Re THE CASHAR COMPANY-WEST HARTLEPOOL RAILWAY Co. v. JACKSON. [V.C. W. North-Eastern Railway Company under a special Act of Parliament (28 & 29 Vict. c. ccclxviii.) The bill by the Hartlepool Railway Company was filed in May 1865. On the 5th July following the special Act was passed intituled as above, and part v. of the Railway Clauses Act of 1863 was thereby incorporated with it. By this it was enacted that the West Hartlepool Railway Company and the Cleveland Company should be thereby dissolved, and their respective undertakings and all the railways, docks, buildings, works, property, and effects to which they were immediately before the dissolution seised or entitled, and the benefit of all contracts, agreements, and proceedings in any way relating thereto, and to which, but for the dissolution, they would be entitled, and all the estate, right, title, other railways, works, properties, and effects to which either of the two companies were entitled immediately before the dissolution, should on the dissolution be vested in and belong to the NorthEastern Railway Company, "but subject to all existing contracts, debts, liabilities, engagements. and obligations affecting the same respectively, and to the payment or discharge, performance or observance thereof by the company." V.C. W.] of laches, if of anything. But Sarl knew in every sense that he was not the owner of the estate, and though he had entered into a verbal agreement to purchase the estate, that the agreement was not intended to bind him. Therefore, upon the main instances brought forward by the plt., a case of gross misrepresentation had been established. As regarded the directors, it had been said that, as the bill had charged them with positive fraud, it ought to be discharged as against them. However, if they chose to act through Sarl in all these transactions and authorised him to act as their agent, they must be fixed with all the consequences of the transactions. But with regard to the shares, the directors knew the true state of affairs as well as Sarl, and they were not justified in announcing in the prospectus that one half of the shares were sub-powers, &c., with respect to their premises and any scribed for, when the fact was that Sarl had only agreed to place them. There would be a declaration that the plt. was entitled to have the contract entered into by him for taking ten shares rescinded, in respect of the misrepresentation in the prospectus, on the faith of which he made his application for such shares. The defts. would be directed to repay the deposit-money, and to remove the plt.'s name from the register. The company would be restrained from proceeding at law; and all the defts. must pay the costs of the suit. Solicitors: Henry Harris; Wilkinson, Stevens, and Wilkinson. Thursday, Nov. 22. Re THE CASHAR COMPANY. Practice-Special examiner― Companies Act 1862. The court has jurisdiction under the Act to deal with all matters relating to practice touching the winding-up of companies, &c., although no bill filed or petition presented. This was a motion for the appointment of a special examiner, as no day could be obtained before the examiners for the examination of witnesses for a considerable time. Waller in support of the motion. B. B. Rogers opposed it, as not being within the jurisdiction of the court. No suit was pending, and only a notice of motion for a future day to remove the name of the applicant from the register of shareholders. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that there was ample jurisdiction under the Companies Act of 1862 to deal with all matters of practice incidental to any application before the court for the winding-up of a company or a rectification of the register of its shareholders. In the present case, however, no sufficient ground had been laid for the appointment of a special examiner, and he must refuse the appliIcation with costs. Solicitors: Ashurst, Morris, and Co.. WEST HARTLEPOOL RAILWAY COMPANY v. Practice-Abatement-Amalgamation. Where an amalgamation of two companies was effected by a special Act of Parliament, a suit against one of the two companies does not thereby abate. This was a motion to dismiss the plts.' bill for want of prosecution. The notice of motion stated that the company had been dissolved and amalgamated with the The following is the 43rd section of the Act of 1863, c. 92, "For consolidating in one Act certain provisions frequently inserted in Acts relating to railways:" Nothing in the amalgamating Act, or in this part of this Act, shall cause the abatement, discontinuance, or determination of, or in anywise prejudicially affect, any action, suit, or other proceeding at law or in equity, commenced by or against the dissolved company, either solely or jointly with any other company, or with any person, before the time of amalgamation and then pending; but the same my be continued, prosecuted. or enforced by or against the amalgamated company, either solely or as the case may require jointly with such other offences against any of the provisions of any special Act company, or with such person, and all persons committing relating to the dissolved company before the amalgamation may be prosecuted, and all penalties incurred by reason of such offences may be sued for and recovered in like manner in all respects as if the amalgamation Act had not been passed, the amalgamated company being in respect of all such matters considered as identical with the dissolved company. Charles Hall in support of the motion. Wickens, for the company, contended that the preceding section of the Railway Consolidation Act of 1863 did not apply. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that in his opinion the cause was within the provisions of that section, and that the suit had not abated. When an abatement by bankruptcy and the like took place, and of which the court could take judicial notice, a sugges tion of that fact was sometimes allowed to be indorsed on the record. But in the present case there was a special Act of Parliament which provided for an amalgamation. Nevertheless another Act of Parliament, which was a public Act, enacted that on an amalgamation a suit should not abate. The duty of the court was therefore plainly indicated by the terms of this latter Act of Parliament. The suit in his opinion not having abated, there must be the usual order to speed the cause. The plts. to pay the costs of the motion. Order accordingly. Solicitors: Bell, Steward, and Co.; Cree and Last. Q. B.] PETERS (app.) v. STAVELEY (resp.)-LEWIS (app.) v. JEwHURST (resp.) Common Law Courts. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Reported by JOHN THOMPSON and T. W. SAUNDERS, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Wednesday, Nov. 14. PETERS (app.) v. STAVELEY (resp.) Master and servant-Custom as to quitting without notice. When the hiring is expressiy for a term certain, a custom of the trade for master or servant to determine it at any time without notice is inadmissible to control the contract. Case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. At the Clerkenwell Police Court, within the Metropolitan police district, on the 6th July 1865, before J. H. Barker, Esq., one of the police magistrates of the metropolis, an information by William Staveley, the resp., against Edward Peters, the app., under sect. 3 of the statute 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, charging "for that he the said app. having contracted with the resp. to serve him for one week, and so on from week to week, as a farrier, and having entered into such service, did, on the 28th June 1865, unlawfully absent himself from the said service before the term of his said contract was complete," was heard and determined, the said app. being represented by his attorney, and upon such hearing the said app. was duly convicted of the said offence, and adjudged to be imprisoned for his said offence in the house of correction, and there kept to hard labour for the space of fourteen days. The app. being dissatisfied with the determinatiɔn upon the hearing of the said information, as being erroneous in point of law, applied for a case. The magistrate gave the app. a certificate that the case having been decided on the facts proved, and in no way involving any point of law whatever, the application was frivolous, and refused to state such case. The app. then, pursuant to sect. 5 of the said 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, applied to Martin, B. at chambers during the vacation, for a summons calling upon the magistrate to show cause why such case should not be stated, and an order was subsequently made, whereby he was ordered to state and sign such case. CASE. At the hearing of the said information it was proved on the part of the resp., and admitted on the part of the app., that the app. contracted and agreed with the resp., at Islington, in the county of Middlesex, on the 26th June 1863, to serve him as a farrier for a week certain, and so on from week to week. That nothing was said by either party at the time of entering into the contract as to determining it by notice. That the app. left the service of the resp. on the 28th June without receiving or giving any notice and against the will of his master the resp. It was contended, on the part of the resp., that there was a custom in the trade among farriers that the hiring should be for one week, and so on from week to week, but that the contract might be determined at any time by either master or servant without any notice; and that the said app. left the service of the said resp. in consequence of a dispute with him, and because he considered himself at liberty to do so on account of the said custom. One witness was called on behalf of the app., who stated on oath that such a custom did exist among farriers; and I was informed by the attorney who appeared for the said app. that he had several other witnesses who would depose to the same custom, but I told him it [Q. B. was useless to call them, as I was of opinion that the hiring was for a week certain, and that the custom could not affect it. I therefore, considering that the offence charged against the said app. had been duly proved, adjudged the said app. to be imprisoned for fourteen days in the house of correction as aforesaid. As it was clearly and distinctly proved that the hiring was for one week certain, and so on from week to week, and that the app. left his work before the first week of his hiring was ended, against the will of his master the resp. and without notice, the question arising is, whether under the above circumstances, any such custom, even if the same existed, could be set up which could override this express hiring. The question for the court was whether or not the magistrate was correct in his said decision. J. Sharpe for the resp.-Here there being a contract to serve for a week certain, evidence of the custom was inadmissible to control the express contract. [COCKBURN, C. J.-Does the magistrate find whether or not the app. bonâ fide believed that such a custom did exist, and acted upon it, not intending to break the law? If the magistrate omitted to take into his consideration such a material element, ought we not to send the case back?] Grantham for the app.-The court, for the sake of this argument, must assume that the custom was proved. The contract was not for an entire week. The word "certain" in the case is the magistrate's. COCKBURN, C. J.-We must take the contract to have been as described by the magistrate, and can only answer the question submitted to us. Then the contract being for one week certain, the custom, even if proved, could not control it. The magistrate's decision must therefore be affirmed. Judgment for the resp. LEWIS (app.) v. Jewhurst (resp.) Seaman's wages-Desertion-Consular certificate of desertion abroad. A seaman having remained ashore all night at a foreign port, the master went to the consul without any notice to the seaman and obtained his certificate, with an indorsement thereon that the seaman had deserted: (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 107.) In a summary proceeding before justices in this country by the seaman to recover his wages, the consul's certificate was Held, not to be conclusive evidence of the fact of desertion. Case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The app., master of the British ship Plover, was summoned before the justices of the peace for the borough of Sunderland, in the county of Durham, on the 21st March 1866, under the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, sect. 188, by the resp. for a balance of wages amounting to 67. 7s. 6d. The resp. shipped as an able seaman on board the Plover in 1865 on a voyage from Sunderland to Alexandria and Taganrog and back at a rate of wages of 31. per month. After leaving Alexandria the vessel called at Constantinople on the 11th Aug., and on 12th Aug., in consequence of some difference arising out of the app. having found fault with the resp. whilst on duty at the wheel a few days before, the resp. requested leave to go on shore at Constantinople to make a complaint to the consul and endeavour to obtain his discharge, but the app. refused to allow him to go on shore for that purpose until the app. could accompany him. On the 14th Aug. the resp., after packing up his Q. B.] YOUNGMAN (app.) v. MORRIS (resp.) [Q. B. certificate might be admissible in evidence, they were not conclusive, and still left the fact of the desertion to be determined by the justices on the evidence before them. clothes in expectation of his discharge, went on shore | although the entry in the official log and the consul's with the app. a distance of three miles from the ship when at anchor in the Bosphorus, but without taking his clothes with him, and after reaching the shore the app. discovered that he had not brought the ship's papers with him, and sent the resp. back to the ship in a shore boat for them. On his return they went before the consul, who refused to discharge the resp. After leaving the office of the consul, the app. and the resp. agreed that the latter should be discharged and leave the ship, and they went together to the shipping office to adjust the question of wages for that purpose, but the shipping master declined to act in the matter without the assent of the consul, who, upon being applied to, refused to assent, on the ground that if he did so he would have numerous similar applications. On leaving the shipping office, the resp. alleges that he was directed by the app. to go to the wharf, and wait there until the app. came to take him back to the ship, and that in consequence of such directions he did go to the wharf and remained there waiting for the app. till the afternoon, but the app. did not come for him as he had promised, and having no money to pay for a lodging he, the resp., slept on the wharf all night. On the contrary, the app. alleges that he requested the resp. to accompany him back to the ship immediately upon leaving the shipping office, which the resp. declined to do, asking for a shilling or two to spend on shore after, which he would return to the ship, but the app. refused to advance him the money, and went back to the ship without him. The resp. states, but unsupported by other evidence, that he went to the consul's office early next morning, 14th Aug., and reported himself, but could learn nothing of the app. and therefore waited about for him expecting him to come on shore again. He met him in the middle of the day and asked him what he was going to do with him, whereupon the app. replied to the effect that he did not now belong to the ship, and he had nothing further to do with him. In the meantime the app. appears to have made an entry in the ship's log-book to the effect that the resp. had deserted, and then proceeded on shore in the forenoon of the 14th Aug. and reported it to the consul and obtained from the consul, on the app.'s own statement and application, a certificate to that effect, the resp. not being present before the consul. On returning from the consul's office he met the resp. and made the observation before stated. The app. returned to the ship the same night without the resp., taking with him another man in his place, and soon after midnight got the ship under weigh in tow of a tug-boat and proceeded to Taganrog, taking with him the resp.'s clothes, alleged to be worth 102., and ultimately returned to England, where he arrived for the time on the 25th Nov. last, being within six months next before the making of the complaint before justices. The resp. after three days (having pawned his jacket for a maintenance) obtained another ship at 31. a-month wages, the same as he had had on board the Plover, and which was admitted to be the current rate of wages at Constantinople at that time. It was contended on the part of the app. that the question of the resp.'s desertion had been adjudicated upon by the British consul at Constantinople, whereby his wages and clothes had become forfeited, and therefore the magistrates at Sunderland had no jurisdiction; then that the entry in the official log and the consul's certificate were conclusive evidence of the fact of desertion. The justices being of opinion that the resp. had not in fact deserted, and had not intended to desert, and that their jurisdiction was not affected by the proceeding before the consul at Constantinople, made an order for part of the amount of the wages claimed after allowing certain deductions admitted to be due to the app. The app. thereupon applied for a case for the opinion of this court. Shield for the resp.-The justices acted under sect. 186 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, and found as a fact that the resp. had not deserted at Constantinople, and did not intend to do so, and they were not estopped from adjudicating by the consul's certificate with the indorsement thereon that the resp. had deserted. C. Pollock, Q.C.for the app.-The consul acted under sect. 207 of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, and he has power by the section to inquire into the allegation of desertion, and having done so and given his certificate it is conclusive of the fact of desertion, and the wages were therefore forfeited. COCKBURN, C. J.-The consul's certificate obtained in the absence of the seaman was not conclusive evidence of the fact of desertion. That is a provision made for the protection of the master. In this case the justices had jurisdiction to inquire into the fact of desertion. Judgment for the resp. Wednesday, Nov. 21. YOUNGMAN (app.) v. MORRIS (resp.) Cattle-plague orders-Removal of dung. The app. removed a load of horse-litter from Middlesex into Hertford, and the justices of Hertford convicted him, under the Cattle Plague Orders, of the offence of removing dung likely to propagate infection. Held, upon the facts, that the justices had exceeded their jurisdiction, inasmuch as the horse-litter in question was not dung likely to propagate infection. The app. Henry Youngman was summoned upon the information and complaint of the resp. Thos. Morris before us the said justices, which charged that the app. on the 16th March 1866, at the parish of Cheshunt, in the county of Hertford, unlawfully did remove a load of dung from the county of Middlesex into the county of Hertford, contrary to the form of the orders in such case made and provided. The offence charged is an offence against the order of the general quarter sessions of the peace for the county of Hertford, holden at the Shire-hall at Hertford, on the 1st Jan. 1866, and thence continued by several adjournments to, and holden at the same place on the 3rd and 20th Jan., the 3rd Feb., and the 3rd March respectively. The following is a copy of such order: As to the removal of manure, hides, &c. into the jurisdiction. It shall not be lawful for any person to bring or send any offal of any cattle, or of any sheep, lamb, or goat, or the hidesor raw or untanned hides or skins, or the horns or hoofs, or the skins of any swine, or any dung whatsoever, or any litter likely to propagate infection, from any place in Great Britain beyond into any place within the jurisdiction. Exceptions out of the orders. The orders permit the removal of manures, hides, &c. sent by railway through the jurisdiction. On the part of the resp., it was contended that the proceeding before the consul being ex parte, and merely to protect the app. from the penalties under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act,pation, and beyond the jurisdiction to any other premises in could not amount to an adjudication, and that, I his own occupation within the jurisdiction. Manures, hides, &c. brought or sent (with the licence of two justices) by any person from any premises in his own occu Q. B.] [Q. B. Thursday, Nov. 22. REG. v. The Justices of Llanfillo, BrecknOCKSHIRE. The deft. Henry Youngman, the now app., in answer to the said summons, pleaded not guilty. Whereupon the said justices proceeded to hear the evidence adduced on the part of the resp., and also on the part of the app., and of which evidence the following is a copy: Harrison Procter, upon his oath, saith: I am inspector of the division of Cheshunt for cattle disease. I put in an Order in Council of the 20th Jan., and orders of the court of quarter sessions for the county of Hertford, of the 3rd Feb. and the 3rd March. Cross-examined: Is horse dung, made within three or four days or a week, of REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF LLANFILLO, Parish tenements-59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 24-Disputed title-Power of justices to adjudicate. Although as a rule justices at petty sessions have no jurisdiction to inquire into any case involving a title to real property; yet, when by statute they are empowered to ascertain a certain fact which necessarily involves such a question, their jurisdiction remains. a kind likely to propagate infection?—I decline to answer the By the 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 24, it is enacted that if any question. Thomas Carter, on his oath, saith: I am a metropolitan police sergeant, No. 29 of the Y division, stationed at Cheshunt. About seven o'clock in the evening of the 16th March I saw a horse drawing a cart laden with horse-dung, with the name on the cart, William Wallace, Esq. When I first saw the cart it was in the county of Middlesex. It passed through the toll-gate and came towards Waltham Cross. I stopped the cart; it was then in the county of Hertford. I asked the driver his name; he gave it-Henry Youngman. I asked what he had in his cart; he said, "Stable dung: I brought it from Harley-mews, Cavendish-square, and am going to take it to be used on my master's premises at Wormley, West End, and I was not aware I was doing wrong." I saw it was dung. " person who shall have been permitted to occupy any tenement, &c. belonging to any parish for the habitation of the poor, or who shall have unlawfully intruded himself into any such tenement, &c., shall refuse to quit the same and deliver up the possession to the parish officers, two justices, upon complaint, may summon the party, and upon his appearance they are to proceed to hear and determine the matter, and if they shall find and adjudge the same to be true, then by warrant under their hands and seals they are to cause possession of the premises to be delivered to the parish officers: For the defence George Smith, upon his oath, Held, that under the foregoing enactment the justices have saith: I am a coachman to Mr. Wallace, and live at No. 4, Harleymews, and at Wormley. On the 16th March I put some litter into a cart of my master's. It was not filled up to the top. It was not likely to propagate infection. Twice a-week I clear the dung. I know of no order that it could not be removed into Hertford. The horses were healthy. I should call it litter. It was taken from under the horses. Sure to be horse dung in it. It is used for litter. My master lives in Harley-street. He left Wormley on the 1st Nov. He has been down once since. John Rogers, upon his oath, saith: I am gardener to Mr. Wallace, and live at Wormley. On the 16th March litter came from London. Used it. Do not know for certain for what. It was level with the cart. Linen and vegetable baskets were on the top. Did not know of the order, or should have stopped the man directly. No disease among our cattle. After hearing the evidence we convicted the app. of such offence and fined him the sum of 1, together with 15s. costs. The questions for the opinion of the court are: First, whether, under the circumstances stated, we were legally right in convicting the app. under the said order of the local authority, on the ground that such order extended to all dung, or in the words of the order, "any dung whatsoever." Secondly, whether we were right in convicting the app., he not having obtained the licence of two justices as required according to the said exceptions out of the Orders No. 4. G. Tayler, for the app., applied that the case should be remitted to the justices on the ground that, as stated, it did not raise the question intended, viz., whether the order of sessions, under which the app. was convicted, was binding, it being contended before them that the Order of Privy Council of Jan. 20, 1864, which empowered the quarter sessions to prohibit the removal of "all dung, hay, straw, fodder, or litter likely to propagate infection," from any place into their county, did not warrant the making of an order for the removal of "any dung what soever." The COURT ordered the case to be remitted to the justices, with an intimation that, if the order of quarter sessions was founded on the Order of Privy Council of Jan. 20, 1864, they had gone beyond their jurisdiction, their limits being confined to the removal of dung likely to propagate infection. Case remitted. power to hear and determine, notwithstanding the party in possession disputes the title of the parish officers to the premises. This was a motion for a certiorari to remove into this court a warrant granted by two justices acting for the division of Llanfillo, Brecknockshire, giving possession of certain cottages alleged to be parish property to the parish authorities, on the ground that the said warrant was granted without jurisdiction. By sect. 24 of the 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, it is enacted, That if any person who shall have been permitted to occupy any parish or town house, or any other tenement or dwellinghouse belonging to, or provided by, or at the charge of any parish for the habitation of the poor thereof, or who shall have unlawfully intruded himself or herself into any such house, tenement, or dwelling-house, or into any house, tenement, or hereditament belonging to such parish, shall refuse or neglect to quit the same and deliver up the possession thereof to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of any such parish within one month after notice, and demand and overseers, or the major part of them, shall have been in writing for that purpose, signed by such churchwardens delivered unto the person in possession, or in his or her absence affixed on some notorious part of the premises, it shall be lawful for any two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace, upon complaint to them made by one or more of the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish in which any such house, tenement, or dwelling shall be situate, to issue their summons to the person against whom such time and place to be appointed by them, and to cause such complaint shall be made to appear before such justices at a summons to be delivered to the party against whom the com plaint shall be made and such justices are hereby empowered and required, upon the appearance of the deft. complaint, and if they shall find and adjudge the same to be to proceed to hear and determine the matter of such true, then by warrant under their hands and seals to cause possession of the premises in question to be delivered to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish or to some of them. alleging that the party in possession of the premises The application was made upon certain facts, had a legal title to them, and that the claim of the parish officers was unsubstantial. H. Matthews, in moving for the rule, contended that the statute in question does not give the justices a power to decide upon questions involving a title to real property, but was intended merely to empower them to give possession of premises which are unquestionably parish property: R. v. The Justices of Middleser, 7 Dowl. 767 ; R. v. Ingham, 19 L. J. 189, Q. B. H. James, who was prepared to show cause in the first instance, was not called upon. Q. B.] REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF LLANFILLO, BRECKNOCKSHIRE. COCKBURN, C. J.-I think that there should be no rule in this case, upon the ground that the justices were not ousted of their jurisdiction by the fact of the title to the premises coming in question. The rule which prohibits justices from adjudicating upon questions of title cannot apply where by statute they have a duty cast upon them to inquire into that question. I am very far from saying, where eertain things are required to be upheld by evidence, in order to warrant the magistrates in issuing a warrant or making an order, or whatever the particular subject may be, that if they proceed to deal with the facts, or any fact essential to the establishment of the matter before them as proved, when in point of fact there is no evidence whatever to prove it, this court will not under such circumstances consider they have acted without jurisdiction, and control the exercise of their authority; but it is a very different thing where a fact is to be proved which is of the very essence of the inquiry, and there is evidence before the magistrates upon the one side, and evidence upon the other. In that case I should be far from saying that because we might see reason to think that, if they have drawn a conclusion one way, it would have been better to have drawn it the other, we are to take upon ourselves to control the exercise of their jurisdiction as regards their inquiring into that matter or fact. There is not only no authority for such a proposition, but I think it is contrary to the established principle of the court. In all cases in which a collateral matter becomes the subject of inquiry, and in such collateral matter they proceed without evidence to give themselves jurisdiction by finding facts which they are not warranted in finding, the court will review their finding, and if they have improperly given themselves jurisdiction, will set aside their proceedings. But where the question is a material element in the consideration of the matter they have to determine, where they have exercised their judgment as judges of the fact and have decided it on a conflict of evidence, there it is contrary to principle and practice that this court should interfere, and in holding this language I think I am speaking consistently with the judgment of the court in the case of Reg. v. Bolton. It seems to be the view of the judgment there, that where the question was one of fact for the justices, and evidence was given on the one side and the other, whatever might be the case in which the court would interfere, they would not interfere where the question is one of fact. I think that is the principle we should proceed upon when called upon to review the decision of the magistrates in matters where they have exercised a summary jurisdiction. Therefore I think there ought to be no rule. MELLOR, J.—I am entirely of the same opinion. I think the whole question depends on what the statute itself prescribes as constituting the offence. If the statute in constituting the offence renders some inquiry into it necessary, as, for instance, in the case before us, in which the words are, "if any person who shall have been permitted to occupy any parish or town house," the magistrates must ascertain and determine whether it was a parish or town house within the meaning of the section. Therefore, if there was evidence on both sides on which the magistrates might come to that conclusion, I think we cannot interfere simply because we think the evidence preponderated the other way. If there was evidence to found the jurisdiction the magistrates must go on where it is an ingredient in the offence, and they must determine the title if it is a necessary ingredient. It is very distinguishable from the case in which a limited jurisdiction depends on the finding of the facts. In those cases [Q. B. we have acted upon the rule that the magistrates cannot give themselves jurisdiction by an erroneous finding upon a matter; but it is entirely different where it is a very ingredient of the offence itself. I need not do more than say that Rex v. Dayınan, 26 L. J. 128, M. C., appears to proceed upon à distinction that it was an essential matter to be determined whether it was a new street or not. However, the cases are unanimous that where it is said there has been an erroneous decision, it is a matter essential to the determination of the offence. I do not think that Mr. Matthews can point out any case where there has been any real difference of opinion; I therefore think that in this case it is essentially necessary for the justices to make the inquiry on which they entered, and we cannot interfere with their finding, even if we thought the evidence preponderated the other way. SHEE, J.-I am also of the same opinion. The object of the Act of Parliament seemed to be to provide a summary remedy for a great inconvenience, the inconvenience of persons who have been occupying parish houses or houses built for the habitation of the poor, or persons who have intruded into such houses, and continued there against the will of, and disregard, the overseers and churchwardens who have given them notice to quit. It provides, for the purpose of remedying that evil, that a notice shall be given by the churchwardens and overseers to such persons as have been permitted to occupy the parish houses, and that if the party to whom such notice has been so given continue to occupy for a month after such notice, the churchwarden shall be empowered to make complaint to the justices, and the justices shall be empowered to require the appearance of the deft., and upon proof on oath that such summons has been served, to proceed to hear and determine the matter of such complaint. There can be no complaint at all unless the house in which the persons whom it is sought to eject had intruded, or in which they continued after notice to quit, be a parish house. The words are "parish house or houses to be provided by the churchwardens or overseers for the habitation of the poor." Therefore it was a necessary matter to be inquired into, because in this section it is said the justices shall hear and determine the matter of such complaint, and if they shall find and adjudge the same to be true, then by warrant under their hands and seals they shall cause possession of the premises in question to be delivered to the churchwardens and overseers; and this they are required to do without any appeal from their decision; and, indeed, an appeal from their decision would entirely frustrate the object of the Act, which provides a summary remedy in a short time, and I cannot distinguish this case from the case of Reg. v. Bolton, in which it was decided to be sufficient to give the magistrates jurisdiction, that the complaint made to them was a matter which, in the words of the Act of Parliament, if proceeded upon, would bring it within their jurisdiction, and that though it should appear upon a more full examination of the evidence before the magistrates that their conclusion was not wholly satisfactory, yet, if there is evidence before them on which they might arrive at the conclusion to which they came, that this court ought not and would not interfere with their decision. If there was no evidence at all on which their adjudication perly to proceed, they would be acting improperly, and disregarding in fact altogether the provisions of this section of the Act of Parliament. was pro LUSH, J.—I am of the same opinion. The form |