4 * Every Wife Prince ought to Govern his Subjects and Servants in fuch manner, that by his Affability and Virtue, they may be endear'd to his Service, rather Voluntarily, than for Pay or Hope of Preferment: For otherwife, whenever the Prince fhall want means to reward, the Subjects likewife will fail in their Good-will to ferve. But he that faithfully Loves, does neither become arrogant in Profperity, nor withdraw in adverfe Fortune. * All Nations do naturally imitate the Manners of their Prince; and obferving his Proceedings, refolve either to Hate or Love him. "There“ fore it highly imports a King, upon his first "Acceffion to the Throne, to give a Good"Opinion of himself to his People; for 'tis that cr firft ftep which determines either the Happi"nefs or Mifery of his Reign. If the People. happen once to Hate their Sovereign, then his. Actions, Good or Evil, are never afterwards accounted Good: But if at the beginning he gains the Love of the People, then every bad Action is reputed a Virtue, as tho' he could not be induc'd to do amifs, without good Cause or Rea fon. *All Men are naturally Good, when no refpect of profit or pleasure draws them to become Evil.. But the Corruption of this World, and our Frailty is fuch, as easily, and often for our particular Intereft we incline to the worst, which was the caufe that Wife Law-givers found out Rewards and Punishments; the one to invite Men to.. Good, the other to deliver them from being Evil. *The Laws and Conftitutions made at the first fettlement of a State, or Commonwealth, Q 4 when when Men were Good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become Evil; and therefore new Laws are made according to the Accidents which happen. * A Prince that defires, by means of his Amballador, to deceive any other Prince, must first abuse his own Ambassador, to the end he should Act and Speak with more earnestnefs, as being perfwaded that the intent and meaning of his Mafter is real; which perhaps he would not do, at least fo effectually, if he was privy to his Mafters diffimulation. * 'Tis a dangerous thing in all Commonwealths, by continual Punishments to hold the minds of Subjects in fufpicion; for Men ever fearing their Ruin, will, like thofe in despair, refolve to fave themselves any way, and fo attempt innovations. All capital Executions ought there fore to be done fuddenly, fo to fecure the minds of Men from further Cruelties. * In a State divided by Sects and Parties, the Leader of any fide is able to kindle Civil War, yet is he unable to moderate the Victory; For to Stir up Seditions and Troubles, the worst Man commonly bears the ftroke; but Peace and Quietness are only fettled by Men of rare Gifts and excellent Virtue. *The Authority which Princes communicate to their Subjects, is chiefly in refpect of Wisdom or Valour; yet it generally happens, that they account them the wifeft and bravest Men, that can beft accommodate themselves to their Hu mour. Ancient and well-govern'd Common-wealths were wont by their Conquefts to fill the Treafuies with Gold and Silver, to give rewards to Soldiers; Soldiers; to exempt the People from Taxes; to: inake Triumphs and Publick Feafts; but now a days as Frinces manage the Wars, the Exchequer is exhaufted, the People impoverish'd without being fecur'd from their Enemies; and the Soldiers Disbanded unrewarded. * Every State well Govern'd, rewards Men of Merit, and Punishes all Offenders; and if any perfon that has well deferv'd of the Commonwealth, fhall afterwards wilfully offend, he ought to be punish'd, notwithstanding his former Ser vices. * Some People being difpleas'd with Innovations that happen in the State, do fometimes, without juft reafons, complain of those that Govern; not unlike a Sick Man, who fhould think the Phyfician, not the Feaver to be the cause of his Pain. *A Prince makes himself first unhappy, when he makes others fo. * There are some fierce Souls, who have but an imperfect Pleasure in being Mafters, if they don't make their Power felt by others, who place Greatness in Force, and the Happiness of their Condition in making People miferable at their pleafure. 'Tis as great a Severity in a Prince to pardon all Crimes, as to pardon none. Frequent Executions caft as great blemish on the Reputation of a King, as frequent Funerals on that of a Phyfician. The Publick is but one Body, and the Prince the Head on't; fo that what Member foever withdraws his Service from the Head, is no better than a Negative Traitor to his Country and himself. Princes ال Princes and their Minifiers have their Nature much like that of Celestial Bodies; they have much Splendor, but no Reft. Princes are no farther touch'd with one anothers Misfortunes than concerns their own Intereft. * The Periods of Empires, like Natural Bodies, grow for a certain Time, and to a certain Size, which they are not to exceed. *The Sources of Conquefts, like those of great Rivers, are generally obfcure, or taken little notice of; until their Streams increafing by the Influence of many others, make fo mighty Inundations, as to grow famous in Stories, as well as Maps of the World. Ufurpers and Tyrams do commonly Justice upon themselves, for the Injuries they have done to others; their own Confciences doing the Office of Tormenters, and avenging their Publick Crimes, by their Private Sufferings; for they live in a perpetual Anguifh of Thought, with Fears and Jealoufies. *It is an easie matter for Princes to cover and defend their unlawful Defires, and unfaithful Vows, with many outward feeming fair Pretences; efpecially feeing there is no Umpire or Moderator of Matters concluded upon, to whom a Reason fhould be tendred. * When Princes, that ought to be common Parents, make themselves as a Party, and lean to a Side; it is a Boat that is over-thrown by uneven. weight on the one fide. For when the Authority of Princes is made but an Acceffary to a Caufe, and that there are other Bands that tye fafter than the Band of Sovereignty; Kings begin to be almost put out of Poffeffion. " It isa miferable state of Mind, to have few things to defire, and many things to fear and yet that commonly is the Cafe of Kings, who being at the highest, want matter of Defire which makes their Minds more languifhing; and have many Reprefentations of Perils and Shadows, which makes their Minds the lefs clear. * Nothing destroys Authority fo much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of Power, prefs'd too far, and relaxed too much. ** The Honour of a Prince, is a good excufe, when he has no mind to engage in a deceitful or unjust War; but it is often forgotten, when the Circumftances are more favourable. There is no way more effectual to engage all to adhere to the Crown, than the grateful Acknowledgiments of past Services. * In a weak Government, an ill digefted Infurrection raises the Power of the Prince, and adds as much Spirit to his Friends, as it depreffes the Faction against him; and it also gives a handle to do fome things, for which it were not eafie otherways to find either Colours or Inftru ments. A Prince that does not fecure Friends to himfelf, while he is in Power and Condition to oblige them, muft never expect to find 'em when he is Old and Impotent, and no longer able to do them any Good. If he Governs Tyrannically in his Youth, he will be fure to be treated Contemptibly in his Old Age; and the bafer his Enemies are, the more infolent and intolerable will be the Affront. There is no Subject fo inconfiderable, but his Prince at one time or other, may have occafion for him; and it holds through the whole Scale of for the |