CHAN.] Re THE LEEDS BANKING COMPANY. MALLORIE'S CASE. [CHAN. breach of duty by handing over the shares to Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie, who had no interest in the shares whatever. It appears to me, therefore, that the matter has altogether slipped through, and that there was no complete contract between these at the foot of that letter Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie | : Then that is followed by the directors coming to a further resolution, by which they agreed that, of the additional shares, one share for every five shares should be offered to the old shareholders; and then, in the event of there being any surplus, they also resolved that the allotment of shares remaining undistributed should be made according to the discretion of the manager and the private directors. If the directors had at that time adopted the suggestion which was contained in this letter, and had said to Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie, "There are surplus shares beyond the one share for five shares which we have agreed to give, and, beyond that one share for five shares, we, the manager and the two private directors, will give you the shares you ask for;" if they had taken that course it might well have been that there would have been a perfect contract between Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie and the company; but the directors took no such course. No such course was taken on behalf of the company. What was done was this on the 18th July Mr. Greenland, on the part of the directors, wrote in these terms: "The directors of the Leeds Banking Company have instructed me to inform you that they have allotted you three additional shares for which you have applied, at the sum of 80% per share, in addition to the two shares previously accepted by you." Then they say that they cannot allot him more, and they allude to the time when the money was to be paid, and they address that letter to the executors of Mr. Matthew Mallorie. The offer on the part of Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie was, "I will take the shares if I can have them as a customer;" neither the directors, nor the manager, nor the private directors, however, adopt his proposal at all, but they send an answer containing their own former resolution to give the shares to the executor of the late Mr. Matthew Mallorie. There the matter ended, save and except that on the 20th July 1864, two days afterwards, Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie wrote to thank Mr. Greenland for the kind allotment of the new shares, and expressed his appreciation of Mr. Greenland's consideration in the matter. There are two ways in which this contract might have been considered to have been made. In the first place, it might have been a contract by Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie to take the shares in his own name. That clearly was not the fact. Then there might possibly have been a contract by Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie to take the shares in the character of executor. It is quite clear that that was not intended by the parties at all, because Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie's original proposition was that he should have the shares as an old customer, and because his family were old shareholders. Then beyond that it would have altered the position of Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie; if he had taken these shares in the character of executor, nothing would have had to be done but to put these shares in the names of the executors. In the first place, the executors would not have taken the shares if the concern had turned out badly; and if the concern had turned out well, it is clear that they would never have been guilty of a The case seems to have been considered by the V. C. as falling to some extent within Dobson's case, but I do not think that Dobson's case has any application to the present case. In Dobson's case there was a complete contract by Mr. Dobson; he not only signed the agreement to take the shares, but he paid the money for the shares: and the sole question in Dobson's case was whether he, having signed the agreement as executor, and paid the money as executor, was entitled, as between himself and the other members of the company, to say that it was the estate, and not himself personally, that was liable for the shares. We held that he could not be entitled to have the shares in the character of executor, so as to make the estate liable as between him and his partners, that he could not as between him and his partners in the concern stipulate that the estate, and not he individually, should be liable. That was the principle upon which Dobson's case proceeded. It does not seem to me that this case falls within Dobson's case. Upon the whole, therefore, I find myself unable to agree with the conclusion at which the V. C. has arrived. I think that the order made by his Honour should be reversed, and that there should be no costs of the appeal. Lord Justice CAIRNS said:-I am of the same opinion. The sole question in the case is whether, at the date of the winding-up of the company, there was a complete contract to take these shares. If there was a complete contract of course Mr. Mallorie is in the same position as if he had become in the most formal way, and had been registered as, a shareholder in the company. We start in this case (and there is no dispute of facts) with a most important admission on the part of Mr. Greenland, the manager of the bank; for in stating his account of the interview which took place before the letter of the 13th July 1864 was written, he says he had a conversation with Mr. Mallorie; that he perfectly well knew that Mr. Mallorie was not the executor of his uncle, and he says, on Mr. Mallorie applying to him to have some shares, “I told him that I doubted whether he could have any, as the new shares were being allotted to shareholders only. He thereupon urged that his request ought to be considered, as he was an old and good customer of the bank. I believe that I thereupon said that I would see what could be done for him." From that statement there are two things perfectly clear. In the first place, that Mr. Mallorie was not claiming, or professing to claim, these shares as executor, but admitted that he had no right under the resolution of the company to get these shares. In the second place, that Mr. Greenland not only did not make a contract at this time, or make a promise to give the shares, but told Mr. Mallorie candidly that he had no authority to do so, and that all he could do for him would be to find out whether the directors would consent to give him the shares upon the footing not of being an old shareholder, or the executor of an old shareholder, but as a customer of the concern-in other words, as one of the general public. a Then the next step is, on the 13th July the letter which has been referred to was written, letter which, when you take the whole it together-I mean by that the letter itself and the additional note in the form of a postscriptamounts merely to this: Mr. Mallorie stated to the company, "I cannot claim these shares as an CHAN.] MOORE v. WEBSTER. [V.C. S. of two ways; either it is a letter of thanks to Mr. Greenland for allotting shares to the executors of Mr. Matthew Mallorie, in which case, of course, it does not advance the contention of the official liquidator here; or it is a letter thanking Mr. Greenland for having allotted shares to Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie individually, in which case it is a letter thanking Mr. Greenland for doing that which he was not authorised to do. In neither view of the case can any contract be spelt out of that letter. Now I certainly have the less hesitation in differing from the learned V. C., for whose great experience and accurate application of the prin ciples of law no person has a more unbounded respect than I have, because, as I understand, his Honour was mainly influenced in the decision he arrived at in this case by the circumstance that his former opinion expressed in Dobson's case had been overruled upon appeal in this court. But when I look at Dobson's case, I own it does not appear to me, for the reason my learned brother has stated, to be in any way a case governing the present. I think, therefore, that the name of Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie must be removed from the list, but I think it is a case in which there ought to be no costs. executor; the time has passed within which that claim might have been made, even if I were an executor; but I beg you will allot me these shares as an old customer, and as my family are old shareholders in the bank." Now that was an offer made to the banking company which they might have accepted, or which they might have declined; but until it was accepted, of course no contract could arise. As far as the records of the company are concerned, all we find that was done afterwards was that on the 14th July, the following day, a meeting of the directors was held, and after some discussion it was resolved that to the shareholders who accepted the allotments of shares, and who made application for further allotments, additional shares should be allotted in certain proportions; and then it was also resolved, as to the allotment of shares remaining undistributed, that they should be allotted according to the discretion of the manager and the two private directors. That is to say, as regards those who had a right in the character of shareholders, or as representatives of shareholders, there was to be an allotment made, without condition and without discretion; then after that was done, if there remained shares unallotted, the general public were to be considered; but then that was to be done at the discretion of Mr. Greenland and of the two private directors. So much for the resolution of the company. Now what follows? Mr. Greenland wrote a letter on the 18th July, addressed on the face of it to the executors of Mr. Matthew Mallorie, and he professes to write that letter by the instructions of the directors of the Leeds Banking Company. Now, I think that the counsel for the official liquidator naturally felt themselves in a difficulty as to the kind of contract which should be supposed to flow from this letter; because the dilemma obviously is this: if this is a letter to be read literally according to the wording of it, that is to say, a letter addressed to the executors of Mr. Matthew Mallorie, and making an offer to them, then no doubt that was a letter which was warranted by the terms of the resolution, but it was never accepted by the Husband and wife-Real estate settled on wifeexecutors of Mr. Matthew Mallorie, and the present app., Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie, is not one of these executors. If, on the other hand, you can get over the wording of the letter, and construe it as an offer made to Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie as an individual, and not as an executor of Mr. Matthew Mallorie, then that was an offer which Mr. Greenland, so far as we can see, was in no way warranted to make, and which the company had never expressed themselves willing to ratify. Then it is suggested that there must have been power under the latter part of the resolution to make the offer to Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie as an individual. I think that that suggestion is entirely met by looking at the document marked A (which was the allotment list as to the reserved shares then about to be issued) which was submitted to us, from which it is perfectly evident that, with the exception of two or three names at the end, the distinction as to which makes the rest of the document more emphatic, the document is prepared upon the footing of being an allotment to shareholders and to representatives of shareholders in the company, as a matter of right assigning to the shareholders the quota of shares which they were entitled to as a matter of right under the resolution of the company. It appears to me, therefore, that no contract was created by the letter of the 18th July, because there was no acceptance then, and no authority to accept Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie as an individual shareholder in the company. Well, then, does the final letter of Mr. Thomas Peter Mallorie, thanking Mr. Greenland for what he had done, make any difference in the case? I think not. That letter must be read in one Discharge the order of the V.C., except so far as it allowed the official liquidator his costs out of the estate; his costs of the appeal also out of the estate. Solicitors for the app., Torr, Janeway, and Tagart, Solicitors for the official liquidator, Freshfields and Newman. V. C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Monday, Dec. 10. Husband's estate by curtesy. A testator left real estate to trustees in trust for his children and their heirs as tenants in common, to hold to such as should be daughters, "independently of any husband or husbands she or they might have, and free from his or their control and liabilities, and to be assigned and disposed of, as she or they might think fit, by any deed or will in writing." One of the daughters married, and died without making any disposition of her property, leaving her husband and a son surviving her: Held, that the husband was not entitled to be a tenant by curtesy of his wife's estate. This was a special case, the principal question being, whether the deft., Edward Webster, was tenant by curtesy of certain real estate devised to his late wife under the will of William James, deceased. The will in question was dated the 10th Aug. 1841, and by it the testator gave all his real and personal estate to trustees in trust for his wife for life, and after her second marriage or decease for such of his children as should be then living, share and share alike, as tenants ir common, to hold to them, their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, for ever, or for and during all his estate, term, and interest therein respectively. The will then proceeded as follows: But if any of my children be daughters, to hold to them independently of any husband they may have, and free from his or their control and liabilities, and to be assigned and disposed of as she or they think fit by any deed or will in writing; and in the event of any of my children being daughters, I direct that my trustees hereinafter named shall deft. and one moiety of the costs of the trustees must be paid by the husband. Solicitors for the trustees and some of the defts., Cunliffe and Beaumont. Solicitors for the husband, Vizard, Crowder, The testator died on the 26th Nov. 1848. He left surviving him one son and two daughters, the elder of whom, Agnes Elizabeth, married the deft. Edward | Webster, and died intestate in March 1860, after giving birth to a son, who survived her. The tes-Anstie, and Young. tator's widow predeceased her daughter. The testator died possessed of considerable real estate, none of which had been sold. This was an application on the part of the trustees of the will for the opinion of the court on the above question. E. E. Kay, for the trustees, submitted the question to the court. Friday, Dec. 21. PICKERING V. THE ILFRACOMBE RAILWAY Pleading-Demurrer- Want of parties Want of A bill filed against a company and two shareholders, as representatives of sixty-two other shareholders, in which relief was prayed against the company, the two shareholders, and all others the holders of the shares: Held, not demurrable for want of parties. Where a contractor, in pursuance of a contract with a railway company, for certain consideration advanced money, purchased lands, and completed a portion of the works of the company, and subsequently filed a bill seeking (inter alia) to enforce the contract, and obtain a lien on the lands: Freeling, for the deft. Edward Webster, contended Morgan v. Morgan. 5 Mad. 408, 410; W. Pearson, for the infant son, submitted that the cases cited were in no way analogous to that before the court. There was a broad distinction between cases where property was limited to the wife's separate use, as it was here, and where it was left to her absolutely in fee, and it would be contrary to the recognised rule if the husband were permitted to take an estate by curtesy in the present instance. He cited Hall v. Waterhouse, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297; and 11 Jur. N. S. 361; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 716. Freeling in reply. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-The authorities in this case seem as clear as the principle. The principle applicable to cases of this description is that which was laid down in Hearle v. Greenback, where it was held that, if a husband had neither an equitable nor a legal seisin in his wife's property, he was not entitled either at law or in equity to an estate by the curtesy. Both Lord Hardwicke and Sir John Leach were of opinion that if the husband were not excluded from the fee, but only from the lifeestate, he was entitled to an estate by the curtesy. In the present case, however, there is no life-estate, and the words of exclusion are, to my mind, not partial, but entire. There must, consequently, be a notwithstanding its appearing doubtful whether the contract was not ultra vires the powers of the company under their Act of Parliament, that the bill was not demurrable for want of equity. This was a demurrer. The allegations contained in the bill were as follows: In the autumn of 1864 the plts., who were contractors, agreed to construct the Devon and Somerset Railway, and, to effect this object, to purchase the necessary land, and pay certain expenses incurred and to be incurred by the company, in consideration of receiving the whole of the capital which the company by their Act were authorised to raise, 50,000l. in cash, 166,000l. in bonds, 200,000l. in 5 per cent. preferential shares, and 250,000l. in ordinary shares. The company, under the provisions of their Act, were limited as to capital to 500,000l. in 20,000 shares of 251. each, and they were empowered to borrow any sums not exceeding in the whole 166,0007. On the 19th July 1865, the above agreement was carried out by articles of contract (which, after reciting a deed of arrangement made between the several holders of the company, whereby it was arranged that the capital was to be divided into two classes of shares, preferential and ordinary) contained a covenant on the part of the company to apply to Parliament, at the expense of the plts., for powers to issue the said 200,000l. worth of 5 per cent. preference shares, and also not to issue any of the 250,000l. worth of ordinary shares, except to the plts. or their nominees. In pursuance of that agreement, the plts. expended large sums of money in constructing a considerable portion of the work, and in the purchase of the necessary lands, such lands being in general conveyed by the vendors to the company. The bill then went on to state that the said company had, unknown to the plts., agreed to become shareholders in the Ilfracombe Railway Company to the amount of 105,000.; that the latter company had made two calls of 21. per share on such shares, and that upon the same not having been paid, had recovered judgment for the amount, and after issuing writs of elegit, in order to ascertain what lands in Devon and Somerset belonged to the Devon and Somerset Company, had commenced actions to eject them from the same. Further, that the Ilfracombe Company had (under the provisions up. V.C. S.] WAKEFIELD v. DUKE OF BUCCLEUGH. of the 36th section of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845) levied execution in respect of all moneys payable on the shares of the Devon and Somerset Company, which had not been called The bill also alleged that the Devon and Somerset Company had, in contravention of the reservation made by the above articles of contract, issued certain B preferential shares to sixty-four persons, and among others, to the defts. Lord Poltimore and Earl Fortescue, whom the plts. submitted (for the purpose of their bill) sufficiently represented all of such shareholders. Under these circumstances the plts. filed their bill against the two companies, and Lord Poltimore and Earl Fortescue, praying (inter alia) that it might be declared that they, the plts., were entitled to a lien on all lands purchased or agreed to be purchased by them or with their money, pursuant to their contract with the Devon and Somerset Railway Company, and that such lien might have a priority ver the claims of the defts, the Ilfracombe Railway Company. That they, the plts., had a right to receive or have a lien upon all moneys now payable or to become payable in respect of the shares held by the defts. Lord Poltimore and Earl Fortescue, and in respect of all others the holders of such shares as had been issued, or reserved for issue, to subscribers other than the plts., the contractors; and that such right or lien should have priority over the claims of the defts. the Ilfracombe Railway Company. Further, that the defts. Lord Poltimore and Earl Fortescue, and all others the holders of such shares, might be restrained from paying any moneys in respect of them to the defts. the Ilfracombe Railway Company. To this bill the defts. demurred for want of parties and for want of equity. Bacon, Q. C. and Wickens for the demurrer.-The bill was defective for want of parties. The plts. prayed for relief against all the shareholders, and they ought consequently to have been parties to the suit. The mere statement in the bill that they were represented by others who were parties was not sufficient. It was impossible now to recede from the direct relief prayed against the whole of the shareholders, and as only two of them had been made parties, the demurrer must be allowed: (Walworth v. Holt, 4 M. & C. 619.) Further, there was a want of equity. The contract which the plts. sought to enforce was vltra vires the powers of the Devon and Somerset Company, and a direct fraud upon their Act of Parliament. The company had no power to issue debentures until half of the capital had been paid up; they had never raised the necessary amount of capital, and had no right to issue any preference shares. The plts. had knowingly entered into an illegal contract, under which they were entitled neither to a lien on the lands nor to the calls to be made upon the shares of the company. Moreover, the allegations were altogether insufficient to establish the case the plts. endeavoured to set up. Greene, Q. C. and J. Sayer, for the plts., were not called upon. [V.C. M. two of the defts., as shareholders in a company and representatives of other shareholders, go on to ask for the same relief in respect of all others the holders of such shares. No doubt there is an inaccuracy in this, but not such an inaccuracy as would justify the court in allowing the demurrer for want of parties. The case amounts to this: the rule has been transgressed in letter but not in substance. The demurrer, if allowed, would have the effect of bringing a number of unnecessary persons before the court at a great expense and inconvenience. As to the demurrer for want of equity, it has been contended that the bill proceeds on a contract not permitted by the Legislature. I do not say that an important question may not hereafter arise as to the legality of the contract set out in the bill, but it is one that involves great argument, and I am not prepared to deal with it now on demurrer. It appears to me that the plts. sufficiently show that they have certain rights in equity which the defts. are trying to disturb by legal proceedings. It is said, however, that there is an insufficiency in the allegations to prove the pits." right to equitable relief; but, taking the case altogether, I consider that there is enough on the face of the bill to justify the plts. in coming to have their rights and claims adjudicated upon by this court, and I shall therefore disallow the demurrer, but as the bill might have been more carefully framed, without costs. Solicitors for the plts., Randall and Ainger. Upon the construction of a local Inclosure Act: Held, that the portion of the common lands sold by the commissioner to defray the expenses of the inclosure was not freed from the rights of the lord of the manor to the mines and minerals beneath the surface. There were two questions in this suit; one under the Inclosure Act of 41 Geo. 3, c. 109, and of the local Inclosure Act of 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. x., being whether a portion of waste or common land inclosed under those Acts and sold to defray the expenses of inclosure was sold freed from all right by the lord of the manor to the mines and minerals beneath the surface. The other question arose only in the event of it being decided that the lord of the manor was so entitled to the mines and minerals beneath the surface of the land thus sold to defray expenses, and was whether the lord, or any person claiming under him, was entitled to work the mines in such a manner as to injure the surface of the land. The bill was filed by Edward Thomas Wakefield, who claimed to be the owner in fee simple of twenty-six Hadley appeared for Lord Poltimore and Earl acres of land, part of the manor of Plain Furness, Fortescue. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.--The argument in support of the demurrer for want of parties has proceeded on the rule, which is now thoroughly understood, that if relief is prayed against a person, that person must necessarily be a party to the suit. To apply that rule, however, to the present case would be ridiculous, for what has happened here is simply this: The plts. in praying for relief against in the parish of Dalton, in the county palatine of Lancaster, and of the mines and iron ore and other mines and minerals in and under the same. He sought by his bill to restrain the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensbury, and his lessee, Miles Kennedy, from entering upon or continuing upon or under the plt.'s lands, and from sinking or opening or continuing any pits or shafts in, upon, or under the same; and from mining or working, or carrying off any iron ore or other minerals from the mines lying V.C. M.] WAKEFIELD v. DUKE OF BUCCLEUGH. [V.C. M. therein directed, and the section provided that, Every allotment for which the full purchase-money shall be paid shall immediately thereupon be absolutely discharged of and from all common and other rights thereon or therein, and be vested in fee-simple in, and be inclosed and thenceforth held in, severalty by such purchaser or purchasers thereof respectively, as his, her, or their private and absolute property, and shall be allotted accordingly by the said commissioner or commissioners. under the same lands; and from erecting any | part as he thought sufficient, and sell it in manner engines or works on the lands; and from further interfering with the plt.'s lands, or the mines and minerals thereunder, or any part thereof. The bill also sought to restrain the defts., their agents and workmen, from working or continuing to work the mines or minerals under the plt.'s lands so or in such manner as to cause a subsidence of the surface or soil thereof; or from removing or causing to be removed any of the substrata necessary for the support of the plt.'s land. The bill also prayed for an account, for damages, and for a receiver. The twenty-six acres of land in question originally formed part of a larger quantity of land set out by the commissioner under and sold to Jane Towers for defraying the expenses of carrying into effect the provisions of 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. x., which was an Act for inclosing the waste lands in the township of Kirkby Ireleth, and of Lindale and Marton, in the parish of Dalton and county of Lancaster. The conveyance to Jane Towers was dated the 5th Oct. 1831, and was made between John Huddlestone, the commissioner under the Act, of the one part, and Jane Towers of the other part, and after reciting the general and local Acts, and that the commissioner had by his award, dated the 27th April 1831, appropriated, marked, and set out parcels of the waste in the schedule of allotment thereinafter mentioned and thereto annexed, in order to raise money by the sale thereof to defray and discharge all the costs, charges and expenses incident to, and of obtaining the said recited Act, and of carrying the same into execution, and that he had sold (besides other allotments to other persons) to Jane Towers the allotments therein mentioned; and after reciting that the purchase-money had been paid, and that the said John Huddlestone had awarded, set out, assigned, allotted, and appointed to the said Jane Towers, and the other persons therein mentioned, in severalty, their several and respective heirs and assigns for ever, the several allotments so purchased by them in consideration of 8251, he conveyed the allotments, and the reversion and all the estate, &c., to hold the same to the only proper use of Jane Towers, her heirs and assigns for ever. The twenty-six acres became subsequently vested in Joseph Sharpe, who by indenture of the 1st April 1865 conveyed them to the plt. in fee. In 1863 a mine of iron ore had been discovered under the land, and the deft. Kennedy, the Duke of Buccleugh's lessee, having opened a pit or shaft on the lands in June 1865, commenced working and carrying off the ore through the shaft. The then owner of the land had protested against this working by Kennedy, who had recently commenced another shaft. The plt. caused a notice to be served on the defts. requesting them to desist. The deft. Kennedy alleged that he was working under a lease or licence from the Duke of Buccleugh. On the 15th June 1865 an injunction had been granted on the terms of the plt.'s being answerable for damages (see 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 628.) It was arranged that the first question, viz., whether the lord of the manor had any right at all to the minerals beneath the surface, should be taken separately from the other, as, if it was decided in the plt.'s favour, the decision would render the discussion of the other question unnecessary. The section of the General Inclosure Act (41 Geo. 3, c. 109) which principally bore upon the present question was the 32nd, which enacted that, in case it should be provided by any subsequent Act that the expenses attending an inclosure should be paid by any part of the lands so to be inclosed, the commissioner should mark and set out such Sect. 40 of the General Inclosure Act enacted that nothing contained in any future local Act should Lessen, prejudice, or defeat the right, title, or interest of any lord or lady of any manor or lordship within the jurisdiotion or limits whereof the lands and grounds thereby directed to be divided and allotted are situate, lying, and being, of, in, or to the seignories, rights, and royalties incident or belonging to such manor or lordship, or reputed manor or lordship, or to the lord or lady thereof, or to any person or persons claiming under him or her, but the same (other than and except the interest and other property as is or are meant or intended to be barred by such Act) shall remain in 'as full, ample, and beneficial manner, to all intents and purposes, as he or she might or ought to have held or enjoyed such rights before the passing of such Act, or in case the same had never been made. The 44th and last section of the Act provided that the provisions of the Act should be only so far effective and binding in each particular case as they should not be otherwise provided in any subsequent Act. The provisions of the local Act (1 & 2 Geo. 4, follows:-The preamble recited that the Duchess of c. x.) which bore upon this question were mainly as Buccleugh was the lady of the manor of Plain Furness, and, as such, was entitled to the soil of the moors, commons, and wastes, and to all mines, minerals, and quarries, of what nature or kind soever, within or under the same. The 23rd section gave power to the commissioner to sell such part or parts of the said moors, commons, or wastes as in his judgment would be necessary in order, by sale thereof, to raise a competent sum of money for paying the charges and expenses of obtaining and passing the Act, and allotting the said moors, commons, and wastes, and generally all other charges and expenses whatsoever relating to the inclosure. out and award (after setting out the allotments) in two or more plots to the lord or lady of the manor, as a compensation for his or her right and interest in the soil of the moors, commons, and wastes, a full sixteenth part of the remainder of the moors over and above such parts as he or she was entitled to as The 24th section directed the commissioner to set owner. and allotment of the residue of the waste amongst The 26th section directed the division, setting out, the landowners in the lands included in the Act; and the 29th section enacted that all allotments made to customary tenants should be estates of freehold in common socage, subject and without prejudice, nevertheless, to the rights of the Duchess of Buccleugh (then lady of the manor), or any future lord or lady of such manor, to all mines, minerals, and quarries under the same. The 43rd section saved and reserved to the Duchess of Buccleugh, and the persons for the time being entitled to the manor, and the mines, minerals, and quarries, all mines and quarries under the said lands thereby directed to be divided and inclosed, with general power to work them, with certain restrictions as to injury to messuages and making reasonable compensation. The 44th section reserved all seignorial rights. The Attorney-General, Shapter, Q. C., and Druce for the plts. Sir R. Palmer, Q. C., Baily, Q. C., and Freeling for the Duke of Buccleugh. |