V. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, under which Portugal took the attitude which resulted in the German declaration of war of March 9, 1916, dates from 1373 and is not only the oldest existing political engagement in the world but is the longest friendship in history. It consists of portions of the following: 1. Treaty of peace, friendship and alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373. 2. Treaty of alliance between England and Portugal, signed at Windsor, May 9, 1386. 3. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, January 29, 1642. 4. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Westminster, July 20, 1654. 5. Treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Whitehall, April 28, 1660. 6. Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal of marriage between his Majesty Charles II and the Princess Catherine, Infanta, signed at Whitehall, June 23, 1661. 7. Treaty of defensive alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Lisbon, May 16, 1703. 8. Convention of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, October 22, 1807. 9. Treaty of friendship and alliance between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, signed at Rio de Janeiro, February 19, 1810. THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE Alexander II of Russia, Emperor William I of Germany and Emperor-King Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary met at Berlin September 5-12, 1872, the result being a general understanding among them and mutual explanations of foreign policies, without any written alliance. This League of the Three Emperors remained firm only three years. In 1876 the Tsar met Francis Joseph at Reichstadt and while in a carriage signed an understanding, converted into two formal documents signed at Vienna in January and March, 1877, by which Austria-Hungary secured the right of occupying BosniaHerzegovina in exchange for her neutrality in case of a successful Russian war against Turkey, while Bessarabia was to fall to Russia. Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as within the Austro-Hun AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 177 garian sphere of influence or interest, and were to be territorially benefited in case of the dismemberment of Turkey. This arrangement was effected without the knowledge or co-operation of Germany, according to the North German Gazette. War broke out between Russia and Turkey on April 24, 1877, and was closed by the treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. The terms of this treaty being unsatisfactory to the powers, the Congress of Berlin was held June 13-July 13, 1878, and resulted in the treaty of Berlin, revising the terms negotiated at San Stefano. Russia's former friendliness toward Germany cooled after the congress, and political conditions determined Bismarck to bind Germany and Austria-Hungary together while the opportunity offered. The occasion was made by him in a few months. In carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Berlin a mixed commission in 1879 was working in Novibazar to delimit the western frontier of Turkey. In three letters to the Emperor of Germany the Tsar demanded that the German representative yield in all instances to the wishes of his Russian colleague. Alexander II wrote in effect that the acceptance by Germany of this demand was the condition of the maintenance of peace between the two peoples. Bismarck, who was at Gastein for his health, wrote to the emperor after reading these letters that, if this demand had been made in a Russian diplomatic document, he would have advised mobilization of the armed forces against Russia. He therefore requested the Kaiser to get the sequel handled through official channels. So far as appearances went the incident blew over; for the Tsar and Kaiser had a cordial meeting at Alexandrovo on September 3. But Bismarck, fearing a change of policy at Vienna after the retirement of Count Julius Andrássy, made use of the incident by passing the correspondence to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. The latter, scenting the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance, replied that an Austro-German alliance would be the only counterweight. The Kaiser was unwilling to have such an alliance, but its terms were nevertheless negotiated by Bismarck and Andrássy on September 21-24, and the Kaiser's assent was obtained on the • Archibald Cary Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance, 95-114; London Times, April 29, May 9, 1879. i 29th, though only after strong pressure was exerted. The treaty of October 7, 1879, was the result.2 The value of this treaty to Bismarck, who laid the course which the Germany of to-day has so eagerly followed, was frankly-and cynically-expressed the next year to a Russian diplomat: "Austria would be very much deceived if she thought that the security resulting from her relations to us was complete. Our interests compel us to prevent her being destroyed, but she is not guaranteed against attack. A war between Russia and Austria would place us, it is true, in a most embarrassing position, but our attitude in such an eventuality will be determined by our own interests, and not by engagements which have no existence. Our interests demand that neither Russia nor Austria be mortally wounded. Their existence as great powers is equally necessary to us. That is what will determine our conduct, should occasion arise." 3 ITALY ENTERS THE COMBINATION Francesco Crispi, then president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, visited several European capitals in the autumn of 1877 and on September 16 had a conference with Prince Bismarck at which they discussed questions of policy and the possibility of an alliance. In conclusion Crispi said: "Then we must confine ourselves to a treaty of alliance in case we should be attacked by France." To which Bismarck rejoined: "I will take the Emperor's orders with a view to opening official negotiations for an alliance."4 In telegrams to the Italian king and the premier, Crispi stated that the alliance was to be defensive and offensive, that Germany refused an eventual treaty against Austria-Hungary, and that she was not interested in the Near Eastern question. Early in 1880, Italy again Hans Blum, Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks. Politische Geschichte von 1871 bis 1890 (Leipzig und Wien, Bibliographisches Institut, 1893), 219-220; in greater detail in his Fürst Bismarck und seine Zeit. Eine Biographie für das deutsche Volk (München, C. H. Beck, 1894-95), V, 285 ff., and referred to by Victor von Strantz, Das Deutsches Reich, 1871-1895 (Berlin, R. von Decker's verlag, 1895), 76-78. See also Archives diplomatiques, 1893, IV, 331-332; Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 255-272. "An analogous treaty between the two powers for defense against France has not been published."-Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 272. James Young Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and the Sabouroff Memoirs," Nineteenth Century and After, January, 1918, 67. Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, II, 37. ITALY ENTERS THE COMBINATION 179 approached Bismarck with regard to an official alliance and received word that "the road to Berlin led through Vienna." In January, 1881, Italy sent an agent to Vienna, where Balkan affairs were discussed. As a result Italy felt that there was no serious obstacle to establishing a close and sincere friendship between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Formal negotiations between Berlin, Rome and Vienna followed. The negotiations apparently continued for a year. They took a double form, Italy regarding Germany as a powerful friend to be conciliated and honored, while to her Austria-Hungary was a masked enemy to be mistrusted, watched and guarded against.' Bismarck was desirous of securing an engagement against France, but Italy would not consent to that, notwithstanding her disappointment at having seen France acquire Tunis by the treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881. And Austria-Hungary again defeated that German ambition, having already refused to include such an engagement in her alliance with Germany. Andrássy held that there was nothing to put Austria-Hungary at variance with France, and offered to resign rather than take an engagement against France. So Bismarck had to forego his desire at that time. The terms of the alliance seem to have taken form as a result of Italy's demands. She sought support for her position and ambitions in the Mediterranean. This was refused, and the incident explains why Art. I of the treaty promises only "mutual support within the scope of their own interests." Even this vague engagement was too much for Austria-Hungary and as an offset to it the Ballplatz secured Art. VII, with the effect of heading off Italian efforts to get Albania. Italy also demanded a guaranty of her territorial integrity, aiming to end all danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the papacy. Austria-Hungary finally consented because such a guaranty would hinder the Italian Government's advocacy of Italia Irredenta, while Germany was willing to have another security for her position in Alsace-Lorraine. Germany was not interested in the Balkans, and therefore the treaty signed by her with Italy. omitted the clause relating to the Near East.3 Emile Joseph Dillon, From the Triple Alliance to the Quadruple Alliance, 28. Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance, 211-212. RUMANIA FORCED IN As early as 1881 Austria-Hungary desired to bring Rumania under her as a protectorate. Therefore she raised the question of the Danube. A conference on the subject was held February 8March 10, 1883, at London. Rumania applied by a note of February I for admission to this diplomatic gathering, which vitally affected her fluvial artery. Count Münster, the German delegate, opposed the application on the ground that, "if a vote was given to Rumania, a position not at all desirable would be created, the power at her volition to impose her veto." Austria-Hungary supported this idea and demanded that Servia, which similarly sought admission, should be considered on equal terms with Rumania. This objection, in view of the customary unanimity in diplomatic gatherings, resulted in a conference resolution to "invite Rumania and Serbia to attend its sessions in order to consult them and to understand their point of view." The small states were to sit at the table of the family of nations only as children. Rumania on February 12 replied that it could "not accept a situation which would give it only a consultative voice and which would not permit it to take part in the decisions of the conference." Serbia accepted. The conference meant much to Rumania and it disturbed her deeply to see Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey handling a matter of vital interest to her, while she herself was made impotent regarding it at the behest of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, her avowed enemy by reason of the unredeemed Rumanian population west of the Carpathians. The Danube was in general controlled by the European Commission, consisting of the above-named powers, and locally by the Mixed Commission, which was subordinate to the European body but, by the system of voting employed, subject to the will of Austria-Hungary. This situation explains Rumania's disturbance when in the session of February 10 Count Karolyi, the Austro-Hungarian delegate, urged that the executive character of the Mixed Commission should come before the conference. This "seemed indispensable to my Government to assure the regular execution of the regulations prepared by the European Commission," he said. He hoped that Rumania |