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goods or parcels by his side, or deposits them in the proper place while he stops. A formal delivery of the goods to the innkeeper is not required. Having become a guest, the relation continues until it is severed by some act showing an intention to leave without returning. E. g., if a traveller, having become a guest at an inn, leave his horse there and go out to dine or lodge with a friend, he does not thereby cease to be a guest; and the better opinion is that he is to be deemed a guest, where he leaves the inn to go to another town to be absent some days, leaving behind property for the care and keeping of which the host is to receive a compensation. But a man does not become a guest, by sending his horse to an inn to be kept at his expense. And where being a guest, he pays his bill and leaves an inn, permitting his baggage to remain, the relation ceases, and with it the innkeeper's liability; so that for any subsequent loss he is answerable only as an ordinary bailee.5

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The innkeeper's liability commences as soon as a traveller takes a carriage provided by the innkeeper to carry guests to and from the cars. And where a man comes to an inn and leaves his goods and horses, and goes into the town saying that he will return at night, and afterwards returns, his goods having been in the mean time stolen; he has his remedy against the innkeeper. He is a guest in such a sense that he is entitled to recover the value of the lost goods."

§ 459. Delivery to an Innkeeper. It is not usual, and it is not necessary that the goods of a guest should be placed in the special custody of the innkeeper. Bringing or placing them infra hospitium, is sufficient to charge him with their safe keeping. We have many illustrations of this rule in the reported cases; as where a sleigh loaded with wheat was put into the innkeeper's wagon-house, where it was usual for him to receive loads of that description; or where a gig on a fair day was received and placed in the open street outside of the yard; or where a loaded

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1 Bennett v. Mellor, 5 Term R., 273; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb., 560; Clute v. Wiggins, 14 John. R., 175; Peet v. McGraw, 25 Wend., 653.

McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt., 316; 5 Sandf., 242.

3 Yorke v. Grindstone, 1 Salk., 388; 2 Ld., Raym., 866; Gelley v. Clark, Cro. Jac., 183; Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly, 102; Allen v. Smith, 12 Com. Beuch, N. S., 63; 104 Eng. Com. L.

Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485; Ingallsbee v. Wood, 36 Barb., 452; S. C. 33 N. Y., 577; Daniels v. Robinson, 28 Vt., 387.

• Wintermute v. Clarke, 5 Sandf., 242; 42 How. Pr., 378; whero a guest takes and pays for his room for the day, and his baggage is to be sent to a boat at evening, the relation continues; Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md., 126.

• Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush., 115.

7 Walbroke v. Griffith, Moor, 877.

Clute v. Wiggins, 14 John. R., 175.

9 Jones v. Tyler, 1 Adol. and Ellis, 522.

sleigh is placed in a yard not enclosed, by the direction of the innkeeper's servant; or where, at the suggestion of a guest, his luggage was taken into the commercial room; or where a lady's reticule with money in it, was left for a few minutes on a bed, in her room; 3 in each of these cases the property was stolen, and the innkeeper was held liable for it. The innkeeper has under the common law a right to prescribe the manner in which the goods or baggage of a guest shall be stored:' and hence he is liable, where the goods are deposited, placed or secured under his direction or that of his servant or agent. He is liable for the goods brought into the inn or within the curtilage, in the usual manner, and for all property delivered into his custody; he is liable as an innkeeper for the property of a guest, thus brought infra hospitium. He is not so liable where the guest himself chooses the place of deposit, and does not request the innkeeper to assume the custody of the property; or where the guest delivers his horse, cattle or sheep to the innkeeper and directs them to be turned out to pasture. He is not liable in such cases for a loss by theft; he does not insure the safety of the property.s

§ 460. The usages of travel, together with the vast variety of goods, parcels, and baggage which are customarily carried by travellers, are to be considered in determining what circumstances will charge the innkeeper with the care of property coming to his house. Horses and carriages are properly entrusted to the hostler; and parcels to the agent or servant accustomed to receive them; 10 while articles of wearing apparel may be delivered or deposited, or hung up in the usual place and manner." If a traveller, as he alights from a car, delivers a check to the

1 Piper v. Mauny, 21 Wend., 282.

2 Richmond v. Smith, 8 Barn. and Cres., 9.

3 Kent v. Shuchard, 2 Barn. and Adol., 803.

Wilson v. Halpin, 1 Daly, 496; 30 How. Pr., 124; Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How. Pr., 147.

Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa, 553; 33 Cal., 557; sec Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill., 302; Pope v. Hall, 14 La. Ann., 324, 524.

Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 439; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me., 163; Burrows v. Triesber, 21 Md., 320.

▾ Albin v. Presby, 8 N. H., 408; Wilson v. Halpin, 1 Daly, 496.

Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend., 642; Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Jones, N. C. Law, 146. 9 Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend., 547; Seymour v. Cook, 55 Barb., 451.

10 Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith, 54; Cairns v. Robins, 8 Mees. and Wels., 258.

11 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal., 557; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb., 560; Candy v. Spencer, 3 F. & F., 306; see Johnson v. Richardson, 17 IIL, 302; Profilet v. Hall, 14 La. Ann., 524; Reed v. Amidon, 41 Vt., 15.

servant of an innkeeper for a valise containing money, he is himself bound to use some care to see that it is brought in;1 and in having it deposited in the proper place; 2 independent of the statute he is not obliged to disclose the contents of a portmanteau, a valise, or a pocket-book; it is sufficient to deliver them as valuable parcels, or even like ordinary baggage. It is for the innkeeper to ascertain values, and give direetions in respect to the place of deposit: and it is clearly the duty of the guest to give him, on request, such reliable information in regard to the value of a package or parcel, as will enable him to take proper care of it.5

§ 461. In England and in many of our States the mode of delivering or depositing valuable parcels with the innkeeper is now regulated by statute. In this State, money, jewels and ornaments must be entrusted to the proprietor or keeper of the house; provided he shall furnish a safe to keep them in and post a notice to that effect in a conspicuous manner in the room occupied by the guest. As these statutes bear upon the liability of the hotel or innkeeper, it will be proper to consider them in that connection."

§ 462. Responsibility of Innkeepers. The keeper of an inn or hotel is liable for the loss of the goods of his guest committed to his care, unless the loss is caused by the act of God, by the common enemy, or by the neglect or default of the guest. On proof of the loss, the innkeeper is primia facie liable."

The rule is strict, and it is reasonable; it was established in a

1 Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 Barb., 384.

2 Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y., 111.

3 In Shoecraft v. Barley, 25 Iowa, 553, a pocket-book was delivered without stating its contents. In Quinton v. Courtney, 1 Hayw. N. C. Rep., 41, saddlebags containing money were carried into the barroom, without notice that they contained money. And in Kellogg v. Sweeny, 1 Lans. R., 397, S. C. 46 N. Y., 291, the plaintiff delivered a satchel containing gold coin to the clerk of the innkeeper, informing him that it contained property of value; and in each of these, as in other cases, the innkeeper was held liable for the loss of the money, it being stolen.

4 Richmond v. Smith, 2 M. and R., 235; 8 B. and C., 9; Sanders v. Spencer, Dyer, 206.

This rule is assumed in construing the statute modifying the common law. Wilkins v. Earle, 9 Abbott Pr., 190; 3 Robt., 352; 44 N. Y., 172; Bendetson v. French, 44 Barb., 31; 46 N. Y., 266.

2 R. S. of N. Y., 945, 6th ed.; 26 and 27 Vict., ch. 41; 3 Fisher's Com. Law Digest, 4689. 7 Hill v. Owen, 5 Blackf. R., 323; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. R., 280; Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How. Pr., 147; Cheesbrough v. Taylor, 12 Abbott Pr., 227 ; Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly, 102.

period when theft and robbery were quite frequent, and innkeepers were thought to have many opportunities and some temptations to combine and connive with ruffians and outlaws in the plunder of strangers; and the rule has been continued in more modern times, on grounds of public utility and convenience. The guest, being a stranger, rarely has the means of proving how his property was lost or injured;1 and so the law holds the innkeeper responsible for the goods entrusted to him, on the same ground as it holds the common carrier answerable for the goods he receives.2

There is in Holinshead's Chronicles a description of the inns of England, copied in the appendix, from which it will be easy to perceive the reason of the law establishing the duties and responsibilities of the innkeeper. The habits and morals of a people are always important to be considered in the study of a law of this kind, confessedly based upon public policy, and designed for the benefit and convenience of the community. The effect of the rule, holding the goodman of the house responsible for all losses occurring in his inn, is such that even in a house frequented by robbers, and served by thieves, the chronicler tells us you shall not hear that a man has been robbed in an inn. Though entirely unintentional, this is very high testimony to the wisdom of the law, showing at once its general utility and the circumstances in which it originated.3

§ 463. From an early day and by the general custom, innkeepers are obliged to keep the goods and chattels of their guests without subtraction or loss day and night, so that no damage shall come to them from the negligence of the innkeeper or his servants. The obligation is very broad; they are bound to keep the goods in safety, and are liable for losses by either negligence or theft. The form of the action against an innkeeper, and the averments in the plaintiff's complaint assume that his liability is grounded on his negligence or breach of duty; and as a deduction from this postulate, we have some adjudications holding that he is not liable where the loss does not arise through his negligence; nor for money retained by the guest in his own keeping, exceeding the

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1 Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R., 273; 14 John. R., 177; Jones on Bailm., 95, 96; Abbott Pr., 190; 3 Robt., 352; 44 N. Y., 172.

2 Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. R., 85, 114.

3 Seo Appendix; and Wilkins v. Earle, 4 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 472; 3 Robt, 352; 19 Abbott Pr., 190; 44 N. Y., 172.

Dawson v. Chawney, 5 Adolph. and Ellis, N. R., 164; Clute v. Wiggins, 14 John. R., 175; ante § § 459, 460; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Maino, 478.

5 Moak's Van Santvoord's Pl., 218, 219; Chitty Pl., 307.

6 Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt., 177; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt., 316; Metcalf v. Hess, 14 Ill., 129; Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon., 72; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind., 212.

amount necessary for travelling expenses:1 and some rulings exempting the innkeeper from liability for losses arising from burglary, or from fire, without any negligence on his part. But the current of authorities under the common law is somewhat more strict: it holds the innkeeper liable for losses by thefts, whether committed by his servants, the domestics within the house, or by parties from without; 3 it holds him liable for losses by robbery and violence, and for those which are unexplained; also for those which are attributable to other guests.1

The innkeeper is bound to use extraordinary diligence in preserving and returning the goods of his guest; he is liable under the same strict rule as a common carrier; he insures the safety of the property entrusted to him, and is liable for it under the common law, unless it is proved that the loss of it is attributable to the negligence or fraud of the guest, or to the act of God or the public enemy. This appears to be the prevailing rule of the common law, where it is not modified by statute. A

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'Simon v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. R., 360; Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill., 302; Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md., 239, 307; Wilkins v. Earle, 3 Robt. R., 352, overruled by Court of Appeals, 44 N. Y,, 172.

2 McDaniels v. Robinson, supra; Merritt v. Claghorn, supra; Cutler v. Bonney, 30 Mich., 259.

3 Filipowski v. Merriweather, 2 F. and F., 285; Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa, 553.

4 Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb., 70; 33 N. Y., 574; Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend., 547; 9 Pick., 280; Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal., 557. The defence in this case was that the defendant's clerk was feloniously knocked down, and the key of the safe taken from him by violence, and the safe (containing plaintiff's property, gold dust) opened and robbed by certain evil disposed persons, who carried away plaintiff's purse or package-and it was held no defence. See Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. Ann., 156. In Woodward v. Birch, 4 Bush (Ky.), 510, there was proof on the part of the defendant tending to show a robbery of the safe during the night, with proof on the part of the plaintiff that a discharged clerk of the defendant had in his possession a key to the lock of the safe; and it was held that the defendant was liable, notwithstanding he told the guest when he received his money, that his safe had recently been robbed, and that he would not be responsible for the money deposited in it. See Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush. (Ky.), 275. In McDaniels v. Robinson (26 Vt., 316), the court conceded that a loss by robbery, by a felonious entry of the defendant's house in the night, might excuse him where it assumed the form of superior force; and yet held it incumbent on him to establish the loss in that manner by satis factory evidence.

Hulett v. Swift, 42 Barb., 230; S. C., 33 N. Y., 571; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Maine, 478; Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H., 533; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick., 280; Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga., 242; Metcalf v. Hess, 14 Ill., 129 ; Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill., 302; 53 Maine, 163; Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md., 220; as to act of public enemy, see ante § 157.