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Promises to Poland?
A absorbed by the question of
By Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy
Eminent Russian Publicist [Translated from the Russkoye Slovo of Moscow for CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE] T the beginning of the war
mean the inevitable enslavement of the attention
European nations and her victory their
political renaissance. the war's significance and its Is it necessary to speak of those bitter idealistic aims, and gave little disenchantments which soon followed ? thought to the resources required for its They did not result from our military prosecution. We put too much faith in defeats, they occurred much earlier, imsome one whose duty it should have been mediately after our first victories. It is to take care of that. Later, when that unnecessary to enlarge upon their causes, come one proved himself unfit for the for these are universally known. They position he occupied, when the resources became possible, first of all, through the provided by him proved inadequate, the construction put on the aims of the war attention of the entire public was directed
by others than ourselves, by men who toward the creation of those resources,
failed to rise to the heights of the situaand we may now look back on the tion. Hence the attempts to reduce to stretch of road behind us with a feeling
nil the manifesto of the Grand Duke. of profound satisfaction. The victories Should these efforts be repeated and of Brusiloff's armies are indubitably prove successful, the moral meaning of also the victories of the Russian people. the great war would thereby be lost, and Without that great upheaval of social
that loss would create for Russia new forces which occurred in our midst these dangers. victories would have been impossible.
Our victories bring us again to face. Thanks to our successes the question a series of important national problems. of the war's aims, which seemed to have I will not speak of how they were solved retreated into the background at the before; but I think it necessary to point time of our defeats, is again forging to out a solution which appears to be the the front. The danger of the collapse of only just and expedient solution. our campaign or the loss of Russian ter Our advances in Galicia make imperaritory, to all appearances, no longer tive some kind of an immediate disposal exists. But there is a worse danger of the Ruthenian problem. On our attifacing us—that of losing the spiritual tude toward that problem depends the motive of the present war. Nor is it the durability of our conquests in Galicia. lesser danger because it lurks within In the interests of Russia's greatness it and does not appear upon the surface is necessary that we acquire in the perof events.
sons of the Galicians friends and not enDo we recall the feelings with which emies, so that their union with Russia we approached Lemberg for the first may become a blessing, not only for Rus. time? That was a bright, spiritual sia but for Galicia as well. What must exultation due to a great patriotic and we do to achieve such results? liberative war. We fought not only for Obviously, we must guarantee the the safety of Russia, but for the salva population of the conquered territory tion of other nationalities as well. Russia full inviolability of their centuries-old seemed to us surrounded by the brilliant order and mode of life and religion, all halo of a liberator. We went forth with this independently of whether we regard the conviction that her defeat would the Galicians as Russians or as foreign
If they are Russians, then we must regard their national characteristics with still deeper respect. In that case their native tongue should be considered Russian, their culture Russian, and these should be carefully preserved as valuable variations of our own.
Our militant nationalists judge exactly to the contrary. From their point of view the Ruthenians, if they are Russians, must not study in their native tongue nor profess the faith of their fathers. The same Russian nationalists who, to some degree, recognize the rights of the Poles to an independent national culture, deny such rights to the Ruthenians on the ground that they are Russians. There is a crying paradox in such an attitude toward the Ruthenians. It is indeed absurd, after recognizing them as part of our own nationality, to proceed, on that ground, to figd in their dialect and customs the expression of a foreign and hostile national spirit.
It is not difficult to imagine what fruit this paradox may bear in practical politics. If the Russian conquest is to result in the cessation of study in the Ruthenian schools, if it is to become a menace to their very existence, we shall acquire an enemy in every Ruthenian pupil, and in his parents. Even our sympathizers in Galicia will receive the impression that Russian rule means for them not a union with Russia but a heavy foreign yoke. No anti-Russian propaganda can cause us greater harm than a policy in regard to education and religion that would inspire in Galicians the thought that for the guarantee of their religion they must look to Austria, not Russia. If a policy of Russianization is odious as applied to foreigners, then as applied to “ Russians " it is also absurd.
The Galicians must be convinced that Russia's aim in Galicia is not to destroy but to protect their national institutions. The official Russian language should be introduced in their schools as modern subject only. The dominant language should remain Ruthenian. If we make it our goal to bring about a complete union between Russians and Galicians, we must imbue them with the
conviction from the very beginning that to become Russian does not mean giving up their religious rites and national customs, but preserving them.
Along with the Galician-Ruthenian question there also appears again the Polish question. * We already know from the newspapers that the Government intends to confirm the promises made to the Poles in the manifesto of the Commander in Chief and in the renowned declaration of Premier Goremykin. Both Russians and Poles are impatiently awaiting the appearance of the new announcement by the Government. But it is not sufficient to make new promises, they must be made in such a manner as to inspire confidence. And for this purpose it is necessary, first of all, that there be no difference between words and acts.
Both Russians and Poles understand but too well that the Commander in Chief's manifesto was at root contradictory to the old methods of Russia's administration of Poland. If there be given no solemn proof that the manifesto means the abolition of those methods, its moral effect will be equal to zero. Everybody remembers the celebrated orders of Minister N. A. Maklakoff and the circu- ; lars of Taube, [Russian Governor of Poland.] They were interpreted as meaning that the Russian civil administration did not hold itself bound by the manifesto of the Commander in Chief, only aiming to turn it into a dead document.
The most rigid of measures will be required to prevent the repetition of such acts. If the Russian Government is really resolved to grant Poland autonomous government it should from the very beginning change the personality of the administration in Poland. The return of the former administrators, who have by their acts broken or nullified the pledges made in the manifesto, is now morally impossible, especially after the reforms inaugurated in Poland by the Germans. If we want to prove by deeds that we intend to give Poland more, and not less, than Germany gave her, we should appoint instead of Russians men of Polish extraction to the
Canada and the War
By Spencer Brodney
Of Britain's allies within her own emsun never sets, two-Canada and Australia--vie for first place in the extent of the aid they have rendered and conare concerned with Canada's contribu- 16,000 men.
administrative posts in Poland. Such a administrative Russianizers with Gerstep follows logically from the idea of an man names. We must show that these autonomous Poland. By both Russians Russianization traditions have once for and Poles it would naturally be regarded all been dropped into the past. We must as the touchstone of our sincerity.
do this not for the sake of Poland, but If we actually desire to free Poland, for the sake of Russia herself. and not to replace the German yoke with To complete our victory over Germany a still heavier Russian one, we must we must not allow her to tear out of our commence as I have indicated. In order hands the banner of liberation. We must that the Russian Army be met joyfully show by deeds to the Poles and the entire in Poland, it is necessary that its return world that Poland can receive real nashall not signify the return of the former tional freedom from Russia alone. LTHOUGH the only self-govern tion, which consists not only in men, but
ing people of the British Em also in that mobilization of resources pire which had a hand in the which equips the fighting man, provides
making of the war was that in him with the lethal weapons of his trade, habiting the United Kingdom, the and finances the whole business of war. * dominions beyond the seas,"—the au
fare. tonomous communities of Canada, Aus Take, first, the number of men who have tralia, New Zealand, South Africa, and
volunteered for active service. The latest Newfoundland—were just as much in available recruiting figures show that by volved as if their respective Governments the 1st of September, 1916, 361,693 men bad themselves declared war. One must had been enrolled. Of this number a realize this fact to appreciate what
certain proportion is in the preliminary the British Empire means
- the most training stage in Canada, where, inloosely bound together of all empires, cidentally, one of the training camps, and yet, as the war has so vividly namely, Camp Borden, in the Province illustrated, extraordinarily cohesive when of Ontario, has up to date cost $1,000,000 its unity is threatened. All
the to build and equip. After their local self-governing dominions—it
training the Canadian troops go to Engcontemptuous to call land, where their course of instruction them “ colonies” – have each and all
is completed by being assimilated to the gone to the assistance of the mother methods and discipline of the British country of their own free will, without
Army. The numbers at present in so much as a word of exhortation from
training in Canada and England, re
But for spectively, are suppressed by the military common allegiance to the Crown, the
censorship, so that it is impossible to tell dominions might be regarded more truly
how many have actually gone to the as allies, thus swelling the long list of
front. those against whom the Central Empires
A hint that the Canadian soldier is
the real thing according to English ideas pire, on which we are proudly told the
may be gathered from the reports of a recent review held by Lloyd George, the first in his capacity of successor to Lord Kitchener as head of the War Of
fice. This was an inspection of a CaFor the moment we nadian division of between 15,000 and
They were in full service
the Government in London.
tinue to render.
uniform, and included volunteers from all parts of the Dominion. Everything was in perfect campaigning order, down to the field kitchens, from which savory odors wafted the
procession passed the saluting base. Lloyd George, in his speech to General Sir Sam Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia; Major Gen. Dave Watson, who is in command of the division, and the officers and men, was at his most eloquent in expressing admiration of the men and in recalling the prowess of their fellow-Canadians who at the second battle of Ypres saved Calais:
“ Just as the Rocky Mountains hurl back the storms of the West, so did these heroes in the battle of Ypres break the hurricane of the German fury. Amid the flames and poisonous fumes of Gehenna they held high the honor of Canada and saved the British Army."
At the beginning of 1916 the Prime Minister of Canada pledged the Dominion to raise its contribution in men to 500,000. But eight months after this announcement more than 138,000 were still required to make good the promise. On this score grievous disappointment is being felt among patriotic British Canadians, who point out that for the whole month of July only 8,552 recruits were enrolled, while for August the number dropped to 7,246. If enlistment proceeds at the same pace, it will take a year and a half for Canada to raise her half million of men, and by then the war might be over.
The causes of this slump in recruiting are twofold. In the first place, a young country in which the needs of industrial development are urgent, and which for that reason has constantly to augment its population by subsidized immigration, can ill afford to lose a single man. While the God of War is demanding more and still more victims in the trenches, the manufacturers of munitions, the farmers, and the railways are clamoring for supplies of labor. This difficulty has recently led to important conferences between the Government and representatives of the employers and of the labor organizations. In the hope of finding a method of maintaining productivity and
at the same time providing men for the firing line, the suggestion has been made to adopt on a wholesale scale the solution arrived at in Great Britain, namely, the replacement of men as far as possible by female labor. But this solution is not so easy in Canada, which, unlike the mother country, has no large surplus of women.
The other causes of the slackening of enlistment are to be found in the attitude of the French Canadians, which has led to a certain amount of recrimination on the traditional nationalistic lines. The figures show that if the population east of the Ottawa River had yielded proportionately as many recruits as the rest of Canada the promised half million would by now have been almost reached. Instead, Quebec, the French-speaking province, has contributed only about onefourth of what would in other circumstances be its quota. An outsider might wonder, even if French Canadians still cherish their old feelings against the English-speaking population, why, seeing that France is Britain's ally, they nevertheless hold back. An answer to this question is supplied by Henri Bourassa, who is a grandson of Papineau, the famous rebel leader, and who is the mouthpiece of French-Canadian sentiment. In an article published in the French Canadian journal, Le Devoir, which has recently excited a vigorous controversy, Mr. Bourassa says in part:
The number of recruits for the European war in the various Provinces of Canada and from each component element of the population is in reverse ratio to attachment to the soil and to the traditional patriotism arising therefrom. The newcomers from the British Isles have enlisted in much larger proportions than English-speaking Canadians, born in this country, while these have enlisted
than the French Canadians. The Western Provinces have given more recruits than Ontario, and Ontario more than Quebec. In each Province the floating population of the cities, the students, the laborers, and the clerks, either unemployed or threatened with dismissal, have supplied
soldiers than the farmers.
Does this mean that the city dwellers are more patriotic than the country people, or that the newcomers from England are better Canadians than their fellow-citizens of British origin born
in Canada? No, it simply means that in Canada, as in every
other country at all times, the citizens of oldest origin are the least disposed to be stampeded into distant ventures of no direct concern to their native land, It proves also that military service is more repugnant to the rural than to the urban population.
There is among French Canadians a larger proportion of farmers and fathers of large families than among any other ethnical element in Canada. Above all, the French Canadians are the only group exclusively Canadian both collectively and individually. They look upon the perturbations of Europe, even those of England or France, as foreign events, Their sympathies naturally go to France against Germany, but they do not think they have an obligation to fight for France any more than the French of Europe would hold themselves bound to fight for Canada against the United States or Japan or even against Germany in case Germany should attack Canada without threatening France.
English Canada contains a considerable proportion of people still in the first stage of national incubation. Under the sway of imperialism a fair nurnber have not yet decided whether their allegiance is to Canada or to the empire, whether the United Kingdom or the Canadian Confederacy is their country. The newcomers are not Canadian in any sense, England or Scotland is their sole fatherland. They have enlisted for the European war as naturally as Canadians, French, or English would take up arms to defend Canada against an aggression on the American Continent.
Thus it is rigorously correct to say that recruiting has gone in inverse ratio to the development of Canadian patriotism. If English-speaking Canadians have a right to blame French Canadians for the small number of their recruits, the newcomers from the lnited Kingdom, who have supplied a much larger proportion of recruits than any other element of the population, would be equally justified in branding the AngloCanadians with disloyalty and treason. Enlistment for the European war is supposed to be absolutely free and voluntary. If that statement is honest and sincere, all provocations from one part of
the population azzinst the other and exclusive attacks against the French Canadians should cease. Instead of unjustly reviling one-third of the (natlian people-a population so remarkabiy characterized by its constant loyalty national institutions, those
men who balm the right to enlighten and lead public openion should have enough good faith and Intelligence to see facts as they are and respect the motives of those who persist in their determination to remain more Canadlan than English or French.
In reply to Mr. Bourassa, British Canadians assert that the war is not a " foreign event” even from the French
Canadian standpoint, because their liberties and privileges, equally with those of all citizens of the Dominion, as well as those of their motherland, France, are at stake on the battlefields of Europe. It is also alleged by Mr. Bourassa's critics that because of distrust of the France that harried the Catholic Church the French-Canadian priests have thrown the weight of their influence into the scales against any effort to help France. On the other hand, however, should be set down Cardinal Begin's instruction issued a few weeks ago to the Catholic clergy of Quebec to help recruiting. Whatever the merits of this controversy may be, it is recognized on all sides that the attitude of the French Canadians makes it impossible for the Dominion Parliament to enact a compulsory service law, as has been done by New Zealand, following the example of the mother country, and as Australia proposes to do by national referendum.
Despite the difficulties of sending to Europe as large an army as desired, Canada is proud of her contribution of over 360,000 men to date. Still more is she proud of her newly discovered capacity to help in the provision of munitions and the equipment and maintenance of her representatives at the front. When the war broke out Canada had as little idea of supplying shells and other military requirements as the proverbial pig has of flying. But today 3,000,000 loaded shells a month are being delivered to the order of the British War Office, while additional large orders are being executed for the Russian Government. The Imperial Munitions Board in Canada is paying out more than $35,000,000 a month to Canadian manufacturers on the delivery of shells. It is said that only three of the great industrial corporations of the United States now handle more business on the American Continent than the board.
The Canadian manufacturer is not only producing loaded shells, but is also providing the rifle and entire equipment of every Canadian soldier. Where the part of the Dominion ends and the British Government begins by maintain