brotherhood. The Church and the Labor Movement are seen as the great forces which may effect such a development, as, "the union of the two in a demand for a League of Nations would make it irresistible, and at the same time purify it from all ignoble elements. These lectures are admirably adapted to accomplish their purpose, and it is fortunate that they have been made available for an audience far greater than that for which they were originally prepared. RALSTON HAYDEN.

Les Alliés et les Neutres (Aôut 1914-Décembre 1916). By Ernest Lémonon. Paris: Librairie Delagrave. 1917. Deuxième édition, pp. xi, 335. Price 3 fr. 50c.

The contents of this work, whose interest properly attaches to those days of 1915 and 1916, now historic, when all minds were engrossed in the varying vicissitudes of war, fall into two rather loosely connected sections. In the first of these, after an interesting chapter dealing with the repercussion of the war upon the political disunion of the several Entente Powers in 1914 and the resultant development, internally, of a recrudescence of national unity and, externally, of the "union sacrée," there follows an account, illuminated by statistics, of the extraordinary military, financial, and industrial "efforts" which the Allies found it necessary to put forth in order to meet their enemies upon tolerably equal terms. A final chapter summarily outlines the immediate diplomatic origins of the war.

The second and more extended portion of the work consists in substance of monthly reviews of foreign affairs contributed by the author to the Revue Politique et Parlementaire during the period from May, 1915, to December, 1916. In effect, the official and, more especially, the popular attitude of the various European neutral countries and of the United States is described from the point of view of a belligerent critic, who, though apparently not entirely willing to exculpate neutral states for their attitude of indifference in the face of Teutonic criminality, nevertheless, attempts impartially to gauge the extent to which neutral opinion was at the time favorable to the Entente. As might be anticipated, the then crucial developments in the Balkans -the perfidious duplicity of Bulgaria, the vacillations and reticent

intervention of Roumania, the tortuous episodes in the Greek imbroglio claim first and most adequate treatment. The ensuing chapter upon the neutral policies of the United States betrays, it is to be feared, a too transparent animus which may perhaps be traced to the unfortunate effect of President Wilson's peace suggestions of December, 1916, upon Entente opinion. Less complete though more considerate attention is given to Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain.

A work admittedly fugitive and incomplete as is this, scarcely calls for extended criticism. One or two remarks may, however, be appended. Obviously, the author could not take advantage of the light which subsequent events, such as the revelations from revolutionary Russia, have thrown upon the period with which he deals. Nor can the reviewer, who is possibly too little sympathetic with the realism of European diplomacy, wholly agree with the reiterated criticism which the writer levels against the policy of the Entente Powers in their dealings with neutrals—namely, their overscrupulous hesitancy in resorting to the "manière forte." As if neutrals were on all occasions solely dominated by fear. In fact, it may appear, when the scroll of history is unfurled, that it was a relative consideration for the feelings, if not always the rights, of neutrals, that chiefly distinguished the diplomacy of the Entente from that of its opponents and thereby contributed to its ultimate success. Certainly, the policy of the White House, too subtle perhaps for a European critic to appreciate in the midst of a desperate conflict, could not be fairly interpreted, as Mr. Lémonon appears to believe, by reference to an all-pervasive fear of German aggression.

HESSEL EDWARD YNTEMA.

James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 and their Relation to a More Perfect Society of Nations. By James Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 1918, pp. xvii, 149. $2.00.

This book belongs to the recent flood of literature, of one sort or another, regarding the formation of a League of Nations. Its purpose is to present (and especially to foreign readers), the Constitution of the United States as a prototype of such a league, springing

from an assembly of sovereigns which assumed to plan for their interdependence as members of an international organization, without destroying their independence, as regards each other.

The United States was reconstituted in 1789 by the act of the people in the several states. This made it a nation for some purposes, but not for all. It subjected the component States to certain modes of judicial control. It deliberately abandoned the English principle that an Act of Parliament was the supreme law of the land. Mr. Justice Willes is quoted (p. 63) as saying of that:

We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by Parliament, with the consent of the Queen, Lords and Commons? I deny that any such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it; but so long as it exists as law, the Courts are bound to obey it. The proceedings here are judicial, not autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering them.

On the other hand, the American principle of the supremacy of law and of the courts in declaring it, the author regards as clearly applicable to a confederation of nations. "All nations," he adds, "do not need to agree to form an international tribunal, for the American plan of a more perfect union was to go into effect when nine of the States should ratify the Constitution, and it is fundamental to bear in mind that by the express language of the Constitution only those States were to be bound which did so ratify it. Nor is it necessary, on the other hand, that the nations form themselves into a Union of States for all, or even for general purposes, as States united for judicial settlement will suffice for justiciable purposes. They merely need to agree by treaty, convention, compact, call it what you will, to submit their disputes, heretofore unsettled by their diplomatic agents, to a court of their own creation, and therefore their agent for this purpose" (pp. 70, 71).

As the Philadelphia Convention undertook to arrange a union, which might contain all the thirteen States and yet might only embrace nine, so (p. 80)

If the nations only will, they may make a union of any of their number for judicial settlement, and that by simply a treaty, convention, compact or agreement, creating the court, granting it jurisdiction, defining its procedure, to be set in motion by the plaintiff, leaving the execution of judgment, as in the case of an arbitral award or of a decision of our Supreme Court, to the good

faith of the contracting parties, and it is done. The example of the American States shows the way to do it. The procedure of the court of the several States shows the feasibility of doing it. The agony of Europe shows that it must be done if the blood and treasure of the future are to be saved from the catastrophes of the past.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration set up by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 is regarded as (p. 82) "a first step to a judiciary of the Society of Nations 'accessible to all, in the midst of the independent Powers.' "'

Probably the most useful part of the book to American readers is that in which attention is called to the two main features as to which the procedure of the Philadelphia Convention differed from that at most international conferences, since held, namely, that

Nominations were to be made and decided by ballot, not by a silence that is held to betoken assent, and that resolutions or proposals were to be adopted by a majority instead of by the unanimous vote of all the States. But it is not unreasonable to believe that future international conferences may, both as to election by ballot and to adoption by majority, profit by the experience of the Federal Convention, which is to date the only international conference whose labors have stood the test of time and of criticism. This seems probable because self-respecting States cannot be expected to have the larger States organize the conference by prearrangement without consulting the delegates of the less powerful nations, and because it may prove undesirable to continue the unanimity rule when no State is bound by its vote in conference or even by the vote of the conference except as the State signifies its own ratification after formal submission of the project for separate approval or disapproval (p. 23).

These points have become of high importance to the world, in view of the procedure at the loosely gathered Peace Conference of 1919 at Paris and Versailles. Unanimity in the gravest matters has been assumed to exist, on the principles that Qui tacet consentire videtur.

There is a colloquialism and freedom of epithet in this treatise. that jars one's sense of style, but lends a certain freshness and vivacity to the historical narrative. Thus it is said that the Maryland and Virginia delegates to the Alexandria Conference of 1785 were "artfully entertained" by Washington at Mount Vernon; Rhode Island is described as a "pigmy commonwealth"; the Federal Convention is spoken of as revising the Articles of Confederation "with a vengeance by throwing them overboard"; and Madison is styled "the little man of Montpelier."

The preface is dated November 11, 1918, the day of the opening of the armistice, and nothing which has occurred since then is made the subject of consideration.

SIMEON E. BALDWIN.

Modern Japan. By Amos S. Hershey and Susanne W. Hershey. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1919, pp. 382.

1

In defining the means through which the cause of peace among nations may be promoted, the foremost private organization devoted to the serious study of the subject enumerates among its objects "to increase the knowledge and understanding of each other by the several nations." Modern Japan is in no sense a pacifist publication; but it has an unquestionable claim for a prominent place in the literature designed to increase the knowledge of Japan by the United States, and the Japanese will find in it friendly criticisms upon points of possible friction between the two nations.

The greater part of the volume is naturally devoted to a discussion of social, industrial and political conditions within Japan. To one not already familiar with those conditions, these pages contain a great deal that is of interest, much that is surprising and some things that are disappointing. But the authors have warned the reader in advance:

When this fascinating and artistic people showed itself eager to learn the secrets of modern civilization and exhibited a marvelous facility for acquiring and adopting Western ideas and machinery, is it surprising that their teachers should have sung the praises of their apt pupils and heralded to the world a somewhat exaggerated idea of their progress and capability? (p. 1.)

Of special interest to the readers of the JOURNAL are the last 125 pages dealing with Japan's modern international relations. Beginning with the acquisition of the Loochoo Islands in 1874, Japan's expansion is traced in Korea, Manchuria and China. The expansionist policy followed closely the introduction of military service in 1872, and the militaristic tendency has developed to the point where the authors state:

With the Japanese, as with the Germans, war is an instrument of policya justifiable method of attaining positive ends such as commercial greatness, 1 Proposed Charter of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book, 1919.