another state is no reason for interference whatever, and that good evidence of unjust designs, drawn from conduct, ought to be obtained before any measures may be taken to prevent them.

The extreme case of extraordinary crimes, committed by a government against its subjects, is still less capable of exact definition. Here, however, the danger of erring is less than in the other instance, because interference here is more disinterested; and the evil results of a mistake are less, because such cases are comparatively rare.

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Having premised thus much in regard to justifying pretexts for interference, let us look now at the actual cases in which international law gives, or is claimed to give to it a sanction We shall consider first the balance of power.

the balance

power.

sitions.

The meaning of the balance of power is this: that any 1. Interference for European state may be restrained from pursuing of plans of acquisition, or making preparations lookTo prevent acqui- ing towards future acquisitions, which are judged to be hazardous to the independence and national existence of its neighbors. In further explanation of the system we may say, (1.) That it matters not whether the actual ratio of power between states is in danger of being disturbed by unjust or by just means, provided only the means are poli tical, not economical and strictly internal. If, for instance, the sovereign of a powerful state should in a just way seat one of his family on the throne of a neighboring state, the justice of the transaction would not be a sufficient protection against the interference of other powers. (2.) That acquisitions outside of Europe have not hitherto been drawn into this policy. England has by degrees become a predominant power in several quarters of the world without provoking the interference of the Continent. The reason is, that foreign acquisitions affect the political balance only in an indirect way. (3.) The system has been applied to power on the land, and not much to power on the sea. England has acquired, undisturbed, a great pre

dominance on the sea, while the balance of power has been in full exercise. The reason is obvious. Power on the sea cannot directly control the political relations of Europe, nor destroy the independence of states. (4.) The system has not yet been carried out beyond the borders of the European states, Turkey included. The reason is, that the transatlantic states have not only come at a recent period into the European international system, but can, as yet, have no appreciable influence in European affairs.

The balance of power is a maxim of self-preservation, which must naturally arise among states which are so contiguous to one another as to be liable to sudden invasions. Suppose a confederacy of states, having free power of war and peace, and that the terms of union guaranteed to each state an independent existence. In such a league, if one strong member threatened the existence of weaker ones, it would be the duty of all to interfere. Europe resembles such a confederacy, and the balance of power is the guaranty of national existence against the designs of states of the first rank. Let the members of such a loose union be removed many thousand miles from one another by tracts of ocean. The self-preserving principle now apprehends no danger, and a system of balances is useless.

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tions.

The maintenance of a certain balance of power, as a fact, if not as a right, characterized the politics of Historical illustraGreece. The Peloponnesian war was really owing, says Thucydides (I. 23), to the alarm which the growth of Athens excited in the confederates, at the head of whom was Sparta. When at the end of that war Athens was subdued, Thebes and Corinth desired its destruction; but the Spartans justly regarded its existence as necessary in the politics of Greece. Subsequently, Athens, when Thebes was beginning to be too powerful, went over to the side of Sparta, her old enemy.

In the middle ages a system of equipoise in Italy was put into motion by the Popes, as soon as the German emperors

became strong in the Peninsula. The Pope's policy was to have two Italian interests which could be set against one another, at the pleasure of the Roman See, which thus secured its own safety and influence. But a nearer approach to the modern balance of power is seen in the Italian affairs consequent upon the claims of the French kings, Charles VIII. and Louis XII. to Naples and Milan, from 1494 onward. The dangers from the French invasion under Charles, led Spain, the Pope and Venice to combine against him. Then, in 1508, the league of Cambray united all the powers involved in the Italian quarrels against Venice for her destruction. Then, in 1510, the Pope fearing that the ruin of Venice would leave Italy exposed to France, formed the Holy League to drive this latter power out of the Peninsula. It must be confessed, however, that the league of Cambray against Venice was dictated by motives much more unworthy than those of self-preservation, and had less to do with maintaining the integrity of Italy than with rapacity and revenge.

Not long after this the Austrian family, in two lines, held Spain and the German Empire with other important territorial possessions, and the great resources of these allied houses seemed to be dangerous to the European system. France now was the weight in the opposite scale. The unaccomplished schemes of king Henry IV. were carried out by Richelieu, when he aided the German protestants and Sweden against Austria; and the peace of Westphalia in 1648, prevented, thenceforward, this state, holding as it did the office of Emperor in its hands, from becoming formidable either to Europe or to Germany.

It was now the turn of France to feel the force of the balance of power. The ambition of Louis XIV. was thought to endanger the existence of other European states, and a universal monarchy seemed to be at hand. The coalitions of nearly all Europe, which resisted and finally humbled the Grand Monarch, are among the most righteous examples of measures for preserving the balance of power which history records. Some of the measures, however, which were adopted

for the preservation of the balance at this time, were of doubt ful justice and policy. It was right to set bounds to the ambition of Louis XIV.; it was right, when his intrigues procured the nomination of his grandson to a throne which had been solemnly renounced for his posterity, to endeavor to prevent, by force of arms, this accumulation of power in the Bourbon line; but what justice was there in the two partition treaties of 1698 and 1700, which disposed of territories appertaining to the Spanish Crown, without asking leave of the king or nation; and was not this high-handed measure a failure in policy, as calculated to offend the pride of Spain? Since the time when the balance of power played such a part in the days of Louis and William of Orange, it has been repeatedly acted on, and may be said to be an established part of the international law of Europe. The most memorable instances of its application in recent times, have been the interposition of the four powers in 1840, which forced Mehemet Ali to renounce the provinces of the Turkish empire, of which he held possession, and that of France and England in 1854, to preserve the integrity of the same empire against the designs of Russia.

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prevent revolu

We have already seen that where one nation's aid is invoked by the government of another for the pur- 2. Interference to pose of putting down a revolt, such assistance is tions. not opposed by the law of nations. Should it be given in the spirit of hostility to free institutions, the motive lies beyond the ordinary sphere of this science. But a part of the European powers have attempted to establish a right of interference to put down revolutionary principles in that continent, whether their aid be called for or not. This principle has been avowed, if we mistake not, only since the French revolution; for only since then has absolutism become conscious of its dangers, and of the hatred felt towards it by multitudes of persons scattered through the nations. The plea is, as in the case of the balance of power, one of self-preservation. The stability of all governments, it is alleged, and of all institutions sus

tained by governments, is threatened by the propagandists of liberty, and even the dread of revolution so greatly paralyzes the energies of states, that everything must be done to make it as remote as possible. It is admitted that no interference undertaken for the direct purpose of spreading absolute principles, or absolutism itself, or even for that of crushing free principles, or of overturning settled governments or constitutions set up in an illegitimate way, is to be justified; but it is claimed that revolutions in modern times have been sources of incredible evils, and that the so called right of a people to alter its government by force, is calculated to bring upon Europe eternal commotion and insecurity.

against revolutions.

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While the French revolution was in progress* some of the Instances of inter- leading powers of Europe had shown a dispoference for or sition to interfere in the affairs of France, partly on the ground that former treaties had been violated, and partly because the king and royal family of France were restrained of their liberty and treated with dishonor. A circular of the emperor of Germany, of July 6, 1791, invited the principal powers of Europe to declare to the French nation, among other things, that the sovereigns "would unite to avenge any further offences against the liberty, the honor and safety of the king and his family; that they would consider as constitutional laws only those to which the king should have given his free assent; and that they would employ every means of terminating the scandal of a usurpation founded on rebellion, and of which the example was dangerous to every government." On the 27th of August, in the same year, the same sovereign, with the king of Prussia, signed à declaration to the same effect, in which they invited the monarchs of Europe to unite with them in using "the most efficacious means to put the king of France in a state to enable him with perfect freedom to lay the foundation of a monarchical government,

* Comp. Wheaton's Hist. p. 347, et seq., and his El. II. 1, 102-109, which I have freely used.