lawry, rather than prohibition, of manufacture as well as sale, and throughout the whole extent of the Union. For with less than national extirpation they see that prohibition within a State is defeated by liberty of importation from non-prohibitory States and foreign countries, as this liberty carries with it the right of sale. The stand taken by the Prohibitionists with respect to vested interests impaired or destroyed by suppressive legislation is worthy of note. In terminating licenses for the manufacture or sale of liquor they would entertain no claim for damages, holding that an annual license has no warranty of renewal. Moreover, that as the liquor traffic is a crime, and crimes forfeit rights, no compensation for loss should ever follow suppression. There have been many decisions of the Supreme Courts of the various States bearing on prohibition; more important, however, than any of these was the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, on December 5, 1887, in the cases of Peter Mugler vs. the State of Kansas (which State had adopted prohibition in its Constitution) and the State of Kansas vs. Ziebold & Hagelin. The essence of the decision is here given :

'Keeping in view the principles governing the relations of the judicial and legislative departments of Government with each other, it is difficult to perceive any ground for the judiciary to declare that the prohibition by Kansas of the manufacture or sale within her limits of intoxicating liquors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to the end of protecting the community against the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of ardent spirits. There is here no justification for holding that the State, under the guise merely of police regulations, is aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights; for we cannot shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the public safety may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact, established by statistics accessible to every one, that the disorder, pauperism, and crime prevalent in the country are in some degree at least traceable to this evil.

"Personal liberty, or the right to manufacture beer or other intoxicating drinks for one's own use, must give way where it conflicts with the

rights of others. In other words, 'The Government may require each citizen to so conduct himself and so use his own property as not unnecessarily to injure another.'

The Legislature, and not the individual, is the proper judge to determine whether society will be injuriously affected by the manufacture of particular articles of drink for the maker's own use.

"The general use of intoxicating drinks is an evil to which the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in this country are in some degree, at least, traceable.

To prevent the evils to society caused by intemperance it is a proper exercise of the police power of a State for a Legislature to even prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating drinks for the maker's own use.

A State cannot be handicapped in its efforts to protect society from a baneful business by any promises of immunity which the Legislature may have made, though based on a valuable consideration. And this is true, notwithstanding the Federal Constitution expressly forbids a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.'

"A lawful occupation of yesterday may become a criminal occupation of to-day, by reason of the progress of government to a higher standard of public morality and virtue.

"A State may even prohibit the sale of a dangerous commodity, though patented by the Federal Government.

"The power of eminent domain and the police power are two distinct things. Property cannot be taken for the public use without compensation, but the prohibition of the use of property for a specific purpose deemed injurious to society is not such a taking. The right of a State to abate a nuisance under its police power should not be burdened with a condition requiring compensation to be made. A State can declare breweries, distilleries, and saloons nuisances and abate them by proceedings in equity where the defendant cannot have a jury trial."

The National Prohibition party, which was organized in Chicago in September, 1869, has active representatives in every State and Territory of the Union. It publishes a large, welledited almanac, "The Political Prohibitionist," many leaflets, tracts, and pamphlets. Of the various journals which support its platform, the most widely circulated is The Voice, of New York.

Opposed to the Prohibitionists stand the advocates of High

License. They do not take so revolutionary a view of the liquor question. Certain of them use alcoholic beverages and find themselves none the worse. They would discriminate between use and abuse, and between comparatively harmless beer and wine and decidedly baneful whiskey and gin. In this camp are numbered many who hold the Prohibitionist position to be the extreme one inevitable to reformers who narrow down their observation to any single evil or vice; who maintain that the comparative conspicuousness of drunkenness has led to an exaggerated impression of its prevalence and of its enormity, whilst the benefit enjoyed by those who use liquor without excess is left out of view. Another group of the advocates for high license are teetotallers, some of whom regard their measure as a step in the direction of the ultimate suppression they desire. All, however, agree that for the present a restrictive policy is best, and that taxes very much higher than those now generally levied should be placed upon saloons, to the end not only that they may bear a more equitable share of the public burdens they create, but that incidentally their number may be reduced. They maintain that, granting it to be desirable that the community be freed from the trade in liquor, those who wish this absolute banishment are much too small a minority in the nation, or in most localities, to have their way. Therefore the political view must limit the ethical or reformatory, for the practical question is less what ought to be done than what can be done. Expressing themselves dissatisfied with the results of prohibitory legislation, they turn the Prohibitionist argument around, and say that to enact a law ahead of public sentiment is only to have law disregarded and brought into disrepute. They would distinguish between the moral reformers, whose mission is to set up an absolute standard of conduct and demand conformity to it, and the business of a Legislature, which is to enact such statutes as the public sentiment of the community will enforce; for law is but the voice of the community's conscience, and the

moral power in a State or nation is not to be measured by the voice but by the conscience behind it. They adduce the widespread breach of laws against liquor-selling on Sundays as proof that already there is more liquor-legislation, of a thoroughly excellent kind, than is put into effect. As showing how few of the American people follow the flag of Prohibition, the Presidential election returns of November, 1888, are cited, exhibiting a Prohibition vote of but 249,506 in a grand total of 11,388,038 ballots. And this when so eminent a Prohibitionist as the late Mr. John B. Gough used to say that three-fourths of the nation must sanction the laws for which he strove if they were to be really effective. The smallness of the Prohibition vote for President as cited, falling as it did vastly below the aggregate State votes on local Prohibition issues, shows that many Prohibitionists, believing that their party candidate could not succeed, cast their ballots for Mr. Harrison or Mr. Cleveland.

It may now be fitting briefly to review some of the most important experiments in legislating on the liquor trade, and first those in prohibition :

Of the States Maine was the first to adopt prohibition, in 1851. During 1856 and 1857 license was tried, but with the exception of those years, prohibition-now constitutional-has been the law. Investigation shows that in the rural communities of the State, where public sentiment sustains prohibition, the measure is successful. It is otherwise in the large towns and seaports, such as Portland, Bangor, and Bath, where proximity to the Canadian border and to Boston renders enforcement difficult. Its advocates allege that the political party in power is afraid to enforce the law for fear of antagonizing the liquor interest in national contests. On the ground of such experiences is chiefly based the platform of the national prohibitory party, which aims to be free from compromising alliances with any other political organization. Governor Robie in 1885, Governor Bodwell in 1887, and Governor Marble in 1888, concur in testifying

that in three-fourths to four-fifths of the State prohibition is fact as well as law, and is effective in reducing crime and promoting prosperity.

Vermont's prohibitory law, now constitutional as well as statutory, dates from 1852. Its enforcement is less satisfactory than that of Maine, the Prohibitionists complaining not only of the insincerity and supineness of the politicians in power, but also of the lowness of fines and penalties imposed upon offenders.

In New Hampshire prohibition became law in 1855, affecting, however, the sale, not the manufacture of liquor. One of the largest breweries in the country is profitably operated at Portsmouth.

Of the New England States, Rhode Island was the fourth and last to adopt prohibition, making it constitutional in 1886. Three-fourths of the population is in the county containing the cities of Providence and Pawtucket, so that the law is subjected to an extreme strain. With very imperfect enforcement the following contrast in Providence is exhibited :

Arrests for offences growing out of liquor traffic in 1885, under license, 4194. Ditto in 1886, under prohibition, 2597. Rhode Island's Legislature has recently voted for the resubmission of prohibition to the people.

While of late years the tide of prohibition sentiment has somewhat ebbed in the East, it has gathered strength in the West. Kansas adopted prohibition into its Constitution in 1880, the measure going into force the next year. An amendment increasing its stringency was enacted in 1887, and the statute granting municipal suffrage to women is claimed to have tended toward the efficient administration of the law. However, with estimates of population differing very widely, it is impossible to arrive at any fairly definite conclusion as to the effect of prohibition on crime in this State. The preponderance of testimony is that the measure is fairly well enforced and that it proves beneficial.