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the reasoned judgment of the distinguished English historian, Pelham 12 (who so often hits the nail on the head when dealing with Roman history), though he expresses it in different fashion: "It is often urged," he says, that Augustus must have known that such attempts [to revive the republic] were doomed to failure. But though we may grant that he miscalculated, it does not follow that he did not believe in his scheme, or that in January 27 B. C. he had not reasons for doing so. As to one condition of its successful working, his own moderation and self-restraint, he was presumably confident; as to the other, it is by no means clear that he was bound to despair of the republic without further trial. The Roman community was not so corrupt or effete as the language

Neither

of many historians would lead us to believe. the remnant of the old nobility nor even the city populace were utterly rotten. As to the great body of Roman citizens, Augustus, himself Italian on his father's side, and knowing Italy well, may reasonably have argued that, although the civil wars and the pre

vailing insecurity of the last twenty years had rudely shaken the fabric of society and produced a temporary demoralization, yet there existed germs of vigorous life which required only the restoration of peace, confidence, and settled government to develop and expand. It was clearly to this Roman people, to the Italy of Virgil and Horace, that he looked. They had been alienated by the narrow exclusiveness

which guided the policy of the later republic; they might now be invited to play their part in a wider Rome, not as the subjects, together with Greeks and barbarians, of a supreme despot, but as a self-governing imperial race. Nor was his confidence altogether misplaced; for, although little is said of it by ancient writers whose horizon was bounded by the walls of Rome, the century that followed the compromise of 27 B. C. witnessed a great outburst of vigor and a rapid diffusion of prosperity in Italy. In one respect, indeed, Augustus's hopes were falsified; the activities which he set free did not run in the channels which he marked out for them. Their efforts are seen in literature, in commerce and agriculture, and in municipal life; but they left untouched the ancient political institutions of the city-state of Rome, the primary assembly, the elective magistracies, and even the senate. Yet Augustus's ideal was no unworthy one. He will never exercise over the imaginations of men the influence of Julius, but he saved for posterity a Latin civilization, and postponed for two centuries the triumph of undisguised military despotism." With which conclusion, appending merely Arnold's dictum 13 that "the unacknowledged character of the despotism which Augustus created was a more indisputable evil" than his failure to develop "the provincial councils" into "real parliaments,' and to create a regular and organized representa tion of the provinces in the central government," and Greenidge's affirmation 14 that the possibility of elec

12" Essays," pp. 31 ff. 13 Op. cit., below I, p. 137. 14 Op. cit., above D, p. 362.

tion by the legions created a rude standard of merit, and it is questionable whether any really incapable man ever sat on the Roman throne "-we return to the maxims of Augustus.

H. THE PRINCE AND THE SENATE. Schiller, Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit," Vols. I and II, 1883; Bury, "The Student's Roman Empire," 1893; Jones, Stuart, "The Roman Empire," 1908; Taylor, "The Change from Dyarchy to Monarchy," in "A Constitutional and Political History of Rome," 1899, pp. 475 ff.; Hirschfeld, "Rückblick," in op. cit., below J, pp. 466 ff.

In terms of their observance or non-observance nearly the whole story of the principate may be told. The ones which concern us most narrowly, and by means of which we may pass to the second part of our theme-the development of principate into monarchy -are two, four, and seven in our enumeration. In regard to the second, we remark in the first place that some of the emperors, notably Caligula (37-41 A. D.), Nero (54-68 A. D.), Domitian (81-96 A. D.), cally with the whole theory of the principate, and, and the first two Severi (193-217 A. D.), broke radireverting to the absolutistic precedent of Julius Cæsar and anticipating the slow emergence of despotism, they neglected, humiliated, and debased the senate, and governed without its assistance. violent changes of procedure were apt to be followed by equally violent reactions, but they helped on the disruption of the principate. Of quite another seri

Such

ousness, however, were diminutions of senatorial prerogatives made by princes whom in contradistinction with the rulers just mentioned we may call the constitutional princes; for in this case authority once lost was lost for good. Augustus himself set the example. By creating the military treasury (aerarium militare) he rendered the army and its commander more independent of senatorial finance. By the appointment of prefects to govern Rome he lessened the power of the senate's executive officers. Tiberius (14-37 A. D.), moreover, by deputing his authority to the praetorian prefect, Sejanus, rid himself of his constitutional responsibility to the senate, and placed the senate at the mercy of the nearest military official. Claudius (41-54 A. D.) diminished perceptibly the rôle of the senators in public administration, and enlarged enormously the activities of his private serFlavian princes (69-96 A. D.) changed the character vants. He also opened the senate to Gauls. The of the senate by restocking it with provincials--with men destitute of republican traditions. Subsequently Trajan (98-117 A. D.) sent his comptrollers to cities it no longer objected to the principate on principle. in Italy and in senatorial and imperial provinces regardless of constitutional frontiers. Hadrian (117138 A. D.) and Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A. D.) withdrew Italy from the senate's jurisdiction by the appointment of four consulares (iuridici) for the general administration of its four quarters. Claudius organized the Fiscus as a treasury for the revenues collected by the prince, and Vespasian and Hadrian reduced so considerably the sources of senatorial revenues that the step taken by Septimius Severus

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when he made the aerarium Saturni simply the municipal treasury of Rome was not a long one. Hadrian practically eliminated the senators from the civil service, and admitted knights, whom he substituted for them, even to his privy council. By these successive losses, even before the epoch-making regime of the Severi, the senate became simply a spectator where once it had been a partner. But the whole empire had changed at the same time. At the establishment of the principate, the main cohesive force in the civilized world had been the Romans, and of them the senate was the head and the senators the hands. "When Hadrian assumed the command," says Pelham,1 the old theory of the empire as a federation of distinct communities in alliance with and under the protectorate of Rome was rapidly losing ground. The differences in race and language, in habits of life, and modes of, thought, which had formerly justified and even necessitated it, were fast disappearing. The titles and distinctions which had once implied not only a desire for political independence, but a partial possession of it were becoming mere phrases. Even the freedom of a free community could be ridiculed with impunity by a popular orator, and the native state, with its native ruler, was, except in a few outlying corners of the empire, a thing of the past. The idea of a single Roman state was in the air, and Hadrian gave effect to it with singular skill and perseverance. mopolitanism was in reality imperialism, and sprang from his desire to stamp everything with the imperial mark, and to utilize everything for the benefit of the empire. He was a Phil-Hellenist, not merely from sentiment, but from the conviction that Latins, Greeks, and even barbarians had all something to contribute to the common service. The man who appointed the Greek Arrian to the command of Roman legions and of a Roman frontier province was noted equally for his careful study of old Roman tactics, and for his liberal adoption of barbarian movements." In this cosmopolitan world the idea of national supremacy, for which the senate had stood and with which it fell, was an anachronism. The emperor alone was the incorporation of the people's ideal, the subject of such loyalty as existed, the only helper in time of need. In subsequent times the senators were agents of disruption.16

His cos

I. THE ITALIANS AND THEIR SUBJECTS. Mommsen. Provinces of the Roman Empire." 1899; Arnold, "Roman Provincial Administration." 2d edition, 1906. A third edition of this deservedly popular work has just appeared. Dill, "Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius," Books I and II, 1905; Reid, "The Municipalities of the Roman Empire," 1913; Friedländer, "Town Life in Ancient Italy," 1902; Haverfield, "Ancient Town-Planning," 1913; Seeck, op. cit., below K. Vol. II, pp. 145 ff.; Declareuil, "Quelques problèmes d'histoire des institutions municipales

au temps de l'Empire romain," in "Nouvelle Revue Historique de droit français et étranger," 1902, pp. 233, 437, 554; 1904, pp. 306, 474, 578; 1908, pp. 543, 674; 1909, pp. 466, 619; 1910, pp. 174 ff.

How this great change came about we may observe from the application of the maxim of Augustus which comes fourth in our enumeration. Its objects were twofold: to restrict the Romans to Italy in the interests of imperialism, and to preserve the provinces as tribute-paying districts. In the long run, however, neither proved feasible or desirable. Even before Augustus's time colonies of Roman citizens had been organized in the provinces, and he was himself obliged to organize others for his veterans, and for the Italians whom his veterans displaced. The natives of Italy simply could not be kept out of the fertile provincial lands, and they were not all willing to sacrifice their citizen privileges to secure them. Still, the Latin half-way houses, of which Augustus established many in the provinces, in which men, without being free from tribute, enjoyed the free use of Latin law, institutions, and language, proved sufficiently attractive to the majority, and they had the additional advantage to the government that they could be opened without fiscal sacrifice to the subjects according as they became fit and desirous to enter. These hostels proved, accordingly, to be the chief centres for the Latinization of western Europe. Moreover, as time went on, in consequence of a change which cannot be discussed here, the importance of the tribute among the revenues of Rome progressively diminished, until finally the treasury stood to gain by the substitution for it of the five per cent. succession tax incident to citizenship.17 A liberal naturalization policy could, therefore, be adopted, in place of the parsimony shown by Augustus in this matter. By manumission, the body of freedmen, and consequently the body of citizens, was enlarged at the expense of the slave population; and by the grant of Latin rights. to subjects (peregrini) and of Italian rights to Latins, the citizen body was still further enlarged, this time at the expense of the provincials. The principate of Claudius represents one epoch in this process; that of Hadrian another; Caracala represents its termination. After his famous edict (212 A.D.) granting Roman citizenship to all subjects, except dediticii, whoever they may be,18 the distinctions once universal persisted only among new freedmen; the non-citizens were relatively a negligible quantity. Therewith was ended definitely the imperial position of Italy. Substantially it had been ended earlier. It had been openly flouted when Septimius Severus, himself an African, had subjected the peninsula to military authority, and had appeared in Rome with the title and axes of a proconsul. Long since the Italians had been relieved of service in the legions and given the privilege of serving only in the praetorian guard. By disbanding this select corps,

17 Seeck, op. cit., below K, Vol. II, p. 252.

18 Girard, "Manuel élémentaire de droit romain," 5th edition, 1911, p. 117; Wilcken, op. cit., below K, Vol. 1, 1, "p 55 ff.

We

The defense alleged by all the nations at present involved in the European war hinges upon the necessity of their continued existence to insure the future of civilization. Nor can we claim with a shadow of truth that the insistence upon this point is more vigorous at Berlin than it is in London or in Paris. shall surely be lacking in fairness if we question the sincerity with which all these European nations tenaciously cling to the notion that they are indispensable to the happiness of future generations. We shall, however, be quite as lacking in candor and intelligence if we fail to see that each of these nations assumes a knowledge of the ultimate end and aim of civilization, coupled to a clear insight into the process by which that ultimate aim must be attained, to an ability to see the chain of connection binding the present to this dim and ultimate future, and, of course, to an analysis of the present situation so complete and accurate as to distinguish the elements necessary to insure the future.

We find it personally a little difficult to concede to any of the nations the gift of prophecy and an ability to read the writing in the stars. Can we be absolutely positive that the future of the human race let us say, depends upon the ruling of Asia, Africa, or South America by any European nation? In the face of the fact that every religious creed which has shown any strength in history has come out of Asia, can we believe that upon the direction of the occidental nations depends the spiritual progress of the human race? We find in Europe at present two different notions of administration; one called parliamentary government and the other bureaucratic government. The one works admirably in England, and rather badly elsewhere; the other is astonishingly efficient in Germany, and less conspicuously useful in other countries. Shall we not really need the powers of a seventh son to tell which of these is more essential to the world at large? We find in England a notion of individual liberty which, on the whole, allows the individual to do pretty much anything he wants to until some other individual sues him in court. ernment is to arbitrate between the two, but is to direct neither. In Germany the government promulgates sets of rules regarding the conduct of individuals toward each other, and compels individuals to observe them. The citizens of both nations claim that the results are as nearly ideal as anything is likely to be in this imperfect world.

The gov

If we look into the past, we shall find it difficult to concede to any generation the ability to tell in advance what will benefit or will injure civilization. The downfall of political Greece, which seemed to many contemporaries certain to destroy Greek culture

1 Reprinted by permission from "The New Republic" for November 7, 1914.

forever, was in fact the instrumentality by which Greek culture was spread throughout the civilized world and made almost universal. Scarcely a Roman citizen could have been found in the fourth century, A. D., who would not have bewailed the invasions of the "barbarous " Germans as the death of civilization. Indeed, educated men were pretty positive for nearly a thousand years that the Barbarians had destroyed civilization. Of this the Renaissance had no doubt whatever, and named the centuries subsequent to the fall of Rome and previous to their own time as the dark ages, when the light of civilization had been quenched. It is an astonishingly different notion of the Barbarian invasions which we find in the pages of ardent Teutonists like Lamprecht or Chamberlain. They are quite convinced that those centuries saw the dawn of civilization. In 1630 Gustavus Adolphus arrived in Germany for the purpose of saving civilization, which he identified with Protestantism, yet he succeeded (as most authorities are now agreed) in wrecking and desolating Germany, and he was certainly one of the chief authors of her poverty and weakness in the two succeeding centuries. Nor do we see at present eye to eye with the savior of civilization in 1815. Louis XVII and the Duke of Wellington now occupy quite unenviable positions as blind reactionaries in the path of progress, while for those masters of foreign politics, George Canning and Metternich, whose policies and speeches impressed their contemporaries as utterances divinely inspired, we have scarcely a respectful word. Yet in 1815 there was probably no individual whom his contemporaries. would have considered sane who did not breathe fervent prayers of thanks in the belief that the future of civilization was now assured, having passed into the hands of its saviors.

Do we not also learn from the history of the past that it is almost impossible for contemporaries to judge correctly in deciding whether resistance to aggression is really a safeguard for the future or merely an attempt of the obsolete and the outworn to retard progress? Few men would now shed tears upon the remains of political Athens; still fewer bemoan the sowing of salt upon the ruins of Carthage. A cold and unsympathetic reception awaits the advocate of the usefulness of imperial Rome of the fourth century A. D. There can be absolutely no doubt that the monasteries rendered indispensable service to the cause of civilization in the early middle ages, not only by the preservation of art and letters, but by the preservation of technical skill in many mechanical trades. But in the sixteenth century the monastic orders had no friends sufficiently ardent and powerful to ward off destruction, and there are not many students to-day who are inclined to question the general gain for civilization by the breaking of their power.

Surely, if in the whole range of history we come