more rapidly, and being more under the control of her officers and crew than a vessel which has not the wind, is bound to give way. The reason of this rule applies to steamboats at all times, since they have always a propelling power, equal to a favorable wind, which renders the vessel perfectly manageable. So, too, a vessel under sail must bear away from a vessel at anchor, because, being under motion, ber direction may be easily changed.? § 744. It is a rule of the Trinity-House, adopted by the court of admiralty, "that when steam vessels on different courses must unavoidably and necessarily cross so near that by continuing their respective courses there would be a risk of coming into collision, each vessel shall put her helm to port so as always to pass on the larboard side of each other." And the rule is doubtless the same whether the vessel is engaged in carrying passengers or freight, or whether it is under the command of the master, or a pilot, who is considered master pro hac vice. In Denison v. Seymour, it is adjudged that the master of a steamboat, employed in the transportation of passengers, like the master of a vessel engaged in the merchant service, is answerable for the diligence of all to The Shannon, 2 Hagg. R., 173; Hawkins v. Dutchess & Orange Steamboat Co., 2 Wend. R., 452. Action on the case for an injury to plaintiff's sloop by collision. On the trial, it appeared that the vessels met just below the overslaugh below Albany; the sloop going down the river with a fair but light breeze at the rate of two miles an hour; the steamboat going up the river at the rate of six or seven miles an hour; the sloop had just crossed the bar in the usual channel, and necessarily ran near the eastern shore; the officers of both vessels hailed; the plaintiff on board of his sloop called to the officers of the steamboat to stop the engine; the pilot of the boat called to the plaintiff, who was at the helm of his sloop, to bear away; the plaintiff did bear away, but as he had but little headway on his vessel, he made but little progress; the engine of the steamboat was stopped, but the boat was not backed, as she might have been, and struck with her bow the waist of the plaintiff's sloop and injured her materially. By the court: "The real question is, whether the officers of the steamboat were not guilty of negligence in refusing or neglecting to exercise the power they possessed, which would have prevented the injury. The boat was perfectly under the control of its officers, the sloop was not; the officers of the boat did not endeavor to avoid the collision which they might have done either by backing their boat or by going on the west side of the sloop, where there was room enough and water enough. The sloop was compelled to go near the cast shore, in order to pass the bar with safety, and after passing the bar, the captain did all in his power to avoid the collision by endeavoring to go west of the boat; but, from the slow motion of the sloop, this was impracticable before the boat struck him.” 2 The Neptune, 1 Dod. Adm. Rep., 467; 3 Kent's Comm., 231. 3 Duke of Sussex, 1 W. Robinson (N. A.) R., 274. 4 Bussey v. Donaldson, 4 Dallas, 206. 1 whom is entrusted the management of the vessel, and that he is liable for any injury done by running the steamboat navigated by him against and sinking another vessel, although the pilot, who received his appointment directly from the owners, is at the wheel steering the boat, and has at the time of the accident the exclusive control and direction of her course. In another case, against the master of a steamboat for running foul of a sloop on the Hudson river, the recorder, before whom the cause was tried, charged the jury that the defendant was prima facie liable for the injury, and that it lay upon him to show that it did not arise from negligence on the part of those who navigated the steamboat ; that the question of negligence was a question of fact for the jury, and if they were of opinion that the plaintiff's vessel might have been avoided by the exercise of due diligence and watchfulness, plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict, unless by reason of the darkness of the night the accident was caused by the absence of a signal light on board of the sloop, there being no want of care on the part of those in charge of the steamboat; and the charge was sustained. The owners are responsible for damages occasioned by the mismanagement of a ship, though under the care of a regular pilot and navigated in obedience to his directions; and the pilot is answerable to them.3 It is true the owners have no voice in the choice of the pilot, and it is also true that the vessel is navigated on their account, and necessarily subject to the law of the port or place; it being the duty of the master to put his vessel in charge of a pilot as required by law. Being in charge of the vessel, the pilot is liable as if he were a common carrier; and the master, being excluded from any control, is not, for the time being, responsi ble for the movements of the vessel.4 § 745. The principles of liability in cases of collision as administered in courts of admiralty are briefly stated by Sir William Scott in the case of 19 Wend. R., 9. 2 Foot v. Wiswall, 14 John. R., 304. 3 Neptune the Second, 1 Dodson R., 467. The employment and regulation of pilots is left to the State laws. R. S. of U. S., 823; Commissioners of Pilots v. Pacific Mail S. Co., 52 N. Y., 609; but it is settled that Congress has the power to legislate on the subject, and thus suspend the State law. Henderson v. Spofford, 59 N. Y., 131. 4 Brown v. Elwell, 60 N. Y., 249; Gillespie v. Zittlosen, 60 N. Y., 449; Smith v. Coudry, 1 How. U. S., 28. The court in this case gives effect to the English statute and the law of the port. See also Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 Maule and S., 577; Attorney General v. Case, 3 Price, 302; 3 Kent's Comm., 176, and notes; Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. U. S., 299. That the master is not liable, see Snell v. Rich, 1 John. R., 304; but see Denison v. Seymour, 9 Wend., 9, 11; Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick., 22. the Woodrop Sims: There are four possibilities under which an accident of this sort may occur. In the first place, it may happen without blame being imputable to either party; as where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major; in that case the misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light; the other not being responsible to him in any degree. Secondly, a misfortune of this kind may arise where both parties are to blame; where there has been a want of due diligence on both sides; in such a case, the rule of law is, that the loss must be apportioned between them, as having been occasioned by the 'fault of both of them. Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burthen. Lastly, it may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and in this case the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other.1 § 746. At common law the plaintiff cannot recover damages for an injury by collision or otherwise, attributable in any degree to his own neg lect or want of due care, unless the defendant has been guilty of some intentional wrong. In a case of mutual negligence, the common law does not interpose in order to make an equitable partition of the damages, as is frequently done in courts of admiralty. If the plaintiff has exercised ordinary care, and the defendant has been guilty of negligence causing the injury, the action for damages may be sustained. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages for an injury sustained by him in the act of resisting the defendant, or preventing him from the exercise of his legal right; as where the master of a freight boat on the canal refused to give the master of a packet boat carrying passengers, the preference given him by statute in passing a lock and a collision ensued causing a slight injury to the freight boat.5 § 747. The manner of landing passengers from steamboats navigating the waters of this State, is prescribed in certain cases by statute, requiring that, where the landing is effected by the use of a small boat, the engine of the steamboat shall be stopped while the passenger is getting into the small boat or out of it on board of the steamboat, and during the passage of the small boat to and from the shore, with this exception, that during such landing and receiving of passengers, the engine of the bo atmay be put in motion in order to keep the steamboat in proper 12 Dodson, R., 83. 2 Barnes v. Cole, 21 Wend. R., 183; 5 Hill R., 232. 3 Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cowen R., 189; 5 Hill R., 233, note a. 6 Cowen R., 192; Rathbun v. payne, 19 Wenl. R., 333; 1 Cowen R., 78 Farnsworth v. Groat, 6 Cowen R., 633. The navigation of the cauals is regulated very minutely by the statutes, 1 R. S., 271, 3d ed, direction, and prevent her from drifting or being driven on shore, and also in order to give sufficient force to carry the small boat to the shore.1 No passenger is permitted to enter the small boat, for the purpose of being landed, until it is completely afloat and wholly disengaged from the steamboat, except by a painter; the small boat to be supplied by a good and sufficient pair of oars, and to be signaled to the steamboat on leaving the shore and when she arrives at it. These and similar enactments, serve but to particularize and specify duties already imposed upon the carrier, or involved in the general principle establishing his liability. The same remark is applicable to the several acts of Congress, regulating the carriage of passengers in merchant vessels, restricting the number to be received to the reasonable capacity of the vessel, and requiring that they shall be properly ventilated, and adequately supplied with provisions for the voyage. The duties of the carrier are minutely specified, and penalties are imposed for the violation of them, so as to afford to the public a sufficient guaranty for their fulfillment, and thereby to counteract the carrier's temptation to crowd a great number of passengers, frequently emigrants of the poorer class, into a small vessel, exposing them to the discases incident to a sea voyage, in an overcrowded and badly ventilated vessel. It was found by experience that the passenger's remedy against the carrier, on his contract was not sufficient protection against this kind of imposition; and hence the statute law has provided a means of vindictive punishment, in the shape of penalties, thus making the carrier's avarice and caution the pledge of fidelity in the discharge of his duties. In this way his love of gain is arrayed against itself, and made to neutralize its vicious properties." § 748. Steam vessels are subject to a further and different kind of temptation, as well as to other and more numerous dangers. Accordingly, those acts of Congress which provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, are of a much wider scope. They provide that such vessels shall be enrolled and licensed; that their boilers and machinery shall be duly inspected once every six months; that a certificate of such inspection shall be given and posted up in some conspicuous part of the boat; that the owners of such licensed boats shall employ a competent number of experienced and skillful engineers; that the steam shall be regulated and kept down in a particular manner; that every steam vessel engaged 12 R. S., 949, 5th ed. 2 Idem. See acts of 1847, 1818, 1849, in Appendix, and R. S. of U. S., 825, 869. in the transportation of freight or passengers at sea or on the lakes shall carry two or more yawls or long-boats, according to her tonnage, each of which shall be competent to carry at least twenty persons; that each vessel shall be furnished with a suction hose and fire-engine and hose suitable to be worked in case of fire; that each vessel shall carry signal lights during the night; that a failure in these duties shall be visited by penalties and by indictment; that every captain, engineer, pilot or other person employed on such steam vessel by whose misconduct, negligence or inattention to his or their respective duties the life of any person on board may be destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and on conviction sentenced to confinement at hard labor for a period not more than ten years; and that in all actions against the owners of steamboats for injuries arising to person or property from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat, or the collapse of a flue, or other injurious escape of steam, the fact of such accident shall be taken as full prima facie evidence, sufficient to charge the defendant, or those in his employment, with negligence, until he shall show that no negligence has been committed by him or those in his employment.1 Though these provisions do not establish any new principle of responsibility, they are of great importance as pointing out the particulars of the carrier's duty and furnishing to the public the means for its enforcement. As between the carrier and the passenger, a failure to comply with them is evidence of neglect, which in most cases of injury casts upon the carrier the burden of showing that the injury did not occur in consequence of his neglect or want of due diligence. § 749. These statutes were not intended to limit the common law liability of ship-owners, as carriers of passengers. Their object was to provide additional safeguards and better security for the lives of passengers on steam vessels; and to secure the observance of the law and the exercise of a vigilant supervision and care, in respect to the construction and equipment and management of steam-vessels, the owners are charged with an absolute liability, when passengers sustain injury from any neg. lect or failure to comply with the terms of the law. The statute providing for the inspection of boilers, does not in any manner limit the liability of the owners for their safety; and a compliance with the statute does not even remove the presumption of negligence, arising from the bursting of a boiler.3 § 750. In order that the master may properly discharge the import 1 See acts of 1838, 1843, in Appendix; R. S. of U. S., 857. |