It is seen that, to avoid risks of conflict which threatened to become disquieting, we only abandoned in Newfoundland privileges defendable with difficulty and hardly necessary [drying of fish on the coast], while keeping the essential, that is, fishing in territorial waters, and for the future throwing out of any possible dispute a precious right, fishing freely, or of buying bait for codfish on the whole extent of the French Shore. These compensations are, however, not the only ones to which we have consented.

We received others in West Africa of an importance very considerable for the development of our colonial empire. The concessions of England related to three places: Gambia, Los Islands and the region. between the Niger and the Tchad.

The river Gambia constitutes sort of a happy anomaly in the hydrographic régime of the West African coast. When most of the water courses are almost impracticable for part of the year the Gambia, for a distance of 300 kilometers as the crow flies from its mouth, is navigable for seagoing vessels. It is one of the principal waterways in this region; we were excluded from it up to now. . . . It is open to us to-day....

The Los Islands (formerly the Idolo Islands), which England has just ceded to us, are six in number, three of them large. . . . Situated less than five kilometers from the coast, in front of the recently built port of Konakry, the capital of French Guinea, this group commands immediate access to it.... We have built at Konakry a port which, if the future responds to what results already realized seem to promise, will be one of the great commercial entrepôts of this coast. The key of this port is since yesterday in our hands.

An important part of the arrangement just signed is devoted to the regions between the Niger and the Tchad. It was no less a question than the alteration or, better, a transformation to our great advantage, of the whole of the frontier determined by the convention of June 14, 1898. ... The desert separated our possessions in the Sudan from those on the Tchad and by a combination of unforeseen circumstances the homogeneity of our African empire, so long sought, was not obtained. . . . Our communications by boat between the rivers of the north and south were impossible without passing through British waters. . . . In equity we needed a route, and we have obtained it. In law, however, that was not at all obligatory. . . .

The capital part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco. Of all questions affecting the interests of France, none in fact has an importance comparable with that of Morocco; and it is evident that on its solution depended the solidity and the development of our African empire

MOROCCO, EGYPT, SIAM AFFECTED

and even the future of our situation in the Mediterranean.

ing from England, whose strong position in Moroccan ports is known, the declaration that it belongs to France to look after the tranquility of this country and to lend its aid for all needed administrative, economic, financial and military reforms, as well as the engagement not to hinder her action to this end, we have attained a result whose value it is superfluous to emphasize. . . .

As concerns Egypt, you will note that the political condition is subjected to no change. The principal interest in the negotiation just completed is financial. A great part of the Egyptian debt is placed in France. It was a question of assuring our holdings the largest guaranties, while adapting them to the new conditions resulting from the financial resurrection of Egypt.

The defense of our own interests has not diverted our attention from a final question of general purport, even universal since it concerns the entire world, that of the free use of the Suez Canal. Remaining faithful to her traditions, the Government of the Republic was fortunate in being able to bring the British Government to engage to maintain in its entirety the freedom of one of the most important routes of international traffic. It must record with a particular satisfaction the adhesion of Great Britain to putting into force the treaty of October 29, 1888.

By the terms of the declaration of London of January 15, 1896, France and Great Britain had in a way neutralized the central provinces of Siam. . . . They engaged to acquire no privilege or particular advantage of which the benefit was not common to the two signatories. They further engaged to enter into no separate arrangement which permitted a third power to do what they reciprocally forbade themselves by this declaration. All these provisions had a rather negative character. The arrangement just concluded with the London cabinet, while maintaining the clauses which precede for those territories, establishes that the Siamese possessions situated east and southeast of this zone and the adjacent islands shall henceforth be considered amenable to French influence, while the regions situated to the west of the same zone and of the Gulf of Siam shall be amenable to English influence. While repudiating the idea of annexing any Siamese territory and engaging strictly to respect the existing treaties, the two Governments agree, regarding each other, that their respective action shall be freely exercised in each of the spheres of influence thus determined, which gives a practical bearing to the new agreement.

The special situation of the New Hebrides had given room for disputes touching the validity of acquisitions of land either by British subjects or

French citizens. The absence of any jurisdiction in these islands rendered insoluble the differences arising on this matter. It has been agreed that an arrangement shall be concluded to put an end to these difficulties.

Finally the two powers have profited by the negotiations under way to regularize the situation of Great Britain in Zanzibar and that of France in Madagascar. This was to put an end to embarrassing claims which, for many years, had hampered our action in the great island of the Indian Ocean.

Thus, thanks to a mutual good will, we managed to regulate the various questions which for a long time weighed on the relations of France and England. The first expressions of opinion abroad show the great importance attached to this settlement and that it is considered as a precious further guaranty for general peace. Moreover, the favorable appreciations of which these arrangements are also the subject in England and in France indicate sufficiently that they safeguard fully the essential interests of each, a condition necessary for a durable and fruitful understanding.

DELCASSÉ.

b. DISPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT PARIS FORWARDING AGREEMENTS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE OF 18TH APRIL, 1904.1

(EXTRACT.)

FOREIGN OFFICE,
April 8, 1904.

After giving an analytical account of the agreements similar to the French summary and stating that they were believed to be desirable "if considered by themselves and on their intrinsic merits," the Marquess of Lansdowne wrote to Sir Edward Monson:

It is, however, important to regard them not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming a part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the international relations of two great countries.

From this point of view their cumulative effect can scarcely fail to be advantageous in a very high degree. They remove the sources of longstanding differences, the existence of which has been a chronic addition to our diplomatic embarrassments and a standing menace to an international friendship which we have been at much pains to cultivate, and which, we rejoice to think, has completely over-shadowed the antipathies and suspicions of the past.

1-15.

Parl. Pap., 1904, CX 313 (Cd. 1952); Nouveau recueil général de traités, 20 série, XXXII,

ENTENTE MAKES FOR HONESTY

231

There is this further reason for mutual congratulations. Each of the parties has been able, without any material sacrifice of its own national interests, to make to the other concessions regarded, and rightly regarded, by the recipient as of the highest importance. . . . For these reasons it is fair to say that, as between Great Britain and France, the arrangement, taken as a whole, will be to the advantage of both parties.

Nor will it, we believe, be found less advantageous if it be regarded from the point of view of the relations of the two powers with the Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Siam. In each of these countries it is obviously desirable to put an end to a system under which the ruler has had to shape his course in deference to the divided counsels of two great European powers. Such a system leading, as it must, to intrigue, to attempts to play one power off against the other, and to undignified competition, can scarcely fail to sow the seeds of international discord, and to bring about a state of things disadvantageous and demoralizing alike to the tutelary powers, and to the weaker state which forms the object of their solicitude. Something will have been gained if the understanding happily arrived at between Great Britain and France should have the effect of bringing this condition of things to an end in regions where the interests of those two powers are specially involved. And it may, perhaps, be permitted to them to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the general peace.

c. SECRET ARTICLES RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO SIGNED AT LONDON APRIL 8, 1904.1

I

(These articles are reprinted here because of their political importance.)

Art. 1.-In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken toward

101 British and Foreign State Papers, 1053-1059; Nouveau recueil général de traités, ze série, V, 664; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 26-30; Treaty Series, No. 24, 1911.

Spain made a declaration of adhesion to the whole declaration on October 3, 1904. (Nouveau recueil général de traités, ze série, XXXV, 666; 104 British and Foreign State Papers, 374; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 8-9; and VI, 30.)

Simultaneous agreements were made between France and Spain, Great Britain and Spain at London May 16, 1907, for the maintenance of the territorial status quo of the three countries in the Mediterranean and in that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa. (American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 425; 100 British and Foreign State Papers, 570-571; Nouveau recueil général de traités, ze série, XXXV, 692.

each other by Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration' of to-day's date would remain intact.

Art. 2.-His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that his Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Art. 3.-The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other présides should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebu shall be intrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Arts. 4 and 7 of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

The articles referred to read:

Art. 4.-The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

Art. 6.-In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the treaty of the 29th October, 1888 [for text see 79 B. and F. S. P., 18], and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of Par. 1 as well as of Par. 2 of Art. VIII of that treaty will remain in abeyance.

Art. 7.-In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebu.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.