The sailor, therefore, after he has served several months, so far from having any pay to receive, is told that the whole is due to the coffee-house keeper, and that moreover he has a further debt to liquidate, which of course can only be done by further service. I have more than once been called upon officially, to liberate Englishmen who had been first kidnapped, and then cheated; and in some instances I have been successful, though in others the terms of agreement, signed with the man's own hand, has been shown me to prove that he was not forced into the Turkish service. The officers of the fleet are chosen from among the soldiery, and their nomination is a matter of interest resting in the hands of the Capoudan Pasha. Nautical skill may truly be said not to exist among the Turks, and any one who has had the good fortune to have sailed with the squadron which accompanied our fleet at the time of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, is thought a very Nelson. With such a crew, it is a matter of surprise how the Turks manage to navigate at all; but the fact is, that the vessel is sailed and steered by Europeans, while the fighting part belongs exclusively to the Turks. I have been told, and, from what I have seen, I can easily believe, that the confusion on board a Turkish vessel is absolutely ridiculous. One-half of the men are, perhaps, horribly sea-sick, sprawling about the deck; while the other half are pulling at ropes of which they have no knowledge. The Chaouses are seen running here and there, bastinadoing right and left, and forcing the men to their duty. Indeed, the way in which the sailors are taught to handle and know the different ropes is, as I was informed, quite on a par with the rest of the system. Vegetables, pipes, pieces of cloth, &c. are attached to the rigging and the cordage, and then the command is given, haul up the long pipe; let go the cabbage, &c. After the news was known of the destruction of a fine ship of war, by the fire-ships of the Greeks, the panic that seized the crew of a Turkish vessel, on the approach of a Greek one, was excessive.. Sailors on board these, have told me, that nothing could exceed the scene of confusion. The guns were fired without aim, and often on the side on which the enemy was not: the men were flying here and there, vociferating and running; many were preparing to jump overboard, and others absolutely did so. In fact, at the best of times, there is little discipline; but at such a juncture there is none. It was the knowledge of this that emboldened the small Greek vessels to approach and manœuvre round the heavy armed Turkish frigates with perfect impunity. A Greek vessel once approached a Turkish heavy frigate so close, that the anchor of the latter caught hold of some part of the rigging of the former. In an instant, both one and the other ran to cut away and disentangle themselves; the Greek not liking such close quarters, and the Turk taking his enemy to be a fire-ship. Not a single shot was fired. The loquacious Greek was heard to vociferate the vilest abuse on the Turk and on Mahomet; while the grave Turk, on the other side, merely shook his finger, and invited him to fight it out hand to hand. A single broadside from an European, of half the weight of metal of the Turk, would have blown the Greek out of the water. "These scenes, however, occurred in the beginning of the revolution. Both their panic and their thorough want of skill have been bettered by experience, and in more than one instance a single Turkish vessel has fought its way through a whole Greek squadron.

"The Viceroy of Egypt, for some years past, has been gradually increasing his naval force, and his fleet now consists of at least sixty vessels of war. Of these, six or seven are frigates, which have been chiefly built in private dock-yards at Marseilles, Leghorn, and Trieste; the others consist of corvettes, brigs, and schooners, and, with few exceptions, the whole of these vessels are of a very superior class, and in excellent order. In action, and in the management of their vessels, the Egyptians have proved themselves infinitely superior to the Constantinople Turks; but this, no doubt, is owing in a great measure to the fact of there being many foreign seamen in the Viceroy's service, who form part of the crew of each vessel.

"Such is the Turkish naval power. The Greek remains now to be described. "Five-and-twenty years ago, the present populous towns of Hydra and Spezzia were two small fishing villages. About this time the coasts of Spain and France were blockaded by our vessels; the Hydriots speculated, and sent in

small craft with corn to the blockaded station; and the immense profits they realized soon induced them to extend their risks. Their Admiral, Tombazi, whom I knew, informed me, that he was the first to get an American ship as a model, and from this, his countrymen constructed those vessels which have subsequently been converted into armed ones. In a few years, almost the whole of the corn-trade of the Black Sea was in the hands of the Greeks, and the inhabitants of Hydra and Spezzia became enormously rich. At the breaking out of the revolution, this profitable trade ceased, and their vessels returned to their respective islands without delay. With the exception of four or five three-masted polaccas, and six or eight schooners, the whole of the vessels belonging to Hydra, Spezzia, and Psara, are rigged as polacca brigs, their size varying from a hundred and fifty to five hundred tons, being pierced for twelve to twenty guns. I am unable to state the exact number of vessels belonging to these three islands at the period above alluded to, but only forty or fifty were armed and equipped during the first months of the revolution; and at no one period does it appear that the Greek naval force sent to sea, ever exceeded eighty vessels.

"The Greek vessels, with few exceptions, have been built from beautiful models, and sail remarkably fast; their crews have all the capabilities of good seamen, except that essential one-discipline. There are several Capitani on board, and each man has as much voice in the direction of the vessel as the Captain himself. This, therefore, gives rise to great confusion; but in the management of their vessels, they are infinitely superior to the Turks.

"Respecting the Greek marine, however, I conceive that an erroneous opinion generally exists in Europe, as, with the exception of the Hydriots and Spezziots, experience has taught me, that the Greeks are far from being experienced sailors. Few even of the Captains of those two islands bave studied navigation, and that to a very limited extent; their ignorance, in this respect, being obviated by the circumstance of their rarely navigating out of sight of land. During fine weather they manage their vessels and small coasting craft very well, and even expertly; but in a squall or gale of wind, especially during the night, they ge nerally lose all self-possession, the greatest confusion prevails, incense is burnt, the Virgin invoked, and every endeavour made to run the vessel into the nearest port for shelter."

"30th January, 1826.

"Missolongi is now regularly invested by the Egyptian army, assisted by the Albanians under the orders of the Seraskier. Up to the present time nothing of consequence has taken place, the troops being employed in forming the batteries, in transporting shot, shells, and ammunition, from Crio Nerò to the Camp, and in cutting fascines and brushwood to fill up the ditches. For this laborious service the Arabs have proved themselves to be far superior to the Albanians, as they were up to their middle in water most part of the day, and notwithstanding the inclemency of the season, did not appear to suffer therefrom. Most part of the shot, shells, &c. were transported on the heads of the Arabs from Crio Nerò to Missolongi, a distance of four hours, which alone would have killed stronger looking men. I am now able, from personal observation, to give you some account of the Egyptian army, which I think will prove acceptable. Each regiment originally consists of four thousand Arabs, clothed in a uniform composed of a red cloth jacket, trowsers, and skull-cap, and armed with a musket, bayonet, and cartouche-box. The officers are Asiatic and other Turks, but the sergeants, corporals, and drummers, are Arabs. In appearance they are certainly the most despicable troops imaginable, there being scarcely a fine-looking man amongst them; added to which, they have almost universally suffered from the Opthalmia, and have either lost an eye, squint very much, or are short-sighted. Since their arrival in the Morea, the uniform of many has given place to all kinds of grotesque clothing, acquired by pillage, such as women's petticoats, Albanian kilts, &c. They make up, however, for their appearance, by their behaviour, being exceedingly obedient, and apt at learning military evolutions, the old regiments going through the exercise very well; added to which, they never by any chance complain, and stand fatigue remarkably well. Indeed, from the time of

their landing in the Morea, their privations have been very great, continually marching and counter-marching over mountains, and fording rivers. At Patrass the tents were not pitched, the men were exposed day and night to the weather, and to protect themselves from its inclemency, dug holes in the ground, into which they thrust their heads, leaving the rest of their bodies exposed. They are constantly drilled, and sometimes are exercised six or seven times a-day. When off duty, one of their occupations is the cleaning of their muskets, which they keep remarkably bright and in good order. There are no regular cavalry attached to Ibrahim Pasha's army, but all the officers, medical staff, and commissariat department, are mounted, besides the baggage horses and mules. Of the European officers, of whom so much has been said, there are few of any consequence with Ibrahim. Of the French, the generality are surgeons, young students from the hospitals: Colonel Seves, known as Soliman Bey, is now at Tripolizza, and has not been here. The Italians are chiefly Instructori, or Drill officers, but they have merely the name, at least while they remained here; it is said, however, that they were of use in Egypt. The number of Europeans now here and at Missolongi with the army does not exceed thirty; and I am informed that there are not more than double that number altogether in the Morea. Ibrahim Pasha is said to pay little attention to them, and in no instance I believe followed their advice, not even of his chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Romey, a Neapolitan. Their pay varies from seven hundred to two thousand piastres a month, with rations for a horse and servant, which undoubtedly is their chief inducement to enter the service of the Pasha of Egypt. Some of these same Europeans in the first instance joined the Greeks, but getting no pay, and receiving ill-treatment and abuse, quitted their service in disgust. Since they have joined the Egyptians they have been regularly paid, and never go into battle."

"13th May, 1826.

"I will now proceed to give you an account of the events attending the fall of Missolongi; and although, up to the present time, the most erroneous accounts are circulated and believed concerning the same, I have reason to think that I have succeeded in arriving at the truth, not without infinite difficulty and trouble.

"The Garrison of Missolongi, reduced to a state of starvation, and perceiving that their hopes of receiving assistance by means of the Greek fleet were not realized, at last determined to abandon the place, and if possible, to escape through the Turkish camp. Unfortunately for them, however, Ibrahim Pasha was advised of all their proceedings and intentions, by deserters from the town; and, in consequence, the most effectual means were taken to prevent a surprise. On Friday, the 21st April, Ibrahim Pasha offered a capitulation to the Greeks, on condition of laying down their arms; which was refused, in consequence of the obstinacy of the Souliots. It is stated, that the understanding, on the part of the Greeks, was, that an armed force should appear on the heights in the rear of the Turkish camp, and, on their giving a signal, the sortie was to be made. This, in fact, took place, although the Greeks never came down from the mountains to the assistance of the garrison; indeed, it is asserted by some, that it was a party of Ibrahim's troops who appeared on the mountains, and by giving the concerted signal, deceived the besieged. Be this as it may, the sortie was made about nine o'clock on Saturday night, 22d ultimo, in great confusion, the women and children being in advance, in consequence of which great numbers of them were killed by the fire of the besiegers, as well as by their falling into the ditches: the others continued to advance; but being opposed on every side by the Turks, a dreadful massacre ensued. I have been assured by persons who were present, and by others who visited the camp soon after the catastrophe, that the plain be tween Missolongi and the mountains was covered with dead bodies. On these occasions it is impossible to ascertain accurately the number of those who fall, and therefore no reliance ought to be placed on the reports which have been circulated on the subject. It is stated, and I believe correctly, that the principal part of the Souliots (who formed the chief defence of Missolongi) escaped to the mountains; and, some days afterwards, several of the Greeks who escaped

at the same time, came into Lepanto, and surrendered to the Turks, as they had wandered about the neighbourhood, without being able to procure the means of subsistence. Above three thousand pair of ears were cut off from the dead bodies, and sent to Constantinople; while about five thousand women and children were made slaves. Among the dead bodies, those of Papadiamantopulo, Eparch of Missolongi, (formerly Primate of Patrass,) and Meyer, Editor of the Greek Chronicle, were recognised. The loss of the Turks was trifling, as the Greeks scarcely offered any resistance, seeming only desirous of effecting their escape. Ibrahim Pasha gave up the town to be sacked by his Arab troops; and, upon the Albanians attempting to participate in the spoils, they were prevented doing so by the Arabs, who actually formed, and fired on the Albanians, by which about a hundred and fifty of the latter are said to have been killed, when the others desisted from their purpose, and were only permitted to enter the place three days afterwards. The truth is, that from the commencement of the Egyptian army's appearance before Missolongi, the greatest jealousy existed between the Albanians serving under the Seraskier, and the Arabs, which led to endless disputes; and, in consequence, the Egyptian camp was formed at the distance of about a mile from that of the Albanians. The latter were not permitted to take any part in the operations of the siege; but were employed at the outposts. Ibrahim Pasha had reason to believe, from the general conduct of the Albanians, as well as from secret information, that some of their Chiefs favoured the Greeks in Missolongi; and, after the fall of that place, such proved to be the case, as letters were found from Albanian Chiefs, addressed to some of the besieged, informing them of Ibrahim's operations. When it is recollected, that the former assaults on Missolongi were made by Albanian mercenaries, under the command of these same Chiefs, the principal cause of their failure has thus become sufficiently evident.

"Missolongi having been completely sacked by the Arabs, orders were given to collect the bodies of the slain; and which, having been placed in heaps, were burnt, in order to prevent infection.

"Upon taking a review of the various attacks made upon Missolongi by the Turks, and the brave defences of its garrison, it is impossible not to render á tribute of admiration to the memory of those, who, compelled by famine to abandon its walls, have perished in the attempt. That such a dreadful catastrophe might have been avoided, there can be no doubt, as Ibrahim Pasha offered the garrison and inhabitants a capitulation on the same terms, as he granted at Anatolicò, which they knew he had fulfilled; and therefore, under the circumstances of the case, might have been honourably agreed to by them.

"Being naturally anxious to visit a place which had made so many brave defences, and had cost the Turks so much, I proceeded to Missolongi a few days since. I must confess, that its appearance caused me much surprise: its fortifications are scarcely worthy the name; and of fifteen guns mounted on the bastions, consisting of three to twelve-pounders, the greater part were unfit for service. There can be no doubt, that the natural position of Missolongi, it being built in a marsh below the level of the sea, was its greatest security, and formed its real defence; but I certainly am of opinion, that the Turks might have taken the place by storm any night, without losing half the number of men they did at Monasteri. The Greeks succeeded by boasting, in frightening the Turks into a belief, that the place was impregnable. The effect of the cannonading from the Turkish batteries, was not what might have been expected; and there really was no practicable breach made, although the walls might have been easily escaladed. The shells, however, caused great devastation, as, with the exception of about twenty houses, all was a heap of ruins. The house which had been inhabited by Lord Byron, escaped unhurt. An Albanian offered to point out to me the tomb of Marco Bozzaris; and, upon reaching the spot, I was shocked to find that the grave of this brave Chief had not been respected by his enemies, who had dug up his remains, as well as those of General Normann, in the expectation that they had been buried with their arms. The skeleton of Marco Bozzaris lay exposed to view; the skull was separated from the body, and my first wish was to rescue at least the former from further sacrilege; but, as I could not conceal

it on my person, and did not deem it prudent to carry it through the Turkish camp exposed to view, I was reluctantly compelled to abandon my design, and merely preserved some of the teeth.

"I then proceeded to the Egyptian camp outside the walls, and had an interview with Ibrahim Fasha. He is of middling stature, rather fat, marked with the small-pox, has a reddish beard, and is on the whole not a goodlooking man: he evidently has an excellent opinion of himself, the natural consequence of being surrounded by flatterers and slaves. He is, however, an active man compared with other Turks, and certainly manages, one way or other, to carry his plans into effect. While marching from place to place in the Morea, his manner of living was not at all splendid or luxurious; but at Missolongi he lived in great state. His tent was a most magnificent one, and combined elegance with comfort. It covered a large extent of ground, and was divided into several apartments. The outside was composed of green canvass, rendered impervious to the weather, by a second covering; the inside was completely lined with pieces of different coloured silk. The tents of the officers were green; those of the men, white. A tent was allotted to every twelve men, and these were placed in regular rows. Ovens were built outside of each tent, which served for cooking the rations, and baking the bread."

"October 18th, 1827.

"In the beginning of 1827, General Church, and Lord Cochrane, arrived in Greece, and were soon afterwards named Military and Naval Commanders-inChief. His Lordship quitted the schooner, in which he had been previously cruising in the Mediterranean, and assumed the command of the American ship, which had been named by the Greeks, the Hellas frigate. The greatest part of the American crew, which navigated the vessel to Greece, are stated to have quitted her soon afterwards, and were replaced by Greeks, under the immediate direction of Admiral Miaulis, who embarked on board at the request of Lord Cochrane: his Lordship had also in his pay some English officers and seamen.

"A few Greek vessels having been equipped, and a land force collected, it was determined to attempt the relief of the Acropolis of Athens, and the expedition sailed about the end of March for the Piræus. An army had been collected by the Greeks in the vicinity of Athens, represented as the largest force they had ever yet brought together in the field: with this force, communications were opened, and offensive operations commenced. A small fort, near the Piræus, capitulated on the 28th April, honourable terms having been granted; but no sooner were the garrison, of three hundred men, in the power of the Greeks, than they were shamefully butchered. This infamous act having been witnessed by Lord Cochrane, he thought it expedient to publish an address to the Greek Marine, disclaiming all participation in the outrage, which he designates 'as the most frightful he ever beheld.' Shortly after this occurrence, the combined Greek forces, under the orders of Church and Cochrane, made a general attack on the Turks besieging Athens; but in a few hours were completely defeated, with considerable loss, and, it is said, the two commanders with difficulty saved their lives, by flying to the ships.

Lord Cochrane then sailed for Patrass, with the frigate and steam vessel; and when off Cape Papa, within sight of Zante, had an action with two Turkish corvettes, which lasted several hours; but strange as it may appear, his Lordship was here again unsuccessful, as both the corvettes escaped, and subsequently reached Alexandria in safety.

"After this failure, Lord Cochrane, appears to have returned to Napoli, and being joined by about twenty Greek vessels, decided on attempting the destruction of the Viceroy's fleet, then fitting out at Alexandria. Thither the expedi tion sailed, and having arrived off the port, on the 16th June, hoisted Austrian colours; but since the former similar attempt made by the Greeks, the Viceroy had adopted strict precautions, and constantly kept a vessel of war cruising outside the harbour. The Egyptian cruiser recognised the Greek vessels at once, and giving the alarm by firing guns, attempted to make the port: failing in doing so, she was run on shore. A fire-ship was sent to burn her, without success: a second succeeded, and she was destroyed. By this time the alarm on shore VOL. III.NO. 5. 28