particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables-which Germany acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung."

A very remarkable situation developed at Paris. It appeared that early in 1917 Japan had secured promises from Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy to support the demands which she intended to make at the Peace Conference to succeed to the German rights in Shantung. As President Wilson informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the famous White House meeting, August 19, 1919, the representatives of Great Britain and France felt that they could not recede from these pledges-"that they were bound by them, but when they involved general interests such as they realized were involved, they were quite willing, and I think desirous that they should be. reconsidered with the consent of the other party." President Wilson and the entire American Commission and their advisers on Far Eastern affairs believed that the German rights and privileges in Shantung should be transferred and released to China. But the Japanese demand was presented at the proper psychological moment. President Wilson felt constrained to accede to the Japanese demands in order to secure the signature of Japan to the treaty and thus save the League of Nations. The action of the American Commission was determined by the President contrary to the advice of Secretary Lansing, General Bliss, Henry White, and all the American experts on the Orient, because in his judgment, "it was the best that could be got, in view of the definite engagements of Great Britain and France." 3

2

Secretary Lansing informed the Committee that he believed that the Japanese delegates would have signed the treaty even though the demand for Shantung had been denied, and this seems to have been the opinion of everyone except the President and possibly Colonel House.*

The treaty as signed and submitted to the Senate contains no provisions with reference to the future disposition of the Shantung 3 Ibid., pp. 531, 532.

2 Senate Hearings, p. 549.

4 Ibid., pp. 182, 531.

interests. The transfer to Japan is absolute, but President Wilson states that the representatives of Japan promised the Council of Four that if their demands were acceded to, Japan would, upon certain conditions and with designated reservations, convey to China what she acquires under Articles 156, 157, and 158. This statement of intentions, or promise, rests in parole, but it appears in substance in the secret procès-verbal, which however is not and probably never will be made a public record. The Chinese commissioners were not permitted to sign the treaty with reservations, and therefore did not sign.

The transfer of the German rights in Shantung to Japan is almost universally disapproved in America, and the feeling is strong that the President yielded unnecessarily to the demand of Japan, and consented to the perpetration of a moral wrong on an ally which had placed its faith in him and his country. This action, in connection with the Lansing-Ishii recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China, has strongly impressed the Chinese mind with the belief that the United States has abandoned the policy of the open door and acquiesced in Japan's claim of political and economic paramountcy in China. The opinion among all classes seems to be "that China has not only in this instance been forced to a specific act by one foreign nation, but that by the treaty for the first time a union of nations comes in to give sanction to a thing which she feels is wrong, and is an outrage on her sovereign rights. In every former instance where such concessions have been wrung from her the balance of power among nations has always made it possible that some Powers would come to her and say: 'We are sorry for you and we will help you out as much as we can.' In this instance China feels that she has been robbed of her rights in Shantung by one nation, originally by Germany, and those rights transferred to Japan, and that all the other nations have come along and have joined in approval of what seems to her an infamous act; and among those Powers that are approving it is the nation which she has always counted as her most disinterested friend.'

5 Statement of Dr. J. C. Ferguson, official adviser to the President of China, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Hearings, etc., pp. 565-6.

On August 23 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, after hearing the statements of President Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, and persons familiar with Far Eastern conditions, by an eight to seven vote, recommended that the Treaty of Peace be amended by striking out the word Japan where it appears in Articles 156, 157, and 158, and inserting in lieu thereof the word China."

The following statements may be taken as fairly expressing the reasons which actuated the members of the committee in voting for an amendment which if accepted by the Senate requires that the treaty be sent back for further consideration by the other signatory powers. Said Senator Johnson of California:

One of the outstanding iniquities of the treaty, neither excused nor justified except upon the Prussian philosophy, was the Shantung question. Every American Commissioner, including the President, has condemned it. And every witness before the Foreign Relations Committee has denounced it. It presented, with none of the prejudices in dealing with an enemy, a clean cut moral issue. The members of the Foreign Relations Committee had to decide whether a friend and an ally should be despoiled upon the sole ground of expediency and fear, and they have decided for the right. All we could do was to disapprove an admitted wrong and fraud practiced upon a weak, friendly, defenseless people, and this we have done. It may be true, as asserted by our opponents, that we cannot remedy the wrong. At least we are not parties to it.

The Democratic senators opposed the amendment on the ground that such action at this time would not help China and might injure her chances ultimately to recover the province through the League of Nations. "If the treaty be rejected finally by us," said Senator Pomerene, "all opportunity for China to recover in this way will be ended. If we ratify the treaty Japan may be expected to restore it as she has promised."

Senator McCumber, a Republican, voted with the Democratic minority and issued a statement in explanation of his vote, which suggests that whatever Japan demands is sacrosant and that the amendment of the treaty by the Senate in the exercise of its constitutional power would be an affront to a proud and high-spirited • Included in the Report of the Committee, Sept. 10, 1919.

people, who are accustomed to have their own way in dealing with their neighbor. He said:"

I feel keenly about the Shantung amendment. If adopted by the Senate it could be nothing less than an affront to Japan, an absolutely useless affront. It stands to reason that Great Britain and France cannot acquiesce in it. If they did, Japan would refuse to ratify the treaty, and would not be in the League of Nations. In that event we would leave Japan and China to settle the dispute between themselves.

I voted against "the Shantung amendment" because under the covenant and treaty, as it stands, all the nations of the world, in joining it, agree no longer to rob China. For this and other reasons as good, I believe in the early ratification of the instrument, unchanged, because it substitutes justice for war in settling international disputes and righting international wrongs of which China. has suffered many.

As to Shantung, my reasons for voting against the amendment.

were:

First-Japan has not yet a title to the territory. She holds it as part of the results of the war until its disposition is decided by this treaty.

Second-Japan has promised publicly in her treaty with China to surrender the leasehold right over this territory which Germany held under its treaty with China, not at some indefinite future time, not a thousand years hence, but as soon as Japan has acquired these rights under the pending treaty.

Third-Japan renewed this promise at Paris through its mission, and has repeated the promise to the President of the United States, who has every reason to believe that Japan will scrupulously keep her pledged word." I agree absolutely in this belief and faith of the President in the sincerity of Japan.

a

Fourth-If Japan should fail to keep the treaty with China, then under the preamble of the League, which provides that all joining it shall maintain "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations, China can go before the Council of the League, and all the nations of the world will unite to force Japan to surrender the territory to China.

7 See also Congressional Record of Aug. 26, 1919.

7a See an article by J. T. Addison on The Value of Japanese Promises, in The New Republic, Sept. 17, 1919. Mr. Addison says: "Since the facts in this brief summary are all vouched for by Japan, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Japan seldom, if ever, keeps important international promises. In telling America so frequently that she does keep her promises, she is relying not on historical facts, but solely on our national ignorance of Far Eastern politics."

Fifth-If this treaty be amended as proposed in the matter of Shantung, Japan is deprived of the privilege of giving to China as the fruits of her victory the victorious possession of the rights held by Germany. By this course a proud and high-spirited people would be affronted. In the public opinion of Japan, opposition would be aroused by the manner in which it is proposed to force Japan to act, after its spontaneous promise to do right.

Then would arise a most serious situation. Japan would refuse to complete her membership in the League of Nations by refusing to ratify the treaty signed by her commissioners at Versailles, and would deal with China as one nation with another. In this event Japan would inevitably impose more severe conditions, which China would be powerless to resist. The only course then open would be to use force against Japan, and Japan would meet force with force.

The issues involved require a clear understanding of the extent. and nature of the German rights and privileges in Shantung, the treaties between Japan and China relating thereto, and the Japanese promise to transfer what she may acquire to China.

II

Germany is required to renounce generally and specifically all her extra-European possessions. The general clause of renunciation leaves the titles in the air, but Germany undertakes to recognize and conform to the measures which may be taken by the Powers in connection therewith. Generally it is provided that,

In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers.

Specifically,

Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions,"

and declares that,

All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the