their country. If this be necessary, in order to accomplish the just ends of war, it may be lawfully done, but not otherwise. Thus, if the progress of an enemy cannot be stopped, nor our

the former body politic has ceased to exist. Consequently, the former political system disappears, and a new one takes its place. And the new political system is established and regulated by its own force and on its own principles. The political and civil rights of the inhabitants of the country depend on the provisions of the new system, in the absence of treaty stipulations on the subject.

(3) Allegiance to the Conquering State. In the absence of any treaty stipulations on this point, it is considered that the citizens of the conquered country owe absolute allegiance to the new State. If it is a bare case of conquest, the conqueror, now become the permanent sovereign, can surely forbid the departure of former citizens from the country, and claim sovereign rights over them. In the case of a title resting solely on cession, it is understood that the former citizens have the option to stay or leave the country, and the continuance of their domicil is conclusive on the obligation of permanent allegiance.

(4) Municipal Private Laws. The reasons for considering the former political laws as abrogated do not apply to the municipal laws, which regulate the private relations of individuals to each other, and their private rights of property. The change of sovereignty does not obliterate the subject-matters of property or obligations, nor the parties to the rights, duties, or compacts; and, in respect to these things, there is a permanent necessity for an uninterrupted existence of laws of some kind. Accordingly, it is held that the municipal private code remains in force. Yet it is not proprio vigore, or by the will of the people of the conquered country, but by the acquiescence of the new sovereignty, which is held to intend the continuance of such laws in the absence of new laws displacing them.

(5) Property of the Conquered State. The conqueror succeeds to the public property of the conquered State, of whatever character, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, lying in possession or in right of action. It can, of course, give valid titles to it, and valid acquittances to debtors of the former State; and the debtors are bound to pay their debts to the new State, as the successor and representative of the old. The notorious case of the refusal of the Elector of Hesse Cassel to recognize the sale of crown-lands made by the King of Westphalia, was a violation of this principle. His State was conquered by Napoleon in 1806, who made a completed conquest of it, and incorporated it into the Kingdom of Westphalia, which was recognized as a sovereignty by the treaties of Tilsit and Schonbrunn, and by the public law of Europe, for not less than seven years. When the Elector was restored to his throne by the treaty of Vienna, he retook possession of the former crown-lands, which his own subjects had bought of the King of Westphalia, and refused to recognize their titles, or to make them any pecuniary allowance. He refused to permit his courts to pass upon the question, or to leave it to arbitration; and the injured parties did not succeed in getting either the parties to the treaty of Vienna, or the Germanic Confederation, to interfere for their redress. The course of the Elector has been condemned by publicists.

Heffter, Europ. Völker. §§ 185, 186; Rotteck und Welcker's Staats-Lexikon (Domainen-käufer); Schweckart's Napoleon und die Kurhess. Capitalschuldner. Phillimore's Intern. Law, iii. §§ 573, 574. Halleck's Intern. Law, 840, 841.

The Elector of Hesse Cassel also refused to respect the payments made by the public debtors to the King of Westphalia. The case of the Count Von Hahn, which was carried through several tribunals, was a fair test of the principle. Count Von

own frontier secured, or if the approaches to a town intended to be attacked cannot be made without laying waste the intermediate territory, the extreme case may justify a resort to measures not

Hahn, a resident of the Duchy of Mecklenburg, compounded with the King of Westphalia for the debt he owed to Hesse Cassel, and obtained a release; and the Duchy of Mecklenburg declared the mortgage upon the count's estate, given to secure that debt, to be cancelled and void. On his restoration, the Elector instituted proceedings as a creditor against the estate. The first two tribunals the Law Faculties of Breslau and Kiel-decided that the Elector could recover so much of the debt as the count had not actually paid. This was upon the theory that the possession of the King of Westphalia was a military occupation, as of a transient conqueror. The final tribunal decided that the debt was validly cancelled, on the ground that the King of Westphalia had become the permanent and recognized sovereign of Hesse Cassel, and that the return of the Elector could not be considered as a continuance of his former sovereignty in such a sense as to invalidate the sovereign acts of the King of Westphalia in dealing with the public debts. Heffter's Europ. Völker. §§ 186-188. Pfeiffer's Kriegserob. ut suprà. Phillimore's Intern. Law, iii. §§ 568-572. Halleck's Intern. Law, 842. Rotteck und Welcker's Staats-Lexikon, tit. Domainen-käufer. Schweckart's Napoleon und die Kurhess. Capitalschuldner. Conversations-Lexikon, iii. Domainen.

(6) Retro-active Effect. The completed conquest operates to confirm and complete the rights and titles which the conquering power may have given, by virtue of previous belligerent occupation, to the public property of the conquered State. Such titles, being given as and for absolute titles, yet, in their nature, subject to the chances and final results of the war, take their date, after the complete conquest, from the original grant. As to the alienations of public property by virtue of belligerent occupation, vide infrà. Belligerent OCCUPATION. Belligerent occupation implies a firm possession, so that the occupying power can execute its will either by force or by acquiescence of the people, and for an indefinite future, subject only to the chances of war. On the other hand, it implies that the status of war continues between the countries, whether fighting has ceased or not, and that the occupying power has not become the permanent civil sovereign of the country. The effect of such occupation may be considered under several heads:

(1) Allegiance and Political Laws. As the State has not been able to protect its citizens, its claim upon their allegiance is suspended during hostile occupation. They not only cannot be afterwards punished for having acquiesced in the authority that has gained control over the place, but they cannot be compelled to pay to their government, after restoration, taxes or excise or customs duties for the time the place was in the enemy's possession. (United States v. Rice (the Castine Case,) Wheaton's Rep. iv. 246. Fleming v. Page, Howard, ix. 663. Cross v. Harrison, Howard, xvi. 164.) The people of the conquered place who submit to the conqueror and remain, as non-combatants, owe a temporary and qualified allegiance to the occupying power. The commander of the occupying forces has a right to require of the inhabitants an oath or parole, not inconsistent with their general and ultimate allegiance to their own State. He may require of them an oath or promise to remain quiet, and make no attempt to disturb his authority, and to submit to such laws as shall be made for the government of the place. He may require them to do police service, but not to take arms against their own country. Indeed, in the absence of any such formal promise, it is understood in modern times, that, by taking the attitude of non-combatants and submitting to the authority, the citizen holds himself out as one not requiring restraint, and is treated as having given an implied parole to that effect. Combatants,

warranted by the ordinary purposes of war. If modern usage has sanctioned any other exceptions, they will be found in the right of reprisals, or vindictive retaliation. The whole international code

or persons who, by resistance, or attempts at resistance, or by refusal to submit to the authority, take the attitude of combatants, may be placed under restraint as prisoners of war. Modern writers have gone so far as to contend, that citizens, who come under this temporary and partial allegiance to the conqueror, cannot throw it off and resist the authority by force, except on grounds analogous to those which justify revolution. If the occupying power does not do its part to protect the citizen in his person or property, or makes unreasonable and tyrannical exactions, these may constitute, as in a case of revolution, ethical justification for a resort to stratagem or force to overthrow the government.

Whether the laws which the occupying power establishes over a conquered place are those of the conquering country, or such other and different laws as that power shall choose to establish, is a matter of internal and not of international law. Under the Constitution of the United States, a place so held is not a State of the Union, and the general laws of the Union do not; proprio vigore, extend over it; but it is simply a district held by the military power, for the belligerent purposes of the Union, and is subject to such laws as the belligerent authorities of the Union may establish. Congress is considered as having a general authority to make laws for the government of such places, under its authority over martial and military law; and, in the absence of Acts of Congress, the President, as commander-in-chief, establishes such rules as he sees fit. (Halleck's Intern. Law, 784-6. Fleming v. Page, How. ix. 615. Cross v. Harrison, How. xvi. 164.) Importations into the United States from such places are held to be foreign and not domestic trade, within the meaning of the revenue laws. By the British system, on the other hand, it is said that a conquered place becomes, ipso facto, a part of the king's domain, and its inhabitants become in all respects his subjects. (Calvin's Case, Coke's Rep. Part VII. Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, Knapp, 338. Campbell v. Hall, State Trials, xxiii. 322. Same, Cowper, i. 205. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, Cowper, i. 165. Collet v. Keith, East. ii. 260. Blanchard v. Guldy, Mod. Rep. iv. 225.) Still, it is not to be supposed that the citizens of such a place are citizens of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or have political privileges as such, as a right to vote, or to be represented in Parliament. Foreign nations must accept the de facto condition of the place, and comply with such commercial and police regulations, and pay such duties, as the occupying power shall establish, if they choose to trade there; and treaty rights bearing on those subjects, whether made with the conquering or the conquered State, are inapplicable.

(2) The Extent of the Belligerent Occupation. The authority of the conqueror extends no further than his actual power extends. Such persons, such things, and such districts of country, as are under his hand and submit to his authority, or are coerced by it, are subject to his laws. His title rests on force, and is measured by it. (3) Municipal and Private Laws. In case of belligerent occupation, as in case of completed conquest, the private laws of the former State subsist, unless they are suspended by the act of the occupying power, and for the same reason,—that some laws must exist, to regulate private rights and relations, and the persons and things which are their subjects remain unchanged: therefore the laws are permitted to continue until a change is expressly made.

(4) Immovable Property. By belligerent occupation, the conqueror has the right to appropriate the use of public lands, and of all incorporeal rights accessory to them. He may confiscate the rents and taxes due, and use these lands in such way as he sees

is founded upon reciprocity. The rules it prescribes are observed by one nation, in confidence that they will be so by others. Where, then, the established usages of war are violated by an enemy, and

fit. But, as his occupation is subject to the chances of war, so is his title to what he cannot remove and corporeally make his own. He cannot, therefore, give to another a permanent title to public lands. Whoever takes a title from the occupier, takes it subject to the results of the war. If the title is, on its face, complete and permanent, and the war results in a completed and recognized sovereignty of the grantor, the title of the alienee is confirmed, and takes its date from the original grant. As to who may take grants from the belligerent occupier, it is to be observed, that, if a subject of the late sovereign purchases a title, he may be treated by his sovereign as dealing with the enemy, and supplying him with means. Indeed, the purchase is inconsistent with his allegiance. If a neutral private citizen buys a title, he takes it subject to the results of the war. If a neutral State takes a title, the act is considered as so far an abandonment of neutrality. It is an attempt to place the contingent property of one belligerent State out of the reach of the chances of war; and the neutral State cannot assert its title against the original sovereign, if he regain possession, except as a hostile act. (Halleck's Intern. Law, 449-451. Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 13, § 198. Kent's Comm. i. 110.) In like manner, a sale of his public lands by the excluded sovereign, while they are under hostile occupation, is only a transfer of his chance of regaining them; and a sale made by him in view of a probable loss of his territory, to defeat the rights of the probable conqueror, may be regarded as a mere stratagem of war, and not as a bonâ fide transfer. As to private property in immovables, the occupying power is not considered, in the modern practice of nations, as authorized to confiscate their use and income. He may make such use of them as the necessities of war require, and subject them to taxes and contributions; but the mere fact of military occupation does not work a transfer of the uses or income of private lands, or authorize such a transfer to be, in fact, made.

(5) Public Movable Property. It is the tendency of States, in all systems of govqrnment, to treat the transfer of corporeal movable property,-what the Common Law calls chattels, as far as possible, as giving the full title to the possessor. The simple and severe rules of war take the same direction. The belligerent occupant is treated as acquiring a complete title to all corporeal movables of the hostile State which come under his actual control. He may, by leaving them behind him, and by their coming back to the possession of the former State, lose his title: but, if he has perfected it by actual possession and the exercise of his right of confiscation, they are his; and the former State takes them, if at all, as a recapture, for its own benefit, by a new title. All incorporeal rights in movables follow the fortune of the movables. They pass to the conqueror, if they are rights; and, as far as they are servitudes or liens, the conqueror takes the things purged of the servitudes or liens.

There are some kinds of public movable property the right to transfer which has been a good deal questioned; that is, collections of works of art, science, natural history, and libraries. This subject is treated in the text, infrà, §§ 352-354; and note 170, infrà, on the Restitution of the Collections at the Louvre. As to State papers, public archives, historical records, judicial and legal documents, &c., all publicists seem agreed that they should neither be destroyed nor removed. They are not of commercial, exchangeable value; their destruction does not aid belligerent operations; they are necessary to the proofs of private rights; and are, in fact, adherent to the local government. (Halleck's Intern. Law, 543. Lieber's Polit. Ethics, p. 7, § 15. Kent's Comm. i. 92. Heffter's Europ. Völker. § 130, 131.)

there are no other means of restraining his excesses, retaliation may justly be resorted to by the suffering nation, in order to compel the enemy to return to the observance of the law which he has violated. (a)

(6) Private Corporeal Property in Movables. In modern warfare, private property in movables is not considered as transferred to the conqueror by the mere fact of belligerent occupation of the country. There must be an act of capture or transfer. The invading or occupying army will take all movables which are directly and primarily capable of use in war. (See note, infrà, on Contraband of War; also note 171, infrà, on Distinction between Enemy's Property at Sea and on Land.) This is because they are, in substance, contraband of war. It may also take to its own use whatever its military necessities require, as live stock, provisions, clothing, &c. Whether it shall make compensation or not, for movables of that description so taken, is matter of State or belligerent policy solely. It may also levy forced contributions on personal property, whether it be directly usable in war or not, as on the money of citizens of the conquered country, to meet its own necessities. In short, it may, if it sees fit, support itself on the resources of the invaded and occupied country. Yet no transfer of title to all or any movables, being private property, is worked by the mere fact of belligerent occupation of the country. So much of the rights of mere booty, loot, or plunder, as the civilization of modern times has left, is restrained in its effects on all parties by the rule that it belongs primarily to the State, the captor taking only what is allowed him by the State, by express or implied permission.

(7) Incorporeal Personal Rights. Incorporeal rights belonging to things—that is, what the Roman law terms real rights-follow the fortune of the thing. But incorporeal rights of a purely personal character, adhering to the person, are not occupied or possessed by the conqueror, by the fact of occupying a region in which the owner of the rights resides, or even by the possession of his person. Nothing short of a reduction of the owner to slavery — no longer a permissible process confiscates such rights. In this class, come debts and other personal obligations. The conqueror can coerce resident debtors so far as to compel them to pay to him debts they owe the ejected sovereign. In such case, as we have seen suprà, the payment of a debt due and payable under the kind of coercion the conqueror can exert, is a defence to the resident debtor to the extent of the payment made. It does not cover mere releases or quittances. It is a defence to a second demand, to the extent of the coercion and actual payment. A non-resident debtor of the ejected sovereign has not the excuse of coercion; and a payment by him is in his own wrong, and not a defence against the demand of the restored sovereign. And the possession, by the military occupant, of the documentary evidence of a debt due to the ejected State or its inhabitants, does not carry with it the right to the debt itself, so as to make the military occupant the legal alienee of the creditor. (Halleck's Intern. Law, 451-3. Heffter's Europ. Völker. 134. Phillimore's Intern. Law, iii. §§ 561-2. Pfeiffer's Kriegseroberung, 165-180. Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 14, § 112.)

(8) Slavery. A slave stands in two relations to his master and his master's sovereign, that of an article of property, and that of a human being. Regarded as a mere article of private property on land, - a movable corporeal chattel,- he would not be (a) Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 8, § 142; ch. 9, §§ 166–173. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, liv. viii. ch. 4, §§ 272-280. Klüber, Part II. tit. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, §§ 262–265.