M. Davignon, his minister for foreign affairs, June 22, 1907, when he wrote: International understandings are the fashion. After the Franco-Russian alliance we had the understanding of Italy with France and England on the Mediterranean, the alliance between England and Japan, and finally the agreement between England and France by which they settled their bargain over Egypt and Morocco. At present England is negotiating with Russia concerning the regulation of boundaries and spheres of influence in Asia. All these understandings arose either from a desire to put an end to old differences or to prevent new ones from arising. . . . The resulting treaty, signed August 31, 1907, left three great countries without mutual suspicions regarding each other. The effort at appeasement continued. Parliamentary and commercial visits were exchanged, and Anglo-Russian friendship became a subject for sympathetic public discussion. All of this attained a new significance when King Edward visited the Czar at Reval on a yachting cruise, June 9-11, 1908. Exchange of courtesies was from ship to ship and the occasion was interesting because it was the first time in history that the standards of Russia and Great Britain floated from one masthead. The toasts delivered at the exchange of visits on June 9 included the following words: The Tsar: ... I trust that this meeting, while strengthening the many and strong ties which unite our houses, will have the happy result of drawing our countries closer together and of promoting and maintaining the peace of the world. In the course of the past year several questions of equal moment both to Russia and to England have been satisfactorily settled by our Governments. I am certain that your Majesty appreciates as highly as I do the value of these agreements, for, notwithstanding their limited scope, they cannot but help to spread among our two countries feelings of mutual goodwill and confidence. . . . The value of the convention from this point of view was discussed by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament, July 10, 1912, when he said: "But for that agreement Russia would have been constantly under the misapprehension that we in southern Persia were going to take advantage of the chaos and the situation to prejudice her interests and the old state of suspicion, of intrigue and squabble, which used to exist between Great Britain and Russia, would have been intensified many fold under the present condition of affairs. Instead of that, however much we may differ as to the merits of the agreement, there has never been for a moment any suspicion on either side that either Russia or Great Britain has been attempting to exploit the situation in Persia to the disadvantage of the other. The fact that that has been so has not only been in the interest of the two countries, but has also been in the interests of peace."-(Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons, XL, 1982-1983.) BALKAN CRISIS CEMENTS ENTENTE 207 The King: ... I most heartily indorse every word that fell from your Majesty's lips with regard to the convention recently concluded between our two Governments. I believe it will serve to knit more closely the bonds that unite the peoples of our two countries, and I am certain that it will conduce to the satisfactory settlement in an amicable manner of some momentous questions in the future. I am convinced that it will not only tend to draw our two countries more closely together, but will help very greatly toward the maintenance of the general peace of the world.'... HOW THE TRIPLE ENTENTE RIPENED M. Izvolski, Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an audience of King Edward, August 21, 1908. At that time the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress had just thrown Abd ul Hamid out of power and restored the constitution of 1876. On October 1, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared his independence of Turkey and assumed the title of Tsar of the Bulgars. On October 3, the monarch of Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces up till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary by virtue of Art. 25 of the treaty of Berlin. These events created the Balkan crisis of 1908-9 in which the German Kaiser a year later said that he stood "by the side of his ally in shining armor." Before he assumed the posture M. Izvolski had a second audience of King Edward on October 11, 1908.3 During the crisis, which lasted until the next May-a period of six months in which Germany kept her armor shining and Austria-Hungary brandished her mailed fist in the face of the Balkans-France, Great Britain and Russia were a unit in upholding the public law of Europe. Though for technical reasons not unconnected with the German attitude, the idea of a conference to revise the treaty of Berlin was abandoned, they were consistent and successful in applying the principle established by the treaty of London of March 13, 1871. This treaty was brought about by a Russian unilateral denunciation of three articles of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, and was negotiated as a result of a declaration of the conference on January 17, 1871, in which it was 2 London Times, Weekly Edition, June 12, 1908, page 376. Ibid., October 16, 1908, 664. recognized "that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the provisions thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement." Owing to the stand taken by France, Great Britain and Russia, with the assistance of Italy, but on the initiative of the British Government, Art. 25 and six paragraphs (5, 7-11) of Art. 29 of the treaty of Berlin were abrogated and a revision substituted for the sixth paragraph of Art. 29. The phrase, the Triple Entente, referring to France, Great Britain and Russia as a triumvirate aiming at the maintenance of peace, became current immediately these facts were public property. No formal document established the Triple Entente, but it probably gained strength from that circumstance. Numerous evidences of close relations between the three governments constantly came to public attention. Of the more formal of these the following farewell to England issued by the Tsar after his visit to the British King at the Cowes regatta, August 2-5, 1909, may be cited: The Emperor is deeply impressed by his visit to this country. The affectionate welcome accorded to him and the Empress by the Royal family, the reception given by the magnificent naval force which saluted him at Cowes, the attitude of British statesmen, people and press, are all happy auguries for the future. It is the Emperor's firm desire and belief that this all too brief visit can only bear the happiest fruit in promoting the friendliest feeling between the Governments and peoples of the two countries.2 EFFECTS OF THE AGADIR CRISIS Triple entente friendliness and co-operation grew as occasion occurred in the complicated web of European politics. The Agadir crisis, precipitated on July 1, 1911, by Germany's sending the warship Panther to that Moroccan Atlantic port, created a situation of great tension during that summer, and resulted in agreements between France and Germany signed November 4, 1911. Great Britain throughout supported in general the attitude of France and, with K. U. K. Ministerium des äussern. Diplomatische aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Hercegovina, Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909, Nos. 156, 162, 175, 177, 184, 192. London Times, Weekly Edition, Supplement, August 13, 1909, iii. 2 CRISIS TRIES AND PROVES FRIENDSHIP 209 Russia, again proved the stanchness of the understanding between them. Reviewing the whole affair in an important speech in the House of Commons on the following November 27, Sir Edward Grey spoke particularly of France: I trust that the fact that we have with France during the last seven years gone hand in hand through a great deal of rough diplomatic weather, without for a moment losing touch with each other, will have its influence in perpetuating in France and here confidence in our mutual good faith and good will, our intention to keep in touch.1 It was typical of the closely organized political groups of the period that Anglo-French-Russian co-operation during such a crisis should have caused rumors of alliances about to be born from the entente. The British prime minister denied the existence of such formal arrangements on the same day Sir Edward Grey spoke, and also on December 6, in reply to a question by Gordon Harvey who "asked the prime minister if the fact that there is no secret arrangement of any sort or kind which has not been disclosed is applicable to treaties which exist between this country and powers other than France." Mr. Asquith said in reply: As has been stated, there were no secret engagements with France other than those that have now been published, and there are no secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any other power. There are none of them of recent date.3 NAVAL AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE ENTENTE After the Agadir crisis had passed the Triple Entente was sure enough of itself to extend the scope of its protective measures. Germany was developing both her army and fleet beyond the necessities of defense, and in particular her sea forces reached a strength which disturbed the balance of naval power. Between friendly nations there constantly occur conversations of the most intimate and frank character respecting the conditions they might be called on jointly Parl., Deb., 5th Series, XXXII, 64–65. • Ibid., 107. Ibid., 1400. to face. Undoubtedly the powers of the Triple Entente had previously adjusted their forces as a result of such conversations. After Agadir changes took place to meet the situation as it was. The first document resulting from such exchanges of views was the agreement extending the Franco-Russian alliance to the naval forces of the two states, signed at Paris July 13, 1912, by Théophile Delcassé, French minister of marine, and Admiral Prince Lieven, chief of the Russian naval general staff. This technical agreement was not only a logical rounding-out of the alliance but a proper new development in view both of the importance of European navies and of the rebuilding of the Russian fleet. During the same period Great Britain and France rearranged their fleets in order to distribute them more economically. Britain had previously maintained the two-power standard both in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. In recent years naval increases in Europe had centered in the northern waters by reason of Germany's building program. No one doubted that the German naval power was pointed at British supremacy. On the other hand, FrancoItalian relations were cordial and lacking in mutual suspicion. Without changing any political element of naval power, it was therefore possible for Great Britain to rely somewhat on French defense of her Mediterranean interests and to strengthen her North Sea fleet at the expense of her squadrons in the Middle Sea. This disposition of the fleets, Sir Edward Grey definitely stated, was "not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war." Great Britain and France on November 22-23, 1912, by exchange of letters reached an understanding that they would examine together "the question whether both Governments should act together" in the event of either "having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace." These letters are considered as part of the Entente Cordiale and are printed below. Use of British land forces is implied in the exchange of letters, if the Governments should decide on common action. Both Governments were entirely free to decide that question according to their own interests. This was made clear by Prime Minister Asquith on March 24, 1913, when he answered two questions in Parliament: |