REVIEW OF BOOKS

ON

SUBJECTS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST

"The Naval Architects' and Shipbuilders' Pocket Book." By Clement Mackrow and Lloyd Woodard. Twelfth Edition. 741 pages. (New York: The Norman W. Hanley Publishing Company.)

This is the 12th edition of Mackrow's "Naval Architect and Shipbuilders' Pocket Book," bearing the date of August 1, 1919. An extensive revision of the pocket book was made for the 11th edition, which appeared in January, 1916. Most of the work on the 11th edition was done by Mr. Mackrow himself who, however, died before its completion. It remained to Mr. Lloyd Woolard of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors to complete Mr. Mackrow's unfinished work. The pocket book contains the usual treatment of the mathematics of engineering common to all handbooks, with such additional mathematics and tables as are specially applicable to naval construction. A chapter is also devoted to aeronautics. It is, perhaps, at first sight not obvious why a handbook on naval architecture should concern itself with the science of aeronautics. The inclusion of this subject is however logical, because the mathematics of stability, displacement, strength calculations, etc., are the same for aircraft as for ships, particularly for the lighter-than-air types of aircraft.

In an appendix to the 12th edition a number of pages are devoted to estimating the cost and weight of merchant vessels. While estimating the weight of structural steel has been covered in some detail, the article is hardly of much help in estimating costs. Reliable and usable data for estimating the cost of ship construction are still a conspicuous omission from handbooks and other treatises on naval construction. Data as to the cost per ton of building vessels in the past are of little use to the estimating department of a shipyard. Something more fundamental is needed. It should be possible to compile data giving the man hours required per ton, or other unit, to produce the various parts entering into the building of a ship. The man-hour unit eliminates fluctuations in wages and differences in local conditions. There will be a great demand for any book which treats the subject of cost estimating on this basis and it is hoped that some one will fill this long-felt need. Unfortunately, those who have the time and are interested in writing are usually not the ones who have access to cost data.

Mackrow's pocket book is more valuable to the British naval architect and draftsman than to the American user, as the data are based principally on British mill and engineering practice.

J. A. F.

"The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916, Its Creation, Development and Work." By Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa. (Cassell, February, 1919.)

This stout volume of 464 pages of text, with an appendix, 9 plates and 13 diagrams, will be found interesting reading by men equipped with the technical knowledge to appreciate the significance of the information it gives as to the employment of the British Grand Fleet during the greater part of the war; but it has another importance almost equally as great, før it is an historical document of the very first rank, and as such it is here considered.

It is a consecutive narrative in the direct and impartial style of military men, who are trained to deal with facts rather than opinions or sentiments, and its language and tone are those of the official report. It begins with an account of the circumstances under which its author, then Sir John Jellicoe, was selected at the beginning of the war to command the newly constituted Grand Fleet, and it gives a chronological record of the movements of that force, of the conditions under which it operated, and of the ideas and convictions in accordance with which it was directed up to the author's relinquishment of its command in November, 1916.

Historically it is important as the first public revelation of serious deficiencies in British naval equipment at the outbreak of the war. The small number of effective destroyers comes as a surprise, but it has a parallel in the lack of frigates which Lord Nelson felt so bitterly that he said the phrase "lack of frigates" would be found graven on his heart. Modern conditions make the destroyer an even more indispensable type of craft than the frigate was a century ago; so the British paid a heavy price, in the way of greater losses from submarines and greater immunity on the part of the German fleet, for their failure to establish the same superiority in destroyers that they possessed in other classes of ships.

Other ways in which Lord Jellicoe declares the Germans to have had an advantage were: In cruising radius and surface speed of submarines; in fire-directing devices on fighting ships; in thicker and more extensive armor on their larger craft, as a result of better design and the use of small tube boilers which gave greater horsepower for a given weight; in superior range-finding devices; and in a delay-action fuse that ensured the bursting of the shell inside instead of outside of the armor of the ship hit.

These are advantages due to superior technical skill on the part of the Germans, but there were others that arose from the conditions under which the war was fought. The vastly greater responsibilities of the British fleet imposed much more wear and tear on it than on the Germans, who were also in a position to conduct such operations as they chose at times when their power was at its maximum, and who also, from operating near their bases, could carry less fuel, and so gain slightly in speed. Apparently Lord Jellicoe attributes the high angle at which the German shells struck to the long range at which the battle was fought rather than to greater power of elevation in the German guns, and their greater effectiveness on such ships as the Invincible and Queen Mary would therefore be due to the thinner

armor and lack of magazine protection on those ships more than to superiority in German gun control.

Yet another disadvantage under which the British operated Admiral Jellicoe points out to have been a lack of adequate docks; a deficiency he attributes to the government's indisposition to spend money for these unspectacular but necessary adjuncts; a parsimony which, he says, seriously restricted the design of ships of large displacement, and necessitated the sacrificing of advantages in them that the possession of docks of sufficient capacity would have made possible. He also cites the strike of the Welsh miners as having for a time restricted the movements and threatened the power of the Grand Fleet, and he had to face and overcome a serious lack of harbor defences at the beginning of the war.

All these things in Admiral Jellicoe's book make the German fleet seem to have been a much more formidable and effectively employed force than would be inferred from its abject surrender without a fight; but the historian, although he will assume that Admiral Jellicoe has proved to those equipped to judge that he was proficient as an organizer and thoroughly conscientious and competent in the technique of his profession, will probably be inclined to think that he emphasizes too strongly the inferiority in matériel of the British fleet. There is a very obvious reason for this in the fact that the book, while in no sense contentious, is still written mainly to justify Admiral Jellicoe's record while he was in command of the Grand Fleet, and to demonstrate that the battle of Jutland was a British and not a German success. Undoubtedly the Grand Fleet accomplished much during the first two years of the war. Undoubtedly the results of the battle of Jutland proved it a British victory. Undoubtedly also the British fleet was maneuvered with superior skill during that battle, but, from the point of view of history, it does not appear a brilliant victory, and Admiral Jellicoe's book does not remove the possibility of arguing plausibly that better results might have been obtained in that engagement if the unquestioned British superiority in most respects had been brought to bear with more decision and persistency. The book, in short, does not make it evident that the leadership in the battle of Jutland displayed the "Nelson touch."

S. G.

"Submarine and Anti-Submarine." By Sir Henry Newbolt. 312 pages, frontispiece in color and 20 other illustrations in pen and ink by Norman Wilkinson, R. I. $2.25 net. (New York: Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co.) This book, while written for general circulation, and untechnical save in the accurate accounts of maneuvers during engagements and the correct use of nautical terms, should prove exceedingly interesting and valuable reading to any one connected with the naval service. The opening chapter is a comparison of the national spirit and ideals of the British and German nations and the second a very complete historical review of the conception and development of the submarine. The remaining chapters are, in the

main, a collection of concise narratives, based on official reports, logs and other authentic sources, covering practically the entire range of British submarine and anti-submarine activities during the present war, together with a chapter discussing the part the submarine played in the war policies of Great Britain and Germany; a chapter on "The Hunted," which contains an account by both sides of the Fanning-Nicholson vs. U-58 engagement; and, in the closing chapter, an excellent account of the Zeebrugge and Ostend affairs. The illustrations have no particular merit and, considering the character of the binding and the quality of the paper used, the price seems rather high.

L. A.

"Official Aero Blue Book and Directory, 1919." Henry Woodhouse, Editor. (Published by the Century Co., New York, at $5.00)

The handsome volume with the above high-sounding title contains a good deal of information interesting from a purely historical standpoint. In order to command the price at which it is sold, however, it has been padded with propaganda, advertisements (not confined to the advertising pages) and irrelevant pictures.

Although the book was not published until March, 1919, much of the material applies only to conditions existing during the war. In this connection I was interested in the advocacy, on page seven, of the Postal Air Service as a training for bombing aviators on account of the similarity (sic) between dropping mail bags and bombs. I hardly think that the postal aeroplanes will be forced to operate at the heights which were found necessary for bombing machines towards the close of the war.

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Over 70 pages are devoted to the description in utmost detail of eight 'airways," five transcontinental and three coastal, proposed by the Aero Club of America.

A chapter entitled "A Flight Across the Atlantic" is an attempt to anticipate the experiences of an actual crossing. In a foreword the editor has the good grace to state that it is an account of an "hypothetical" flight. When it originally appeared in Flying there was no such explanation and some of the London newspapers accepted the account at its face value, which is either a commentary upon the appalling lack of technical knowledge of the "aviation experts" of the journals or a great tribute to the imagination of the writer.

Following are chapters giving the histories of various sporting events beginning with the Gordon Bennett Aviation and Balloon Trophies. As these events were run under the auspices of the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale of which the Aero Club of America is the representative I expected that care would be taken to have the accounts correct if for no other reason than to justify the title of the book. I was disappointed however.

The history of the Gordon Bennett Aviation Trophy contains many errors in spelling and gross inaccuracies in the times. As an example, the time for

Latham, the third to finish, in the 20 kilometer 1909 race is given as 15 minutes 50 seconds which would have tied him with the winner Glenn (not Glen) Curtiss. As a matter of fact, Latham took 17 minutes 32 seconds. Again, the record given for Prévost, the winner of the 1913 cup, is 200 kilometers in 50 minutes 453 seconds. I happened to have witnessed this race, which was held at Rheims, and my records show that he took exactly nine minutes longer than the time stated. Such mistakes as these are really inexcusable in a book pretending to be "official."

In the history of the Gordon Bennett Balloon Trophy, written by Mr. Hawley, the races won by Americans are described in great detail, whereas those won by representatives of other nations are dismissed with a few lines. The 1912 race is referred to in the following quaint manner: the seventh race for the cup will have been competed for before this is published (sic), and the club members all hope that the good team that is going to Germany to compete will bring the cup back to the Aero Club, as it is sadly missed from the trophy room after two years of possession." That is all.

For the benefit of the reader I should like to state that the 1912 race was won by the French representative Bienaimé.

Let us sincerely hope that if future editions of the book contain articles written in 1912 pains will at least be taken to edit them properly.

The remaining pages contain descriptions of the lesser contests, lists of qualified pilots and a directory of aeronautic organizations. Finally, there are given American and world's aviation records. These are stated to be only to December 31, 1915, but, in an effort to bring the list up to date, the flight of the NC-1 seaplane with 51 (not 50) people and Captain Schroeder's height record of 28,900 feet are included.

This list contains very few mistakes, but why should there be any? With the exceptions noted above it could have been set up in type three years ago and proofread ever since.

J. J. I.

"The Hatchet of the U. S. S. George Washington." Compiled by Captain Edwin T. Pollock, U. S. N., and Lieutenant (j. g.) Paul F. Bloomhardt, Chaplain Corps, U. S. N. Net proceeds to Navy Relief Society, Washington, D. C., from which copies may be obtained. Price $2.00.

The daily paper of the George Washington, published during nine eastward passages from February 21 to December 12, 1918, may now be had in a collected volume, each number an exact copy, even to printer's errors, of The Hatchet as it appeared "on the high seas." The errors, typographical or otherwise, in no way detract from the interest of the series, which, considering the difficulties and distracting responsibilities under which the editor, Chaplain Bloomhardt, and his corps of helpers labored, is a highly creditable journalistic achievement. News and humor mingle-the former in concise radio messages that recall the stirring events of the last year of the war; the latter with occasional effusions, such as the "Letters to Mable" and the "Badger Fight Hoax," which deserve their rescue from oblivion.