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ANTI-ALIEN LAWS OF STATES

433

which would deny to Japanese the right to acquire land or to lease it for more than three years. The purpose of this bill was to prevent the accumulation of agricultural land by the industrious and thrifty Japanese farmers. But the danger was largely imaginary because, due to the "gentlemen's agreement," very few Japanese could enter the country, and in 1913 less than 13,000 acres were actually owned by them. In spite of the efforts of the national administration, the bill was passed in a modified form, which made it apply only to "aliens ineligible to citizenship." This class included, specifically, the Chinese, and, by interpretation, all aliens who were not "free white persons" or persons of African nativity or descent. The act, moreover, especially asserted that it respected all treaty obligations. Thus the responsibility was thrown back upon the Federal Government, whose naturalization laws apparently debarred Japanese from citizenship. At the time Professor H. A. Millis, a well-known economist who had made the most careful study of the Japanese in the western states, did not hesitate to assert that the law was "unjust, impolitic and unnecessary legislation." Against this land law the Japanese Government protested, and our administration defended the legality of the act. But as an effort was made on both sides to avoid trouble the issue was never joined, and the exchange of notes never completed. But the so-called "alien land law" did more to disturb friendly relations than the immigration controversy seven years before. Happily, there has been no renewal of the anti-Japanese agitation in California. In 1915 Japan made a notable exhibit at the Panama-Pacific Exposition, which was properly appreciated, and since that time a better understanding has been established between the labor organizations of California and Japan.

FRICTION IN THE FAR EAST

The other occasion for friction was found in the Far East. The United States had befriended Japan in her days of weakness, and she adopted the same policy toward China when her "break-up" and division among the powers was openly discussed. In 1899, John Hay, the American secretary of state, sent out his "open

door" note, which was indorsed by Japan as well as the other powers. The next year, during the Boxer uprising, a second note won the support of all the powers to a pledge of the "integrity of China." Since that time the "open door" and the "integrity of China" have been fundamental principles of both American and Japanese policy in the Far East.

But after the Russo-Japanese War Japan succeeded to Russia's interests in Manchuria. American merchants had enjoyed a fair trade in that region. The propinquity of Japan, her cheap processes of manufacturing and her subsidized shipping all meant that she would soon prove a dangerous competitor for American and European traders in North China. Charges were soon made by Americans that, in addition to these advantages, the Japanese were closing the "open door" in the interests of their merchants. That Japan was trying in every way to improve her trade in that region is unquestionable. But that she deliberately and officially broke her "open door" pledge has never been proven, and after the first few years of adjustment were over, this charge was no longer heard. But there were some Americans who asserted that the United States should go to war with Japan in order to protect American trade in China. This was a proposition too absurd to be taken seriously by our people.

On the other hand a certain amount of criticism of American merchants and corporations was voiced in Japan. Up to that time railroad and mining concessions in China had generally been used by European powers for political ends. The Japanese could not understand that the United States had no intention of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of China. An American railroad or mine or dock-yard would be a business, not a political, enterprise. But it has taken time to drive this home to a certain type of Japanese writer, who constantly thought of American enterprises in terms of Russian or German procedure.

With such grounds for recrimination in the Far East and in our western states, it was not difficult for thoughtless writers to keep alive an alarming discussion. And as our people were so little informed regarding the facts and also regarding the purpose and power of Japan, it was easy for some to think seriously of the day

ZIMMERMANN NOTE AND ITS EFFECT

435 when a powerful Japanese squadron might, unannounced, appear off our coast and land an expeditionary force large enough to overrun the region as far as the Rocky Mountains. It is hard to realize this to-day, but many of our people feared, if they did not believe, it a few years ago.

GERMAN PROPAGANDA

We now know that in large part this propaganda was directed by German agencies. Before the war Berlin was the source of many of the alarming rumors of Japanese-American strife. During the war the group of newspapers in this country which had been most bitterly anti-Japanese was the most pro-German. As soon as Japan entered the war the Germans tried in every way to use it as an argument against further American sympathy with the Allies. And just before we declared war upon Germany, our efficient secret service secured possession of the famous Zimmermann note, in which the German foreign secretary proposed a joint Mexican-Japanese attack upon the United States, and promised Mexico her old provinces in our southwest as a reward. This, we must remember, was proposed while we were still on friendly terms with Germany. Japan denounced the attempt in the strongest terms. And a formal reply from both the United States and Japan may be found in the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes on November 2, 1917.3

These notes were exchanged between Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii, the special Japanese ambassador. Their purpose was "to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated." The provisions were much like those in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908,4 when trouble makers were criticising Japan's conduct in Manchuria. But in addition to renewing the pledge by both parties to respect the integrity of China and the policy of the open door, the United States, on the This group was also the extreme advocate of American intervention in Mexico and furthered its plans by frequent references to the alleged menace of Japan there. For text of the note and official discussions of it, see Appendix IV, p. 450.

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3

For text of the notes and official American statement regarding them, see Appendix V, p. 456.

4

For essential text of the exchange, see The Monroe Doctrine after the War, 298 (A League of Nations, I, No. 5). ·

ground that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries," recognized that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Thus, in 1917, the alarmists who sought to create trouble between Japan and the United States because of the former's policy in China, were silenced. Japan once more gave a formal pledge to respect the integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry there. Until she has positively broken these assurances the self-appointed mentors might well keep their peace.

NO BASIS OF MISUNDERSTANDING

There has been, and is, no reasonable ground for misunderstanding between the United States and Japan. In every possible way Japan has shown that she seeks to maintain friendly relations, the "traditional friendship," with the United States. The exchange of notes and the cordial acceptance of the American plans for Siberian intervention are the latest expression of this feeling. In China the two countries may well co-operate, through their representatives and their merchants. Competition between business men may cause hard feeling, but no one should consider it a proper occasion for war. And our Government has formally recognized that Japan has special interests in China, just as the United States has for almost a hundred years asserted it has special interests in the lands to the south of us.

And at this time when America has played so important a part in redressing the wrongs of the Old World, she might well right a few in the New. The naturalization laws which debar Oriental residents from citizenship are as unjust as any of the racial discriminations of the Dual Empire. Because of our Chinese exclusion laws, the "gentlemen's agreement," and our last immigration law, only a few Orientals of a superior class can enter the country. Those that we admit should be placed on terms of absolute equality with all other aliens, and they should be permitted and encouraged to accept the responsibilities of citizenship. President Roosevelt proposed this to Congress in 1006. It might

JAPAN RECENTLY A FEUDAL STATE

437 well be passed in the year of the Great Peace. And with this national law, all discriminatory laws on the statute books of our states would become inoperative. In these ways the most irritating causes of misunderstanding would be removed, while the fundamental immigration policy would remain unimpaired.

VI. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. AUTOCRACY OR DEMOCRACY

But even should the present occasions for friction be removed, there is always the danger that other misunderstandings may arise as long as the people of Japan and of the United States are so little familiar with the history, culture and ideals of each other. In the absence of the needed information, we are apt to apply to the Japanese the ideas which we have gained of peoples with whom we are more familiar. Our people knew, for example, that Japan was an empire, possessed of a relatively large standing army and navy. In these respects it seemed to have more in common with Germany than with the United States. How could Japan take a loyal part in a war which finally was designed "to make the world safe for democracy"? This point was well covered by our ambassador to Japan, Mr. Morris, in his first public statement after his arrival at Tokyo. He pointed out that the Allies were not fighting to establish democratic governments throughout the world, but rather in order that peoples might be free to establish their own governments. So, as we believe that the monarchy will be preserved in Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and among our Balkan Allies, we also believe that it will remain unimpaired in Japan. A better understanding of the Japanese governmental system would be of service to Americans.

EMERGED FROM FEUDALISM IN 1871

First we must bear in mind that as recently as 1871 Japan was a feudal state, not unlike those of Europe in the Middle Age. The country was divided into about 300 fiefs, over which feudal lords ruled. The central power was divided between the emperor, or mikado, who was the source of all authority, and an hereditary general, or shogun, who administered the government in the name

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