Because the act of the governor in determining the sufficiency of grounds of removal, and then removing, is judicial, it does not incapacitate him from acting where he discovered the delinquencies and himself preferred the charges.- Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699.

Removing a person from office for cause involves the exercise of judicial power. It must be conducted consonant with due process of law, which requires notice to the officer, a hearing, and determination. - Clay v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091.

[8] — Validity of statutes.

66

An act authorizing the governor to remove elective or appointive officers for gross neglect of duty, corrupt conduct in office, or other misfeasance or malfeasance therein," is constitutional.- AttorneyGeneral v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699.

An act which vests in the governor the power to remove for cause certain officers created by the legislature, is valid.- Clay v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091.

The appointment of a successor to an appointive officer, removable at the pleasure of the appointing power, effects a removal without any notice of removal.- People ex rel. Ward v. Drake, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 325, 60 N. Y. Supp. 309.

Certain acts by Commissioners defined as grounds for removal,― see post, § 15.

Removal of an officer "for cause must be for some dereliction or general neglect of duty, or incapacity to perform the duties, or some delinquency affecting his general character and his fitness for the office. The cause assigned should be personal to himself, and implying an unfitness for the place. That some other man is a better man for the place, or more congenial to the appointing or removing power, is not a ground for removal under such a statute.- People ex rel. Munday v. Fire Comrs., 72 N. Y. 445.

Words spoken under exasperating circumstances, though expressing refusal to obey instructions, etc., do not constitute neglect, malfeasance or misfeasance in office, warranting removal.-People ex rel. Hill v. Mace, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 344, 32 N. Y. Supp. 335.

Removal for "cause" can be only for a good reason, not a false reason which the removing power honestly but mistakenly believes to be true.- Matter of Nichols, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474.

Power to remove 66 99 for cause does not confer an unlimited discretion, but only the right to proceed for some act of omission or commission by the officer in regard to his duties, or affecting his general character, which the law and a sound public opinion will pronounce to be sufficient to justify a forfeiture of the office and not in the political bias or personal dislike of the removing officer nor in his leanings towards another individual for whom the place is desired.Matter of Nichols, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474.

An officer is not liable, before an impeachment tribunal, for a judicial act, unless he acted willfully, maliciously or corruptly.- State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 55 N. W. 774, 38 Neb. 584, 55 N. W. 774, 58 N. W. 32.

On a removal for cause, the party against whom the proceeding is taken must be informed of the causes of the supposed removal, and be allowed an opportunity for explanation.- People ex rel. Munday v. Fire Comrs., 72 N. Y. 445.

In removing an officer for cause, such officer is entitled to a personal notice of the proceedings and the time and place of the trial thereof, and to a copy of the charges specifically stated with substantial accuracy; to a reasonable time and opportunity to prepare his defense and produce his testimony; to be heard and defended by counsel; to cross-examine the witnesses, and to except to the proofs against him. If the charge be not denied, still it must, if not admitted, be examined and proved.- Matter of Nichols, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474.

"Due process" in removal of officers does not mean necessarily judicial process, but administrative process.- Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699.

Because removal from office must be for cause, upon specific charges, and after an opportunity to be heard, does not imply that such removal is a deprivation of "property," under the "due process " clause.Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A.

699.

In removing public officers, the state is not so bound by the term "due process of law" that it is impossible for it to invest its agents with these powers without subjecting itself to the delays and uncertainties of strict judicial action in cases of emergency.- AttorneyGeneral v. Jochim, 99 Mich, 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699.

Removal for cause involves the exercise of judicial powers. Hence, it must be after a proper and duly noticed hearing on charges consisting of distinctly stated facts, not general charges of wrong or neglect.- Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112.

"Due process of law" is not necessarily judicial process, but is often purely executive or administrative. Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201.

The suspension of a railroad commissioner after notice and a hearing under the provision of a statute empowering the governor to suspend a commissioner for certain causes, is "due process of law."Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 425, 28 S. E. 554.

Where an officer has been removed from office by the governor, the courts will not review the action of the governor on the merits.Matter of Guden, 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 421, affg. s. c. 71 App. Div. (N. Y.) 422, 75 N. Y. Supp. 794.

The acts and proceedings of the governor in removing an officer for cause may be judicially reviewed, but the courts should use the power very reluctantly.- Matter of Nichols, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474.

Under the statute of North Carolina giving the governor power to remove railroad commissioners for certain causes, when the power of suspension is exercised by the governor in an orderly manner, his act is not reviewable by the courts.- Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 425, 28 S. E. 554.

Where the specific charge stated is insufficient to justify removal, or where the removal is erroneous, and no good and sufficient ground therefor appears, an officer is entitled to a mandamus to restore him. -Matter of Nichols, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474.

[14] Validity of commission plan of regulation.

What bodies may be vested with the power to punish for contempt,see post, § 19, note [8].

State may authorize a commission to hear and determine complaints, see post, § 48, note [1].

Validity of commission plan of regulating gas and electrical corporations, see post, § 66, note [5], § 72, note [2].

There is nothing in the statutes or constitution of the United States which prevents a state from creating a board of railroad commissioners, and what powers the board shall have will depend upon the law creating them, of which the courts of the state are the absolute interpreters.— Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 650.

Railroads, from the public nature of the business carried on, and the interest which the public have in their operation, are subject, as to their state business, to state regulation, which may be exerted either directly by the legislative body or by administrative bodies endowed with power to that end.- Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. N. Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 585, affg. s. c. 137 N. C. 1, 49 S. E. 191.

A state may, in the exercise of its police powers, confer on an administrative agency the power to make reasonable regulations as to the time, place and manner of delivery of merchandise, etc.- McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v Mayes, 201 U S. 321, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 491.

The creation of a state railroad commission, with power to classify and regulate rates, is within the power of the Texas Legislature.Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U.S.) 1047.

Railroad corporations are subject to legislative control in all respects necessary to protect the public against danger, injuries, and oppression, and the state may exercise this control through boards of commissioners. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 437.

A state may give a state commission power over railway rates and service. Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 47, affg. s. c. 70 Ga. 694.

The statute of Mississippi creating a railroad commission and charging it with the duty of supervising railroads, is constitutional.Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 334, 388, 1191.

It is within the constitutional powers of a state to regulate freight and passenger tariffs by a state railroad commission.- Trammel v. Dinsmore, 102 Fed. 794, revg. s. c. 92 Fed. 714.

The legislature may delegate the exercise of its powers as to regulating and establishing rates, in matters of detail, to an administrative board of its own creation.- Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. 335.

The state may regulate railroad rates, etc., by commission,- Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

The establishment of a commission, whose duty is to see to it that railroad rates for the transportation of freight and passengers are just and reasonable, is clearly within the constitutional rights of the states.Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 57 Fed. 436.

The act creating a railroad commission in Tennessee held unconstitutional and ineffectual and the commission plan of regulation dis

approved.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission of Tenn., 19 Fed. 679.

The act of the Georgia legislature forbidding unreasonable or discriminatory rates, and providing for a commission to prescribe just and reasonable rates, is constitutional.— Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., 5 Fed. 641.

The legislature may delegate to a commission created by it the power to fix the maximum rates to be charged by gas and electrical corporations.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, revg. s. c. 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Sup. 341,

The Rapid Transit Act of 1894 is constitutional.- Sun Publishing Assn. v. Mayor, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788, affg. s. c. 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230, 40 N. Y. Supp. 607.

The power of the state to fix rates may be exercised by a commission provided there is a standard fixed by which the commission is to be guided.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Supp. 341, revd. on other points, 191 N. Y. 123, 89 N. E. 693.

A Georgia act forbidding unjust discriminations, and creating a state railroad commission, is constitutional. In the exercise of its power over rates, etc., it was not expected the legislature should do more than pass laws to bring about the ends in view. The commissioners are officers clothed with power sufficient to effectually execute the law. Legislative grants of power to the officers of the law, to make rules and regulations which are to have the force and effect of laws, are common and valid.- Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; affd. 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 47.

The legislature of a state has the power to regulate charges by carriers, and, having such power, may confer it upon a municipality.Chicago U. Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 Ill. 484, 65 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631.

Since railroads take their charters subject to the common law principles forbidding discriminations, excessive charges, etc., the legislature may prescribe the methods and agencies to be used in enforcing these common law duties.- Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 1.

The Indiana Railroad Commission Act is constitutional.— Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 38 Ind. App. 439, 78 N. E. 338.

It is constitutional to vest a state railroad commission with power to permit roads to charge less for a longer than for a shorter distance. -Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 633, 21 Ky. L. R. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012.