1

§ 574. A check for baggage is a kind of receipt; it is like a ticket given to a passenger as an evidence of his right to a place in the conveyance. A ticket is evidence that a passenger has paid his fare, and where on its face it entitles the holder to travel over several lines of road, a recognition of the ticket by one of the roads as valid, is proof that the company is liable for the passenger's baggage. The check is given for the purpose of relieving the passenger from all care and supervision of his baggage while on the journey; and where it is the custom of a road to check baggage on the passenger's showing his ticket, the check is prima facie evidence of a delivery of the baggage and that the party receiving it was a passenger. The possession of a ticket is also presumptive evidence that the holder has paid the regular fare on the route on the day of its date.3

The non-delivery of baggage at the end of the journey, when called for, prima facie proves a loss of the same by the carrier's negligence.* Circumstances, like the passenger's lameness, may excuse delay in calling for baggage.5

§ 575. From an early day carriers have been accustomed to make regulations limiting the amount and weight of baggage to be carried with a passenger; and while the custom does not appear to be general in respect to the conveyance of passengers by land, it appears to be well settled that a carrier may adopt a tariff of prices, under which he charges a passenger without baggage a specific sum, a passenger with baggage worth a hundred dollars an additional amount, a passenger with baggage worth five hundred dollars a further sum, and so on, increasing the charge with the increase in the risk and expense of the transportation; taking care that the charges be justly and reasonably proportioned to the risk assumed and service rendered. It appears that steamers carrying passengers to Europe, make an agreement limiting the space to be occupied, as well as the value of the baggage, for which the owners become liable; and that agreements of this kind are upheld."

594.

1 Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Fahey, 52 Ill., 81; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y., 2 Davis v. M. S. & N. Ind. R. Co., 22 Ill., 278; Ill. Central R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill., 332; Davis v. Cayuga & Susq. R. R. Co., 10 How. Pr., 330; Earle v. Cadmus, 2 Daly, 237.

3 Pier v. Finch, 24 Barb., 514.

Burnell v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y., 184; Fairfax v. N. Y. C. & H. R.

R. Co., 67 N. Y., 11.

5 Curtis v. Avon &c. R. R. Co., 49 Barb., 148; 49 N. Y., 546.

7 Nevins v.

6 Middletown v. Fowler, 1 Salk., 282; Upshore v. Aidee, 1 Comyns, 25. Bay State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw., 225; Berley v. Newton, 10 How. Pr., 490; see McCormack v. Penn. C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 303; Williams v. Great W. R. Co., 10 Exch., 15.

Steers v. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y., 1; 51 N. Y., 166.

The general rule applies: the carrier is entitled to know the general nature and value of the property he is asked to take charge of; but where the carrier demands and receives compensation as freight for the transportation of packages containing merchandise and baggage, and there are no circumstances of fraud or concealment on the part of the passenger, the carrier must answer for the merchandise as well as the baggage.1 And where he sets up a limitation of his liability, he must establish the contract affirmatively; since the law will not imply a contract from a notice on a check or card given for baggage.2

3

§ 576. There being no special agreement relating to a passenger's baggage, his fare or the price paid by him for a ticket, includes the transportation of his baggage. The contract covers his baggage1those articles of wearing apparel and personal comfort and convenience which are usually or occasionally carried by passengers as baggage. The contract to carry the ordinary baggage of a passenger is implied from the usual course of business; and the carrier's obligation is to receive and carry the baggage in the same conveyance or train, and deliver it to the passenger at the place of destination in the usual manner. Outside of any special agreement, the carriage of baggage is incident to the carriage of a passenger; and in the absence of the principal contract for the conveyance of the passenger, i. c., where he goes by another and parallel route, the carrier is not chargeable as such with his baggage.”

A servant travelling with, and on a ticket paid for by his master, may maintain an action in his own name against a railway company for the loss of his baggage; he is not obliged to sue upon the contract, and it is not material who pays his fare. If the plaintiff brings his action on the contract, he must prove a contract with himself; and when he

9

1 Stoneman v. Erie Railway Co., 52 N. Y., 429; the case also holds that a married woman may recover for a loss of her personal effects; Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md., 1; Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 13 Wallace, 262.

2 Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb., 21; 4 Bosw., 225; 19 Wend., 270.

3 Chicago & Rock Island R. R. Co. v. Fahey, 52 Ill., 81.

4 Powell v. Myers, 23 Wend., 591.

Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend., 85; 30 N. Y., 594; 42 N. Y., 325; 10 Ohio, 145; 6 Hill, 586; 5 Cush., 69; 3 Daly, 162; 25 Wend., 459; Quimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt., 604.

6 Glasco v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 36 Barb., 557; Jones v. Norwich & N. Y. Tr. Co., 50 Barb., 193; Collins v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 10 Cush., 506.

7 Fairfax v. N. Y. C. & II. River R. R. Co., 5 Jones and Spencer, 516; Wilson v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 56 Maine, 60. See 67 N. Y., 11.

Marshall v. York, N. & B. R. Co., 11 C. B., 655; Van Horn v. Kermit, 4 E. D. Smith, 453, 456.

9 Weed v. Saratoga R. R. Co., 19 Wend., 534; Beecher v. Great Eastern R. Co., 18 Weekly R., 627; proof of contract; Baltimore S. P. Co. v. Smith, 23 Md., 402.

brings an action on the case, charging the carrier on the ground of his common law liability, it is sufficient to establish plaintiff's title to the goods, and that they were placed in the defendant's custody by the plaintiff's daughter, servant, son or agent as a passenger.1

§ 577. A railroad company running in connection with others and forming a through line, may contract to carry freight for the entire distance; and the contract stipulating for exemption from liability as an insurer, will enure to the benefit of the connecting roads. The contract may be proved by the bill of lading, or it may be established by other evidence; it is not established by showing a delivery of the goods marked or addressed to a party at the termination of the route. The law does not in this country imply a contract by the carrier, from the receipt of goods thus marked, to carry them beyond the terminus of his line; at which point he becomes a forwarder, bound to send them forward according to his instructions, or in the usual manner. And the rule is not changed where the freight for the entire distance is paid in advance, to be afterwards divided with a connecting line of boats by which the transportation is to be completed.5

An important railroad carrier uses this form, in receipting goods for transportation: "Goods or property consigned to any place off the company's line of road, or to any point or place beyond its termini, will be sent forward with as reasonable dispatch as the general business of the corporation, at its warehouse within mentioned, will admit, by a carrier or freight-man, when there are such known to the station agent at said warehouse willing to receive the same, unconditionally, for transportation; the company acting for the purpose of delivery to such carrier or freight-man, as the agents of the consignor or consignee, and not as carriers. The company will not be liable or responsible for any loss, damage or injury to property, after the same shall have been sent from said warehouse of the company, or tendered to such carrier or freight-man

1 Grant v. Newton, 1 E. D. Smith, 95; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend., 282; 23, Md., 402.

2 Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wallace, 594; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wallace, 123; Maghee v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., 45 N. Y., 514; Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden & Amboy R. & Tr. Co., 54 N. Y., 197; C. & A. R. & Tr. Co. v. Forsythe, 61 Penn. St., 81.

3 It was proved by the bill of lading in Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, supra; and in Railroad Co. v. Pratt, supra, by the way-bill and other circumstances. See also Root v. Great Western R. Co., 45 N. Y., 524.

* Van Santvcord v. St. John, G Hill, 158, 161; Root v. Great Western R. Co., 45 N. Y., 524; Babcock v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 49 N. Y., 491; Hinckley v. N. Y. C. & Hudson River R. R. Co., 56 N. Y., 429.

• Washburn & M. M. Co. v. Providence & W. R. Co., 113 Mass., 490.

for such transportation." Under this agreement it is the right and the duty of the carrier to send forward the goods from the termination of the road, according to the terms of the contract.1

§ 578. A similar contract is held valid in England, and is quite essential there to protect a carrier from the operation of the rule upheld by the English courts, namely, that a railway company receiving goods marked for a particular place, undertakes prima facie to carry them to their destination; that the rule applies when the goods are directed to points beyond the terminus of the route of the carrier receiving the goods, and even when directed to points beyond the limits of England; and that the contract is exclusively with the first company, so as to leave the owner no right of action against any of the subsequent companies on the route. A rule so comprehensive could not be enforced in this country, without compelling the first carrier in some cases, to answer for the conduct of a great many companies.

§ 579. The growing custom of our railroads to unite in forming extensive lines of transportation, running the same train of cars over several roads, must be considered with the law bearing on the relations thus formed. When the arrangement between the companies provides for the giving of through bills of lading and charging a sum total as freight over the entire line, to be divided between the companies, each may be charged as a carrier on the contract for the transportation of through freight; on the ground of the authority given by each company under the arrangement. The contract being made on the authority of the several companies, it has been urged that they should be held jointly liable on it; and although the arrangement does not constitute a partnership, it may easily be so framed as to authorize the making of joint contracts on behalf of the connecting roads."

1 Hinckley v. N. Y. C. & Hudson River R. R. Co., 56 N. Y., 429. The stipulation cited authorizes the company to forward in the usual course of business by any responsible carrier; and the contract cannot be varied in this respect, by proof of a simultaneous direction to forwardby rail.

4 Fowles v. Great Western R. Co., 7 Exch., 699; 7 Railw. Cas., 421.

2 Muschamp v. Lancaster & Preston Railw., 8 M. and W., 421; Watson v. Ambergate, N. & B. R., 3 Eng. Law and Eq., 497; Scothorn v. S. Staffordshire Railw., 8 Exch., 341; S. C., 18 Eng. L. and Eq., 553; Wilson v. York, N. & B. Railw., 18 Eng. L. and Eq., 557; Crouch v. London & N. Railw., 14 C. B., 255; S. C., 25 Eng. L. and Eq., 287; Bristol & Ex. v. Collins, 7 Ho. Lds. Cas., 194; Coxon v. Great Western R. Co., 5 H. & N., 274.

2 Cin., Ham. & Day. R. v. Spratt, 2 Duvall, 4; ante §§ 572, 573; Hill Man. Co. v. Boston & Lowell R. R. 104 Mass., 122.

3 In Gass v. N. Y., Providence & B. R. Co. (99 Mass., 220), three carriers united to form a through route and carry freight over it for one entire charge to

§ 580. Prima facie the delivery of a package or parcel of goods to a common carrier addressed to a consignee at a point on a lateral route branching off from the first line, implies a direction to have the package stopped at the point of separation and sent forward by the usual carrier on the lateral route. A similar presumption arises from a delivery of goods to a carrier, addressed to a point beyond the termination of his route, with a special address to the care of a person acting as the carrier's agent at the terminus. The address authorizes the agent to receive and send forward the goods; 2 by itself the address to the care of the agent at the point of new departure, may indicate that the goods are to pass into the hands of the agent's principal. The circumstances may be considered to ascertain the meaning of the special address.3 Addressed to a succeeding carrier or to his agent, the meaning is that the goods are to be transferred to the carrier named; so that when they come into his custody, he receives them as a common carrier. And when the address specifies a succession of lines or roads by which the goods are to go forward to their place of destination, each carrier must deliver to the next without delay and without departing from his instructions; and in the usual manner; and with suitable directions. He is bound to use reasonable care and attention, in reading the address found upon the goods.

5

6

§ 581. On a carrier's receiving goods marked for a point beyond the terminus of his road or line, his implied contract is to carry them over his road or line and transfer them to the next carrier in the due and usual course of business. We find in a few cases some disposition to infer a through contract from rather slight circumstances; and on the other hand a decided current of authority raising no presumption either

be divided between the three companies; and the court held that the arrangement did not creato a partnership or joint liability. Wibert v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 12 N. Y., 245; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H., 9.

1 Russell & Annis v. Livingston & Wells, 16 N. Y., 515; Van Santvoord v. St. John, 25 Wend., 660; S. C., 6 Hill, 157.

2 Bristol v. R. & S. R. Co., 9 Barb., 158; an agent for the delivering carrier, does not instantly on their arrival, become the agent of the owner of the goods; 16 N. Y., 515; Fitzsimmons v. Southern Ex. Co., 40 Ga., 330; Ela v. Am. Merchants' Union Ex. Co., 29 Wis., 611.

3 Rogers v. Wheeler, 6 Lansing, 420; S. C., 52 N. Y., 262.

4 Ladue v. Griffith, 25 N. Y., 334; Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. & Tr. Co., 2 Daly, 454, 490; Rogers v. Wheeler, supra.

McDonald v. Western R. Cor., 34 N. Y., 497; Briggs v. N. Y. Central, 28

Barb., 515; Johnson v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 33 N. Y., C10.

6 Mills v. Michigan Central R., 45 N. Y., 622.

Hempstead v. N. Y. Central R. R., 28 Barb., 485; 33 N. Y., 610.

Sherman v. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 5 Daly, 521.