SERVICES IN MANY PLACES

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Later services were those rendered at Singapore when an Indian regiment, incited by German propagandists, mutinied. And after Japanese merchant vessels were submarined in the Mediterranean Japan sent a torpedo-boat flotilla to those waters, where they rendered efficient service until the end of the war. In effect this was a participation in the war in Europe.

MILITARY SUPPLIES FURNISHED RUSSIA

But a greater, although far less spectacular, service was rendered in supplying Russia with military materials of all description as long as she remained in the war. With only one port of entry on the west, at Archangel, Russia had to depend more and more upon the goods made in Japan and shipped over the Trans-Siberian railway. Not only did the Japanese government arsenals and factories work at full blast, but the authorities encouraged private concerns to make every effort to supply the Russian needs. As a result Russia received invaluable help, and the Japanese hold some hundred millions of doubtful securities. But if this help had been denied, the collapse of Russia would have come long before it did. It would be an interesting, but hardly profitable, study to estimate what would have been the effect if Japan had been bound by a German alliance. Russia would have had to mobilize a large army in the Far East, the British colonials would hardly have dared leave their own lands, and the commerce of the Pacific would have passed out of the control of the Allies.

III. WHY JAPAN SENT NO TROOPS TO EUROPE

These positive contributions of Japan to the Allies' cause have frequently been overlooked, and during the first three years of the war the question was often asked: Why has Japan not sent a force to Europe? In considering this question we should first of all remember that Japan was primarily charged with the maintenance of peace in the Far East and its adjacent seas. To

send a force to Europe, to France or to Russia, Japan should receive a formal request from the Allies. There is no evidence that such was made.

Instead, early in 1915, a number of articles appeared in French newspapers and reviews advocating Japanese participation. To a less extent the question was discussed in Great Britain. Among the French publicists who urged this were M. Pichon, formerly minister of foreign affairs, and M. Clémenceau, former premier and later in office at the close of the war. These proposals, which it must be remembered were informal and unofficial, generally called for the landing of a Japanese force of about half a million men in the Balkan Peninsula to co-operate with Serbia. Another proposal suggested that the Japanese move across the TransSiberian railway and join the Russian armies.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

These discussions naturally were echoed in Japan. At once a considerable divergence of opinion was expressed both there and abroad. First of all, it was held that Japan should not take part in the European battles unless her aid was absolutely essential to victory. The war began primarily as a European conflict. A sound psychology demanded, in the early period, that the armies of European states, aided by their colonies, should triumph over the Central Powers. To bring in a large force of Japanese would give the Germans a sentimental argument for use in neutral countries, and especially in America. This was realized by responsible Entente statesmen. And as to the eastern front, the Japanese, with a fine sense of propriety, appreciated that it was too soon after the Russian War for them to assume that without their aid the Russians would be defeated. Some resentment was manifested in Japan at the idea that Japanese soldiers were desired in order to spare the European troops. For it must not be forgotten that from every calculation the man-power of the Allies far surpassed that of the Central Powers. As long as Russia remained in the field the eastern front could be supported best by supplies rather than men, and Japan made every effort to meet this need.

TRANSPORT BAR TO MILITARY AID

425 It was not until after the collapse of Russia that the question of man-power became a serious one with the Allies. But before that day the United States had entered the field, and she could. place men in Europe much faster and more easily than could Japan. The general view in Japan, except among a few outspoken advocates of the Allies' cause, was that she should thoroughly perform her duties in the Far East, and should adopt a policy of "watchful waiting" in regard to sending a force to Europe, although prepared to participate if her man-power were formally desired.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

The sending of a force to Europe, therefore, never passed out of the stage of discussion. But in that stage certain very practical difficulties were presented. First of all was the question of transport. When we remember how every resource of ocean transportation was called upon to convey the American armies across the relatively narrow Atlantic, we can understand the almost insoluble difficulties presented in moving a force from Japan to Europe. From Yokohama to Marseilles, via the Suez Canal, is over 9,000 marine miles; from Yokohama to Bordeaux, via Panama, is over 12,000; from New York to Bordeaux is only 3,187. Given an equal number of transports, of equal size and speed, it would take three or four times as much tonnage to land a Japanese army in Europe as it would an American one of the same size. But the transportation facilities in the Far East could not be compared with those on the Atlantic. In 1914, the merchant marine of Japan numbered 168 steamers of over 3,000 tons, with a total of 922,020 tons. She possessed only eight ships of over 10,000 tons. This tonnage was worked to the fullest capacity to carry on the trade abandoned by British and other Allies' ships because of the military needs of the Entente. It requires little insight to understand that, as long as the manpower of the Allies remained superior to that of Germany, the very best use that Japan could make of her tonnage was in supplying the Allies with food and materials. The effect of withdrawing all the large Japanese vessels for transport services would

have been lamentable. But if she withdrew one-third of her available tonnage, say 300,000 tons, this would only suffice to transport and maintain 50,000 Japanese in Europe, if the moderate allowance of six tons per man were made. While British and requisitioned German tonnage has carried the bulk of the American troops to Europe, little help could have been found in those quarters for Japan. From every point of view, therefore, the transportation of an effective Japanese force to Europe seemed out of the question. But if it became absolutely necessary, then the tonnage could have been diverted, the Far Eastern trade allowed to lapse, the civilians of Europe and of Japan placed on a starvation allowance, so that Japan might throw her reserves of men into the European field. Fortunately, the war was brought to a close before such a need developed.

And a similar situation existed on the eastern front. The only means of transportation between Japan and European Russia was the Trans-Siberian railway, over 5,000 miles long. This was worked to fullest capacity to convey the supplies to the Russian front from Vladivostok. As long as Russia had hundreds of thousands of soldiers without equipment, was it not sound policy to use the railroad for transporting supplies rather than for transporting unneeded man-power which would in turn need more supplies? With the establishment of Bolsheviki control in Russia, their abandonment of the Allies, and their treachery to both the Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovak troops, the Japanese were profoundly grateful that no desire for glory had caused a Japanese force to be left at the mercy of the Germans and Bolsheviki five thousand miles from their base.

She

Of all the practical difficulties, that connected with transportation was the most insoluble. But two others were presented. First, was that of the expense involved. No one of the five Allies was so unprepared to finance a costly war as was Japan. was still groaning under the burden of taxation due to the Russian War, which only ended in 1905. In 1914, the national debt of Japan amounted to over $1,250,000,000. About 25% of the annual expenditure of the state went to paying interest. The people had borne, with increasing unrest, a burden of taxation

HEAVY TAXES, SMALL INCOMES

427

which Americans in time of peace would have deemed unthinkable. A study of the fiscal system shows how the Government had been compelled to tap almost every conceivable source of revenue. Such unpopular taxes as the salt monopoly, the textile, business and transit taxes called for readjustment. One economist estimated that 44% of the people's income went for taxes. And when the low standard of living is borne in mind, the fact that in 1914 the highest skilled laborer received only about 50 cents a day, while the farm laborer received $27.00 a year, we can understand that for the poorest of the Allies to have conducted one of the most expensive operations would have been more than any one could ask, unless the need was absolutely imperative. To be sure, the Japanese soldiers would be paid little, and their food would be cheap, but all the implements of warfare would cost her as much as any other state, while transport would cost more. Farm laborers earning $27.00 a year can hardly bear the burden of a modern war as well as Americans whose earnings in a similar capacity would run from six to nine hundred dollars, with food and lodging provided.

The second problem was the equipment of the Japanese army. As far as man-power went the Japanese possessed a very effective force. But the Great War was largely a war of machinery. Japan was hopelessly deficient in airplanes, motor transport, artillery and machine guns. In her last war, with Russia, man-power counted for much, but in the Great War man-power had to be re-enforced by unheard-of quantities of guns, airships and motors. At the outbreak of the war Japan did not possess a single automobile factory. To equip an expeditionary force she would have had to fall back upon the overworked factories of Europe and America. That fact in itself indicates one of the great problems which the Japanese staff would have had to face.

1

For details of Japanese finances see the plates prefixed to the Seventeenth Financial and Economic Annual of Japan. 1917. The Department of Finance (Tokyo, Government Printing Office, 1917).