Слике страница
PDF
ePub

R. Co., 184 N. Y. 351, 77 N. E. 392, affg. s. c. 88 App. Div. (N. Y.) 147, 84 N. Y. Supp. 383.

In statutes giving a penalty, if there be reasonable doubt of the case made upon the trial or in the pleadings coming within the statute, the party of whom the penalty is claimed is to have the benefit of such doubt.- Chase v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 523.

If the language of a penal statute is ambiguous, the construction will be given it which is most to the advantage of the person on whom the penalty is imposed.- Branch v. W. & W. R. Co., 77 N. C. 347.

[38] Effect of subsequent statute covering same subject matter. Provisions of N. Y. Statutory Construction Law as to re-enactments, see N. Y. Statutory Construction Law, § 32.

A statute covering the whole subject-matter of a former one, adding offences, varying the procedure, etc., operates not cumulatively but by way of substitution, and therefore impliedly repeals it. In the absence of any repealing clause, however, it is necessary to the implication of a repeal that the objects of the two statutes should be the same. If they are not both statutes will stand, though they refer to the same subject.-U. S. v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, affg. s. c. Fed. Cases, No. 14, 799.

A later act covering the whole subject of a prior one, and embracing new provisions plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute, supersedes the prior act, in the sense of embracing all thereof that was intended to be preserved, omitting what was not so intended, and changing what was intended to be changed, and so prevents the two from being regarded as in any respect coexistent or cumulative enactments. Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 155 Fed. 945.

Statute law is not abrogated or annulled by mere re-enactment or repetition, and when, for purposes of enlargement, contraction, or otherwise, a statute is re-enacted or repeated with amendments, the amendatory act is to be regarded as an affirmation and continuation of the prior law, in so far as in substance and operation it is the same, and is to be regarded as new legislation only in so far as in substance or operation it differs from the prior law. Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 155 Fed. 945.

Where a revising statute covers the whole subject-matter of antecedent statutes, the revising statute virtually repeals the former enactments without any express provision to that effect, and even where some parts of the revised statute are omitted in the new law, they are not in general to be regarded as left in operation, but are considered as annulled, if it appear that the legislature intended to cover the

whole subject-matter by the new statute.- Matter of N. Y. Institution, 121 N. Y. 234, 24 N. E. 378.

While repeals by implication are not favored, yet where the provisions of the later statute cannot have their full force and effect without the repeal of the former statute, such former statute must be deemed to be repealed by implication, or otherwise the plain intent of the legislature, as evidenced by its latest expression, is prevented from due operation by an inconsistent former statute. In such cases where the provisions are inconsistent, the latter must prevail as the latest exhibition of the will of the law-making power.- Matter of Wash. St. A. & Pk. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 442, 22 N. E. 356, affg. s. c. 52 Hun (N. Y.), 311, 5 N. Y. Supp. 355.

Where a later statute, not purporting to amend a former one upon the same subject, covers that subject, and was plainly intended to furnish the whole law thereon, the former statute will be held to be repealed by necessary implication, although it contains no express clause making such repeal.- Heckmann v. Pinkey, 81 N. Y. 211.

Where the law antecedently to a revision was settled, either by clear expressions in the statutes, or adjudications upon them, the mere change in phraseology shall not be deemed or construed a change of the law, unless such phraseology evidently purports an intention in the legislature to work a change.- Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 77; Theriat v. Hari, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 380; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 693; Yates v. People, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 314; revd. on other grounds, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 335; Taylor v. Delancy, 2 Caines' Cas. (N. Y.) 143; Croswell v. Crane, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 191.

[39] Construction of specific provisions.

Such expressions as "liability created by law," "required by law," "regulated by law," "allowed by law," "made by law," "limited by law," "as prescribed by law," "a law of the state," occurring in codes. or other legislative enactments are always used as referring to statutory provisions only.- Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663.

The words "prescribed by law" in N. Y. Const., Art. V, § 6, providing that the powers and duties of the boards and officers mentioned in that article "shall be such as now are or hereafter may be prescribed by law," means that the officers shall have such powers as are or may be prescribed by some statute of the state.- People v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 55 Misc. (N. Y.) 507.

[40] Divisibility of statutes.

The act creating the Texas Railroad Commission made rates fixed by it conclusive, and provided an enormous penalty for disregarding them.-Held, even if these two provisions are unconstitutional, the

rest of the act remains and will be enforced.- Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047.

The provision of the Constitution of California making the rates fixed by its state railroad commission conclusively just and reasonable is void, but is so clearly separable from the rest of the provisions relating to the commission that it does not render them invalid.— So. Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

If a state law were intended to apply to both state and interstate transportation, and was invalid as to the latter, it would nevertheless be valid and operative as to the former.- Dillon v. Erie R. Co., 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 116, 43 N. Y. Supp. 320.

Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, the remainder will not be declared unconstitutional also, if the two are distinct and separable, so that the latter may stand, though the former becomes of no effect.- Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247, 24 L. R. A. 141.

"In my opinion while this part of the act [referring to so much of Pub. Serv. Com. L., § 14, as relates to the application to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court] is of doubtful validity, it is not necessary at this time to pass upon the question of its constitutionality. If the statute is otherwise good, this part, if bad, can be eliminated without destroying the entire fabric of the act."- Opinion of Corporation Counsel F. K. Pendleton, rendered to Comptroller H. A. Metz, July 13, 1907.

[41] Classification by a state for purposes of regulation.

The power of the state to classify persons and property in its legislation is well established.-Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U. S. 340, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 533.

There is no arbitrary classification in a state statute which requires the production of books and papers by corporations upon notice. Such statute was passed to require the corporation as the responsible owner and custodian of the books and papers to produce the same without the necessity of calling upon bookkeepers, managers and other servants who may or may not have custody or control thereof at the time the notice is given.— Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 T. S. 541, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 178, affg. s. c. Vt. 66 Atl. 790. A statute which puts in one class all engaged in a business of a special and public character, requires of them the performance of a duty which they can do better and more quickly than others, and imposes a not exorbitant penalty for a failure to perform that duty within a reasonable. time, can not be adjudged unconstitutional as a purely arbitrary classification.- Seaboard Air L. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 28, affg. s. c. 73 S. C. 71, 52 S. E. 797.

A state has power through its legislature to classify objects for the purpose of government, but in exercising that power the classification must have relation to the purpose of the legislature, but logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required. A classification may not be merely arbitrary, but there must be great freedom of discretion, even though it result in ill advised, unequal and oppressive legislation.- Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 114.

In a general classification for governmental purposes, there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things and such a classification ought not to be rendered invalid so long as there is no substantial and fair ground to say that it is an unreasonable and unfounded classification.- Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union Co. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 89, revg. s. c. 145 Fed. 344.

Legislation may be directed against a class, when any fair ground for the discrimination exists.- Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 638.

While a state has the right to classify for regulation, such classification must be based upon some difference bearing a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is attempted and no mere arbitrary selection can ever be justified by calling it classification. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 609.

§ 2. Definitions.-[a.]* The term "commission," when used in this act, means either public service commission, hereby created, which by the terms of this act is vested with the power or duty in question.

[b.]* The term "commissioner," when used in this act, means one of the members of such commission.

[c.]* The term "corporation," when used in this act, includes a corporation, company, association and joint-stock association.

[d.]* The word "person," when used in this act, includes an individual and a firm or copartnership.

[e.]* The term "street railroad," when used in this act, includes every railroad by whatsoever power operated, or any extension or extensions, branch or branches thereof, for public use in the conveyance of persons or property for compensation, being mainly upon, along, above or below any street, avenue, road, highway, bridge or public place in any city, village or town, and including

*Arbitrary paragraph designation not in original Act.-Ed.

all switches, spurs, tracks, right of trackage, subways, tunnels, stations, terminals and terminal facilities of every kind used, operated, controlled or owned by or in connection with any such street railroad; but the said term "street railroad," when used in this act, shall not include a railroad constituting or used as part of a trunk line railroad system.

[f.]* The term "railroad," when used in this act, includes every railroad, other than a street railroad, by whatsoever power operated for the public use in the conveyance of persons or property for compensation, with all bridges, ferries, tunnels, switches, spurs, tracks, stations and terminal facilities of every kind used, operated, controlled or owned by or in connection with any such railroad.

[g.]* The term "street railroad corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, partnership and person, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever, operating, owning, managing or controlling any street railroad or any cars or other equipment used thereon or in connection therewith.

[h.]* The term "railroad corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, partnership and person, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever, owning, operating, managing or controlling any railroad or any cars or other equipment used thereon or in connection therewith.

[i.]* The term " common carrier," when used in this act, includes all railroad corporations, street railroad corporations, express companies, car companies, sleeping-car companies, freight companies, freight-line companies and all persons and associations of persons, whether incorporated or not, operating such agencies for public use in the conveyance of persons or property within this state.

[j.]* The term "gas corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, partnership and person, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever, owning, operating, managing or controlling any plant or property for manufacturing and distributing and selling for distribution or distributing illuminating gas (natural or manufactured) for light, heat or power.

[k.]* The term " electrical corporation," when used in this act, includes every corporation, company, association, joint-stock asso* Arbitrary paragraph designation not in orginal Act.-Ed.

« ПретходнаНастави »