national prestige and territorial increase. If to this psychological quality and militaristic teaching and training there is added the existence of a powerful military caste or clique, the possession of great military power, and a Hegelian philosophy of the state, the analogy with Prussia becomes very striking (p. 254 n.). The similarity between the Japanese and German ideas of foreign policy is illustrated in a quotation on page 259 from the Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi. Apparently not content that Japan should remain the land of the rising sun, the Count aspired for his country, if not the proud position of her great Western ally upon whose flag the sun never sets, at least a place in the risen sun. Commenting on the forced retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula after the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Count Hayashi wrote: What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able to follow her own course, not only able to put meddling Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself (p. 259). In a chapter (XVI) on Japanese aims and policy in China, the authors give a documentary narrative of the conquest of Kiao-chou by Japan and the subsequent negotiations with China on the subject. The timeliness of this subject in connection with the discussion of the treaty of peace with Germany justifies more than passing notice. The ultimatum which Japan delivered to Germany on August 15, 1914, demanded the delivery of the entire leased territory of Kiaochou "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Nine days later, in a "message to the American people," cabled to the New York Independent, Count Okuma gave the following as surance: As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to the people of America and the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps her promises (p. 298). But less than a year later, in the ultimatum to China of May 7, 1915, containing the so-called twenty-one demands, the Japanese Govern ment declared: "The Imperial Japanese Government, in taking Kiaochou, made immense sacrifices in blood and money. Therefore after taking the place, there is not the least obligation. . . to return the place to China" (p. 300). In the series of agreements signed on May 25, 1915, which were imposed upon China as the result of this ultimatum, Japan attached important conditions to the restoration of Kiao-chou to China, including an exclusive Japanese concession at a place to be designated by the Japanese Government, and the previous negotiation of a mutually satisfactory agreement "as regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto" (p. 313). Professor Hershey believes that "Kiao-chou may, indeed, be 'restored,' but it will be under such conditions as to leave Japan virtually predominant in Shantung"; and this incident leads the authors to add: For sincere lovers of the Japanese like the authors of this volume it becomes a very painful duty to have to record their impression that the Japanese Government must experience a considerable change of heart and method before implicit confidence can be placed in its pledges and assurances. It is greatly to be deplored that in the field of diplomacy Japan has preferred to imitate Russia and Germany rather than the countries of Western Europe and America (p. 298, note). In answer to the Japanese justification of her treatment of China by speaking of a "Monroe Doctrine for Asia," our authors reply that: The analogy of Japan's policy in Asia with the Monroe Doctrine has some striking aspects, but is very misleading and imperfect. In so far as Japan desires to prevent further European political aggression in Eastern Asia or to remove a political menace like that of Germany in possession of Tsing-tau, Americans are able to sympathize with Japan's attitude. But in so far as the Monroe Doctrine for Asia includes aims of political aggression, exclusive or monopolistic concessions, a privileged position for purposes of commercial or industrial exploitation, the analogy fails. The United States makes no such claims on the American Continent (p. 316). In a chapter on Japan and the United States (XVII), the authors discuss the negotiations over the San Francisco school question, the immigration problem and the California land laws and reach the conclusion that "The first condition for a future good understanding between the two countries is a realization of the fact in Japan that, so far as lies within our power, the doors of the United States are practically closed to all Oriental races" (p. 335). And, after discussing the possibilities of war between Japan and the United States, (Chapter XVIII), Professor Hershey states: The assumption frequently made in certain circles that the difficulties between the two countries are due to mutual ignorance and misunderstanding and can be removed by campaigns of education contains a measure of truth, but something more is needed than handshakings accompanied by mutual felicitations and an exchange of compliments or expressions of good-will. A mutual effort must be made to understand the issues involved, together with the point of view of each nation regarding them. The Japanese must be taught to understand that the race and immigration issues on the Pacific coast constitute an American economic problem which can be solved in only one way-by the virtual exclusion of the Oriental laborers. In the execution of this policy as much consideration as possible should be shown for Japanese (and Chinese) susceptibilities. Irritating, unjust and unnecessary laws like the Webb Act should be avoided, and our federal naturalization act might be revised so as to render it nondiscriminatory. But on the main point the Japanese must be made to understand that no compromise is possible (p. 345). Among recent developments in the international relations of Japan, treated in the concluding chapter of the book, the LansingIshii agreement is stated by the authors to mark a decisive crisis in Japan's Far Eastern diplomacy. She has the choice of following the older diplomacy, which regarded China as "a happy hunting ground for concession hunters, loan syndicates and traders of various nationalities," or the newer diplomacy represented by the American policy of the open door which constitute a "sort of Magna Charta for freedom of trade in China and the preservation of Chinese independence.' Professor Hershey concludes that: Japan has truly reached the parting of the ways in her Far Eastern policy. Her conduct in China and consequently her relations with the United States are bound to become better or worse. Either she will revert to her old aims and methods learned in an evil school and taught by bad European examples, or she will whole-heartedly and unreservedly adopt the aims and methods of the newer diplomacy as advocated and practised by the United States. In the latter event, China will probably be saved, and the United States, recognizing the "special position" of Japan in the contiguous and adjacent provinces, will only be too glad to cooperate with Japan and other nations in the guidance and industrial development of the Chinese Empire. It is to be hoped that the terrible lessons of the last five years will not fail to make their proper impress upon the choice of the road in foreign policy which Japan will decide to follow. GEO. A. FINCH. Cuestiones Internacionales: Bolivia-Paraguay. By Américo del Val (E. Diez de Medina). La Paz: Imprenta Nacional. 1918, pp. 83. 3300 Bolivia-Chile: Cuestiones de Actualidad. By E. Diez de Medina. La Paz: Arnó Hermanos. 1919, pp. vi, 154. The first of these two interesting pamphlets is a reproduction of a series of articles published by Señor Diez de Medina under the pen name of Américo del Val, in the newspaper El Norte of La Paz, in answer to another series of articles published by Dr. Cecilio Baez, Minister of Paraguay to France, England, Italy, and Spain, upon the mooted question of boundaries between Bolivia and Paraguay. The subject-matter of this boundary controversy between Bolivia and Paraguay is a piece of territory situated between the western bank of the River Paraguay, from the north boundary of the Brazilian possessions of Bahía Negra to the left bank of the Pilcomayo River, which flows out across Asunción, the capital city of Paraguay. This boundary dispute has indeed been the subject of many extended discussions among the most distinguished writers and statesmen of Bolivia and Paraguay, and is, perhaps, today, the most important and best known boundary dispute of Latin America, both on account of the extent of the territory in controversy and the length of time over which this controversy has extended. While it is not our present purpose to join in this famous dispute, and much less to show any partiality in the same, or, still less, to pass judgment on the ultimate question of who is right and who is wrong, we cannot refrain from admiring the clear statement of the Bolivian case by Señor Diez de Medina and heartily congratulate him upon. his patriotic and scholarly efforts. The other pamphlet contains three valuable essays on international politics, which it must be admitted are not lacking in importance and interest. The first deals with what the author calls the fundamental rights of Bolivia. Among these rights he cites those of self-preservation, independence, and international communication. "A treaty," he says, "which is based upon conquest and sets a limitation to the fundamental rights of a state, cannot be eternal, nor perpetually binding. . . . The modern doctrine establishes that, in principle, a state cannot relinquish such permanent rights as constitute the foundation of its own independence: thus treaties which entail a violation of such rights can have no validity nor even an obligatory character. In practice the value of such treaties has just been shown by the undoing of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine forced. upon France by Germany by the Treaty of Versailles of 1871." The next essay relates to the war of 1879 between Bolivia and Chile, which brought about the enclosure of the former within land boundaries and excluded her from the sea. In this essay the author reviews the causes and responsibilities of that war, giving us a clear conception not only of the Bolivian point of view on this question, but also on the ethical aspects of the same from an international point of view. In the last essay, which refers to the Toco question, the author reveals himself, as Señor C. Rojas says in the introductory note to this pamphlet, to be a diplomatist who has been officially engaged in obtaining the recognition of private rights in the territories transferred to Chile. PEDRO CAPÓ RODRÍGUEZ. Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question. With texts Jewish Rights at the Congresses of Vienna (1814-1815) and Aix-La- The conception of the Jew as a subject in international relations. is a somewhat novel one to the Gentile, even if he may be generally well-informed concerning the history of international law. The Jewish publicists who have produced these two monographs have not only justified their scholarship in the task, but have shown themselves in what is apparently a minority of one among international |