WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN 353 the entry of the United States into the war. This last mission developed into a permanent organization of considerable size.' "During the year, however, an increasing number of intergovernmental and inter-departmental conferences took place both on diplomatic and military questions and on problems connected with the distribution between the Allies of imported supplies. This gradual integration of the Alliance was brought to a head toward the end of the year by the Rapallo agreement. During the year the democratic Alliance has thus acquired the rudiments of a permanent machinery."" SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS "DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE" The significance of all this executive and administrative apparatus is more than the compelling fact that it won the war, more even than the necessary circumstance that it makes the return to peace simpler, quicker and surer than it otherwise could be. Its real significance lies in the impetus it gives to world organization. Before the war governments had been combining for common purposes ever since the Congress of Vienna had stipulated that "states separated or traversed by a single navigable river engage to regulate the navigation of such river by common agreement." Posts, telegraphs, railroads, maritime navigation, and many other matters of mutual interest had similarly been the subjects of international arrangements, until at the outbreak of the war there were 53 institutions carrying out the will of the nations generally, and half as many conventions providing for unified practice which did not require administrative offices. All these international institutions withstood the effects of war and continued functioning during it, with the exception of those, like the European Commission of the Danube, that were deliberately and for their own interests put out of business by the Central Powers. To concentrate and combine them after the war is to establish the whole physical basis. 1 On the details of the activities of this mission see the little volume "Who's Who in the British War Mission," a new edition of which is about to be issued. "The War Cabinet. Report for the year 1917, 15-16, v-vi. 3 Jean Perrinjaquet, "Projet pour la création d'un Bureau général international permanent," Revue générale de droit international public, XVIII, 216-237 (with of a League of Nations upon the firmest possible foundations of mutual legal, financial, commercial, economic and social co-operation. The Supreme War Council and the two dozen councils and committees subordinate to it have become the integrated system which can and should include and develop all previous activities as the administrative organ of a League of Nations. Those who object to a League of Nations on account of the difficulties which it presents will find a convincing answer to their doubts in the success which has attended the solution of the problems connected with establishing this de facto League of Nations, as represented by the Interallied Conference, the Supreme War Council and the organizations associated with it. II. DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME The date set for the "war conference" was November 16. The participants began to gather at Paris immediately after the Rapallo conference. On November 12 David Lloyd George, premier of Great Britain, at a luncheon in the old tapestry-room at the French ministry of war delivered a speech before the French Army Council, Senate and Chamber which lighted up the problem of a Supreme War Council for the world's public like a flash of lightning from a clear sky on a moonless night. Later Lloyd George explained the purpose of this speech, which is best introduced by his own words in the House of Commons: We went to Rapallo with a document most carefully prepared-and may I say also, in order to explode another myth, that it was submitted to the [British] Cabinet before I left. The document which was passed was hardly different. Of course, we had to discuss things with our Allies, but in substance it was the document prepared here, discussed French text of American project of convention); Denys P. Myers, "La Concentration des organismes internationaux publics," La Vie internationale, III, 96–122. This second article proposes, in elaboration of the earlier plan and on the basis of existing organs, international bureau departments of public law, private law, commerce, science, hygiene and morals, agriculture, land transportation, maritime transportation, posts and telegraphs, monetary unity, literary property and industrial property. "FORCED EVERYBODY TO TALK" 355 line by line in the Cabinet, which I had in my pocket after the last Cabinet meeting held a few hours before I left. But I was afraid of this, that here was a beautifully drafted document in which you had concerned a considerable number of men, including distinguished soldiers for a member of the general staff was one who was most helpful to me in drafting the document-prepared, and carried by the Allies at two or three conferences. Nothing happened. Simply an announcement in the papers that at last we had found some means of co-ordination. There has been too much of that, and I made up my mind to take risks, and I took them, in order to arouse public sentiment, not here merely, but in France, in Italy and in America-to get public sentiment behind, to see that this document became an act. It is not easy to rouse public opinion. I may know nothing about military strategy, but I do know something of political strategy. To get public opinion interested in a proposal and to convince the public of the desirability of it is an essential part of political strategy. That is why I did it, and it has done it. I might have gone over there and delivered a speech-passing eulogies upon the armies, upon generals, upon Governments and peoples, and they would have said-probably civility would have made them say it "That is a very fine and eloquent speech." But it would have had not the slightest effect. So I set out to deliver a disagreeable speech, that would force everybody to talk about this scheme. They have talked about it throughout two or three continents. The result is that America is in, Italy is in, France is in, Britain is in, and public opinion is in, and that is all I wanted.1 ... BRITISH PREMIER'S STARTLING SPEECH In the speech itself on November 12 the British premier said: I must claim your indulgence for taking up the time of so many men who hold great and responsible positions in the state and the legislature at a moment when they can ill spare from the conduct of important affairs time for listening to speeches. My only apology is that I have important practical considerations to submit to you, which affect not merely the future of your own country and of mine, but the destiny of the world. I have one advantage in speaking of this war, in that I am almost the only minister in any land, on either side, who has been in it from the beginning to this hour. I therefore ought to know something 'Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 901-902. about the course of events and their hidden causes. Of both I want to say something to you to-day. My friend and comrade, M. Painlevé, has explained to you the important decision taken by the Governments of France, Italy and Great Britain in setting up a Supreme Council of the Allies whose forces operate in the west to insure the united direction of their efforts on that front. As he has already explained, that council will consist of the leading ministers of the allied countries, advised by some of their most distinguished soldiers, and the choice which has already been made by these countries of their experts proves that the Governments mean this council to be a real power in the co-ordination of their military effort. AMERICA AND RUSSIA Unfortunately, there was no time to consult America and Russia 1 before setting up this council. The Italian disaster and the need of immediate action to repair it rendered it essential that we should make a start with the powers whose forces could be drawn upon for action on the Italian front. But in order to insure the complete success of this great experiment-an experiment the success of which I believe to be essential to victory for the allied cause it is necessary that all our great Allies should be represented in its deliberations, and I look forward with confidence to securing the agreements of those two great countries and to their co-operation in the work of this council. There are two questions which may be asked with reference to the step we have taken. Why are we taking it now? That is easy to answer. For the second question it is more difficult to find a satisfactory answer— why did we not take it before? NEED FOR GREATER UNITY DEMONSTRATED I propose to answer both. In regard to the first question, the events of the war have demonstrated, even to the most separatist and suspicious mind, the need for greater unity among the Allies in their war control. The Allies had on their side-in spite of all that has happened they still have at their command-all the essential ingredients of victory. They have command of the sea, which has never yet failed to bring victory in the end to the power that can hold out. On land they have the advantage in numbers, in weight of men and material, in economic and The Russo-German armistice was not signed until a week after the delivery of the speech. MAKE-BELIEVE UNITY 357 financial resources, and beyond and above all in the justice of their cause. In a prolonged war nothing counts as much as a good conscience. This combined superiority ought ere now to have insured victory for the Allies. At least it ought to have carried them much further along the road to victory than the point which they have yet reached. To the extent that they have failed in achieving their purpose, who and what are responsible?... No, the fault has not been with the armies. It has been entirely due to the absence of real unity in the war direction of the allied countries. We have all felt the need of it. We have all talked about it. We have passed endless resolutions resolving it. But it has never yet been achieved. In this important matter we have never passed from rhetoric into reality, from speech into strategy. In spite of all the resolutions there has been no authority responsible for co-ordinating the conduct of the war on all fronts, and in the absence of that central authority each country was left to its devices. We have gone on talking of the eastern front and the western front and the Italian front and the Saloniki front and the Egyptian front and the Mesopotamia front, forgetting that there is but one front with many flanks; that with these colossal armies the battlefield is continental. EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT UNITY As my colleagues here know very well, there have been many attempts made to achieve strategic unity. Conferences have been annually held to concert united action for the campaign of the coming year. Great generals came from many lands to Paris with carefully and skilfully prepared plans for their own fronts. In the absence of a genuine Interallied Council of men responsible as much for one part of the battlefield as for another there was a sensitiveness, a delicacy about even tendering advice, letting alone support for any sector other than that for which the generals were themselves directly responsible. But there had to be an appearance of a strategic whole, so they all sat at the same table and, metaphorically, took thread and needle, sewed these plans together, and produced them to a subsequent civilian conference as one great strategic piece; and it was solemnly proclaimed to the world the following morning that the unity of the Allies was complete. That unity, in so far as strategy went, was pure make-believe; and make-believe may live through a generation of peace-it cannot survive a week of war. It was a collection of completely independent schemes |