all such articles of convenience and comfort as may be reasonably carried in that manner, considering the nature of the journey. watch, or an opera glass may be carried as baggage.2

A gold

§ 700. Railroad carriers of passengers have the same right to demand payment of the fare in advance, as other carriers. They may refuse to allow a passenger to get on board without a ticket; and they may in this State put him off at a regular station or near some dwelling-house, on his refusing to pay his fare;3 using all proper care not to injure him, in doing so.1

After a passenger has refused to pay his fare and the train has been stopped for the purpose of putting him off, a subsequent offer to pay does not give him a right to remain, does not take from the conductor the right to exclude him from the car. for that cause, he does not gain the tendering the fare or a valid ticket. his journey on the train.

So having been put off the train right to re-enter immediately, on He forfeits his right to continue

May a railroad company demand an increased rate of fare, on account of a passenger's neglect to procure his ticket before entering the car? Our courts have hesitated to hold the affirmative of this proposition, couched in this form; and yet there is good authority upholding the right of the company to adopt the ticket system and allow passengers purchasing tickets to ride at a less rate than that charged to those paying in the cars; on condition the company keep its offices open for the sale of tickets for a reasonable time before the train leaves." The statute of New York adopts the principle, with the qualification. It also imposes a penalty upon the road for taking a greater rate of fare than that allowed by law.9

1 Pardce v. Drew, 25 Wend., 459; Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y., 594; 42 N. Y., 326; ante §§ 502, 569–571; 574–576; Jones v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 50 Barb., 193.

2 Toledo, Wabash etc. R. R. v. Hammond, 33 Ind., 379; American C. Co. v. Cross, 8 Bush (Ky.), 472.

3 People v. Jillson, 3 Park. Cr. R., 234; Laws of 1850, pp. 230, 231. Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Cɔ., 23 N. Y., 343.

People v. Jillson, supra; Hibbard v. N. Y. & Eric R. Co., 15 N. Y., 455, 461.

6 State v. Campbell, 32 N. J., 309.

7 St. Louis R. v. South, 43 Ill., 176; State v. Goold, 53 Maine, 279; Hilliard v. Goold, 34 N. H., 230; People v. Jillson, supra; Crocker v. New London R., 24 Conn., 249.

Porter v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 34 Barb., 353; Nellis v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 30 N. Y., 505; 28 Ind., 1; Du Laurans v. St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co., 2 American R., 102, note 108; Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind., 116.

9 Chase v. N. Y. Central R., 26 N. Y., 523; 46 N. Y., 644; Lewis v. N. Y. Central R., 49 Barb., 330.

§ 701. When a passenger does not pay his fare in advance, the carrier has a lien therefor upon the baggage entrusted to him; and may detain the same as a security for its payment. When he waives his right to payment in advance, he is presumed to rely upon the lien given him by law, or upon the personal responsibility of his passenger, to secure his reasonable hire. He cannot detain his passenger therefor; and he cannot take things from his possession to secure payment of his demand.2

The carrier's lien does not, under the common law, involve or carry with it a power to sell or satisfy his demand. It is a naked right of detention which cannot be made available to liquidate his charge, without a legal proceeding, in the nature of a foreclosure in equity. And during the time he detains goods to enforce his lien, he is not allowed to charge for keeping them.4

We have seen that an innkeeper has a lien upon the goods entrusted to him by his guest, though they be the property of another person; and it has been urged that a carrier stands in the same relation to his passenger, and should therefore have a co-extensive lien.5 The analogy is very strong; and yet the better opinion is that a carrier's lien for freight arises out of a contract by the owner for the conveyance of the goods, and that it cannot be enforced against the owner where the goods are carried at the request of a bailee or of a party acquiring the possession of them by fraud."

III. THE CONTRACT.

§ 702. We give but little attention to those contracts which are most frequently made, those which result from a general order given, or from some action taken under a custom or course of business. A traveller buys a railroad ticket, without much considering the effect of his purchase. He applies to an agent of the company for a ticket to a given place on the line of the road; he pays the fare and goes on board of the right train, with his ticket as a voucher or token of his right to a passage.

1 Wolf v. Summers, 2 Campb., 631; Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 Mees. & Welsb., 148.

2 Ramsden v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 104 Mass., 117.

3 Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend., 267; Briggs v. Boston R., 6 Allen, 246; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Maine, 339; Staples v. Bradley, 23 Conn., 167. A mortgagee or pledgee may bring an action in equity demanding a sale of the property. Brigg v. Oliver, 68 N. Y., 236, 339, just reported.

* Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co., 3 H. L. Cas., 338.

Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 490; York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym., 867 ; Jolınson v. Hill, 3 Stark. R., 172.

6 Gilson v. Gwinn, 107 Mass., 126; Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y., 337 ; Fisk v. Newberry, 1 Doug. Mich. R., 1; Buskirk v. Purington, 2 Hall, 561, 569.

However general or few the words used, the contract is well defined; it binds the carrier to convey the passenger with his baggage to the place indicated on his ticket. The contract is the same, where a passenger takes passage on a steamboat. The carrier also engages to convey the passenger with all reasonable diligence, to the place of his destination; he engages, under ordinary circumstances, to convey the passenger within the advertised time.2

For a breach of the carrier's engagement to make the connections or to convey his passenger within the time specified in the published time table, the law allows the injured party to recover the direct and natural damages resulting from the delay. It does not allow him to recover remote or speculative damages; as in other cases, it limits the recovery to such damages as might be reasonably expected to result from the delay.

3

When a passenger is seriously injured by the delay, he is entitled to recover the damages thereby sustained; and the railroad carrier cannot escape liability by showing that the delay arose from the willful act of the conductor.5

§ 703. When in England two or more railroad companies unite to form an extended line, on which passengers are booked through, the contract is between the passenger and the company issuing the ticket. And our rule is the same, where the company issuing the ticket, contracts for the entire distance; and the contract is fairly established by all the facts and circumstances."

'Jones v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 50 Barb., 193; 45 N. Y., 184.

2 Denton v. Great Northern R. Co., 5 El. & Bl., 860; Hamlin v. Great Northern R. Co., 1 H. & N., 403; the contract is to be established as a matter of fact; Hurst v. Great Western R. Co., 19 C. B. N. S., 310.

3 Hamlin v. Great Northern R. Co., 1 H. & N., 408; Benson v. N. J. R. & Tr. Co., 9 Bosw., 412; Woodyear v. Great Western R. Co., L. R., 2 C. P., 318; Hobbs v. London & Southwestern R. Co., L. R.. 10 Q. B., 111; Denton v. Great Northern R. Co., 5 El. & Bl., 830; contract evidenced by an excursion ticket good for fourteen days; Great Northern R. Co. v. Hawcroft, 21 L. J. Q. B., 178. 4 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch., 341; Horne v. Midland R. Co., L. R., 8 C. P., 131, 140.

Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 N. Y., 362; 20 N. Y., 48; Meyer v. Second Ave. R. Co., 8 Bosw., 305; Shea v. Sixth Avenue R. Co., 62 N. Y., 180.

6 Mytton v. Midland R. Co., 4 H. and N., 615; Coxon v. Great Western R. Co., 5 II. and N., 274; Bristol &c. R. Co. v. Collins, 7 II. L. Cas., 194.

7 Weed v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 19 Wend., 534; Burtis v. Buffalo & State Lin R. Co., 24 N. Y., 269; Hart v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., 8 N. Y., 37; 29 Barb., 35; 53 N. Y., 363, 370; Ill. Central R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill., 332.

Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y., 217; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y., 661; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y., 306; 45 N. Y., 184, 189.

The contract is with the connected roads as joint contractors, when they are jointly concerned in the business of carrying passengers and there is a community of interest between them in the sale of tickets; ' as where the tickets are sold by an agent acting for both roads, and the transportation is effected by the united agency of the roads, thus practically consolidated in the business.2

When one of several connecting roads, sells the tickets of the different roads, with authority from each, printed on one slip of paper and capable of being readily detached, on an agreement dividing the proceeds between the roads rateably; each road makes a contract with the passenger covering its own line. The company selling the ticket over the connecting road, acts as an agent; and each road is liable to the passenger for any failure in duty on its line 3-liable on the theory of contract. The same principles apply to the contract for the conveyance of passengers, which apply to contracts for the transportation of goods.

§ 704. The law of the State where a contract is made and is to be performed, determines its validity; and so where a railroad in this State contracts to convey a passenger from one place to another within its jurisdiction, with a limitation upon its liability allowed by our laws, the contract is to be enforced according to its legal effect here. E. g., Ohio, which does not uphold a contract made in that State exempting a carrier from liability for the negligence of its agents and servants, will enforce a like contract made here by the Erie Railroad to be performed within this State. The rule is still broader: the contract is to be construed and interpreted according to the laws of the State where it is made, unless it appears from its terms to have been entered into with a

1 Wylde v. Northern R. R. Co. of N. J., 53 N. Y., 156; Hart v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., 8 N. Y., 37.

2 An appointment by several roads of a common agent to sell coupon tickets over their roads, does not make them partners. Spragne v. Smith, 29 Vt., 421; Harton v. Eastern R., 114 Mass., 44; Straiton v. N. Y. R., 2 E. D. Smith, 184. And while it is quite feasible for these companies to unite their business in such a manner as to create a partnership, we do not often find them doing so. See Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall., 65, 85; Najac v. Boston R., 7 Allen, 329; Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 203; Northern Central, 16 Md., 331; Ill. Central R. v. Copeland, 24 I., 332; 17 N. Y., 303; 20 Barb., 35; Glaser v. N. Y. R., 35 Barb., 557.

3 Milner v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 363; Kessler v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y., 538; S. C., 7 Lans., 62.

4 Ante §§ 572, 577, 578.

↑ Knowlton v. Erie Railway Co., 19 Ohio St., 260. We have already alluded to the differing opinions entertained respecting the validity of such a contract which are so fully reviewed in Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall., 357.

view to the laws of some other State; as where it is to be substantially performed in another State. The mere fact that a passenger on the road, on the Erie for example, will be occasionally carried over the State line, in the execution of a contract of transportation, does not prevent its enforcement according to the law of this State, where it is made. And hence when a suit is brought here on the contract, for damages to a passenger caused by the negligence of the company at a point where the road bends into Pennsylvania, the law of this State prescribes the measure of the recovery.1

A railroad corporation organized in one State, and extending its line into another and transacting business there by its permission, does so subject to the laws of that State. It is not permitted to act under, and afterwards reject those laws, as its interests may dictate."

Under a contract for services, the law of the place where they are rendered governs, and controls its legal effect.3

The statute law of a State has no extra-territorial operation; and so the statute giving an action for damages resulting from a death caused by culpable negligence, operates only within the State. As the cause of action is created by the statute, it cannot arise outside of the jurisdiction enacting the statute. In perfect harmony with this principle, our courts give effect to the statute on navigable waters, which are within the boundaries of the State.5

§ 705. We have noticed in passing that in this State and in some others, a gratuitous passenger may by an express contract exempt a railroad company from liability for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents and servants; that a person riding on a drover's pass, issued

1 Dike v. Erie R., 45 N. Y., 113.

2 Milnor v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 363.

3 Mullin v. Hicks, 49 Barb., 250; Waldron v. Ritchings, 3 Daly, 288; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y., 9, 91; 33 N. Y., 615.

Whitford v. Panama Railroad Co., 3 Bosw., 67; S. C., 23 N. Y., 465. The death occurred on the Panama Railroad, a corporation organized under the laws of New York. 2 Keyes, 294; Richardson v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 98 Mass., 85; Needham v. G. T. R. Co., 38 Vt., 294; Woodward v. M. S. & N. I. R. Co., 20 Ohio St., 121; Allen v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 45 Md., 41; G. W. R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich., 305.

* Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 45 Barb., 226; reversed, S. C., 35 N. Y., 352. The injury causing death, resulted from a collision on Long Island Sonnd, near Sands' Point. As to the territorial limits of the county of New York, see Orr v. City of Brooklyn, 33 N. Y., 661; and as to the effect of an assignment of personal property situate in another State, made here, see Van Buskirk v. Warren, 2 Keyes, 119.

Wells v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 24 N. Y., 181.