similar disclosures were to be repeated, he would much prefer not to take any further part in the discussions, and to put off expressing his views until the final Conference took place. A perusal of the articles complained of would make it clear that someone who had been present in the room was responsible for the disclosure, and his colleagues would agree that it would be impossible to continue these discussions if such incidents were likely to recur.

It would be in the recollection of some of his colleagues that he had hesitated to agree to the Peace Conference meeting in a capital, because he was afraid that the local press would take an undue part in the proceedings, and attempt to influence decisions by an injudicious criticism of the delegates of other countries. The mere fact that the Peace Conference was meeting in Paris should transform the city for the moment from a French into an international capital.

It would be unnecessary for him to lay stress on the fact that the occurrence of such incidents only tended to encourage the Germans to give the public the wrong impression that the Allies were only fighting each other for individual advantages. Consequently, such incidents must be put a stop to; strong action must be taken to prevent the possibility of their recurrence; otherwise, that Conference would become absolutely futile.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could only thank Mr. Lloyd George for his statement, which he accepted in the spirit in which it was made. Mr. Lloyd George would recognise how difficult it was to supervise the press. The pressmen had entry into all Government offices, and it was impossible to prevent leakage occurring. He could only express his deep regret that the articles referred to had found their way in the press, and he promised to take every possible measure to prevent a recurrence of the incidents complained of. Here, in France, the press censorship still functioned; but the Government did not dare to enforce it too rigorously. Nevertheless, he would do his best to stop the publication of such harmful articles. He agreed word for word with everything that Mr. Lloyd George had said. Nothing had done more to put the Allies in the wrong light with the Germans than the indiscretions of the press. He promised to do his best to prevent a repetition of such indiscretions. But he could hardly guarantee that nothing of the kind would ever occur again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the fact that the articles complained of had been published in the "Temps", the "Journal", and the "Echo de Paris". As was well known, the "Temps" was, at any rate, supposed to be in close touch with the Government, so that the article in question became doubly mischievous. His complaint, however, was not directed against the press. His chief

point was that someone sitting in that room had deliberately given the information complained of to the press with a definite purpose. He fully agreed with M. Clemenceau that it was impossible to control the press, but it should be possible to prevent responsible officials from giving away such information, especially when the information so given was deliberately altered in order to make it the ground for a violent attack on one of the Allied countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would make very serious protests to the directors of the "Temps". At the same time he would point out that in France a press censorship still existed which did not exist in Great Britain and America, consequently measures could be taken for its proper application.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether in M. Clemenceau's opinion a severe enquiry could not be instituted to discover who had given out the information about Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the British authorities had in the previous case instituted a stern inquiry, with the result that the offender had been discovered. He thought that if the French Government were to make a stern and persistent enquiry, the culprit in this case would also be found. In his opinion, the culprit ought to be tracked down, otherwise discussion here would become impossible.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. BALFOUR invited attention to another aspect of the same case. The same leakage was taking place in regard to Commissions and Committees, with the result that the members who had expressed an opinion on any question were subsequently lectured by outside parties. For instance, he himself had mentioned at one of the meetings that the port of Dantzig constituted a difficult problem. In consequence, M. Dmowski had called on him and talked to him for a considerable time on his supposed anti-Polish feelings; though, as a matter of fact, he was a great supporter of the Poles. The point, however, was this, namely, that as a result of his having made a remark at a secret meeting, an outside diplomat had forthwith been sent to him to discuss the whole question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could confirm Mr. Balfour's statement, because he himself had first learnt of the decisions about to be reached by Commissions from outside parties against whom the decision was going to be given. In his opinion, every member of the Delegation should take steps to ensure that no one connected with his Delegation was to blame.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether, to begin with a notice should not be circulated to all members of the Peace Conference, enjoining strict secrecy.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the whole of the military and naval terms had been published in the press.

M. SONNINO said that whilst all were agreed in regard to the question of the Press, the proceedings of Committees and Commissions presented a greater difficulty. In his opinion, a circular should be issued to all members of the Commissions impressing on them the necessity for reticence. He thought a great many people talked almost unconsciously; therefore, a circular might be useful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that whoever was responsible for giving the information should not be allowed in the Council Chamber. The incident to which he had called attention presented the same characteristics as the previous case, that is, it contained a communication in inverted commas, which could only have been given by someone who had been present in the room.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with all that had been said by M. Clemenceau. He merely wished to add that severe instructions had been given to the Press, and daily a great number of articles and paragraphs were suppressed by the press censor. An enquiry would, however, be carried out as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George.

(It was agreed :—

(1) That a strict and severe enquiry should be instituted by the French Authorities in order to discover, if possible, the name of the person who had given information to the Press in regard to the Conversation held at the Quai d'Orsay about Poland.

(2) That a circular should be issued by the Secretariat General to members of the Peace Conference impressing on them the necessity for strict reticence in regard to the proceedings of the Conference.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS. 22nd March, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/63

BC-56

Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a. m.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU opened the Meeting by asking M. Jules Cambon to address the Council.

Polish Frontiers:

Western Frontier of East Prussia

M. CAMBON said that he proposed to read the note prepared for the Council by the Committee on Polish Affairs in accordance with the instruction received

to re-examine the proposals concerning the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the exchange of views in the Council on the 19th March.1

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the opinion that as this note had been communicated to all the representatives, it would be unnecessary to read it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conclusion of the note was that the Committee on Polish Affairs, after reconsidering the problem, maintained its previous proposals.

(For text see Annexure "A".)

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that as he had taken an active part in the discussion of the first Report of the Polish Committee and as he had raised objections to the inclusion within Poland of two million Germans, he felt he must add a few comments on this second Report. He was still somewhat alarmed by the effect the Report would produce. He was not as convinced as at the previous meeting that this effect could be avoided. He did not wish to criticise the Polish Committee which had worked in a perfect spirit of impartiality and which had had to solve serious difficulties. Poland had to be given a corridor to the sea with every guarantee of security. The Committee had come to the conclusion that this could not be done without subjecting to Poland a large German population. He feared that this demand, added to many others which would have to be made from Germany, would produce deplorable results on German public opinion. The Allies should not run the risk of driving the country to such desperation that no Government would dare to sign the terms. At the present time the Government at Weimar was not very stable and all the currents of German life went on their way without taking much notice of its existence. It was tolerated, however, as there was nothing put in its place. The Conference must avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign it, or such as would cause the immediate collapse of any government that undertook the responsibility of accepting it. These observations were not levelled at the Committee on Polish Affairs, but the recommendations of that Committee were a considerable element in the difficulty just mentioned. He was inclined to accept, provisionally, the solution proposed by the Committee and to do likewise with all similar proposals by other Committees, with the clear understanding that the Supreme 1See BC-53, p. 414.