While the burden was on the plaintiff to satisfy the jury of the defendant's liability, the burden is now on the defendant to make it clearly appear to us that the verdict is wrong. Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78ing room. Mr. Perkins went as far as the Atl. 468, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1121.

Unless it is apparent that an injustice has been done. Woodis v. Jordan, 62 Me. 490; Fitch v. Sidelinger, supra.

The witness located Mr. Perkins in the dining room door, his back towards her, and standing between herself and her husband. Their purpose in entering the dining room, unexplained by defendant, does not aid in establishing the probability of the correctness of her statement, but does furnish ample ground for the presumption that if, as she stated, she does not remember what they said, she did not see all that occurred. Motions overruled.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 503-508; Dec. Dig. § 185.*] 2. NEW TRIAL_(§ 71*)-GROUNDS-VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.

When the evidence is conflicting, and the question of liability and damages is one that is peculiarly within the province of the jury, and the evidence does not convince the court that the jury were clearly wrong, a motion for new trial will be overruled.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. $$ 144, 145; Dec. Dig. § 71.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 1004*)-GROUNDSEXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

John Gilpatrick occupied the seat with her. While proceeding along Main street in Bangor, and near the opera house, the car in which the plaintiff was riding collided with a car in front, which had stopped to allow a passenger to alight. The collision was of sufficient force to break the windows of the first car and destroy the glass in the headlight of the forward car. The plaintiff claims that she was thrown violently forward, striking her right knee and body against the seat in front of her; that her knee was seriously injured; and that she received other injuries resulting in a miscarriage. The extent of the injury claimed was testified to by many expert witnesses on each side, and the jury apparently had the benefit of all the scientific information available. It is conceded that the collision occurred, and that the plaintiff's right knee was injured. The defendant claims, however that the collision was slight, that the injury was not serious, and "it was impossible for the plaintiff to have been injured as she stated, for the reason that she could not have struck her stomach and knee against the seat in front of her at the same time," and insists that the damages are excessive even if the jury found miscarriage was the result of the accident.

The defendant claimed, in addition, that any damage arising by reason of miscarriage was due to the act of the plaintiff in taking

medicines to produce a miscarriage, and called Mrs. Alice L. Trimble, whose testimony covers many pages of the record, in support The court will not disturb a verdict on the of this contention. Mrs. Trimble was houseground of excessive damages unless it very clear-keeper for the plaintiff while the latter was ly appears to be excessive upon any view of the facts, which the jury were authorized to adopt. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error. Cent. Dig. §§ 3944-3947; Dec. Dig. § 1004.*]

Action by Agnes Boyd against the Bangor Railway & Electric Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial. Motion overruled.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Bartlett Brooks, of Bangor, for plaintiff. E. C. Ryder, of Bangor, for defendant.

following her occupation as nurse, and at the time of the accident was so employed. She saw the plaintiff on her return home on Tuesday following the accident, and says "she was walking lame, and I asked her what ailed her, and she told me she got hurt," and told her how she was injured, and that the following Saturday she saw her taking medicine and "asked her what it was for," and she was told in effect that the medicine was intended to produce a miscarriage; that again on the same day she saw her prepare other medicine, which plaintiff admitted she had taken later on the same day for the same purpose. According to the testimony of this witness, plaintiff's "sister was in the house when she took it, and she went out and must have told some of the children of the neighborhood about it. I heard of it and come home and told Mrs. Boyd, and she sent her sister upstairs to get the bag of pennyroyal, and made her throw it in the fire, and threatened to put her in On September 23, 1911, the plaintiff enter- the asylum if she ever told about it. Q. Did ed the defendant's car at Hampden, and paid you see her burn the pennyroyal? A. I did. her fare to Bangor, her destination. She Q. Went upstairs and got it? A. Yes, sir." was riding in the fourth seat from the front The testimony of this witness was denied end of the car, and her husband and one by the plaintiff, who explained in detail con

HANSON, J. This is an action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while a passenger on one of the defendant's cars. The plaintiff obtained a verdict for $2,071, and the defendant has filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against law and the weight of evidence, and because the damages are excessive.

versations with the witness as to the medicines being used for other purpose than that claimed by the witness, and by the plaintiff's sister, who denied as completely the statements relating to her presence and acts. The plaintiff also introduced expert medical testimony as to the use and effect of the medicines and preparations claimed to have been used by the plaintiff.

The issues in the case were presented to the jury under proper instructions. The testimony was conflicting. The defendant placed much reliance on the testimony of Mrs. Trimble. She was pitted against the plaintiff upon a vital question in the case. The jury saw and heard them and judged between them.

[1; 2] After carefully examining and comparing the testimony we cannot say that the verdict is so manifestly wrong as to be set aside as against the evidence. When the evidence is conflicting and the question of liability and damages is one that is peculiar

ly within the province of the jury, and the

evidence does not convince the court that the jury were clearly wrong, a motion for a new trial will be overruled. Stone v. Street Railway, 99 Me. 243, 59 Atl. 56; Guptill v. Insurance Co., 109 Me. 323, 84 Atl. 529; Hubbard v. M. H. & E. Company, 105 Me. 384, 74 Atl. 924.

A verdict on a properly submitted issue should not be lightly set aside. Sanford v. Kimball, 106 Me. 355, 76 Atl. $90, 138 Am. St. Rep. 345.

While the burden was on the plaintiff to satisfy the jury of the defendant's liability, yet after verdict for the plaintiff the burden is on the defendant to make it clearly appear that the verdict is wrong. Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468, 1912C, 1121.

Ann. Cas.

Where a verdict is excessive, a motion for new trial will be overruled in the event that plaintiff remits the excess, but otherwise it will be sustained.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 324-329; Dec. Dig. § 162.*]

Action by Herbert L. Blair, administrator, against the Lewiston, Augusta & Waterville Street Railway. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moved for new trial. Conditionally overruled.

See, also, 110 Me. 235, 85 Atl. 792.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR, KING, HALEY, and HANSON, JJ.

B. F. Maher, of Augusta, for plaintiff. Andrews & Nelson, of Augusta, for defendant.

PER CURIAM. The only question involved is whether the verdict for the plaintiff is excessive. The court is of opinion that the evidence did not warrant a verdict for $2.

234.66, and that $1,200 is the limit beyond which it ought not to be allowed to stand.

If the plaintiff within 30 days after the certificate is received remits all of the verdict in excess of $1,200, motion overruled; otherwise, motion sustained.

(111 Me. 318)

HAGGETT v. JONES. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Dec. 30, 1913.)

EQUITY CASES.

Findings of a single justice in equity will not be reversed unless clearly wrong. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error. Cent. Dig. §§ 3970-3978: Dec. Dig. § 1009.*1

[3] The damages are large, but we cannot say that they are so excessive as to require us to disturb the verdict. From the testimony of all the witnesses having knowledge of the facts, including that of Mrs. | 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1009*)-FINDINGS— Trimble, it clearly appears that the plaintiff's suffering was intense at times, and for a long period her suffering was severe. This was an element of damage considered by the jury under proper instruction, and was properly left to the judgment of the jury, who saw and heard the witnesses, and they were in better position to determine the facts than the court can be. The court will not disturb a verdict upon the ground of excessive damages unless it very clearly appears to be excessive upon any view of the facts which the jury are authorized to adopt. Donnelly v. Granite Co., 90 Me. 110, 37 Atl. 874.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 901*)—BURDEN OF PROVING ERROR.

The burden is on appellant to show that the fact findings of a single justice in equity are incorrect.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1771, 3670; Dec. Dig. § 991.*]

3. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 74*)-CON

SIDERATION.

Though a grantee acted in good faith, a conveyance to him by an insolvent grantor was invalid as to creditors if the grantee did not pay an adequate consideration.

"The court cannot say that the verdict is either against the evidence or too large. The jury saw the parties and could best judge what damages would fit the case, and ¦ § 74.*j

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 186-190; Dec. Dig.

Me.)

4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 300*)—AcTIONS-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

The decree appealed from was not accom

Evidence, in a suit by a trustee in bank-panied by a finding of facts; but from an exruptcy to set aside a conveyance by the bankrupt to his wife, held to sustain a finding that the bankrupt was not indebted to his wife in any amount on account of the allowance of her alleged claim against his brother's estate, of which he was administrator, so that such alleged indebtedness could not be considered as part consideration for the conveyance.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 896-903; Dec. Dig. $ 300.*]

5. FRAUDULENT Conveyances (8 76*)-INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.

Where, though a bankrupt's deed to his wife recited that the consideration for the conveyance was $1.610, the only actual consideration was an indebtedness of $635 by the bankrupt to his wife, the consideration was so inadequate as to avoid the conveyance as to creditors.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 192-196; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

6. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§§ 99, 317*)-
RELIEF
INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION
GRANTED.

amination of the bill and answers it clearly appears that the sitting justice, in making the decree, must have found, either that the husband, in making the conveyance, had no fraudulent purpose in fact thereby to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or, if he had such purpose, that his wife, the defendant, did not participate in it, and did not take the conveyance to further that purpose, and that there was no constructive or legal fraud arising from a want of an adequate and sufficient consideration for the conveyance.

[1, 2] The findings of a single justice, in equity procedure, upon questions of fact necessarily involved are not to be reversed upon appeal unless clearly wrong, and the burden is on the appellant to satisfy the court that such is the fact; otherwise the decree appealed from must be affirmed. Savings Inst. v. Emerson, 91 Me. 535, 538, 40 Atl. 551.

So far as the decree of the sitting justice

was not made with a fraudulent purpose in fact in which the defendant participated, we are not satisfied that it is wrong, and, if that were the only question involved in the appeal, we should dismiss it.

Where property worth $1,610 was convey-imports that he found that the conveyance ed by a bankrupt to his wife for a sole consideration of $635, the amount of an indebtedness due from him to her, but the parties believed in good faith that the indebtedness was larger, the conveyance would be regarded as having the effect of a mortgage securing the sum of $635 to the wife, and the property would be sold subject to her rights by descent therein, and the net proceeds applied first to pay her such amount, and the remainder held for the benefit of creditors.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 323, 327, 328, 979, 980; Dec. Dig. §§ 99, 317.*]

7. BANKRUPTCY (§ 268*)-EFFECT ON PROP

ERTY.

A husband's bankruptcy did not deprive his wife of her rights by descent, under the statute, in the bankrupt's realty.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 372-379; Dec. Dig. § 268.*] Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County, in Equity.

Suit by J. Wilder Haggett, trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of George C. Jones, against Lizzie N. Jones. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings as directed.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR. CORNISH, KING, BIRD, and PHILBROOK,

JJ.

Clifford E. McGlauflin, of Portland, for appellant. Howard E. Hall, of Damariscotta, Charles L. Macurda, of Wiscasset, and Weston M. Hilton, of Damariscotta, for appellee. KING, J. Bill in equity by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a conveyance of real estate made to the defendant by her husband, the bankrupt, on the ground that it The was made in fraud of his creditors. sitting justice decreed that the bill be dismissed, with costs, and the case is before this court on complainant's appeal from that decree.

But upon examination of the record we find certain facts that apparently were not brought to the attention of the sitting justice, a consideration of which leads us to the conclusion that the appeal must be sustained.

[3] It is conceded that at the time of the Conveyance the grantor was insolvent: accordingly the kind and amount of the consideration therefor becomes material even in the absence of an actual intent to defraud. A grantee is not protected in taking a conveyance from an insolvent grantor when he has not paid an adequate consideration therefor, though he may have acted in good faith. Egery v. Johnson, 70 Me. 258, 261.

The conveyance recites a consideration of $1,610.60, and it was claimed for the defendant that her husband then owed her that sum, to pay which the conveyance was given, and that it was a fair and adequate consideration for the property conveyed. On the other hand, the complainant contended that

The evi

there was no bona fide indebtedness from the
husband to the wife existing at the time of
the conveyance, and, further, that the value
of the property conveyed was considerably in
excess of the amount specified.
dence as to the value of the property was
conflicting, and, if it were an established fact
that the husband did actually owe his wife
the sum named in the deed, and made the
conveyance in payment thereof, we should
hesitate to disturb it on the ground that the
consideration was inadequate in the absence
of any actual intent to defraud.

There was sufficient evidence to justify a conclusion that the husband was indebted

to his wife at the time of the conveyance | and that the sum of $514 be allowed unto to some extent, and it may be that both he Lizzie N. Jones as a claim of the fourth and his wife believed that indebtedness class, to be paid from said estate." amounted to $1,610.60. That, however, was not the fact as we understand the evidence. The sum of $1,610.60 was made up of two items of supposed indebtedness from him to her, with interest thereon. One was an item of $500 drawn from the Waltham, Mass., Savings Bank, January 9, 1907. This item, with interest to the date of the conveyance, as they computed it, amounted to $635. We think the evidence warrants a finding that this $500 was the wife's property which she [5] The evidence is plenary, therefore, that drew from the bank and loaned to her hus- of the $1,610.60 named in the conveyance as band, and that at the time of the conveyance its consideration only $635 was an actual he owed her that sum and the accrued inter-indebtedness from the grantor to the grantee. est thereon.