Слике страница
PDF
ePub

GERMAN PRESSURE ON RUMANIA

181

would no longer refuse to accede to this proposition. In the session of February 13 Count Karolyi read a project, in which France objected to the word "executory"; Russia took the same view. Count Karolyi then "declared himself ready to abandon the word." Rumania protested against the final action of the conference, but to no avail.1

GERMAN PRESSURE FOR SECRET DIPLOMACY

Said Take Ionescu in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies: "Germany helped us, but at what price? The price, gentlemen, was our treaty of alliance with Austria." And he proceeds:

After that, as Rumania still objected, a new incident fell all of a sudden from the skies, which Austria seized upon. On June 5, 1883, at the unveiling of the statue of Stephen the Great at Jassy, Pierre Gradishteano ... spoke at the banquet of the two pearls which were missing from the crown of Stephen the Great. Of these pearls, gentlemen, one, the larger, was beyond the Pruth, was Bessarabia; the other, the smaller, was the Bukovina.

No protest came from Russia, for Russia did not think that her military power would dissolve in a glass of champagne, so that she could no longer defend her frontier. But from beyond the mountains, where the desire was to pick a quarrel with us at any cost, and at any cost, as in the case of Serbia, to put an end to Rumanian arrogance, bred of the victories on the plains of Bulgaria, and regarded as menacing to Hungary—from beyond the mountains came formidable protests. Our excuses, the explanations which followed, availed us nothing. The situation had become intolerable. . . .

And then, gentlemen, Jean Bratiano went on leave for 40 days, on July 12; King Carol left on August 4. He met Jean Bratiano on August 6 at Breslau. On August 10, Bratiano returned home. From Berlin the King went to Vienna, and stayed at the Burg. He returned to Prédéal on August 16. Lastly, on August 23, Bratiano set off again, for 15 days, to Gastein. It was then that the alliance was concluded. . . .

The conclusion of this alliance came, not so much from our fear of Russia, as from the fact that our other neighbor made our life intolerable, and that we found no other means except the alliance to make our existence

Ministerul afacerilor straine. Cestunea Dunarei, Acte si documente (Bucuresci, 1883), 833-840, 842, 912. The protocols are also printed in Archives Diplomatiques, ze série, VII, 216-262.

tolerable. In exchange the protocol about the Danube was naturally given up, for no one wishes to throttle an ally; that would be superfluous; one keeps that for neutrals or one's enemies.'

In August or September, 1883, Rumania became a silent partner in the Triple Alliance, signing a treaty identical with that of Italy. How closely the text was guarded is shown by Alexander Marghiloman, former Rumanian foreign secretary: "I myself, though I was foreign secretary, had never seen that treaty... and knew only some of its stipulations from verbal communications made to me by the prime minister. . . . When the fateful Crown council was held at Sinaia, in 1914, which, under the presidency of King Carol, decided on Rumania's attitude, this treaty lay on the table, but only three of those present knew its contents, though it was to form the chief subject of the deliberations." 2

CHANGES IN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In 1887 German policy had changed toward Balkan affairs and the presence of Rumania in the alliance also doubtless contributed to its being given a new form. The renewal of that year was made in a single document. It was probably at that time that the exchange of letters between the sovereigns took place, possibly having been preceded by similar letters of a less formal character. Doubtless the military undertakings of the alliance were revised at the same time.

The renewal of May 6, 1891, also involved a revision. Marquis di Rudini, Italian minister of foreign affairs, "imparted to it a marked economic character which, besides satisfying certain needs of his country, insensibly blunted the anti-French point of the alliance," 3 which had been given to it as a result of the commercial negotiations

Take Ionescu, The Policy of National Instinct. A speech delivered . . . in the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies during the sitting of 16th & 17th December, 1915 (London, Sir Joseph Causton & Sons, 1916), pp. 79-83.

War and Peace, February, 1918, page 185. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Rumania's participation in the alliance has been common in well-informed circles for 20 years. For instance, Andrew D. White, American ambassador to Germany and chairman of the American delegation to the First Hague Conference, referring to Germany's opposition to arbitration proposals at that conference, wrote in his diary on June 9, 1899: "There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies-the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey and Rumania-leading them to oppose it." (Autobiography of Andrew D. White, II, 294.)

Emile Joseph Dillon, From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance, 35-36.

BISMARCK AND THE NEAR EAST

183

under the ægis of the treaty. This was accomplished only with difficulty and with after-effects. Italy desired a commercial treaty which Germany and Austria-Hungary refused to sign. Rudini gained his point by writing to Count Eberhard zu Solms-Sonnewalde, the German ambassador at Rome: "Your Excellency, the delay in ratifying these commercial treaties is a species of blackmail on the part of the government you represent. I have the honor to inform you that if the pending treaty is not signed within 24 hours I shall tear up the Triple Alliance and announce the reasons to the world." The treaties in question were signed on December 6, 1891, being similar to each other in text.1

MOMENTOUS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

Art. VII of the main treaty proved in the course of time to be its crucial provision. The publication of its text throws a flood of light backward upon the motley events of successive Balkan crises, while it establishes a certain continuity between various Balkan incidents dating from the treaty of Berlin in 1878. In 1882, when the alliance was concluded, Germany had been so little interested in the Balkans that she signed a separate treaty with Italy omitting reference to that region. Bismarck then considered the Near East an unavoidable pawn on the chessboard of relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia. But by 1887 he had altered that view and was willing to make the preservation of the Balkan status quo one of the casus fæderis of the Triple Alliance for Germany. This change fixed Berlin's eyes upon the Near East, contributed to the birth of the Drang nach Osten idea, encouraged in its degree the development of the Berlin-Bagdad conception and the Turko-German rapprochement, which culminated in the actual alliance of 1914. Thus Art. VII proved to be the point of application for the inherent menace of the Triple Alliance to European peace. The Young Turk revival

Treaty of commerce, customs and navigation between Germany and Italy, Nouveau recueil général de traités, ze série, XVII, 712-809; treaty of commerce and navigation between Italy and Austria-Hungary, Neumann, Traités de l'Autriche-Hongrie, XV, 97-249. Germany signed a treaty of the same character with Austria-Hungary and Belgium on the same day. The treaty with Italy superseded the one of May 4, 1883. All the treaties mentioned represented a new German commercial policy.

The quotation is taken from an article in the New York World said to have been supplied to it from official Italian sources.

of the Ottoman constitution on July 10, 1908, was followed on October 1 by the declaration of Bulgarian independence from Turkey and on October 3 by Austria-Hungary's proclamation annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary under the terms of the treaty of Berlin. This violent rupture of the Balkan status quo created a crisis of magnitude and was the first of the train of circumstances which led directly to the world war-the Turko-Italian war, the Balkan wars and the ultimatum to Serbia.

The Bosnia-Herzegovinian crisis was a test for the Triple Alliance, its effect on the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary being recorded in the instructions of December 15, 1909, which are printed as part of the alliance.' The crisis had the effect of welding Germany and Austria-Hungary closer together. Early in the affair Emperor William sent to Francis Joseph a letter in which he is alleged to have asserted that "Germany stands steadfastly with AustriaHungary not only in consequence of the alliance, but also by reason of the agreement of their interests." That was assuredly Germany's attitude, for on September 21, 1910, the Kaiser had occasion to reply to a welcome by the burgomaster of Vienna, who referred to "the inmost joy of Austria-Hungary, which recently had occasion once more to recognize the Nibelung loyalty of the German Empire and of its exalted ruler." And Emperor William replied: "Methinks I read in your resolve the agreement of the city of Vienna with the action of an ally in taking his stand in shining armor at a grave moment by the side of your most gracious sovereign. This was at once an injunction of duty and of friendship; for the alliance has, to the weal of the world, passed into and pervaded as an imponderable element the convictions and the life of both peoples." 3

ITALY STRAINS AT THE LEASH

Italy's position in the alliance was strained as a result of that part of the Turko-Italian war which extended Italian military operations to the Turkish islands. Austria-Hungary protested against

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

ITALY STRAINS AT THE LEASH

185

the disturbance of the status quo and a rancorous correspondence ensued. After the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Italy was enabled to return the compliment in Austria-Hungary's own words. On July 26 the Duke of Avarna, Italian ambassador at Vienna, wrote to Count Berchtold, the Vienna minister of foreign affairs: "Should the threatening conflict lead to war and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Serbian territory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Art. VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim compensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in advance." Austria-Hungary sought freedom of action and declared that, as she contemplated no territorial acquisitions, she would nevertheless be prepared to discuss "an eventual compensation" if she were "compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be considered as merely provisional." Germany in the main sided against Austria-Hungary and held that the Italian interpretation of Art. VII should be acknowledged even if Italy remained neutral. After this expression of German opinion, Count Berchtold telegraphed on August 23, to Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome: "I authorize you to declare to the Rome cabinet, in conjunction with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian interpretation of the term 'dans les régions des Balcans' in Art. VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration of the treaty. This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us."4 This did not quite meet the Italian contention, which was summarized by Count Berchtold on December 12, in the following language: "Under the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only temporary. We, therefore, should have notified the Italian cabinet and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier." s

Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. XV, p. 21.

2 Ibid., No. XV, p. 21.

3

Ibid., No. XLII, p. 39. $ Ibid., No. LXXIV, 54; cf. Italian Green Book, No. 3.

4 Ibid., No. XLIV, 40–41.

« ПретходнаНастави »