MAY 17, 1832.] Apportionment Bill. [H. OF R. would he not think that, from these elements, he could comes nearest to its exact mathematical share, in strict fulascertain the amount of the representative population? filment of the letter of the constitution, that representaUnquestionably he would. He would multiply forty-se- tives shall be apportioned according to numbers. It is ven thousand by two hundred and forty, and would get, known to be impossible to distribute them exactly in proas a result, eleven million two hundred and eighty thou- portion to numbers; but the amendment in each case gives sand. But the representative population of the United that number of members which comes nearest to matheStates, computed according to the rule of the constitu-matical exactness, tion, is eleven million nine hundred and twenty-eight thou- What principle can be more equitable? What other sand seven hundred and thirty-one, exceeding the former can be constitutional? There are but three kinds of apsum by six hundred and forty-eight thousand, and leaving portionment conceivable. An apportionment mathemathat enormous amount of the people of the United States tically exact, one making the nearest possible approach to unrepresented. If the same foreigner had learned that mathematical exactness, and one not making the nearest our federal population was eleven million nine hundred possible approach to such exactness. The first is out of and twenty-eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-one, the question, the second is that of the amendments, and and that we allowed a member for every forty-seven thou- the third that of the bill; and did not the fact teach us the sand, he would expect, by dividing eleven million nine reverse, we should think it incredible that it would not be hundred and twenty-eight thousand seven hundred and deemed an adequate objection to the bill, that it does not thirty-one by this ratio, to ascertain the size of the popu-make an apportionment as nearly approaching as poslar branch of our Legislature. He would make his di-sible to mathematical accuracy. vision, and get two hundred and fifty-three as the result. And here I will meet the preliminary objection of the Yet we have but a House of two hundred and forty, al- committee, that the amendments proceed on "consolithough eleven million nine hundred and twenty-eight dating principles;" an objection fondly recurred to in the thousand seven hundred and thirty-one is the population report. It was the only suggestion in the able report of to be represented, and forty-seven thousand is the ratio. the committee which I saw with pain; for it gives me no The other great fault of the bill is, that, by it, repre- pain to see an able argument made use of in opposition to sentatives are not "apportioned among the several States my own views. But I regretted that my worthy colleague, according to their respective numbers." In proving this, on the select committee, should be willing to have reI leave wholly out of the account the aggregate numbers course to the prejudice connected with the word consoliof the people of the United States, at which gentlemen dation. Principles of consolidation! Sir, there are no take such alarm. I forbear all allusion to that much principles required to get the aggregate population of the dreaded element of these calculations, the entire federal United States, but those of simple addition. The gentlepopulation. I will confine myself to the numbers of the man cannot mean that any thing and every thing, to several States, according to which representatives are to which the usage of language allows the word consolibe apportioned, and I will quote but one of the illustra-dation to be applied, is pernicious. Five years ago, we tions of the position to be proved, which are contained in had a consolidation of all the Post Office laws into one. I the Senate's report, and that of the minority of the com- presume there was no harm in that. When General mittee. The bill gives to Vermont five members, and to Washington transmitted the federal constitution to the old New York forty, just eight times as many. If representa- Congress, in the letter accompanying it, he described tives are apportioned to these States "according to their "the consolidation of the Union" as the "greatest inrespective numbers," the numbers of New York must be terest of every true American." I am sure the gentleeight times those of Vermont. Are they so? Very far man does not object to that kind of consolidation. There from it. New York lacks more than three hundred thou- is, I admit, an odious species of consolidation, which was sand of being eight times as large as Vermont, more than probably running in the gentleman's head. It was charged the whole population of Vermont. And if these two upon one party in 1787, that they wished to merge the States were represented according to their respective State Governments in one National Government. numbers, the apportionment which gave Vermont five, an idea is hinted at in a pamphlet written by a deceased would give New York thirty-four. The bill gives Ver- patriot and statesman of great eminence, to whom I would mont but five, and gives New York forty. It does not, be the last to make a disrespectful allusion, (President therefore, apportion representatives to these two States Monroe,) in which he says that one National Government, according to their respective numbers. This defect in extending over these States, and absorbing them into one the bill is susceptible of the most various and ample illus-grand republic, would be the sublimest political spectacle tration, as will appear from the examination of the Se- the world ever saw. It was proposed in the federal nate's report. constitution, by some of the Virginia members, to Now, what are the remedies provided for the two capi- give the General Government a negative on the acts of tal defects of the bill by the amendments? In the first the State Governments. This is the kind of consolidation place, we leave as small an amount as possible of the popu- which the gentleman from Tennessee holds in just abhorlation unrepresented. We take two hundred and fifty-rence. Now, what is its antagonist principle? Is it not six for the number of which the House is to consist. Di- the equal sovereignty of the States, small and large? And viding the population by this number, we get forty-six yet the gentleman objects consolidation to our amendthousand five hundred and ninety-six as the number enti- ment, which goes to protect the small States, and strenutled to choose a member, and we pursue such a process of ously supports a bill which tends to strengthen the strong division and apportionment, that not a member is lost in and to weaken the weak; to give to him that hath, and to the result, and a very minute remainder is left unrepre- take away from him that hath not; and he is really anxsented. On multiplying forty-six thousand five hundred ious lest the weak, defenceless, and unprotected States and ninety-six by two hundred and fifty-six, the result is of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, should, by this eleven million nine hundred and twenty-eight thousand new consolidation, be swallowed up and devoured entire seven hundred and thirty-six, being less, by four hundred by Delaware and Rhode Island! Such and fifty-five, than the aggregate federal numbers. Com- It has been already conceded that the amendment does pare this with six hundred and forty-eight thousand, the not make an apportionment mathematically exact. But if unrepresented remainder of the bill!" there is truth in the rule of three, it makes the nearest The remedy of the second evil is sought by the amend- possible approach to such exactness. The process purment in the application of the following principle, viz. To sued may be seen on page sixty-one of the minority regive to each State that number of representatives which port. It is a process not contrived by me, sir; not ema VOL. VIII.-191 MAY 17, 1832.] Apportionment Bill. [H. OF R. nating from the minority of the select committee, nor from mont has a remainder of forty-five thousand six hundred any political school, to be suspected of a lurking fondness and fifty-seven, and Ohio of forty-two thousand two hunfor consolidation. The table referred to, I will take leave dred and eighty-two. Can any person seriously vindicate to say, was constructed by one of the soundest mathema-such division as this? ticians and most accomplished scholars in this Congress, Let it be recollected, too, that gross as the injustice is, Governor Dickerson, of New Jersey, a gentleman entire- it is magnified by the fact that it falls on those States, the ly free from the heresy of political consolidation. The smallest, which are least able to bear the loss of a memproportion is simply this: As the whole population to be ber. It is urged that it is only a single member at the represented (eleven million nine hundred and twenty-utmost which is lost; but this to a State like Delaware, eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-one) is to the entitled at best to but two, is half her delegation. Let me whole House, (two hundred and fifty-six,) so is the popu- bring in an amendment to the apportionment bill, which, lation of each State to its share in the representation. leaving the total number of the House the same, shall deAs eleven million nine hundred and twenty-eight thousand prive New York and Pennsylvania each of one-half of their seven hundred and thirty-one, divided by two hundred delegations: let the question before this House be, not and fifty-six, gives forty-six thousand five hundred and whether Delaware shall have two members or one, but ninety-six, the process is abridged by dividing the popula- whether New York shall have forty members or twenty. tion of each State by forty-six thousand five hundred and I think we should then hear some appeals to our equity. ninety-six, for the number of representatives, and where I think we should then be told, give us our exact number, the quotient is not an exact or whole number, we take and, if you cannot give us our exact mathematical share, let the nearest whole number. us have that which comes nearest to it. Do not rob us of half The House perceives, at once, how entirely unfounded our delegation, while you leave untouched the entire House. is the idea at which so much alarm is expressed, that we But we are still told that this crying evil is the unavoidrepresent fractions. There is no representation of frac-able result of dividing the population of the several States tions in the amendment. But where the quotient on the by a common ratio. If this were so, it would be merely division is a whole number, with a fraction or remainder, proving, by the enormous injustice of the result, that such (as it is in every State, both according to the bill and the use of a common ratio is unconstitutional. But I deny the amendment,) we take the nearest whole number. If the fact. I deny that any such results are obtained, by a fair fraction is less than half the divisor, we take the number division of the population of the States, by a common ratio. next lower; if more than half, the number next higher, If there is any thing on which a man may be permitted to as being, in the two cases, respectively, the nearest. speak with a little positiveness, it is the simple rules of Such is the equitable and constitutional method of the arithmetic. We learn them at school; I thought I did, in amendments. The bill pursues a different course. It my schoolboy days, become a tolerable proficient in short assumes an arbitrary ratio. This is objectionable in itself, division; but since I have served seven years' apprenticeexcept so far as the ratio assumed is known to be that ship in Congress, I find, at least if the principles of this which will give a House of the desired magnitude; and bill are sound, that I know nothing about it. The bill, in that can only be ascertained by the consolidating process effect, says, that if you divide six hundred and ten thouof the amendment. But the mode of applying the ratio is sand four hundred and eight by forty-s y-seven thousand, you more objectionable than that of fixing it, if, indeed, it be get twelve. Now, I say, you get no such thing. To make fixed on any principle, for none is avowed by the friends the matter clear, and to show what sort of a division the of the bill. The ratio is used as a divisor. The population bill deals in, let us take smaller numbers. Suppose you of the States is divided by it, and when the quotient is not are to divide nine by five. What is the answer? The an exact whole number, (which it is not in a single case,) bill says one; and this is the precise point I contest. Such the bill takes--what? The nearest exact whole number? a division will neither give one as the exact quotient, nor Far from it. It takes, in every case, the next lowest whole as the answer nearest the exact quotient. Suppose an number, and for what imaginable reason of arithmetic executor were called upon to divide an estate of $10,000 or common sense, I have not yet, after all that has been among five heirs, ignorant of the mystery of numbers, and said about it, succeeded in comprehending. All that I he should proceed in his division thus: five into ten goes thought I once learned in the science of numbers, must be once; and, giving to each heir one thousand dollars, put abandoned if this bill can be maintained on principle. Let five in his own pocket. This would be downright knavme take the case of my own State. Our population is six ery. But suppose the estate to be only $9,000, and he hundred and ten thousand four hundred and eight. The should then work his division as before, five into nine bill divides this sum by forty-seven thousand, and gives us once, and put the four thousand dollars in his pocket. twelve as the result. But six hundred and ten thousand Would this be much more honest? Certainly not. Whether four hundred and eight, divided by forty-seven thousand, the dividend is nine or ten, the answer in neither case is yields twelve, with a remainder of forty-six thousand four one. But the bill says it is one. When I divide nine by hundred and eight. If our population were but five hun-five, the answer, the exact answer, may be expressed two dred and ninety-two more, forty-seven thousand would ways, which are of identical purport. It is either one, divide it exactly thirteen times. Now the amendments, in more four-fifths, or two, less one-fifth, or, in more mathethis case, give Massachusetts thirteen members instead of matical language, it is either 1-1-4-5 or 2-1-5. These twelve, and why? Because neither is the exact number, two expressions are precisely the same, and each gives the but thirteen wants but five hundred and ninety-two of being result of the division. The former is the usual arithmetiexact, while twelve wants forty-six thousand four hundred cal expression, but in the higher mathematical notation and eight of being exact. Which then is preferable, the one is just as common as the other. To say then that, by bill which disregards a fraction of excess to the enormous dividing nine by five, you get one, is an arithmetical falseamount of forty-six thousand four hundred and eight, or hood. It is a wider departure from the truth than if you the amendment which disregards a fraction of deficiency should say two and two make six. If, on a division of nine of the trifling amount of five hundred and ninety-two? 1 by five, an exact answer is required and is practicable, it ask again, sir, what do you plead in favor of twelve? Ex- is either 1-1-4-5 or 2--1-5. If the subject-matter do not actness? It is not exact. The nearest approach to exact- admit exact division, if you must disregard fractions, then ness? It does not come nearer than within forty-six thou- it is for common equity, or rather common sense, to desand four hundred and eight; and our amendment comes cide whether you will neglect the large fraction or the within five hundred and ninety-two! This is the strongest small one; whether you will come as near the truth as you case, I grant, but there are others nearly as strong. Ver- can, or not come as near as you can; whether you will શ MAY 17, 1832.] Apportionment Bill. [H. of R. take a number which, though not exact, is the nearest people of the States. What, confine the right of suffrage approach to exactness; or a number of which you can to those who may fall into one of these ideal constituneither say that it is the true number, or as near the true encies; leave forty-six thousand freemen without the pri number as you can come. The amendment does the for-vilege of voting! Not so. After the bill has apportioned mer; the bill does the latter. The principle of the bill a certain number of members to each State, they are to is intolerable, even in matters of dollars and cents. The be chosen by that State or its people, as a whole, by geneinnate love of justice, which animates us all, would revolt at ral ticket, in single districts, or in districts electing more it, in a case where nothing more precious was at stake, than than one. If chosen by districts, these districts are made "So much trash as can be grasped thus." to consist, as nearly as may be, of the same number of inBut when applied to the dearest political privileges, to habitants. This single consideration shows the want of the right of the people to be represented on this floor, soundness in the bill. It says there shall be one repreand their share in making the laws under which their lives sentative for every forty-seven thousand seven hundred, and liberties are held, it is truly shocking. This, sir, is or (which gives the same result) forty-seven thousand, no arithmetical puzzle; it is no mathematical refinement; and it gives Massachusetts twelve. But divide Massait is plain truth. I urge these principles because they are chusetts into thirteen districts, and you get in each distrue. Perhaps the only relations presented to human trict forty-six thousand nine hundred and fifty-four, within reason, of the truth of which we can be certain, abso- forty-six of the darling ratio; but divide it into twelve dislutely certain, are mathematical relations. This is a case tricts, and each district will contain fifty thousand eight where the elements you deal with are mathematical, and hundred and sixty-seven! The same bill which proposes we demonstrate that the bill leads to a result which is nei- to allow every forty-seven thousand to choose a member, ther true, that is, exact, (which can seldom be expected in requires fifty thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven of moral, social, and political calculations,) nor as near the the freemen of Massachusetts to make a choice; and this, truth as the nature of the subject admits. too, although we offer an amendment, by which the right of choosing a member should be conferred on a constituency approaching the magic ratio within forty-six; and what is done by the bill, and by the amendment, in the case of Massachusetts, is done in a proportionate degree in the case of every State to which the bill and amendment assign a different number of representatives. This brings me to the great objection which has haunt ed the principle of these amendments from the first, viz. that it is a representation of fractions. And this I meet with a direct negative. The amendments propose no representation of fractions. They propose to give to the people, the whole people of each of the several States, a certain number of representatives; and in all cases that But it is objected that there is no common divisor, number which comes the nearest to the exact proportion which, applied to the population of the several States, to which the States are entitled, "according to their num- will give the number of members which the bill as bers." If, indeed, it were truly objected that the amend signs. I must confess, sir, that nothing has filled me ments gave a member to fractions, it would, as is stated in with so much surprise, in relation to this matter, as the minority report, be a much more valid objection to the stress laid on this argument. The fact is undoubtthe bill, that it gives no representation to these fractions; edly so, but the same objection applies to the bill bethat it leaves, for instance, utterly unrepresented, in Mas fore us, to every other apportionment bill ever passed, sachusetts, forty-six thousand four hundred and eight; in and will unquestionably apply to every future apportionVermont, forty-five thousand six hundred and fifty-seven; ment bill; for though it is possible to construct a list of in Ohio, forty-two thousand two hundred and eighty-two. twenty-four States, which would possess each a number of Let the friends of the bill, if they wish to try the force inhabitants susceptible of division by a common divisor, yet of this objection, carry their process through; to use the the chances are almost infinite against the actual existence phrase, which is getting fashionable, let them "play the of such a state of things. There never has yet passed an game out." They say the fractions are to be disregarded, apportionment bill, in which any two States received the are to be unrepresented, and that nothing short of a con- exact number given, by applying to their population a stituency is entitled to a member. Let them then add a common divisor. In the present bill, there is no one few sections to their bill, simply to carry its provisions State which is exactly divided by the ratio assumed; nor into effect. They have power to do so. The constitu- are there at the present time any two States of the Union tion gives to Congress the right, if it pleases, of regulating susceptible of an exact division by any ratio that has been the time, place, and manner of choosing representatives. named. Gentlemen who have not thoroughly investigated Let them take their ratio into the States; divide the States this complicated subject, will find it hard to credit this; into districts, each containing forty-seven thousand inha- but such is the fact. I hold in my hand a table showing, bitants; and let them enact that no citizen, living without in reference to each State, these four things: First, the the limits of these districts, and belonging to the disfran- divisor actually applied by the bill to the population of chised, not to be represented remainder, shall have a vote. All this they have power to do; and it would be no more unjust nor unfair than the bill as it stands. Nay, it is the development of the bill. But let this be carried out into practice, and I much mistake if you would not hear, even from the smallest State of the Union, the response which she uttered when, in 1787, it was proposed, as well in the Senate as in the House of Representatives, to give the States a proportionate power, that "she would sooner take a foreign Government by the hand," But we all know that no such thing could be attempted for a moment. This alleged necessity of a common ratio, and this disfranchisement of fractions, is mere theory, made use of here, but instantly repudiated when the bill is applied to the choice of representatives. It is the fatal defect of the bill that it lays down a process not only unconstitutional and inequitable, but one which it does not pretend to carry into effect, which it dare not enact into law, which a million of bayonets could not force upon the a each State. Second. The variation of that divisor from the assumed ratio of forty-seven thousand. Third. The divisor applied to each State by the amendment. Fourth. The variation between that divisor and the number of inhabitants entitled to a representative on the principles of the amendment. I will not trouble the House by reading the table which I have constructed for the purpose of illustrating this subject. But its inspection will prove these facts: That the bill, instead of one common divisor, employs a different divisor for each State. That these divisors range from seventy-five thousand four hundred and thirty-two, which is the largest, to fortyseven thousand seven hundred and fifty-six, which is the smallest; a difference of twenty-seven thousand six hundred and seventy-six. That the amendment in like manner employs a separate divisor for each State; the largest being fifty-five thousand one hundred and seventy-nine, and the smallest thirty H. OF R.] Apportionment Bill. [MAY 17, 1832. seven thousand seven hundred and sixteen; a difference ment would give New York, in a House of two hundred only of seventeen thousand four hundred and sixty-three; and forty members, thirty-nine, being the number nearand, finally, That in every one of the sixteen States, with regard to which the bill and amendment differ, the variation between the actual divisor and the assumed ratio of the amendment is less, and in most cases much less, than the variation between the actual divisor and the assumed ratio of the bill. The sixteen States in question are those marked with a star. 2,215 1,709 358 2,001 13,103 170 198 893 111 8,880 1,503 74 900 est to 38.59, and consequently fulfilling, by the nearest possible approach, the law that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. In 1813, a direct tax of $3,000,000 was laid, and the share assessed upon New York, according to her numbers, was $430,141. But she was then (as it is proposed she should be now) overrepresented. Had she paid a share of the direct tax according to her representation, she would have paid $447,513, a difference of $17,373. In 1815, another direct tax of $6,000,000 was laid in the same proportions, and New York paid $34,746 less than she would have done had she been taxed according to her representation. But the defects of this system of apportionment are still more glaring, in reference to indirect taxation, by which the revenue of the country is raised, and which has of late averaged nearly $24,000,000. This sum falling on consumption, is very unequally paid. Some pay little or nothing, and others much more than their proportionate share. But these inequalities pervade the country; and, for the purpose of the present argument, we may suppose that under a just system of laws each individual paystwo dollars. It is plain that, in order to give it this equitable character, it is all-important that representation and taxation should go hand in hand; that is, that each State, as near as may be, should possess a control over the legisla tion of the country, in just proportion to the share of the public burdens which she supports under that legislation. On this principle, as New York, out of two hundred and forty members, is, by the bill, to elect forty, she ought, out of 24,000,000 of taxes, to pay 4,000,000. But the portion she will pay according to her population, is but 1,094 $3,859,000, a difference of $141,000, to which extent she 1,160 is over-represented. On the other hand, of the same tax, 2,845 Vermont pays $561,312; while her representative share 8,583 would be but $500,000. To this degree Vermont is un2,420 represented. Delaware pays $151,000; but her repre1,501 sentative share would be but $100,000. She is therefore 1,237 unrepresented more than thirty-three and a third per cent. It is true, if she sent two members, being taxed but $151,000, she would be over-represented nearly twentyfive per cent. This would be the case of the greatest departure made by the amendment from an exact proportion between representation and taxation. All the defects, both of the bill and amendment, are at the maximum in this State. But here as elsewhere all the objections to the amendment apply with greater force to the bill, and, in departing from an exact proportion of representation to taxation in Delaware, while the error of the amendment is twenty-five per cent., that of the bill is thirty-three and one-third. In all the States the amendment makes the nearest approach to the preservation of an exact propor tion between representation and taxation; while the bill in several States runs to the extreme of giving more or less than the just share of that representative power by which the taxes are laid, modified, and repealed. 198 2,404 5,872 3,123 Thus, it is shown that there is no common divisor in the bill, more than in the amendment, if by common divisor be meant a divisor that can be applied to the States without a remainder. It is equally a matter not of proof by argument, but of ocular inspection on the paper or the slate, that the divisors actually employed by the amend ment' approach more nearly to a common divisor than those of the bill. I come now to a great topic, one which would alone well employ our time for hours and days. I mean the subject of the connexion of representation and taxation, and the principle that they must go hand in hand. In this principle our revolution began. On this our constitution Considerable reliance is placed on the argument drawn was founded. It is this which is embalmed in all our in- from that part of the constitution which directs that there stitutions; and when it is permanently lost sight of, they shall not be more than one member for every thirty thouwill cease to be a birthright worth transmitting to poste- sand inhabitants, but each State shall have at least one rity. And, first, a word of direct taxation. So essential member. This provision for a single case, in which a did the framers of the constitution consider it that repre- member is given to a constituency less than an assumed sentation and direct taxation should go hand in hand, that ratio, is thought to prove that it can be done constitutionthe apportionment of representatives and direct taxes is ally in no other case. This objection would be sufficientincluded in the same clause. The convention would not by answered by repeating what has been already urged, trust a paragraph, no, not a semicolon, between them; they that the additional member is given, not to the residuum are provided for in the same sentence. How does this bill of population that remains after the divisor, but that, as stand the test of this principle? It gives New York forty well as all the other members allotted to a State, it is given members out of two hundred and forty, an exact sixth part. to the people of that State; and the utmost that this clause But of a tax of $240, New York would pay but $38 59, of the constitution requires is, that there shall not be that being her share of a tax of $240, apportioned among given to any State more than one member for every thirty the several States according to numbers. The amend-thousand of its inhabitants. But I take it, the historical MAY 17, 1832.] Apportionment Bill. [H. of R. explanation of this clause is the true one. The adjust-it, though the other, he thought, was that which its ment of the claims of the large and small States, in refer- framers intended, (viz. that the one for every thirty thouence to equality, was the point of difficulty and delicacy in sand meant for every thirty thousand in a State,) and that the convention. It was finally settled that there should the sectional division which had arisen in respect to it, be equality in the Senate, and proportionate representation was one, among other circumstances, foreboding the disin the House, and it was settled that there should be one solution of the Union. His Secretary of State, the leader for every forty thousand. But, according to the estimate of one of these geographical parties, as was to have been of population before the convention, Delaware had but expected, endeavored to decide him against the bill, and thirty-seven thousand inhabitants, and, consequently, in in the equal division of his cabinet he adopted the course the literal application of the rule, was not entitled even to which was perfectly natural for a mind like General Washone member. What more natural than, under these cir-ington's. The question at issue was a question of concumstances, and in reference to this most difficult part of stitutional law, and he determined to acquiesce in the judgthe work, to provide for greater caution, that every Statement of the law officer of the Government, the Attorney should have at least one member? This I take to be the General. Mr. Jefferson has related to us with what extrue historical interpretation of the clause. treme reluctance he did it; and, after Mr. Randolph, the Attorney General, had brought him the message, ready drawn for his signature, General Washington followed him to the door, and took from him his word of honor that such was his own opinion. It is objected to the amendment, that, by varying the population of the States, and without altering the aggregate population of the Union, it would be possible to make the House of Representatives vary, in amount, to the extent of twenty members. As the nature of the case That message we have on the journals of Congress, and does not admit mathematical exactness, it is no doubt pos- the opinions, in extenso, of the cabinet have been sought sible ingeniously to construct cases, in which those errors and obtained by the chairman of the select committee, for which the amendment provides a remedy shall be made | [Mr. POLK, ] from the gentleman entrusted with the Washas small as possible, and those which it leaves without a re-ington papers. They have been laid on our tables, and medy made as large as possible. But in the case supposed, add nothing to the argument, as already set forth in the as in all others, the departure from exact justice, in the able report of the select committee. The only part of extreme supposition, is greater on the side of the bill than the argument of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Randolph that apon that of the amendment. Thus, without changing the pears to me to have weight, is that which forms the basis of aggregate population of the United States, the numbers General Washington's second objection to the bill, viz. of the several States might be so varied, that, retaining the that it gave to eight of the States more than one member same ratio, the House of Representatives should fluctuate for every thirty thousand--an objection that does not apply from two hundred and twenty-nine to two hundred and to the amendment. Mr. Jefferson's argument is marked fifty-three, a difference of twenty-four. with his characteristic ingenuity and diligence; but almost But, after all, the objection most relied upon by the all of it which does not relate to the objection just alluded opponents of the amendment, is the rejection of the bill to, is employed in urging against the bill that it had no of 1792 by General Washington. That bill, it is alleged, common divisor: and how much real force there was in was framed on the same principles as the amendment, and this objection, we have already seen. The opinion of the was negatived by General Washington as unconstitutional. Attorney General adds nothing to the argument, and some Sir, if this simple fact, unqualified and unexplained, were of its suggestions are so wild and crude, that, could I recertified to me, I do not know that I could persuade my-joice in the infirmities of the human mind, under any cirself to support the amendment against such an authority.cumstances, I should be gratified at seeing the principle of I might think it better, in this republic, to strengthen the the amendment so weakly assailed. What, for instance, example of leaving untouched and unquestioned the autho- will the House of Representatives think of language like rity of Washington, than to insist on correcting the evils this? "If the fraction of one State can raise a member of this bill. I should even be ready, as things are, to for another, it may often happen that the balance which agree with gentlemen that I would allow them all the ad- the States wish to preserve among themselves may be devantages of General Washington's authority in this argu-stroyed unexpectedly by their own act. What would the ment, if they will admit its weight in other questions of sensations of South Carolina be, if her blacks shall costill higher moment in the policy of the country. But as operate in giving a member to Connecticut?" Can we be no compromise like this can be made, I must examine the blamed for denying the weight of an authority propped circumstances under which General Washington rejected by absurdities like this? the bill, and I scruple not to say that, were the bill of 1792 substantially like the amendment, (which is far from being the case, as I shall presently show,) the circumstances under which it was rejected are such as to reduce to nothing the argument to be drawn from that fact, on the weight of General Washington's name. It is a familiar anecdote of Lord Mansfield, that he once advised a junior in the profession of the danger of giving the reasons on which his strongest and clearest opinions were founded. There is nothing to which this counsel applies with greater force than the argument from authority. When the authority of Washington, as such, is adduced to What are the facts? The bill of 1792 passed by a ma- command my assent, his revered image arises to my mind. jority of one in the Senate, and two in the House. The I think not of the measure, nor of the arguments by which argument of unfailing resort, under a written constitution, it is supported and opposed, but I think of Washington; was made use of on this as on every other measure of im- of all that he did, and all that he was; of his character and portance; it was by its opponents declared unconstitu- his services, his exploits in the field, his wisdom in the tional. It went to the President, and the divisions which cabinet, and the steady virtues of his private life. These attended it in Congress followed it into the cabinet. Gene- constitute, indeed, an authority more powerful than any ral Washington took the opinions of his cabinet in writing. thing which, on the ground of mere human authority, can The Secretary of State and the Attorney General were of be addressed to the mind of man. But authority is one opinion that it was unconstitutional; the Secretary of the principle, and argument is another. Authority addresses Treasury and the Secretary of War recommended its the feelings, the affections, the sentiments; it checks the adoption. The President kept it till the very last day. calm action of understanding, and for a while represses On the tenth day, he came to the Secretary of State and the spirits. It is cheering and animating when it confirms expressed his anxiety on the subject of the bill. He had the dictates of the judgment; but when it opposes them, noticed that the division was geographical; the constitu- it embarrasses and distresses the mind. Argument is a tion would bear the construction which the bill put upon different principle of belief; it addresses the understanding. |