The Imperial German Government has often stated its intentions with respect to Belgium. At the beginning of the war, in the ultimatum presented to Belgium on August 2, 1914, the German Government declared that, "in the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government binds itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full"; otherwise the "eventual adjustments of the relations of the two states to each other must be left to the decision of arms." Two days later, in his speech before the Reichstag on August 4, the chancellor, BethmannHolweg, defined the purposes of Germany more precisely, and more narrowly. He said:

1

Gentlemen, we are now defending ourselves in circumstances of extreme necessity (wir sind jetzt in der Notwehr), and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, have perhaps already set foot on Belgian territory. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the rules of international law (das widerspricht den Geboten des Völkerrechts).... We were forced to disregard the legitimate protest of the Luxemburg and the Belgian Governments. The wrong-I speak openly—the wrong that we are thus doing, we will try to make good again as soon as our military end is attained. 2

Such was the expressed purpose of the German Government at the opening of the war. Meantime, the German army overran and conquered the greater part of Belgium. It did more. As a necessary part of attaining their military ends, the Germans in

Belgium in the offices of the American Historical Review, material compiled by Professor Van den Ven for the Belgian Information Service, extracts made from the German newspapers by Richard Jente for the Committee on Public Information, and official dispatches of Brand Whitlock, American minister to Belgium, under date of August 10, 1917, February 3 and 23, March 6, 13 and 27, 1918, together with a number of documents transmitted with these dispatches, have been placed at my disposal.

1

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (London, 1915), 310. Miscellaneous No. 10 (1915), Cd. 7860.

The German text from the official Reichstag reports, for this part of the speech, together with a translation, is printed in J. R. O'Regan, The German War of 1914, 49. Aside from three slight changes, I have followed Mr. O'Regan's translation. The original speech was published for propagandist purposes in Der Kriegsausbruch 1914 (Berlin, 1914), 11.

PROMISES DID NOT BIND

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stituted in Belgium a reign of terror such as has not been known among civilized nations. Nothing was omitted that might serve to break the spirit of the people. The record of senseless crimes and cruelties, of bestial acts, of nameless obscenities and revolting savagery which must be charged to the account of the German army in Belgium recalls those deeds by which "the Huns, under their king Attila, a thousand years ago, made a name for themselves which is still mighty in tradition and story."

PROMISES NO LONGER BINDING

After the conquest and spoliation of Belgium, the promises which the German Government had formerly made were thought to be no longer binding. "The conquest of Belgium has simply been forced upon us," said Freiherr von Bissing, the German governor general of Belgium. "I will not discuss the views of those who dream that the German Government is bound by the declaration made at the beginning of the war." In its subsequent declarations of policy, the German Government has accordingly held a different language from that used by Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4, 1914.

These subsequent official declarations of policy in respect to Belgium were in substance much the same; and it will be sufficient to quote the last of them—the latest and the most precise-that of Chancellor von Hertling, before the Main Committee in the Reichstag, on July 11, 1918:

That we do not contemplate holding Belgium in possession permanently that has been our policy from the beginning of the war. As I said on November 29, the war has been for us, from the very beginning, a war of defense and not a war of conquest. The invasion of Belgium was a necessity forced upon us by the conditions of war. In the same way, the occupation of Belgium was a necessity forced upon us by the war. Belgium, in our hands, is a pledge for future negotiations. A pledge signifies security against known dangers, which one may avoid by having this pledge in his hand. One surrenders this pledge, therefore, only when 'General von Bissing's Testament: a Study in German Ideals (London, Fisher Unwin, 1917), 24.

...

these dangers are removed. The Belgian pledge therefore signifies for us that we must guard ourselves in the peace negotiations, as I have already pointed out, against the danger of Belgium ever again becoming the deploying ground of our enemies: not only in a military sense, Gentlemen, but also in an economic sense. We must guard ourselves against the danger of our becoming, after the war, economically isolated (abgeschnürt). By virtue of her relations, her position and her entire development, Belgium is assigned to Germany. If we enter into close economic relations with Belgium in the economic sphere, that is also wholly in the interest of Belgium herself. If we succeed in establishing close economic ties with Belgium, if we succeed in coming to an understanding with Belgium in respect to political questions which touch the vital interests of Germany, we have the certain prospect that we shall thereby have the best security against the future dangers which might threaten us from England and France by way of Belgium or in respect to Belgium.

1 Preussische Kreuzzeitung, July 15, 1918. The most important earlier official statements of German policy with respect to Belgium are the following:

"We will obtain sure guaranties in order that Belgium should not become a vassal state of England and France and should not be used as an economic and military bulwark against Germany." (Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, April 5, 1916; taken from Passelecq, “Belgian Unity and the Flemish Movement," Nineteenth Century, October, 1916.)

"Point seven has to do with the Belgian question. Concerning the Belgian question, my predecessors have repeatedly declared that at no time during the war has the forcible incorporation (Angliederung) of Belgium with Germany formed a part of the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to that complex of questions, the details of which are to be arranged by war and peace negotiations (durch die Kriegs- und Friedensverhandlungen zu ordnen sein werden). So long as our opponents do not unreservedly take the position that the territorial integrity of the Central Powers is the sole possible basis of peace discussions, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always taken, and decline to exclude the Belgian affair from the general discussion." (Hertling in the Reichstag, January 24, 1918, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 25, 1918.)

"From this rostrum it has been repeatedly affirmed that we do not contemplate retaining Belgium, that we do not contemplate making the Belgian state an integral part of the German Empire, but that, as was pointed out in the Papal note of August I of last year, we must be safeguarded against the danger that a country, with which we wish after the war to live once more in peace and friendship, should become the object or the center of hostile machinations. The means by which this end is to be attained, and the cause of universal peace thereby served, ought to be discussed in a circle of that kind [referring to the unofficial suggestion of Walter Runciman in the House of Commons that it would be well if responsible representatives of the belligerent powers should get together in an intimate meeting for discussion]. If, therefore, a proposal looking in that direction should come from the opposite side-for example, from the Belgian Government at Havre-we would not assume an attitude of rejection, even if the discussion could at first, as is self-evident, be only tentative." (Hertling in the Reichstag, February 25, 1918, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, February 26, 1918.)

GERMAN THEORY FALSE

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Germany's officially proclaimed policy in Belgium therefore amounted to this: Germany did not intend to annex Belgium; but she intended to use it as a pledge, or pawn, to obtain "guaranties" against England and France. How did she intend to use it? What were the guaranties? Much light is thrown on these questions by the administrative policy which Germany had carried out in Belgium since the war began. If we may judge from her conduct in Belgium, the purpose of the German Government was to destroy the Belgian state and to dissolve the Belgian nation. If her measures had succeeded, there would be no Belgium.

I. THE FLEMISH QUESTION

In recent years the Germans have adopted the theory that there never has been any Belgian nation, but only a Belgian state, which is an "artificial creation of European diplomacy," dating from the year 1830. The Germans say that this artificial creation, which is largely the work of English and French machinations, was already tending toward dissolution before the war, and that the inevitable result of the war will be to complete the process. This theory is fundamentally false; but the facts of Belgian history and the facts of Belgian social life, regarded in a purely external way, furnished the Germans with a basis sufficient for their very practical purposes.

It is true that before 1830 Belgium was never an independent state. In the middle ages the country now included in Belgium and Holland was a group of feudal principalities and chartered cities, more or less independent of each other, and commonly distinguished from the outside world by the collective term "Low Countries"-Netherlands. In the 15th century the Netherlands came under the suzerainty of the Dukes of Burgundy; as parts of the Burgundian possessions they passed to the Hapsburgs; and finally, when the Spanish and Austrian territories of Charles V were divided in 1556, they went with Spain to Philip II.

A distinguishing characteristic of the people of the Netherlands, in all this early history, was the stubbornness with which they

defended their local franchises. The city of Ghent was so intractable that it came to be known as the Cité Ardente-the "Fiery City":"Pig-headed Gantois," Charles the Bold called the burghers on one occasion. And so Philip II found them still in the latter part of the 16th century when he attempted to subject them to the direct control of the Spanish crown. They were so pig-headed that even the Duke of Alva, no mean artist in the application of Schrecklichkeit, backed up by the best troops in Europe, failed to accomplish that object. The northern (Dutch) Netherlands finally won complete independence in 1648, while the southern Netherlands (Belgium) remained under Spanish control but were allowed to retain their former privileges.

The southern Netherlands might have won independence at this time also if they had been willing to join with the northern provinces. This they were unwilling to do precisely because they were already conscious of being a distinct people, differing in many respects from the Dutch. They were altogether Catholic in religion, while the Dutch were Protestant; and they were mainly an agricultural and industrial people, while the Dutch were chiefly commercial. It was at this time that the term Belgium, Belgique, which may be sometimes found in medieval manuscripts, was much used to distinguish the southern Netherlands; and even at this early date the Belgians not infrequently referred to their little country as the Patrie. And so the southern Netherlands preferred, on condition of retaining their local privileges, to remain under Spanish rule, rather than join the Protestant and commercial republic of Holland.

BELGIAN DETERMINATION TO BE INDEPENDENT

Under Spanish rule they remained until 1713, when they were transferred, as a result of war and treaties, to Austria. At that time their local franchises were again confirmed in the Treaty of the Barriers and in a charter known as "The Joyous Entry of Charles VI." When, in 1788, Joseph II attempted to abolish this charter, and to incorporate Belgium into a centralized and imperial administrative system, the Belgians rebelled; and although the rebellion was suppressed, the charter was finally restored. Mean