« ПретходнаНастави »
ded to this voluntations of various - Dr. Quidde,
that limitation must not be deferred until the completion of a world organization.
Appended to this volume are a considerable number of interesting documents, such as resolutions of various peace conferences, the scheme of an international treaty presented by Dr. Quidde, and the plans contained in various schemes for a League or Confederacy of Nations. It may be added that Dr. Wehberg's book will prove a valuable work of reference to German publications on the subject of which it treats.
Amos S. HERSHEY.
The Society of Nations. By T. J. Lawrence. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1919, pp. xi, 194. $1.50 net.
This volume presents in book form the substance of six lectures given by the distinguished author in the autumn of 1917 at the University of Bristol. Although delivered when the great war was at its height, their purpose was to give to laymen sufficient understanding of the history of international relations to enable them to form reasonable convictions as to the possibility of developing, after the war, a society of states within which civilization might continue to progress, together with a knowledge of the best lines of advance towards this end. The first three lectures sketch in broad lines the upbuilding of international society and the law of nations, from the earliest times to the outbreak of the great war. The absence of any general obligation to enforce accepted rules, the scientific arming of the nations, and the German doctrine of Kriegsraison are set forth as the fatal weaknesses of the system. The fourth lecture is a picture, done in war-time colors, of the acts and the policies by which Germany partially destroyed the existing structure of international law. The blows struck at good faith and the obligation of treaties by the violation of Belgium, at humanity and the obligation of law by German “frightfulness," and at neutral rights by the widespread application of the doctrine of reprisals are declared to have reduced to ruins the law of war and the law of neutrality. The law of jurisdiction and the law of diplomacy, on the other hand, still stand untouched.
In lectures five and six, which have been entirely rewritten, are set forth the conditions of reconstruction, and the author's plan for
the rebuilding of international society. The development of a recognized and enforceable code of international law is declared to have been rendered imperative by the conditions under which modern wars are fought, and the conscious organization of the world for peace rather than for war, together with a general recognition by ail civilized states of a positive duty to enforce the law, are emphasized as the necessary steps to reform. In the light of subsequent proceedings in Paris, Lawrence's suggestions as to procedure, and his scheme for world organization, are of interest. At the time he wrote he would have had the Peace Conference decide upon the general principles of the new world order, and then appoint one international committee to work out the details and another to revise and codify international law. Both would report to a great international congress, and in the meantime an authority would be created for deciding disputes which could not be settled by diplomacy.
A League of Nations possessing certain definite characteristics is mis solution of the problem of world organization. “There are four needs,” he writes, “the satisfaction of which civilized mankind should insist upon in any scheme for the creation of a new and better international order whether by means of a league of nations or in some other way. They are, first, the provision of Arbitral Courts to deal with cases susceptible of judicial treatment; secondly, the establishinent of conciliation committees for the settlement of cases not capable of judicial treatment; thirdly, the organization of an international force to be used in the last report for the purpose of compelling recalcitrant states to submit to the decisions of these tribunals and committees; and fourthly, the proportional and simultaneous disarmainent of all civilized Powers, saving only the forces necessary to safeguard the social fabric."
It is to be noted also that he would reserve for the “Great WorldPowers” a position “of advantage” upon the conciliation committee, or committees, otherwise, “we cannot be sure that predominant force would always be available to support, if necessary, the decisions arrived at. Yet unless this union of irresistible force with impartial justice can be established and maintained, the new order will break down, like the old, in a welter of bloodshed and misery."
Finally, the author recognizes that no constitutional machinery will accomplish much of itself, and places the ultimate hope of man. kind upon the development of an international moral and spiritual brotherhood. The Church and the Labor Movement are seen as the great forces which may effect such a development, as, “the union of the two in a demand for a League of Nations would make it irresistible, and at the same time purify it from all ignoble elements." These lectures are admirably adapted to accomplish their purpose, and it is fortunate that they have been made available for an audience far greater than that for which they were originally prepared.
Les Alliés et les Neutres (Aôut 1914-Décembre 1916). By Ernest
Lémonon. Paris : Librairie Delagrave. 1917. Deuxième édition, pp. xi, 335. Price 3 fr. 50c.
The contents of this work, whose interest properly attaches to those days of 1915 and 1916, now historic, when all minds were engrossed in the varying vicissitudes of war, fall into two rather loosely connected sections. In the first of these, after an interesting chapter dealing with the repercussion of the war upon the political disunion of the several Entente Powers in 1914 and the resultant development, internally, of a recrudescence of national unity and, externally, of the “union sacrée,” there follows an account, illuminated by statistics, of the extraordinary military, financial, and industrial “efforts” which the Allies found it necessary to put forth in order to meet their enemies upon tolerably equal terms. A final chapter summarily outlines the immediate diplomatic origins of the war.
The second and more extended portion of the work consists in substance of monthly reviews of foreign affairs contributed by the author to the Revue Politique et Parlementaire during the period from May, 1915, to December, 1916. In effect, the official and, more especially, the popular attitude of the various European neutral countries and of the United States is described from the point of view of a belligerent critic, who, though apparently not entirely willing to exculpate neutral states for their attitude of indifference in the face of Teutonic criminality, nevertheless, attempts impartially to gauge the extent to which neutral opinion was at the time favorable to the Entente. As might be anticipated, the then crucial developments in the Balkans -the perfidious duplicity of Bulgaria, the vacillations and reticent intervention of Roumania, the tortuous episodes in the Greek imbroglio—claim first and most adequate treatment. The ensuing chapter upon the neutral policies of the United States betrays, it is to be feared, a too transparent animus which may perhaps be traced to the unfortunate effect of President Wilson's peace suggestions of December, 1916, upon Entente opinion. Less complete though more considerate attention is given to Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain.
A work admittedly fugitive and incomplete as is this, scarcely calls for extended criticism. One or two remarks may, however, be · appended. Obviously, the author could not take advantage of the light which subsequent events, such as the revelations from revolutionary Russia, have thrown upon the period with which he deals. Nor can the reviewer, who is possibly too little sympathetic with the realism of European diplomacy, wholly agree with the reiterated criticism which the writer levels against the policy of the Entente Powers in their dealings with neutrals-namely, their overscrupulous hesitancy in resorting to the “manière forte.” As if neutrals were on all occasions solely dominated by fear. In fact, it may appear, when the scroll of history is unfurled, that it was a relative consideration for the feelings, if not always the rights, of neutrals, that chiefly distinguished the diplomacy of the Entente from that of its opponents and thereby contributed to its ultimate success. Certainly, the policy of the White House, too subtle perhaps for a European critic to appreciate in the midst of a desperate conflict, could not be fairly interpreted, as Mr. Lémonon appears to believe, by reference to an all-pervasive fear of German aggression.
HESSEL EDWARD YNTEMA.
James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of
1787 and their Relation to a More Perfect Society of Nations. By James Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 1918, pp. xvii, 149. $2.00.
This book belongs to the recent flood of literature, of one sort or another, regarding the formation of a League of Nations. Its purpose is to present (and especially to foreign readers), the Constitution of the United States as a prototype of such a league, springing from an assembly of sovereigns which assumed to plan for their interdependence as members of an international organization, without destroying their independence, as regards each other.
The United States was reconstituted in 1789 by the act of the people in the several states. This made it a nation for some purposes, but not for all. It subjected the component States to certain modes of judicial control. It deliberately abandoned the English principle that an Act of Parliament was the supreme law of the land. Mr. Justice Willes is quoted (p. 63) as saying of that:
We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by Parliament, with the consent of the Queen, Lords and Commons ? I deny that any such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it; but so long as it exists as law, the Courts are bound to obey it. The proceedings here are judicial, not autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering them.
On the other hand, the American principle of the supremacy of law and of the courts in declaring it, the author regards as clearly applicable to a confederation of nations. “All nations,” he adds, “do not need to agree to form an international tribunal, for the American plan of a more perfect union was to go into effect when nine of the States should ratify the Constitution, and it is fundamental to bear in mind that by the express language of the Constitution only those States were to be bound which did so ratify it. Nor is it necessary, on the other hand, that the nations form themselves into a Union of States for all, or even for general purposes, as States united for judicial settlement will suffice for justiciable purposes. They merely need to agree by treaty, convention, compact, call it what you will, to submit their disputes, heretofore unsettled by their diplomatic agents, to a court of their own creation, and therefore their agent for this purpose” (pp. 70, 71).
As the Philadelphia Convention undertook to arrange a union, which might contain all the thirteen States and yet might only embrace nine, so (p. 80) If the nations only will, they may make a union of any of their number for judicial settlement, and that by simply a treaty, convention, compact or agreement, creating the court, granting it jurisdiction, defining its procedure, to be set in motion by the plaintiff, leaving the execution of judgment, as in the case of an arbitral award or of a decision of our Supreme Court, to the good