any serious influence upon the further development of the Russian offensive on that front. Thus far there has not been the slightest sign of any effect of the Russian Riga offensive upon the situation on the Sereth front. The Rumanian campaign goes on entirely independent of any offensives the Russians may undertake on any other part of the front.

The Russian" feeler " put out against the German lines in the east, with the view to finding a weak spot, was unsuccessful. In spite of the use of powerful effectives in Rumania, the German east front is still strong enough to beat off attacks at any point.

War Conference at Rome

The Entente Powers recently held a war council in Rome. The importance of the conference is illustrated by the very fact that the British Premier, Lloyd George, personally went to the Tiber city; heretofore the Italian ally had hardly been honored by such attention. As for the plans and decisions of the council, the details are naturally kept secret. It is reported that three main problems were discussed and solved: Greece, the military operations in Macedonia, and a more comprehensive and united conduct of war.

Indications are that the Macedonian front is to be included in the unity of the Entente war conduct. From the latest joint ultimatum to Greece such intention may well be deduced. This

ultimatum aims at the elimination of the Greek army as a possible factor in threatening the allied Saloniki expedition. The Greek army is to be withdrawn from Macedonia and Thessalonica and concentrated in the Peloponnesus, which means that it is to be placed under Entente control.

Should the Allies have really decided upon a concerted campaign in Macedonia, "military expediency" may be named as a basis for the Entente ultimatium. Manifestly the Rome conference discussed the probability of the Teutons' turning their attention to the Macedonian front after the completion of the Rumanian campaign. Such a probability suggests to the Allies to safeguard the rear of their Saloniki expedition.

On the west front there has been comparative calm of late. There was a flareup of fighting activity, such as the British advance against the German positions at Seres, north of the Ancre. But that was all.

However, from the inflexible confidence which the Entente professes to have in the future, and from their expressed will to carry the war to a successful conclusion, it may be safely asserted that the final decision of the war will fall in the west. For this final decision both sides are now feverishly preparing. All signs point to the bloodiest and last struggle of this terrible conflict on that front in the coming Spring.

D

URING the month just passed there

have been but three military movements of importance - a French thrust at Verdun, which was entirely successful; the continuance of the German campaign against Rumania, and a sudden blow by the Russians against the

German lines in the Riga sector, the fate of which still hangs in the balance. I have stated these in their chronological order, and probably in the order of their importance.

The French thrust against the German lines before Verdun was a true triumph

when the territory occupied is that of one of the lesser belligerents. Napoleon was before Moscow, and if men had judged from the map there would have been no question as to who was the victor. But a year or two later came the surrender of Paris and the exile of Napoleon to Elba. In the present war we have seen the Germans all but eliminate the Russian Army and occupy Poland as far east as the Pinsk marshes. But the territory gained has not, as far as events have yet determined, given Germany any particular advantage.

of French artillery over that of the Germans, and may well be an augury of future fighting on the western front. It is this fact that gives it its importance. If the war is ever fought to a military decision, it is almost axiomatic that the decision must come on the western front. Von Hindenburg, the apostle of a German war in the east, may find in the east excellent opportunities for dramatic, spectacular efforts. Such efforts, by very reason of their spectacular character, will undoubtedly make their appeal both to neutrals and to the German people. But it is not to be gainsaid that this appeal is deceptive.

To judge of the outcome of the great war from the amount of territory conquered is to deceive one's self. The very basis of judgment is wrong, and the judgment itself must be at fault as a consequence. Particularly is this true

Germany is the mainspring of the forces of the Central Powers, and to defeat them the Allies must defeat Germany. On this point there will not be the slightest dispute. The German Army is in the west. A total of 120 divisions have been positively identified on the western front, and it is certain that these

constitute the bulk of the German Army in the field. And as the German Army is in the west, and the German Army must be defeated before the Allies can be victorious, it must also be recognized that the decision, if decision there be, will be found on the western front. Once the western situation is solved, the eastern situation will solve itself. In fact, there will be no eastern question to solve, as there will be an immediate and total collapse the very minute the army in the west is decisively defeated. It is therefore necessary to scan every movement in the west with an attention not necessary of the events of the east if we would frame an opinion of the importance of the various moves.

French Success of Dec. 15-16

To return to the French attack in the Verdun sector: The object was the ridge of Louvemont. This ridge forms the main defensive line on the east bank of the river. There are individual points south of this ridge which are capable of sustained defense, as the French proved after the Louvemont position fell into German hands; but the only continuous line of defense on the east side of the Meuse is the Louvemont ridge. The French began their attack on Hill 304 on the west bank, but their artillery in the meantime was pounding the German lines across the stream. For three days the artillery kept up its preparation. Then the attack was suddenly shifted to the east bank and the infantry sent forward. Pepper Hill, the most eastern point of the Louvemont ridge, fell into their hands immediately. This success exposed the German gun positions about the village of Louvemont and at the same time brought the German trenches near the town under an enfilade fire from the French infantry. The village was therefore given up and the French infantry swept on. From there they struck due east, and in thirty-six hours took the Farm of Chambrettes and the village of Bezonvaux. Here they rested. Many guns were taken, many others destroyed, and nearly 10,000 unwounded prisoners were left in French hands.

There is ample food for reflection in this attack, as many factors entering

into it are positively known. In the first place there was no material disparity in numbers between the attacking force and that of the defenders. Such as there was, was in German favor. The French used four divisions in the attack, the Germans five in the defense. All elements of terrain were strongly in favor of the defense. And yet so accurate was the fire of the French artillery, and so devastating, that the French infantry were able to seize in less than two days' fighting all that the Germans had taken between Feb. 26 and April 9. We can with small effort recall the ferocity of the fighting that occurred in this sector of the battle of Verdun between those dates, and we know in a general way how very great the German losses were. And yet, with a loss in killed and wounded not equaling the number of prisoners captured, the French have taken away every foot of valuable territory the Germans occupied during those terrible days of last Spring.

The attack was delivered over a front of only six miles, held by nearly 100,000 men, or over 16,000 to the mile. It is perfectly evident then that the German line had not been weakened in order to use the men in other fields. The Germans were outfought man to man and gun to gun. That is the whole thing in a nutshell.

I would call attention particularly to the number of prisoners captured. This number is 10 per cent. of the total force engaged, and the surrender must then have been made rather readily. It has been frequently asserted that the quality of the German soldiers has rapidly deteriorated, that although they fight well under attack, when on defense they are unable to stand the pounding of the allied artillery and infantry as did the soldiers of a year ago. This view seems to be confirmed by recent events at Verdun. Nothing but a serious fall in morale can explain the readiness to surrender which marked this fighting.

As to the military result obtained, it may be summed up in few words. This success restores to the French all the important positions on the east bank of the river, precluding any future attempt by

the Germans to storm the Verdun positions. Immune from attack, the line here may now be the scene of a French offense in the Spring.

The Situation in Rumania

The close of last month's review saw the Germans and the Russians fighting on the north bank of the Buzeu River. The Germans had just forced the crossing and driven the Rumanians back from their defensive positions on the northern bank. The Germans kept up this pressure relentlessly, extending their movement into Dobrudja so that their line extended from the Transylvanian frontier to the Black Sea. During the month the entire line has moved forward. Dobrudja has been cleared as the first step. A stiff resistance was made, first at Tulcea and later at Macin; but both points eventually fell, and all of Dobrudja passed into German hands. On the western side of the Danube the Russians fell back slowly.

Once the line of the Buzeu was made untenable, the next defensive position that appeared was the line of the Sereth, from its mouth northward as far as the Trotus, and from there to the Transylvanian border. But the Germans were not to reach the Sereth without heavy fighting and great resistance.

The first line the Russians elected to defend was that of the Rimnicu River. This is a small stream, generally paralleling the course of the Buzeu. It possesses no strength from a defensive standpoint. At the same time, it took the Germans a longer time to force this position than it had the Buzeu. After a week's heavy fighting, however, the river was crossed, and the town of Rimnicu Sarat was taken. The Russians retired further northward toward the eventual position. In their retirement they pivoted on the Danube, where their left flank rested at a point some distance south of Braila.

The complete conquest of Dobrudja, however, exposed the Russian left to a fire from three directions. From the eastern side of the Danube it was under fire from the flank and rear. From the west bank it was facing the German trenches. It became necessary then to

draw back the left, as had been done with the centre and right. Accordingly Braila was abandoned and the retirement toward the north bank of the Sereth began. In the meantime the German centre was pushing northward, and finally took the important village of Foscani. But here the advance was checked. Along the Putna River fierce fighting developed. The Russians were attempting to prevent the forward movement of the German left, which was striving to throw the Russians first across this stream, after which there was in view the Oituz, and finally the Trotus River. But the Putna has proved a serious intermediate stumbling block. The Germans have crossed it twice, but each time have been thrown back to the

southern bank. As far as can be judged from present reports the Russians still hold the northern bank safely.

Crucial Line on the Seeth

Returning to the situation at the mouth of the Sereth: On this part of the line the Russians have reached the position which it is absolutely necessary to defend. Vadeni, near the bend in the Danube, has fallen, and the Germans are before Galatz, but on the south side of the Sereth. The difficulties which the Germans have experienced on the smaller streams indicate that either the German attack is losing its force or the Russians have been considerably strengthened. The latter is by far the more probable. The speed of the Rumanian collapse undoubtedly took Russia unawares, just as it did the rest of the world. There was not sufficient time to throw into Rumania a large enough army, with its artillery equipment, to make a material impression on the German attack. But when it was seen that the retirement was to be on a large scale, another position was selected nearer the Russian bases, where the distances to be covered were considerably less. There has been full time to prepare this position for defense and to equip it with artillery supplies. Just what this line may be is not certain, but the probability is that it is the line of the Sereth and the Trotus. Here, then, if at all, we may expect to see the German drive come to an abrupt halt.