bearing upon the attitude of the United States toward the settlement of disputes.

So far as the determination of justiciable questions arising under the law of nations or under treaties is concerned, we ought to be willing to stand on precisely the same footing with all other nations. We should be willing to submit our legal rights to judicial decision, and to abide by the decision. We have shown that we are willing to do that by the numerous treaties that we have made with the greater part of the world agreeing to do that, and we should be willing to have the same thing provided for in this general agreement.

With regard to questions of policy, however, some different considerations are apparent.

In determining the extent of our participation in the political affairs of the Old World, we ought to be satisfied that a sufficient affirmative reason exists for setting aside to that extent the long established policy of the United States to keep the Old and the New World from becoming entangled in each other's affairs and embroiled in each other's quarrels. Just so far as such a reason exists, we ought to go, but no further.

We have to start in the consideration of such a subject with the words of Washington's Farewell Address: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." And Jefferson's advice to Monroe: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."

Unquestionably, the Old and the New World have come into much more intimate relations since the time of Washington and Jefferson, and they have many more interests in common. Nevertheless, the basis of the expressions I have quoted remains in substance. The people of the United States have no direct interest in the distribution of territory in the Balkans, or the control of Morocco, and the peoples of Europe have no direct interest in the questions between Chile and Peru, or between the United States and Colombia. Based upon this fact, the Monroe Doctrine has hitherto kept the Old World and the

New in two separate fireproof compartments so that a conflagration in one did not extend to the other.

There never was a time when the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine for the preservation of peace and safety of the United States was more evident than it is now. Some facile writers of late have pronounced the doctrine obsolete and useless, but I know of no experienced and responsible American statesman who has ever taken that view, and I cannot help feeling that such a view results from insufficient acquaintance with the subject.

There has, however, arisen in these days for the American people a powerful secondary interest in the affairs of Europe coming from the fact that war in Europe and the Near East threatens to involve the entire world, and the peaceable nations of Europe need outside help to put out the fire, and keep it from starting again. That help to preserve peace we ought to give, and that help we wish to give. In agreeing to give it, the following considerations should be observed:

We are not asking, and do not need, any help from the nations of the Old World for the preservation of peace in America, nor is any American nation asking for such help. The difficulties, the disturbing conditions, the dangers that threaten,-are all in the affairs of Europe and the Near East. The real reason for creating a League of Nations is to deal with those difficulties and dangers, not with American affairs. It is, therefore, wholly unnecessary for the purpose of the League that purely American affairs should be included within the scope of the agreement.

When we enter into the League of Nations we do so not with. any desire to interfere in the concerns of foreign nations, but because the peaceable nations of Europe ask us to put our power behind theirs to preserve peace in their part of the world. It is not reasonable, therefore, that such participation as we agree to in the activities of the League should be made the basis of an inference that we are trying to interfere in the Old World, and therefore should abandon our objection to having the Old World interfere in America.

With reference to the most important American questions, Europe as a whole on one side and the United States on the other occupy positions which however friendly are nevertheless in opposition. It must be remembered that the League of Nations contemplates the membership not only of our present allies, but ultimately of all the

nations of Europe. Now, the Monroe Doctrine was declared against those nations of Europe. It was a warning to them not to trespass on American territory and, admitting exceptions and speaking only in the most general way, the nations of Europe are on one side of that question and the United States is on the other. To submit the policy of Monroe to a council composed chiefly of European Powers is to surrender it.

I will add-without taking up space to discuss it-that I cannot escape the conclusion that to ratify this agreement as it now stands would itself be a surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the agreement as it now stands gives to the United States no effective substitute for the protection which the maintenance of that doctrine affords.

The same thing is true of immigration. The nations of Europe in general are nations from which emigrants go. The United States is a nation to which immigrants come. Apart from Great Britain, which would be bound to look after the similar interests of Canada and Australia, Europe and America are bound to look at questions of emigration and immigration from different points of view, and under the influence of different interests-friendly indeed, but opposing.

It hardly seems reasonable that under these circumstances the United States should be penalized for complying with the request of its friends in Europe to join them in the preservation of peace, primarily for their benefit and not for ours, by giving up our right to self-protection when that is wholly unnecessary to accomplish the object of the agreement. I think, therefore, that these purely American questions ought to be excepted from the jurisdiction of the Executive Council and Body of Delegates, and I have prepared and annexed hereto a third amendment in the form of a reservation, this being the method which was followed without any objection to accomplish the same purpose at the close of both the Hague Conferences.

The fourth point upon which I think there should be an amendment is Article X, which contains the undertaking "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.'

Looking at this article as a part of a perpetual League for the Preservation of Peace, my first impression was that the whole article.

ought to be stricken out. If perpetual, it would be an attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the distribution of power and territory made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the Allies in this present juncture of affairs. It would necessarily be futile. It would be what was attempted by the Peace of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty Years' War, by the Congress of Vienna at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It would not only be futile; it would be mischievous. Change and growth are the law of life, and no generation can impose its will in regard to the growth of nations and the distribution of power, upon succeeding generations.

I think, however, that this article must be considered not merely with reference to the future, but with reference to the present situation in Europe. Indeed, this whole agreement ought to be considered in that double aspect. The belligerent power of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey has been destroyed; but that will not lead to future peace without a reconstruction of eastern Europe and western Asia. The vast territories of the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs have lost the rulers who formerly kept the population in order, and are filled with turbulent masses without stable government, unaccustomed to self-control and fighting among themselves like children of the dragon's teeth. There can be no settled peace until these masses are reduced to order.

Since the Bolsheviki have been allowed to consolidate the control which they established with German aid in Russia, the situation is that Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, with a population of less than 130,000,000 are confronted with the disorganized but vigorous and warlike population of Germany, German Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia, amounting approximately to 280,000,000, fast returning to barbarism and the lawless violence of barbarous races. Order must be restored. The allied nations in their council must determine the lines of reconstruction. Their determinations must be enforced. They may make mistakes. Doubtless they will, but there must be decision and decision must be enforced.

Under these conditions the United States cannot quit. It must go on to the performance of its duty, and the immediate aspect of Article X is an agreement to do that. I think, therefore, that Article X should be amended so that it shall hold a limited time, and there

after any member may withdraw from it. I annex an amendment to that effect.

The fifth amendment which I think is needed is one suggested by M. Bourgeois in his speech at the conference which I have quoted above. It is to the provisions regarding the limitation of armaments. The success of those provisions is vital. If they are not effective the whole effort to secure future peace goes for nothing.

The plan of this League is contained in Articles 8 and 9. They provide that there shall be a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, that the Executive Council shall formulate plans for a general agreement as to the amount of these reductions, and that when an agreement has been made by the Powers the parties will not conceal from each other, but will give full and frank information regarding their industries capable of being adapted to warlike purposes, the scale of their armaments and their military and naval programmes.

Article 9 provides for a permanent commission to advise the League on the execution of these provisions. This full information is essential. Otherwise one nation will suspect another of secret preparation and will prepare to protect itself in the same way, so that the whole scheme of limitation will be destroyed. There would be some justification for this, because there are some nations of whom it would be idle to expect the truth on such a subject; their public officers would regard it as a duty to conceal and mislead. The only way to prevent that sort of thing is by giving the permanent commission power of inspection and verification. Every country should assent to this just as every trustee and treasurer is willing to have an independent audit of his accounts. I annex such an amendment.

Enough has been said already to indicate that this Constitution of a League of Peace cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive instrument. It necessarily leaves much to be determined hereafter. We do not know yet what nations are to be the members of the League, what nations are to be represented in the Council, what the limitations of armaments, what the regulations for the manufacture of munitions, or what the parties understand to be the scope of the provisions for freedom of transit and equitable treatment for commerce. The provision of Article 19 (of which I fully approve), relating to mandataries to aid or take charge of administration in new