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GERMANY "REINSURES" WITH RUSSIA

191

Art. II. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The two courts pledge themselves to permit no modification of the territorial status quo in that peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as it arises, every attempt to disturb that status quo or to modify it without their consent.

Art. III. The two courts recognize the European and naturally obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, founded on the law of nations, confirmed by treaties, and set forth in the declaration made by the second plenipotentiary of Russia at the Congress of Berlin, in the session of July 12 (Protocol 19). They will take care in common that Turkey makes no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any government by lending to military operations of a belligerent power that portion of its empire adjoining the straits. In case of infraction or to prevent infraction in case it is in prospect, the two courts shall warn Turkey that they would consider her, if such were to take place, as having put herself in a state of war with the injured party, and as having deprived herself henceforth of the benefits of security assured to her territorial status quo by the treaty of Berlin.2

In a protocol signed the same day, it was declared that, in order to complete the stipulations of Arts. II and III of the treaty, the two courts had agreed upon the following points:

1. Germany, as in the past, will aid Russia to re-establish in Bulgaria a regular and legal government. She promises that she will in no case give consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battenberg.

2. In case the Emperor of Russia should find himself obliged to take over the task of defending the entrance into the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany engages to lend benevolent neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the measures which his Majesty shall deem it necessary to take in order to guard the key of his empire.3

"The plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able to accept completely the proposition of the second plenipotentiary of Great Britain concerning the closing of the straits, are minded to request on their side insertion in the protocol of the observation:

"That in their opinion the principle of the closing of the straits is a European principle, and that the provisions concluded on this matter in 1841, 1856 and 1871, and now confirmed by the treaty of Berlin, are obligatory on the part of all the powers, conformably to the spirit and the letter of the existing treaties, not only toward the Sultan but toward all the powers signatory of these transactions."-Das Staatsarchiv, XXXIV, 274.

* Serge Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," American Historical Review, XXIII, 338-339.

Ibid., 339.

The treaty was to expire in 1890. In 1889 the Russian minister of foreign affairs was directed to study whether renewal of the treaty should take place. The decision was that it should, and on December 19 the Tsar ordered arrangements to that end, the renewal negotiations not to begin before April, 1890. In a conversation on February 12, 1890, Bismarck said to Shuvalov: "I vote for the continuance of our entente." Shuvalov was doubtless right when, in reporting this conversation, he ventured the opinion that "to Bismarck our entente is in some sort a guarantee that no written agreement exists between us and France, and that is very important for Germany." William II of Germany dropped Bismarck as his pilot on March 20, 1890. Three days before, when the Kaiser had already accepted the Prince's resignation, Shuvalov had seen the prince and had been told that William II had objected to his chancellor's Russophil policy. Yet the Kaiser sent for the Russian ambassador in the night of March 21 and, at the ensuing interview at 8 A.M., declared: "I beg you to tell his Majesty that on my part I am entirely disposed to renew our agreement. . . . Nothing has changed either in my personal sentiments toward him or in my policy in regard to Russia." The Tsar annotated this dispatch: "We shall see by the sequel whether deeds correspond with words." And the sequel was that the Berlin pundits first determined to transfer the negotiations to St. Petersburg, and when General Schweinitz, German ambassador to Russia, opened his long-awaited instructions to proceed he found they were orders to refuse to renew the treaty. "In my secret heart, I am well content," wrote the Tsar on the report of the incident.' Russia was free to cultivate the friendship of France.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA MAKE FRIENDS

An entirely different spirit from that of the Triple Alliance-as different as the purposes of the contesting sides in the present waris evident from the beginning in the history of the Triple Entente which was taking form as the new ruler of Germany was breaking from his Russian moorings.

Goriainov, loc. cit., 341-344: Chancellor Georg Leo von Caprivi was, of course, the person technically responsible for the decision and his explanation was that the Germany's treaty relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia were "too complicated." Bismarck retorted that they "of course required a considerable degree of diplomatic skill." (Hofmann, Fürst Bismarck, II, 4.)

RUSSIA AND FRANCE MAKE FRIENDS

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The Triple Entente had for its foundation the Dual Alliance between France and Russia. Instead of a friendship forced by grim necessity and based on sharp dealings, we here find amity the natural result of mutual interest based on a ready acceptance of the equality and the equal rights of the parties.

In 1888 Russian bonds were depressed on the Berlin exchange. On November 20 a Russian 4% loan of 500 million francs was authorized, and was offered at Paris, London, Amsterdam and St. Petersburg. In France alone 1,163,000,000 francs was subscribed and Russian rentes rose everywhere except at Berlin. At that time Charles Louis de Saulces de Freycinet, minister of war in the Floquet cabinet, advocated a program of military reorganization. One day MajorGeneral Baron Frederiks, Russian military attaché and an old friend, called upon him and engaged him in a familiar conversation. Russia, he at length proposed, would like to rearm its troops with a French modeled rifle. The proposal was submitted to the cabinet and agreed to. Shortly after, early in November, Grand Duke Vladimir, brother of the Tsar, asked M. Freycinet to examine the French Lebel rifle and its ammunition. After this examination, Baron Frederiks called on the minister of war and inquired if France would manufacture 500,000 of the weapon for Russia.

"We ask nothing better than to satisfy you," said M. Freycinet in a tone half serious, half jocular. "Only we would have to be assured that the guns would never shoot at us."

"We understand that perfectly," returned the Russian in the same voice, "and we will give you every guaranty on that point."

A few days later M. Freycinet met Baron Arthur Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador, and repeated his conversation with the attaché. The baron said:

"Not only do I approve what Frederiks said to you, but I am myself ready to use his words on my own account."

"That being so," continued M. Freycinet, "would you accept a conversation on the subject with M. Goblet, our minister of foreign affairs?"

"Certainly," replied Baron Mohrenheim, and negotiations began without delay.1

Pierre Albin, La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894), 264-267.

Between that conversation and the actual signing of any document there was a period of nearly three years. Franco-Russian relations during this time grew more cordial, notwithstanding several incidents capable of creating tension. Events recent at the time suggested the possibility that Great Britain might associate herself with the powers of the Triple Alliance, and this created in the mind of Alexander III a noticeable pro-French disposition. The expiration of the Russo-German treaty on June 18, 1890, left Russia free to make new arrangements.

The actual Franco-Russian negotiations were rapidly conducted when once seriously begun.

Alexander Ribot was minister of foreign affairs in the fourth Freycinet ministry in the spring of 1891. Lefebvre de Laboulaye, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, was on leave at Paris in April and he, M. Ribot and Baron Mohrenheim, together with Premier Freycinet, began pour parlers which lasted about two months. On July 22 a French squadron anchored at Kronstadt, Admiral Gervais and his men enjoying extraordinary courtesies during their stay in Russian waters, which lasted until August 10. On August 12 Baron Mohrenheim was ordered to St. Petersburg, where he had an audience of the Tsar on the 18th. At that time a text was agreed upon and it was formally signed immediately after Mohrenheim's return to Paris on the 22nd.

DISTANCE DOES NOT SEPARATE

The fact of the agreement was announced almost immediately. On August 31 Baron Mohrenheim, speaking at Cauterets in reply to an ovation, said: "The preparations you have made for my return would almost justify me in believing I had not been absent. It is true that distance does not always separate and that absence may itself be a drawing together." Premier de Freycinet on September 10 referred at a luncheon to general officers and military attachés to France as being "in a new situation." On September 29 at Bapaume, M. Ribot, minister of foreign affairs, referred to the "profound sympathies" uniting Russia and France as illustrated by recent manifestations. "What is true of internal policy is even more true

I

Jens Julius Hansen, L'Alliance franco-russe, 69, 71, 72-73; Archives diplomatiques, XL, 212–213.

ALLIANCE FOLLOWS NAVAL VISIT

195

of external policy; results are not improvised; they are the consequence and the reward of a long series of efforts." 1

I

The exchange of notes of August 27, 1891, satisfied neither the French Premier Freycinet, nor the actual military alignment of Europe. Since the conversation of 1888 there had been more or less interchange of military ideas between France and Russia. In 1891, with the approval of General Vannovski, Russian minister of war, Russian officers had got into touch with the French general staff "to initiate arrangements for transportation of troops and provisioning." 2 In October an Austro-German mixed commission composed of general staff officers was appointed for the purpose of assuring the eventual collaboration of the allied forces against Russia. Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian minister of state, arrived in Paris November 17, 1891, and left five days later. On the 21st at a conference between him, Ambassador Mohrenheim, Premier Freycinet and Minister Ribot a military convention was agreed to in principle. Negotiations were well advanced when the Freycinet ministry fell on February 18, 1892, to be followed by a Loubet ministry in which Ribot and Freycinet respectively retained the portfolios of foreign affairs and war. Negotiations continued and the French assistant chief of the general staff, General Le Mouton de Boisdeffre, went to Russia in midAugust for the ostensible purpose of attending the Russian maneuvers. Toward the end of the month he exchanged with General Obruchef the signed copies of the Franco-Russian military convention.

ALLIANCE SIGNED AFTER NAVAL FRATERNIZING

Political events in 1893 caused both France and Russia keenly to appreciate the advantages of their mutual friendship. On October 13 a Russian squadron under Admiral Avellane anchored at Toulon and for two weeks was the object of unbridled French enthusiasm, culminating in an exchange of cordial telegrams between President Carnot and the Tsar. Under the impulse of this courtesy Jules Develle, minister of foreign affairs at Paris, and M. Giers at St. Petersburg virtually concluded negotiations for a formal alliance by the end of November. The Dupuy cabinet, of which Develle • Archives diplomatiques, XL, 214. Albin, op. cit., 334; Hansen, op. cit., 86.

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