and huck towels. If we were called upon to find what kind of articles of this character were luxuries, we would say that the fine and expensive grades of linen towels used by people of means would be included within that class, but cotton towels are in everyday use in the household of the common laborer, and we do not consider that they are luxuries in any sense of the word. Cotton counterpanes are the lowest class of decorative bed coverings. The higher grades, consisting of those embroidered or in part of lace, which are excluded rom the paragraph, might be considered luxuries. Bath mats and wash cloths made of fabrics of the turkish-towel variety manufactured on the Jacquard loom are other articles which we do not consider luxuries. Cotton table damask, although a Jacquard figured material, is used by the common people because it is the cheapest of all the dining-table coverings. We do not think that the mere manufacturing of an article out of a Jacquard figured material brings it within the class of luxuries.

It is urged by the Government that our decision in the Gardner case is improper because it makes the provision for "Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton" a basket provision covering articles which would be dutiable at the same rate under paragraph 266 and hence the provision for Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton would be absolutely useless and its enactment would constitute an absurdity. This contention was considered in the Sachs case, supra, wherein we said:

The fallacy of this argument is shown by an examination of other analogous provisions of the statute, for it appears that Congress has imposed duty at the rate of 30 per cent ad valorem on knit underwear and wearing apparel in paragraph 261, for wearing apparel not knit in paragraph 256, for tracing cloth in paragraph 254, and for cotton cloth exceeding number 99 size yarn in paragraph 252. All of these articles would pay the same rate under the catch-all provision in paragraph 266 in the absence of these special provisions for them, and it can not be successfully contended that all of those provisions are surplusage.

For the purpose of showing that it was the intention of the lawmakers to impose duty on Jacquard figured cotton quilts under paragraph 258, the attorney for the Government in his brief refers freely to the documents placed before the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on Finance, and to the arguments in the House of Representatives when the provision for "Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton" was put into the bill.

While it is within the power of the courts, and sometimes it becomes their duty, to ascertain the policy of the Government in order to correctly interpret the statutes, such a course is of doubtful wisdom and a dangerous expedient, and such a line of research should last be resorted to. G. A. 7222 (T. D. 31588).

It seems to us that the history of this provision and the action of Congress furnishes a better guide and shows the intention of the lawmaking body more clearly than does an explanation made by one

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of the Representatives in debate on the floor of the House, or the arguments for particular legislation made by the domestic manufacturers at the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on Finance. It is significant that paragraph 269 of the bill (corresponding to par. 264 of the act) passed by the House contained a provision for "quilts * * * made of cotton." This provision was changed by the Committee on Finance of the Senate to read "quilts composed of two fabrics quilted * made of cotton," which provision was passed by the Senate. Had this provision been enacted into law there would be no doubt but that Jacquard figured quilts would have been excluded from the paragraph. The provision was amended in conference, however, by striking out the words "composed of two fabrics quilted," and thus we think a clear intention is shown to broaden the scope of the provision passed by the Senate to include the quilts other than those which are composed of two fabrics quilted"-that is, counterpanes and all other kinds of cotton quilts which are not embroidered nor in part of lace and are not otherwise provided for. Upon reading paragraph 264 it is evident that the construction of the provision for quilts must be the same as that given to the balance of the paragraph. From the language of the law enacted we are of opinion that it was the purpose of Congress to impose a low rate of duty on all such articles of necessity, and as quilts are one of the things mentioned they should be considered in the same category.

"

For the reasons above given and following the decisions cited, we hold that the articles in question are properly dutiable at 25 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 264. To that extent the protests are sustained.

A further claim is made in some of the protests that a discount of 5 per cent on the duties should be allowed under subsection 7 of paragraph J of section 4, but as no evidence was offered in support of this claim the same is overruled.

CONCURRING OPINION.

FISCHER and HOWELL, General Appraisers: The Court of Customs Appeals having held in Carter v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., —; T. D. 35475), Wilson v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., —; T. D. 35476), and United States v. Sherman (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., —; T. D. 35501) that the last provision in paragraph 258 of the act of 1913 applies solely to manufactures of cotton, Jacquard figured, when there is no other more specific provision for such articles, thus making that paragraph merely a basket or catch-all provision, we can reach no other conclusion in this matter than that expressed in the opinion of our colleague, Judge Cooper, and we accordingly concur with him in it.

(T. D. 35578-G. A. 7749.)

Saddle nails not parts of saddles.

Saddle nails, composed of metal and used to fasten the saddle to the saddletree, are properly dutiable as manufactures of metal under paragraph 167 of the act of 1913, as here classified by the collector, rather than free of duty under paragraph 530 of said act as "parts" of saddles, as claimed by the importers. They constitute merely one of the classes of materials employed in the manufacture of a saddle.

United States General Appraisers, New York, July 6, 1915.

In the matter of protest 756568 of Bartley Bros. & Hall against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

[Affirmed.]

Strauss & Hedges (J. L. Klingaman of counsel) for the importers.

Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Martin T. Baldwin, special attorney), for the United States.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers). FISCHER, General Appraiser: This merchandise consists of saddle nails composed of metal. Duty was levied thereon at 20 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 167 of the act of 1913 as manufactures of metal not specially provided for, and they are claimed to be entitled to free entry under the provision in paragraph 530 of said act for "harness, saddles, and saddlery, in sets or in parts, finished or unfinished."

The fact that these nails are used chiefly for binding saddles to saddletrees is fully established by the uncontradicted testimony offered on behalf of the importers. But it is not at all clear to us how it can be claimed that such a use operates to make a saddle nail a part of a saddle.

Unquestionably it was the intention of Congress that the terms "sets" or "parts," as used in said paragraph 530, should be construed to mean something more than mere saddle nails, thread, pieces of leather, or any one of the other individual classes of materials which are employed in the manufacture of harness, saddles, and saddlery. Manifestly the provision contemplates manufactured articles which may be in a finished or an unfinished state, but which are definitely, generally, and uniformly known and recognized as "sets" or "parts" of harness, saddles, and saddlery, such as bridles, stirrups, reins, breechings, belly bands, back pads, etc.

In Abstract 25455 (T. D. 31543) this board overruled a protest filed by these same importers wherein they claimed that certain flax webbing 24 yards long and from 1 to 3 inches wide, and cut to the length required for straining over the tree of a saddle, was properly

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dutiable as saddlery or parts thereof. That case arose under the last preceding tariff act, and in its ruling therein the board said:

In former decisions of the board the term "saddlery" has been held to include articles "used in the equipment of horses." G. A. 5320 (T. D. 24353); G. A. 5321 (T. D. 24354). These cases arose under the act of 1897, but there has been no material change in the corresponding provisions of the act of 1909. The evidence introduced in this case is not sufficient to establish that the term has a well-defined commercial meaning that would include the webbing now under consideration, which, in our opinion, is material used in making saddles, rather than saddlery. It is in fact flax webbing and is specifically provided for in paragraph 349.

In re Simon (84 Fed., 154) the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, in passing upon an analogous question to that here raised, held with respect to certain india-rubber tubing:

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This importation is of small india-rubber tubing in meter lengths, colored, the chief use of which is for the making of the stems of artificial flowers. The paragraph under which this manufacture was assessed does not provide a duty on materials for artificial flowers, but for parts of artificial flowers, and this tubing is not any finished part of an artificial flower, but is merely a material from which the stems, as such a part of an artificial flower, can be made.

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This latter ruling was followed by this board in G. A. 4217 (T. D. 19769).

The protest is overruled and the decision of the collector is affirmed.

(T. D. 35579-G. A. 7750.)

Testing machines, gear cutters, etc.

Machines designed for the sole purpose of testing the accuracy of the cutting work done by gear-cutting machines, and gear-cutters and hobs imported unaccom. panied by the machines of which they form part, are properly dutiable as manufactures of metal under paragraph 199 of the act of 1909, as here classified by the collector, rather than as machine tools under paragraph 197 of said act, as claimed in the protests.

United States General Appraisers, New York, July 6, 1915.

In the matter of protests 726522, etc., of W. H. Allison Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Detroit.

[Affirmed.]

H. C. Allison for the importers.

Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Martin T. Baldwin, special attorney), for the United States.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers). FISCHER, General Appraiser: The merchandise consists of gear cutters, gear-testing machines, and necessary tools for gear-cutting machines. Duty was levied thereon at 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 199 of the act of 1909, and they are claimed to be properly

dutiable at but 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 197 of said act as machine tools.

The gear cutters are composed of high-speed steel and are in the form of circular disks; they are about 4 or 5 inches in diameter, about three-fourths of an inch thick, with a hole in the center a little over 1 inch in diameter, and around the periphery is a series of teeth, each tooth about three-fourths of an inch long. When placed on the shaft of a gear-cutting machine these teeth cut into a bar or rod of iron and produce a worm gear.

Another form of cutter involved herein is in the shape of a steel cylinder, solid, of irregular dimensions, having approximately midway between the two ends a series of teeth which project out from the cylinder about one-half or three-fourths of an inch. This cutter is likewise composed of high speed steel and is technically known as a "hob," which operates upon the worm gear in very much the same way as the single gear cutters above described, except that it cuts more than one tooth at the same time.

A power-driven machine operating these hobs and cutters would unquestionably be properly classifiable as a machine tool; but, when invoiced and shipped separately, as they are in this instance, the hobs and cutters in question constitute merely parts of machine tools, for which parts there is no specific tariff provision. They are therefore necessarily relegated to the provision covering manufactures of metal not specially provided for in said paragraph 199, and the decision of the collector in so classifying them is hereby affirmed. The testing machines under consideration consist of power-driven mechanisms specially designed for the sole purpose of testing the accuracy of the cutting work performed by the gear-cutting machines. The two classes of machines are entirely separate and distinct and work independently of each other. The testing operation involves no cutting whatever and makes absolutely no change in the physical status of the product of the gear-cutting machine.

In G. A. 7559 (T. D. 34413) this board held that only such machines as are driven by other than hand power and that work upon metal, employing in their operations cutting tools, are machine tools. Obviously, then, these testing machines do not respond to the definition of what constitutes a machine tool, in that no cutting tools are employed in their operation. The collector was therefore correct in holding the same properly classifiable under said paragraph 199 as manufactures of metal; and it necessarily follows that the same conclusion is equally true with respect to such tools as accompanied the machines in question.

The protests are accordingly overruled and the decisions of the collector affirmed.