forces, was transformed by Bulgaria's victories into a distinctly Balkan union, friendly perhaps, but certainly not subservient, to Russia. When Bulgaria When Bulgaria single-handed inflicted on the Turkish armies at Lule Burgas a defeat more crushing than any the Turk had suffered in all his wars with Russia, the Czar's Government realized that Bulgaria, which had been independent in her weakness, was not likely to become servile when grown strong. It need not be stated baldly that Russia thereupon ruined the Balkan Alliance. Certainly the great Russian people viewed with genuine sorrow the SerboBulgarian friction. But just as certainly imperial Russia watched Serbia's initial treachery grow and take shape as envy of Bulgaria's victories nourished it, and she tolerated this treachery. Russia watched Serbia repudiate her treaty of alliance with Bulgaria, a treaty which the Russian Czar himself had sanctioned, watched her seize the Bulgar land of Macedonia and terrorize its Bulgar natives, make a new alliance with Greece and Rumania to destroy her Slavic ally, cause the tragic war of 1913, and rob Bulgaria at the Treaty of Bucharest. Were the interests of Slavdom paramount in the eyes of Russian diplomacy, it should have moved heaven and earth to avert such a Slavonic catastrophe. But in 1913 Russia forgot the Slavic cause, and Slavic Bulgaria was once more dismembered, this time with Russia's consent, if not with Russia's connivance. It was over Russian pontoons that Rumania crossed the Danube to invade Bulgaria in 1913. Time speedily brought its retribution. Within less than a year Russia and Serbia themselves were fighting a battle of life and death. And then Russia called on Bulgaria, in the sacred name of Slavdom, to fight her enemies, to save her ward Serbia from destruction. But how could Bulgaria be appealed to in the name of Pan Slavism, when this is not a Pan Slavistic war? Russia's own allies oppose the Pan Slavistic idea no less than do her enemies, while millions of Slavs are actually fighting—and fighting willingly-on the Teutonic side. Bulgaria experienced the deepest sorrow at such a Slavic tragedy, but surely neither her Slavic ideals nor her own political interests threw her on Russia's side. And what ideals or interest could draw her to the help of Serbia? Serbia claimed she was fighting to liberate her kinsmen from the Austrian yoke, yet she herself exercised in Bulgar Macedonia a reign of terror and tyranny such as no Austrian, no Turk, or Russian ever exercised anywhere, as any one may convince himself by reading the "Report of the International Carnegie Commission." For over a year, while Rumania, brought by the logic of events to recognize the folly of her immediate past, was making overtures to Bulgaria for the return of Dobrudja, while even Turkey came to terms with Bulgaria, Serbia, gasping in the throes of death, fought with one hand to "liberate" the Austrian Serbs, while with the other she tortured the Macedonian Bulgars. From Bulgaria's point of view any talk of moral ideals in this war is futile claptrap. It is part of the campaign of both sides to call themselves champions of liberty and saviors of civilization. Actually this war is a gigantic clash of the most sordid interests imaginable. In such a conflict of interests, then, Bulgaria also had to seek her own national interests, nor sacrifice them on the altar of passion and impulse. To Britain and France, who spoke of the principle of nationality, Bulgaria recalled the Treaty of Bucharest, the blackest violation of that principle. Russia's pleas for Slavdom Bulgaria answered by offering to forget Russia's crucifixion of Slavdom in 1913, if Russia showed herself ready to vindicate her sincerity in 1915. To maintain her despotism in Macedonia, Serbia was using some 60,000 troops. Bulgaria told the Entente: If you are really fighting for justice and the rights of small nationalities, compel Serbia to restore Macedonia to us. This step would begin the correction of the worst political crime in Europe, the Treaty of Bucharest. It would release 60,000 Serbian troops to be employed where they belong, toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. If you undo now the work of the Treaty of Bucharest, Bulgaria will join your side. But the Entente either would not or could not compel Serbía to relinquish the Bulgar-inhabited regions of Macedonia. Instead, Serbia kept importuning the Entente to allow her to invade unmobolized Bulgaria. Bulgaria was thus brought to realize clearly that she could expect from the Entente nothing at all commensurate with the sacrifices demanded of her, since the composition of the Entente's powers necessarily called for the support of Serbia's ambitions. The Entente offered Bulgaria, in exchange for her army, a portion of Serb Macedonia-that is, in case Serbia should obtain Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and a few other Austro-Hungarian provinces. To match this Entente proposal Germany offered Bulgaria all of Serb-ruled Macedonia in exchange for Bulgaria's benevolent neutrality; and in case she joined actively the Teutonic cause the Bulgar-inhabited districts in the Timok and Morava valleys, which the Berlin Congress had awarded to the Serb. To join the Entente under such conditions would have been suicidal folly for Bulgaria. And then, in the Fall of 1915, the Austro-German drive through Serbia began. That drive was bound to reach Macedonia, which both European coalitions recognized as Bulgarian by right. For Bulgaria to oppose this German drive meant to defend Serbia, the State which had robbed her, without any hope of adequate restitution. To contemplate idly the Teutonic advance would have been a criminal neglect of her own most cherished interests. Yet the Entente sent an ultimatum demanding that she break relations with the Central Powers. Instead she entered the field against Serbia, and thus found herself opposing the Entente. Has Bulgaria been astute in her choice? Time alone will tell. Needless to say, her belief in Germany's ultimate victory was an important factor in determining her decision. Two brief months in 1915 sufficed for Bulgaria to complete her military task in Serbia. The Anglo-French expedition sent to Saloniki is still where it was the first week of fighting, and late reports made it likely that, after having taken time to sow, reap, and gather her crops, Bulgaria will still be able to anticipate General Sarrail's forces and to change the longprophesied allied offensive into a defensive. With military prophecies, however, the present writer is not concerned. It is idle to speculate whether Bulgaria will win in the end. Far more important is it to reach a judgment as to whether she deserves to win. Was Bulgaria's decision morally worthy? It was and is motivated by her determination to free once for all her oppressed kinsmen. But in so doing Bulgaria helps Germany's cause? True enough, but if Germany's cause is no better than that of her foes it is hard to see how it is any worse. Between the two hostile coalitions one may make a military choice, as Bulgaria has already done; but a moral choice cannot be made. It seems scarcely necessary to recount here Germany's iniquities, as they have been made abundantly familiar to us all. But perhaps those who still believe that the Entente is fighting for the principle of nationality should remember that in October, 1915, Réné Viviani pronounced in the French Chamber the Entente's guarantee of the infamous Treaty of Bucharest. And when the case of Belgium is cited it must not be forgotten that for the past twelvemonth the Entente has been making of Greece a second Belgium. That Greece has not made armed opposition nor risked inviting Belgium's fate may be a reflection on Greece's self-respect, but it certainly does not alter the case as far as the Entente is concerned. THE In a word, Bulgaria sees in this war the conflict for world-supremacy of two selfish coalitions, and, if she finds herself on the side of the Central Powers, it is not because she hates England and France and Russia, and loves Germany and Austria, but because in this particular situation Germany appears to be both readier and abler to permit small Bulgaria to realize, not her place in the sun-Bulgaria has no such celestial ambitions but her humble station on our long-suffering Mother Earth. Bulgaria's Claim on Macedonia HE Bulgarian Prime Minister frankly and openly declared to an American correspondent last Fall, before Bulgaria went into the war, the wishes and aims of Bulgaria. He said that Bulgaria wanted Macedonia, and that whoever gave it to her would have her on his side. The Allies, from fear of offending Serbia, refused to hand over Macedonia to Bulgaria and order Serbia out of it. They only promised to satisfy the Bulgarian demands after the war, due regard being paid to the compensations in territory that Serbia might get from Austria. The Serbians also pretended to make concessions to Bulgaria, but after the war, and on conditions inacceptable to the Bulgarians. After the sad experience Bulgaria has had with Serbian treaties and promises she is not to blame if she refused to accept any such "wild goose chase." They knew well enough that after the war the Serbians would have played the same trick that they played in the Balkan war, namely, refuse to evacuate Macedonia. It is not to be supposed that any one of the Allies, after an exhausting war of two, three, or four years, would have been willing to drive them out of Macedonia, but would have proposed a compromise between the two countries. A compromise would have been unfavorable to Bulgaria, for the Serbians being in possession of the country would have had in their hands the bigger end of the stick. Hence Bulgaria would either have had to submit to what Serbia was willing to cede to it or to fight again for her rights. In the latter case all Europe would have been against her, for every one would have considered her as a disturber of the peace. Another consideration which influenced the conduct of Bulgaria was, no doubt, the fact that when Germany and Austria decided to invade Serbia and open a way for themselves to Constantinople Bulgaria would have had to oppose them or to allow them a free passage through her territory. In the former case she would have suffered the fate of Belgium, in the latter case she would have incurred the displeasure and enmity of the Allies. The Allies would have been in no position to succor her against an Austro-German drive. The whole question of how Bulgaria should regulate her conduct between the two warring parties depended upon a satisfactory solution of the Macedonian question. The Bulgarians regard Macedonia as theirs by all the rights which a nation can advance for the possession of a country. These claims are based upon the following considerations: 1. The Christian population of Macedonia up to the Shar Mountains is overwhelmingly Bulgarian. This has been testified to by all impartial travelers (English, French, Russian, German, &c.) who have visited the country. 2. The people of Macedonia have always called themselves Bulgarians and their sympathies have always been with Bulgaria. There are thousands of them here in the United States and they all openly declare that they are Bulgarians and not Serbians. We have in Bulgaria over 100,000 Macedonians who, during the Turkish régime, fled for refuge into Bulgaria. We have Macedonians as politicians, teachers, merchants, Government functionaries, &c. Over 300 officers in the army are from Macedonia, and some of them rank as Generals and Colonels. In Serbia you will not find even 100 Bulgarians who have taken refuge there, for Serbia for them has always been an alien country. 3. The San Stefano treaty of 1878, concluded between Russia and Turkey after their war, has drawn officially the boundaries of the Bulgarian element in the Balkan Peninsula. That treaty was drawn up by Russia and not by Bulgaria, and it includes almost the whole of Macedonia. The Bulgarians swear by that treaty and demand that the wishes of the late Czar Liberator of Russia should be executed. 4. Serbia never claimed Macedonia before 1892, and it was only in order to compensate herself for the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina that she began FOR her intrigues and propaganda in Macedonia. The Berlin treaty of 1878, which supplanted that of San Stefano, provided for Macedonia, as it did for Armenia, some sort of an autonomous government. This provision of the treaty has not been put in practice because, besides the Turks, the Serbians and the Greeks were opposed to autonomy in Macedonia. Why? Because they know perfectly well that under an autonomous administration, under the guarantee of the European powers, where people would be free to express by their votes their opinions, the Bulgarian element will decidedly come to the front, and that everybody will see that Macedonia is a solid Bulgarian country. The writer of a recent editorial says that Bulgaria "went to war for no reason except the brazenly announced desire for plunder." Is the desire of France to regain Alsace-Lorraine, of Italy to get the Trentino, or of Serbia to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, a "desire for plunder"? Just as much right as these countries have to their respective claims, so much has Bulgaria to Macedonia. In claiming Macedonia, Bulgaria takes her stand upon the principles for which, we are told, the Allies are fighting, namely, the liberty of the small nationalities to dispose of their destiny as they think best, and the right of peoples to say under what Government they choose to live. Bulgaria's Lost Claim: An Answer OR a correct understanding of the merits of the Serb-Bulgar controversy on the subject of Macedonia and the points raised by "A Bulgarian Diplomat," a brief review of the history of the Balkan Peninsula until the accession of the Turk rule and a glimpse into the principal events that preceded and followed the emancipation of Bulgaria and the Turkish-Balkan war of 1912-13 are necessary. In the first part of the seventh century the dwellers of the Balkan Peninsula consisted of the Greeks, Illyrians, whom we now designate as Albanians, and the Rumanians, who are largely settlers drawn from various parts of the Roman Empire upon the conquest by Trajan of Dacia in 105. These historical facts serve to show that the Turks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins are ethnologically alien to the Balkan Peninsula. In about 638 a group of Serbs and Croats, whose original home was along the Carpathian Mountains, were invited by the Emperor to Constantinople, where he arranged to employ them against the Avars. Eventually they settled in the Macedonian district and established a powerful kingdom, (with occasional lapses,) which was utterly destroyed by the Turks in 1389. In about 660 a nomadic people, originally from the steppes of Asia, in the vicinity of the River Volga, reached the Balkan Peninsula, and settled in Maesia. These Nomads were of the same Ughur or Finnish stock from which the present Turks, the Finns, and the Hungarians sprung. They were Bulgarians. Here they established a tremendous empire and extorted tribute from the Greeks and Serbs; but they also lost their independence to the Turks in 1389. With the decline of the Bulgar power in the first part of the eleventh century, the Macedonian district passed successively under the rules of Bonifae, Marquis of Monserrat, Byzantium, and Serbia; and the Turks conquered it from the Serbs in 1389 and held sway over it until 1913. The widespread state of anarchy and massacre that ravaged Bulgaria in 1876-7 was the immediate and driving cause of the war of Russia against Turkey. Czar Alexander, in his famous manifesto, issued on April 23, 1877, declaring war against Turkey, said: "Our desire to ameliorate the lot of the Christian population of Turkey has been shared by the whole nation, which now shows itself ready to bear fresh sacrifices to alleviate the position of the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula." In this war for the liberation of Bulgaria little Serbia fought on the side of Russia. The treaty of Berlin confirmed the provisions of the treaty of San Stefano dealing with Bulgaria, except that it made Bulgaria a tributary principality to the Sultan instead of an independent State, and it also severed Eastern Rumelia from the Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty and placed it under the political and military rule of the Sultan; it, however, was united to Bulgaria in 1885. The Turkish misrule in Macedonia, particularly during 1903-8, was retaliated by bomb and dynamite outrages in which the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb bands participated, both against the constituted authorities and against one another. It is a matter of history that the Revel program of 1908, agreed upon between the King of England and the Emperor of Austria, was to sever the Macedonian provinces from the domination of Constantinople and make them into an autonomous State. It was at this psychological moment that the Young Turk Party, to thwart the proposed disruption of Macedonia from the Sultan's rule, demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1876, which Abdul Hamid granted. The Young Turk rule, a most doubtful experiment, brought no relief to a long-suffering people, and its hopeless incompetency was emphasized by the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the overthrow by Bulgaria of the Turk suzerainty, the reaction of 1909, and the Turco-Italian war. These evidences of the collapse of the Young Turk rule, succeeding each other in quick order, furnished Pashitch of Serbia and Venizelos of Greece an excuse to form the Balkan League, whose prime purpose was to liberate the co-religionists and co-nationalists of the contracting parties from the Turk's yoke. The treaty of the league stipulated for concerted action against a common enemy, but it did not map out the respective territorial shares of the members of the league in the event of the success of the proposed campaign. The treaty also contained the all-important provision that, in the event of any disagreements arising among the members of the league with reference to any subject or point under said treaty, such disputed subject, or point, including division of conquered territory, if any, should be referred to the Czar of Russia, and his finding should be binding upon the appellants. On Oct. 12, 1912, the Balkan League began a successful war against Turkey. Under the treaty of London of May 30, 1913, Bulgaria acquired all Thrace to the Enos-Media line, together with parts of Macedonia to the west of Bulgaria. Ferdinand of Bulgaria disapproved the arrangement made by Dr. Daneff (his |