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This declaration, which bears on its face sufficient evidence of having been "made in Germany," was published in the Frankfurter Zeitung June 25, 1918. At the same time the Kölnische Zeitung published,1 from a "special source," a communication which is obviously no more than an official comment upon the declaration. The essential parts of this communication are as follows:

"This making of Flanders and Wallonia independent states would naturally not prevent these two countries from entering into a union with each other, which would make it possible for them to settle by a common legislation those affairs which especially require a common settlement because of the close economic relations between them. The example of AustriaHungary perhaps shows a practical way. By such a settlement a 'real guaranty' would be obtained for Germany, namely, that French influence would be actually suppressed in Belgium. In such an arrangement Germany will also have obtained one of the absolutely essential securities designated by Count Hertling in his speech of February 25, 1918, namely, that this country would not again become a strategical point of attack for our enemies. A free Flanders, built upon a Germanic basis, has as vital an interest as Germany in keeping French or English armies from its borders. . . . In the very nature of the case, however, such an independent Flanders needs in economic respects the support of the German Empire. Firm and definite articles in the treaty of peace must make this support easy and permanently secure. These articles must also include Wallonia, whose economic advantages neither Flanders nor Germany wishes to forego. Thus nothing will prevent the two countries from establishing and developing their own government according to their own will. No annexation, no Germanizing of Flanders under compulsion, but a free Flanders in close economic relation to the natural hinterland, Germany; that is and remains the desired aim which will best serve the well-being of all concerned.”

1 Reprinted from the Kölnische Zeitung in the Berliner Tageblatt, June 26, 1918.

DO GERMANS BELIEVE WHAT THEY SAY?

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Such is the way in which the German Government was preparing to "restore" Belgium. From the Belgian point of view, which is happily the point of view of the Allies also, this is not restoration, but exploitation under another name. This would be, as Brand Whitlock says, worse than the atrocities, worse than the deportations. They kill the body, this would kill the soul."

One of the dangers to which the world is exposed, says Vernon Lyman Kellogg, is that "the Germans really believe much of what they say." On the whole, this is perhaps the most serious aspect of the world conflict. The more one reads German writings, the more one reads, for example, the letters or the "Testament" of Von Bissing, the more one realizes that what he says is monstrous, and the more one is convinced that he really believes much of what he says. Between the facts as they are revealed in the history, the deeds, and the words of the Belgian people, and the conclusions which the Germans draw from these facts, there intervenes a "specifically German way of thinking and feeling" which is in great part an impenetrable mystery. Who shall disengage the various elements of brazen effrontery and sly cunning, of angular and unplastic logic, of massive but honest stupidity, of sentimental perversion, of naïve egoism and moral obliquity that enter into the German mentality? Perhaps the problem is insolvable; but somehow or other the Germans really believe much of what they say.

This does not mean that they are under any illusion as to the overwhelming opposition of the Belgians to their clumsy policy of conciliation. They understand perfectly the weakness of the Activist movement. "As soon as we remove our protecting hand," says Von Bissing, "the Flemish movement will be branded by the Walloons and Frenchlings as pro-German, and will be completely suppressed." This is the exact fact. The governor general knows it for a fact; but he finds that it does not properly follow from the established premises. The Belgians are two peoples, one of which, being of German origin and speech, must naturally wish to unite with the Germans; but the fact is they spurn the Germans. This is the fact; but logically it should not be the fact it is somehow or other, and eventually, a cosmic

error. As the governor general contemplates this fact, therefore, he can only blink and say: "The character of the Belgian people is a psychological enigma."

The enigma, as M. Passelecq says, is "so simple that it takes a German not to understand it." In truth the "enigma" was long since easily solved by Ernest Maurice Arndt, a German contemporary of the Revolution of 1830. "The fundamental principle of the Belgian Revolution," he said, "that which gives it character and distinguishes it from other events of the same order, resides in the most intimate essence of the people. It is the aspiration to an independent national existence, . . . which, during many centuries, the Belgians have labored for." But in speaking of national aspirations, we have to do with an influence of the moral and spiritual order—thus rising above the level along which the Prussian mind travels.

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Revue des deux mondes, June 1, 1918, 527, quoted from Van Langenhove, La volonté nationale belge en 1830, 93.

A VICTORY PROGRAM

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A VICTORY PROGRAM

At the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees of World Peace Foundation, November 30, 1918, it was unanimously voted "that the World Peace Foundation approves the principles of which a statement' is here subjoined":

The war now happily brought to a close has been above all a war to end war, but in order to insure the fruits of victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe there should be formed a league of free nations, as universal as possible, based on treaty and pledged that the security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the whole. The initiating nucleus of the membership of the league should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the war.

The league should aim at promoting the liberty, progress and fair economic opportunity of all nations, and the orderly development of the world.

It should insure peace by eliminating causes of dissension, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by uniting the potential force of all the members as a standing menace against any nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world.

The advantage of membership in the league, both economically and from the point of view of security, should be so clear that all nations will desire to be members of it.

For this purpose it is necessary to create:

1. For the decision of justiciable questions, an impartial tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the assent of the parties to the controversy; provision to be made for enforcing its decisions.

This program was prepared with a view to its being generally adopted by organizations by a special committee of the League to Enforce Peace consisting of William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Oscar S. Straus, Theodore Marburg, Hamilton Holt, Talcott Williams, William H. Short and Glenn Frank. It was adopted by the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace and by the League of Free Nations Association on November 23, 1918, and by other organizations. A joint committee for Massachusetts to promote a league of free nations in accordance with this program has been formed to conduct an active co-operative campaign.

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2. For questions that are not justiciable in their character, a council of conciliation, as mediator, which shall hear, consider and make recommendations; and, failing acquiescence by the parties concerned, the league shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken.

3. An administrative organization for the conduct of affairs of common interest, the protection and care of backward regions and internationalized places, and such matters as have been jointly administered before and during the war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods and through machinery that will insure both stability and progress, preventing, on the one hand, any crystalization of the status quo that will defeat the forces of healthy growth and change, and providing, on the other hand, a way by which progress can be secured and necessary change effected without recourse to

war.

4. A representative congress to formulate and codify rules of international law, to inspect the work of the administrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the tranquility of the world or the progress or betterment of human relations. Its deliberations should be public.

5. An executive body, able to speak with authority in the name of the nations represented, and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered.

The representatives of the different nations in the organs of the league should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they assume. The rules of international law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity.

A resort to force by any nation should be prevented by a solemn agreement that any aggression will be met immediately by such an overwhelming economic and military force that it will not be attempted.

No member of the league should make any other offensive or defensive treaty or alliance, and all treaties of whatever nature made by any member of the league should at once be made public.

Such a league must be formed at the time of the definite peace or the opportunity may be lost for ever.

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