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national justice or permanent international peace; (2) that the principle of mutual protection, which is the basis of civil society and the starting-point from which every system of law has been developed, affords the only true basis for international peace; (3) that the same impulse which has driven nations of dissimilar culture and ideals to enter into defensive alliances that have almost imperceptibly grown into two great international groups, will also force them to take a further step in the same direction, and merge these groups into one combination for mutual defence; and (4) that an international alliance for territorial defence must be the starting-point of a real system of international law.
Mr. Jacobs believes that disarmament can be accomplished, not by agreement, but only by guarantees against territorial aggression and the gradual growth of a feeling of security. He does not believe that the cause of international peace would be greatly advanced by the establishment of an international court of justice, because he does not believe that nations would willingly submit to its decisions, but he believes that a real system of law and a court would inevitably evolve from the conditions established by the adoption of the principle of mutual protection and the formation of a general alliance for territorial defence.
As to the objection that a general defensive alliance would stereotype international conditions, he says that the prohibition of the use of force has not done so among individuals. The nation which wants more commodious quarters must, he contends, like the individual, pay the rental or purchase price. "The cost of a war of conquest would probably yield a far better return if utilized for the peaceable acquisition and development of territory, or to secure trading and industrial opportunities for its growing population.” Here, as elsewhere in the volume, he pushes the analogy between nations and individuals too far.
A general defensive alliance, he contends, presents far fewer objections and dangers than a special alliance, for the members of a special alliance are usually faced in any conflict by a combination of similar strength, and the chances of victory or defeat are more or less evenly balanced, whereas a general agreement for mutual defence would always bring “an overwhelming margin of force against the would-be aggressor.” As to the danger of a general defensive alliance being undermined sooner or later by internal intrigue, he points out that “at least one-half the world must first betray and then be prepared to fight the other half.”
Mr. Jacobs lays almost exclusive stress on territorial aggression as the cause of wars. As economic and commercial rivalries have been primarily responsible for many modern wars, the mere guarantee of territorial integrity will not put an end to war. The covenant of the League of Nations recognizes this fact in the powers conferred on the Council. On the whole, however, Mr. Jacobs' essay constitutes a valuable argument for the League, especially for Article X, while it offers some reasons for the postponement for future consideration of such questions as disarmament, the establishment of an international court of justice, and the revision of international law.
JOHN H. LATANÉ.
Foreign Financial Control in China. By T. W. Overlach. New York:
Macmillan. 1919. pp. xiii, 295. $2.00.
In this day of international rivalries and world stress, publishers often overreach themselves in their feverish search for new material and sensational products. While writers, without adequate training in special fields or literary experience, rush into print to help on some phase or other of world development. In the volume before us, the author attempts to "give a comparative and scientific account ofthe most tangible and concrete problem of the otherwise so elusive Far Eastern Question, namely, the problem of 'Foreign Financial Control in China'.” Feeling that “a clearer vision in international affairs” and a candid examination of the whole situation by “each nation with unprejudiced mind,” are necessary to the solution of the Far Eastern Question, he proposes to "adopt a sympathetic view and attitude toward all the Powers concerned, trying to give justice to each, instead of seeing things through the colored glasses of national ambitions." His work is prefaced by a theoretical introduction in which the writer defines the political and economic terms now in vogue within diplomatic circles in the Far East, and an historical introduction containing the history of Foreign Relations with China before 1895. The latter is compiled almost entirely from Sargent's Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy and Morse's The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The book contains chapters on the relations of China with Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan and the United States; and it concludes with a chapter on “International Control” and another entitled “Conclusion.” The former is misleading, for while it deals with some of the attempts at international co-operation, it falls short of being an intimate or comprehensive study of the vital problem of international control. And the latter is a brief summary of some results of foreign pressure on China and of general statements concerning the need of international co-operation.
The author has an uninteresting and prosy style. He intersperses his text with long and wearisome quotations; and he presupposes on the part of his readers an intimate knowledge of recent Chinese diplomatic history. These drawbacks, in an otherwise attractive volume, are sufficient to prevent the work from appealing to the general reader. And it will be equally disappointing to the student and the expert, since it contains little new material and falls short of being a broad, masterly treatment of the subject in hand. In some chapters, such as those on “Great Britain,” “Russia,” and “Japan,” the writer has given a fairly complete account of the topic under discussion; but those on “France,” “Germany,” “United States," and “International Control” are inadequate, both in their conception and in their treatment of the problems involved. There is a bibliography, an index, and an outline of the contents of each chapter, all of which add to the usefulness of the book. But the great lack which the reader feels throughout the volume is a map of China, or better, a series of sketch maps, that would show the location and extent of the various railway and financial concessions described, or referred to, in each chapter.
The idea of the author in defining terms and phrases in his “Theoretical Introduction” is excellent; but it would have been more satisfactory if he had carried out his plan consistently. He fails, however, to make clear the “Open Door” policy; and, on the question of “concessions,” he confines his discussion to railway concessions, avoiding any reference to economic and territorial concessions. While on the topic of “control,” he does not explain the different degrees and kinds of political control. This inconsistency is undoubtedly due to the vital error of supposing that one can write intelligently on one phase of a great Oriental question without keeping its connection with the rest of the problem constantly in mind and without making this connection perfectly clear to one's readers. The relationship of the problem of Foreign Financial Control in China to the whole situation-financial, economic and political—in that vast Republic today, should have been explained in some detail-at least in the Introduction.
One cannot but feel that the author has undertaken an unnecessary and thankless task in attempting to produce a volume dealing only with the financial and railway policy of foreign states in China, without making a study of the political policies of these states. There are excellent works already on the railroads of China; and there are other books that cover the financial history as well as he does, for, unfortunately, his narrative stops in 1913 and it does not give the intimate history of the Six Power Loan or of later loans.
Moreover, the writer is led inevitably into blunders, whenever he steps outside the narrow field of his chosen research. For instance, he speaks of the Ishii-Lansing Treaty in high terms as “removing all danger of friction between the United States and Japan” (p. 194), and as securing “the independence and territorial integrity of China and the ‘Open Door,' for commerce and industry.” But it is well known that this agreement was so skillfully yet loosely drawn, that it confirmed Japan in her holdings and rights in Manchuria and North China, while affording American interests no more protection than already existed and furnishing no guarantee against further aggression on the part of Japan. And no mention was made of the racial discrimination in our immigration laws—one of the sources of friction between the two countries; while the transfer of Shantung to Japan in the recent peace treaty shows that the high-sounding phrases of the Ishii agreement concerning the integrity of China meant nothing to the rulers of the Japanese Empire.
Again, without any explanation of the work and policy of Japan in the Far East, the author suddenly claims that: “All treaties, conventions, agreements, and alliances through which Japan is consolidating her position are concluded for the consolidation and maintenance of a permanent peace in eastern Asia. This is the key to the whole Far Eastern Question: A Permanent Peace but a Japanese Peace (p. 194).” This sounds well; but there is a selfish, sinister side to this program, which is apparent only to those who know the real meaning of the term, “Japanese Peace.” Unfortunately, while the present party controls the destiny of the Empire of the Rising Sun, this will mean nothing more than a peaceful situation where Japan gets everything she wants in the trade and development of the East, and the rest of the world the fragments that remain, and where China will enjoy her national life and development under Japanese leading-strings.
The publisher's advertisement of this volume conveys a wrong impression of its purpose and contents. This is inexcusable, and in the long run will not help the sale of their books. “It presents,” they claim, “an unbiassed analysis of the financial and political activities of the six leading Powers in China during the last twenty years." But the author begins his work with the statement that he is concerned only with the financial side of recent Chinese development. And he keeps strictly to his program, except that he lays more stress on railway development than on financial or economic progress, and that he says nothing about the developments of the last six years. Again, the publishers state that the book “emphasizes the need of international co-operation.” It does so in a few sentences; but one is not impressed with the case as presented. Nor does the author suggest any feasible plan by means of which this can be brought about or the Chinese Government set on its feet-financially, economically and politically. Further, the publishers state that the aim of this volume is a contribution toward international conciliation, by assisting the Powers “to readjust their specific national interests and viewpoints on the basis of mutual respect for the needs and aspirations of all, including those of China.” It is doubtful if the diplomats of any state will be greatly impressed by a book that tells only part of the story and fails to give an adequate picture of the terrible plighteconomic, financial and political-in which China stands today, and to prove the hopelessness of her outlook without some form of international intervention.
NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS.
El Perú y la Gran Guerra. By Juan Bautista de Lavalle. Lima:
Imprenta Americana, 1919. pp. xv, 439.
Students of the Great War will not overlook or underestimate the assistance to the desired end which was rendered by so many of the Latin-American nations. In the volume before us we find an ex