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IV. THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITION

In March of this year an entirely new question was presented by the action of the Bolsheviki representatives in signing the wretched treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Russia thus withdrew from the war, breaking the pact of London signed by the Tsar's Government. The eastern front had collapsed-not only was Germany free to mass most of her divisions on the west for her strenuous offensives which so promptly commenced, but there was the immediate danger of her overrunning Russia and exploiting such stores of food and supplies as might be found. Japan at once consulted her Allies as to what should be done under these new conditions. Three plans were unofficially considered. First, the immediate landing of a Japanese force to take possession of the vast amount of military supplies piled up at Vladivostok; secondly, the sending of an expeditionary force to seize the TransSiberian railway and thus prevent a German advance to the east, if such were attempted. This also called for the recapture and disarmament of the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners in Siberia, who had been released and armed by the Bolsheviki. And, thirdly, the endeavor to restore the eastern front;-but this plan was recognized as impossible from the start. It was difficult to know what was best to be done because of the abnormal conditions in Russia. But one thing was certain, and that was that Japan would not act without the advice and approval of her Allies, especially Great Britain and the United States. In Japan the discussion was complicated because of a bitter political controversy then raging, and any decision of the Terauchi ministry was bound to provoke criticism, largely of a political nature.

The first step was taken on April 5, when a small force of sailors was landed at Vladivostok to protect life and property there, after a Japanese had been killed and two wounded by Russians. This was followed by the landing of British and later American sailors. In this way the great port of Vladivostok and the supplies there came under the control of the Allies. For the next few months there was indecision. President Wilson then

PURPOSES IN SIBERIA DECLARED

429

considered the problem and used his strong influence in favor of moderate measures. A new turn was given to the discussion when the Czecho-Slovak troops began to appear at Vladivostok, after having fought their way across Siberia, leaving most of their numbers embattled behind them.

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PLAN

By August 3 the American proposal had been formulated and adopted by Japan. It called for the dispatch of a joint expeditionary force to Siberia to rescue the Czecho-Slovak troops from the German and Austro-Hungarian armed prisoners. Furthermore, this military assistance would "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." In addition the United States proposed to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there. Statements were issued in Tokyo and in Washington defining the scope of the joint expedition.' The Japanese document contained this pledge: "They reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION

Steps were at once taken to carry out these plans. The Japanese contingent was commanded by General Otani, who became the commander-in-chief of the joint force. Two American regiments were hurried up from the Philippines and Major-General Graves led the first troops across from the United States. After some For the texts of the statements, see The Supreme War Council, 413-416 (A League of Nations, I, No. 7).

fighting along the Amur River, the Allies and the Czecho-Slovaks were able to disperse the combined Bolsheviki-German-Austrian forces. Almost all the former prisoners were disarmed and placed under restraint, the Czecho-Slovak troops were rescued, and the Trans-Siberian railroad opened for its whole length. At present an All-Russian Council is in session in Omsk which has been recognized by the Allies. What the future holds for Russia no one can say, whether order will soon be restored or whether a long period of military occupation may be necessary. But so far as Japan is concerned, we can say that she has co-operated cordially and loyally with her Allies and with the United States in Siberia, and any future decisions will be reached as in the past, through friendly discussion and, if necessary, mutual concession.

If any one had prophesied, five or six years ago, that soldiers of the United States and of Japan would soon be fighting side by side against a European foe, he would have been laughed into silence. For at that time our relations with Germany and Austria were of the best, whereas on several occasions a rumor of war with Japan had been current in many quarters in the United States. What, then, have been the relations between the United States and Japan in the past, and what foundation has there been for alarmist reports which have dismayed many of the people of the two countries?

V. JAPAN AND THE UNITED States

For a full 50 years the relations between the United States and Japan were more friendly than those which we had with almost any other power. They were more than "correct," in the diplomatic sense; they were based upon genuine good will on our part and a keen sense of appreciation and gratitude on the part of Japan. The United States in 1854, through kindly but firm pressure, had brought about the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse, after her ports had been closed for over 200 years to all but a limited Chinese and Dutch commerce. In the first years

of Japan's new foreign relations the United States consistently tried to help the Japanese solve their many unfamiliar problems,

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IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

431

and repeatedly tried to moderate the less conciliatory views of European diplomats. So Japan turned to the United States for advice and assistance in many of her new ventures, and not a few of the leaders of New Japan were either educated in America or by Americans in Japan. And for more than 40 years the trusted adviser of the Japanese foreign office was always an American. Every well-informed student of international relations would testify that the official intercourse between Japan and the United States has been a model which might well have been followed by other powers.

CONTROVERSIAL INCIDENTS, 1906-1913

It was in 1905 that the first suspicion of friction appeared. And in the next nine years a series of incidents occasioned some illfeeling, but it must be remembered that the friction was always between popular groups: the official relations were always cordial.

The occasions for controversy were found in both the United States and in the Far East. In the United States it arose from the agitation for the exclusion of the Japanese immigrants. This movement began in California about 1905. It had small basis in fact, for there were relatively few Japanese in this country, but if their number continued to increase as rapidly as it had since 1900 a real social and economic problem would soon be presented. Instead of meeting this problem through diplomatic channels, the agitators, remembering the Chinese exclusion movement of an earlier generation, commenced direct action. This took the form of the so-called "school-boy incident" in San Francisco. Using the excuse that school facilities were lacking after the great fire in 1906, the school board ordered all Oriental students to attend a designated school. The Japanese, recognizing the motive which prompted this action, justly resented it. And it was the more ungracious because at the time of the earthquake and fire the Japanese Red Cross had contributed to the relief of San Francisco more money than all other foreign countries combined. They had eagerly seized this opportunity of showing their appreciation of all that the United States had done for Japan in the For American documents relating to this question, see Appendix III, p. 448.

past. The action of a local school board soon became a national and an international question. With the legal aspects we are not concerned here. The matter was settled, between the Federal Government and San Francisco, by a compromise. The Japanese students were admitted to all the schools as of old, and President Roosevelt promised to take up the question of immigration with Japan.

When the matter was presented in proper form, the Japanese at once met our requests. Practically all thoughtful Japanese realized the dangers involved in a mass immigration of people from a land with low standards of living to one where they were high. The understanding took the form of the "gentlemen's agreement," under which Japan promised not to give passports to laborers desiring to emigrate to the United States, and our Government in turn agreed not to subject the Japanese to the humiliation of an exclusion act. Since this agreement went into effect in 1907, it has met every need. No one has found ground for questioning the scrupulous good faith of the Japanese foreign office in the issue of passports. In fact the admission of Japanese, under the passport system, has worked out with fewer abuses than the admission of Chinese under the exclusion laws which we administer ourselves.1

Unfortunately this good understanding did not quiet the agitation on the Pacific Coast. In the California Legislature in 1909, 1911 and 1913 a number of measures were proposed which would have caused discrimination against the Japanese residents of the state. These were reported to the Japanese press, and even though not passed they kept alive the resentment. Japanese who accepted our views regarding immigration did not hesitate to assert that such Japanese as were admitted to our country should enjoy rights and privileges equal to those of any alien. A crisis was reached when, in 1913, a bill was proposed at Sacramento The immigration from Japan by years since 1908 has been as follows:

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