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drawn from, the appellants' affidavit and documents and the correspondence between the appellants and the Procurator-General, the British Legation at Copenhagen, and the British Foreign Office. The case was heard by the learned President, who, on February 23, 1917, pronounced the tierces of salmon to be contraband of war liable to confiscation, and he condemned the same for the sum of £2,019 then in Court. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that it was not competent for the Prize Court to condemn the sum of £2,019 in place of the condemnation of the goods themselves. Their Lordships are of opinion that, having regard to the terms of the agreement made on November 25, 1916, namely, that the sum of £2,019 should be disposed of in accordance with the order of the Prize Court, this objection cannot be maintained.
The main argument urged on behalf of the appellants was that the doctrine of continuous voyage did not apply, and that the shipment of salmon was not within the terms of the modification contained in para. 1 (iii) of the Declaration of London Order in Council No. 2, 1914. This modification provides that: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said Declaration, conditional contraband shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port if the goods are consigned to order, or if the ship’s papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods, or if they show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy." The construction of this modification was considered in the case of The Louisiana (34 The Times L. R. 222;  A. C., 461), and the judgment of their Lordships covers the present case. The question arose, in that case, whether the ship’s papers show who is the consignee of the goods, if the shipper retains control, and can alter the destination of the goods according to his interest, and at his own discretion. It was pointed out that under these conditions the shipper would retain as full control of the goods as if the consignment had been to order, and that conditional contraband could be supplied to the enemy Government, through neutral ports, as freely as if Article 35 of the Declaration of London had been adopted without modification. The judgment proceeds: “In their Lordships' opinion the words 'the consignee of the goods,' must mean some person other than the consignor to whom the consignor parts with the real control of the goods." In the present case there is no person other than the consignor to whom the consignor parts with the real control of the goods, and it follows
other the the goodhom
that the tierces of salmon are liable to capture as conditional contraband, although on board a vessel bound for a neutral port. It is not necessary to consider the further provisions of para. 1 (iii), but their Lordships do not desire to throw any doubt on the finding of the President that the ship's papers did show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. The next modification (iv) provides: “That in the cases covered by the preceding para. (iii), it shall lie upon the owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent." The effect of this provision is that in cases covered by para. (iii) the neutral trader has brought himself under suspicion, and that it is incumbent upon him to displace such suspicion by sufficient proof of the innocency of the destination of the goods which have been seized. The question therefore arises whether the appellants have discharged the obligation which this provision throws upon them. At the date of shipment, the tierces of salmon had not been declared as goods for neutral consumption and no guarantee had been obtained from the Danish Merchant Guild. This omission is in itself a ground for grave suspicion. Their Lordships are not satisfied that any sufficient explanation has been given consistent with the innocency of the destination of the tierces of salmon. There appears to be no valid reason why this declaration should not have been made and the guarantee given in the usual course of business. On the other hand, the appellants had undoubtedly an inducement to endeavor to import salmon which could be sent forward to Berlin or Schlutup without the risk that they would be placed on the black list. When the first message was sent to Hansen at Seattle to ship a carload of Columbia River salmon, the last lot of salmon had not been sent to Berlin, and the last lot had only been sent, a few days earlier, to Schlutup. There is no direct evidence when the branches at Berlin and Schlutup were actually closed, and the inference is that they had not been closed at the date of the shipment in the Hellig Olaf. At one time the appellants were placed on the black list, but subsequently removed on the explanation that the salmon sent to Germany had not been imported subject to declaration or guarantee. Their Lordships fully accept the accuracy of the explanation given by the appellants, but it shows the existence of a business under which salmon were imported for enemy destination when not subject to the restrictions which a declaration and a guarantee would impose. Under these circumstances, it was clearly the duty of the appellants to make a full and free disclosure of all the conditions under which they were carrying on their business as importers of salmon. As a matter of fact, the only reference to Germany in the first statement made by the appellants is that, for a short time after the war, some imported goods had been sent to that destination, whereas it appears on further inquiry and in the second report of the accountants on July 3, 1916, that eight barrels of salmon had been sent to Schlutup on December 19, 1915, and eight barrels to Berlin so late as January 19, 1916. Their Lordships are unable to come to the conclusion that the appellants did at the outset make a full disclosure of all the relevant factors attaching to their business, and it has been pointed out in previous cases that it is incumbent upon neutral traders to make such a disclosure in cases where the liability is upon them to remove elements of suspicion which affect the destination of the seized cargo.
Their Lordships therefore find that in the present case the appellants have not discharged their obligation of proving that the destination of the salmon was innocent. During the hearing of the appeal a petition was presented to their Lordships on behalf of the appellants to admit fresh evidence not before the President at the hearing, but their Lordships were unable to entertain this petition for reasons stated during the hearing of the appeal. The appeal must be dismissed with costs, including the costs of the petition to admit fresh evidencu. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly,
Manual of Military Law. War Office. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
1914. Reprinted 1916. pp. xvi, 908.
This official compilation of the laws of war was instituted by a request from the Rt. Hon. F. Stanley, Secretary of State for War, to the Parliamentary Counsel Office, to prepare rules of procedure under Section 67 of the Army Discipline Act of 1879 and also a manual containing the Act and above rules with notes, so as to form a textbook on military law. The continuance of the work was approved by subsequent Secretaries of State for War and the work was finally issued in 1884 under the authority of the Rt. Hon. the Marquis of Harlington, M. P., then Secretary of State for War. The great delay was due to the repeal of the Act of 1879 and its replacement by the Army Act of 1881.
General editorship was undertaken by Mr. G. A. R. Fitzgerald, of the Parliamentary Bar, but chapters were written by Sir Henry Thring, K. C. B., Parliamentary Counsel, and subsequently Lord Thring, by Mr. H. Jenkyns, C. B., Mr. C. P. Ilbert, Lt.-Col. Blake, R. M. L. I., and Mr. A. C. Meysey-Thompson. Free use was made of the earlier work of Major-General R. Carey, C. B., entitled “Military Law and Discipline," and also of the late Captain T. F. Simmons' book on the “Constitution and Practice of Courts-Martial.” The work was further revised by the Rt. Hon. G. O. Morgan, Q. C., M. P., Judge Advocate General.
A second and revised edition appeared in 1887 and, new rules and statutes requiring it, they were incorporated and a third revised edition issued in 1894.
The Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, being applicable to courtsmartial, a new edition was required and appeared, incorporating such Act, in 1899, under the editorship of Mr. F. F. Liddell, with assistance from Sir John Scott, Sir Henry Jenkyns and several eminent hands.
The fifth edition appeared in 1907, edited by Mr. Graham-Harrison, having been made necessary by amendments to the Army Act
and the reorganization of the system of commands and of the War Office.
The present and sixth edition appeared in 1914, edited by Hon. Hugh Godley.
Its points of advance are (1): A new chapter (Chapter XIV) on the laws and usages of war on land, by Col. J. E. Edmunds, C. B., and Mr. L. Oppenheim, LL.D. The latter has held for years, in succession to Dr. Westlake, the Whewell Professorship in International Law at Cambridge University, and has maintained the high traditions of his chair. (2) Chapter XL has been largely rewritten and other portions revised, because of the reorganization of the Army in 1908, and later Acts, like the Official Secrets Act of 1911, have been included. (3) The War Office has revised the index.
The above brief history of this valuable and authoritative, but necessarily technical and extended, work, is almost all that can be given concerning it. Statutes and rules and many forms are included.
The chapter by Colonel Edwards and Professor Oppenheim was published by His Majesty's Stationery Office as a separate small volume, entitled “Land Warfare," as early as 1913.
Considering the deep interest felt in the United States in the investigation and attempted reform of courts-martial, it may be mentioned that in the index of this Manual that topic covers between five and six pages of fine print and the work affords a mine of official information as to the British law and practice.
Attention is also called to Chapter VII, entitled “Offences Punishable by Ordinary Law," which gives a wonderfully clear and adequate, but condensed, statement of the general criminal law. A student reading for an examination could not find a more useful and compendious text.
CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY.
Neutrality Versus Justice, An Essay on International Relations. By
A. J. Jacobs. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1917. pp. 128. 2 s. net.
The author of this little essay undertakes to establish the following theses: (1) that the time-honored policy of neutrality, hitherto sacred to militarists and pacifists alike, is utterly incompatible with inter