pieced together. Stitching is not strategy. So it came to pass that when these plans were worked out in the terrible realities of war the stitches came out and disintegration was complete.

I know the answer that is given to an appeal for unity of control. It is that Germany and Austria are acting on interior lines, whereas we are on external lines. That is no answer. That fact simply affords an additional argument for unification of effort in order to overcome the natural advantages possessed by the foe.

You have only to summarize events to realize how many of the failures from which we have suffered are attributable to this one fundamental defect in the allied war organization. We have won great victories. When I look at the appalling casualty lists I sometimes wish it had not been necessary to win so many. Still, on one important part of the land front we have more than held our own. We have driven the enemy back. On the sea front we have beaten him, in spite of the infamy of the submarine warfare. We have achieved a great deal; I believe we should already have achieved all if in time we had achieved unity.

There is one feature of this war which makes it unique among all the innumerable wars of the past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are blockading two huge empires. It would have been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly grasped the fact that in a siege not only must every part of the line of circumvallation be strong enough to resist the strongest attack which the besieged can bring to bear upon it; more than that, the besieging army must be ready to strike at the weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may be. Have we done so? Look at the facts.

THE GATEWAY TO THE EAST

The enemy was cut off by the allied navies from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence he had been drawing enormous stores of food and material. On the east he was blockaded by Russia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain and Italy. But the south, the important south, with its gateway to the east, was left to be held by the forces of a small country with half the population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by the struggles of three wars and with two treacherous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportunity to knife it when it was engaged in defending itself against a mightier foe.

What was the result of this inconceivable blunder? What would any man whose mind was devoted to the examination of the whole, not merely to one part of the great battlefield, have expected to happen?

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Exactly what did happen. While we were hammering with the whole of our might at the impenetrable barrier in the west, the Central Powers, feeling confident that we could not break through, threw their weight on that little country, crushed her resistance, opened the gate to the east, and unlocked great stores of corn, cattle and minerals, yea, unlocked the door of hope-all essential to enable Germany to sustain her struggle. Without these additional stores Germany might have failed to support her armies at full strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid fighting material were added to the armies which Germany can control -added to her and lost to us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly exhausted its resources for war, cut off from the only possible source of supply, was re-equipped and resuscitated, and became once more a formidable military power, whose activities absorbed hundreds of thousands of our best men in order to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the east. By this fatuity this terrible war was given new life.

Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? The answer is simple. Because it was no one's business in particular to guard the gates of the Balkans.

"Too LATE"

The one front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed in other spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Russia had a 1,000-mile frontier to guard, and, even if she had not, she could not get through to help Serbia, because Rumania was neutral. It is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were sent when the mischief was complete.

Half of those forces sent in time-nay, half the men who fell in the futile attempt to break through on the western front in September of that year-would have saved Serbia, would have saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of Germany.

You may say that is an old story. I wish it were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial which has been running to this hour. 1915 was the year of tragedy for Serbia; 1916 was the year of tragedy for Rumania. The story is too fresh in our memories to make it necessary for me to recapitulate events. What am I to say? I have nothing but to say that it was the Serbian story almost without a. variation. It is incredible when you think of the consequences to the allied cause of the Rumanian defeat....

If you want to appreciate thoroughly how we were waging four wars and not one, I will give you one fact to reflect upon. In 1916 we had the

same conference in Paris and the same appearance of preparing one great strategic plan. But when the military power of Russia collapsed in March, what took place? If Europe had been treated as one battlefield you might have thought that when it was clear that a great army which was operating on one flank and could not come up in time, or even come into action at all, there would have been a change in strategy. Not in the least.

PLANS ESSENTIALLY INDEPENDENT

Their plans proceeded exactly as if nothing had occurred in Russia. Why? Because their plans were essentially independent of each other and not part of a strategic whole. You will forgive me for talking quite plainly because this is no time for concealing or for glossing over facts. War is pre-eminently a game where realities count. This is 1917. What has happened? I wish there had even been some variety in the character of the tragedy. But there has been the same disaster due to the same cause. Russia collapsed. Italy was menaced. The business of Russia is to look after her own front. It is the concern of Italy to look after her own war. "Am I my brother's keeper?" Disastrous! Fatal! The Italian front is just as important to France and Britain as it was to Germany. Germany understood that in time. Unfortunately we did not.

It is no use minimizing the extent of the disaster. If you do, then you will never take adequate steps to repair it. When we advance a kilometer into the enemy's lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can and shall win.

But what if we had advanced 50 kilometers beyond his lines and made 200,000 of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his best guns, with enormous quantities of ammunition and stores? What print would we have for our headlines? Have you an idea how long it would take the arsenals of France and Great Britain to manufacture 2,500 guns?

At this moment the extent to which we can prevent this defeat from developing into a catastrophe depends upon the promptitude and completeness with which we break with our past and for the first time realize in action the essential unity of all the allied fronts. I believe that we have at last learned this great lesson. That is the meaning of this Superior Council. If I am right in my conjectures then this council

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will be given real power, the efforts of the Allies will be co-ordinated, and victory will await valor. We shall then live to bless even the Italian disaster, for without it I do not believe it would have been possible to secure real unity. Prejudices and suspicions would have kept us apart. Had we learned this lesson even three months ago what a difference it would have made!

A DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON

I must read to you a message which appeared in The Times three days ago from its Washington correspondent. It is a message of the first importance, for, in the words of an old English saying, "Outsiders see most of the game." And these shrewd men in America, calmly observing the course of events from a distance of thousands of miles, have come to conclusions which we would have done well to make ours years ago:

"It is realized here that delicate questions of prestige exist between the great European nations engaged in the war, and that this militates against quick decisions and effective action when these are most needed. It is believed by some of President Wilson's closest advisers that Germany owes much of her success in this war to her unity of control, which permits the full direction of all Teutonic efforts from Berlin. Indeed, it is felt here that unless the Allies can achieve a degree of co-ordination equal to that which has enabled Germany to score her striking, though perhaps ineffectual, successes, she will be able to hold out far longer than otherwise would have been believed possible. American military experts believe that if the allied help rushed to General Cadorna's assistance to stem the tide of invasion had been thrown into the balance when Italy's forces were within 40 miles of Laibach, the Allies would have been able to force the road to Vienna. Victory at Laibach would have spelled a new Austerlitz, and the magnitude of the prize almost within his grasp is believed here to have justified General Cadorna in taking the risk of advancing his center too far and temporarily weakening his left flank. The lack of co-operation between France, Great Britain and Italy is blamed here for the disaster which ensued, and which it is believed would not have occurred if one supreme military authority had directed the combined operations of the Allies with the sole aim of victory without regard to any other considerations."

You may say the American estimate of the possibilities of the Italian front for the Allies is too favorable. Why? It is not for me to express an opinion. I am but a civilian; but I am entitled to point out that the Austrian army is certainly not better than the Italian. On the

contrary, whenever there was a straight fight between the Italians and the Austrians the former invariably won. And the Germans are certainly no better than the British and French troops. When there has been a straight fight between them we have invariably defeated their best and most vaunted regiments. And as for the difficulties of getting there, what we have already accomplished in the course of the last few days is the best answer to that.

THE SECOND QUESTION

But now I will answer the other question-Why was this not said before and why was this not done before? I have said it before, and I have tried to do it before, and so have some of my French colleagues that I see here. For weeks, for months, for years, at committees, at conferences, at consultations, until I almost became weary of the attempt, I have written it where it may be read and will be read when the time comes. I should like to be able to read you the statement submitted to the conference in Rome in January about the perils and the possibilities of the Italian front this year, so that you might judge it in the light of subsequent events. I feel confident that nothing could more convincingly demonstrate the opportunities which the Allies have lost through lack of combined thought and action.

We have latterly sought strenuously to improve matters by more frequent conferences and consultations, and there is no doubt that substantial improvement has been effected. As the result of that conference in Rome and the subsequent consultations, arrangements were made which shortened considerably the period within which aid could be given to Italy in the event of her being attacked. And if the tragedies of Serbia and Rumania are not to be repeated-and I feel assured that they will not, in spite of the very untoward circumstances—it will be because the preparations made as the result of the Rome conference have materially affected the situation. But if there had been real co-ordination of the military efforts of the Allies we should now have been engaged in Italy, not in averting disaster from our Allies, but in the inflicting of disaster upon our enemies. That is why we have come to the conclusion that for the cumbrous and clumsy machinery of conferences there shall be substituted a permanent council whose duty it will be to survey the whole field of military endeavor with a view to determining where and how the resources of the Allies can be most effectively employed. Personally I had made up my mind that, unless some change were effected,