permanent force, recruited locally, or possibly of a mixed nature, comprising Poles and Germans.

7. The questions for decision, therefore, are

(i) Whether Polish forces should be prohibited from entering the territory of the Free City of Dantzig;

(ii) Whether it should be demanded that the German forces withdraw from that territory.

(iii) In the event of (i) and (ii) being agreed upon, what force should be provided to garrison that territory.

8. At the same time, the question of the taking over of Memel (vide Section X, Conditions of Peace) by the principal Allied and Associated Powers is also for consideration. In this case it only appears to be a question of the replacement of the German garrison by a small Allied force pending decision as to final occupation. (Signed) W. THWAITES Major-General

MILITARY SECTION, 30. 5. 19.

Appendix "C" to IC-197 [FM-25]

Note Drafted by the Yugo-Slav Commission

JUNE 18TH, 1919. The Commission has examined the question raised by Sir Maurice Hankey's letter to M. Dutasta, dated June 17th.2

The following opinions have been expressed:

1. The American Delegation recommends that the boundaries should be drawn as indicated in the Commission's Report, in answer to Sir Maurice Hankey's note dated June 11th, but expresses no opinion as regards the military measures to be taken.

2. The British and French Delegations

recalling the fact that the Supreme Council has agreed, concerning Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Hungary, that it would be advisable not to assign to military occupation limits that would differ from the definitive boundaries,

recommend that the same solution should be adopted concerning the Klagenfurt Basin, i. e. to determine as quickly as possible the political boundaries in accordance with the above mentioned report, the Yugo-Slavs being authorised to occupy Zone "A" and the Austrians Zone "B".

3. The Italian Delegation,

considering on the one hand that Sir Maurice Hankey's letter, dated

'Ante, p. 834.

June 17th, deals with the complete evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both the Yugo-Slavs and the Austrians,

considering on the other hand that the lines proposed by the American, British and French Delegations as boundary lines, are, according to the Italian Delegation, only limits for the zones of plebiscite, which ought not to be considered as political boundaries,

is of opinion that the zone which ought to be evacuated by both the Austrians and the Yugo-Slavs, ought to include the whole basin (Zones "A" and "B") as previously defined by the Supreme Council.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/26

FM-26

Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, June 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.

1. M. PICHON said that he thought it would be best to ask M. Tardieu to inform the Council of the conclusions of his Committee regarding the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt for the purpose of the telegram which the Council was requested to send (see previous Minutes I. C. 197,

Evacuation of the
Klagenfurt Basin

Minute 3).1

M. TARDIEU said that the answer to this question was to be found in Minute 5 of a note addressed to the Supreme Council by the

1FM-25, p. 834.

Commission for Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs. (See Annexure A). The consequence was that no change was made in Zone A and none proposed in Zone B, and that the boundaries shown on what was known as President Wilson's map were maintained by the unanimous assent of the Committee.

M. PICHON said that if the Council approved the proposal sent to them from the Council of Four, it would follow that a telegram should be sent demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both sides, the frontiers being those shown on President Wilson's map excluding the Miesthal region.

M. SONNINO said that as no alteration was proposed in the frontier, no specification need be made in the message. The telegram of May 31st should be repeated.

MR. BALFOUR said he could not quite understand what it was proposed the Council should do. Was it to order that a large tract of country should be left with no troops in it either Austrian or Jugo-Slav?

M. TARDIEU observed that the Commission had no remarks to make on this policy as the question had not been submitted to it.

M. SONNINO said that the Council of Heads of Governments wished the Military Representatives on the spot to be informed of the order given for the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin. These Officers would then make proposals in accordance with events for maintaining order in the evacuated area. This was the resolution adopted in the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING said that he did not quite follow M. Sonnino. He read the letter written by Sir Maurice Hankey on June 17th (see I. C. 197, Minute 3) to mean that entire evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was to be ordered. At the same time the Council of Foreign Ministers were asked to determine certain limits. M. Sonnino said these limits had already been laid down. If the outline of the Klagenfurt Basin had already been determined, the letter must mean lines behind which the occupying troops should retire.

M. SONNINO maintained that this was not the meaning of the resolution of the Council of Four. Seeing that the Commission proposed no change in the outer limits of the Klagenfurt Basin, all that remained to be done was to re-affirm the orders of May 31st.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to "approve"; for his part he did not.

MR. BALFOUR also said that he did not approve.

M. SONNINO said that he had himself raised the question in the Council of Four and asked what was to happen

He asked whether the Council would authorise the military Representatives on the spot to take action. The Council had decided that these Officers should not take action but should make proposals to the Council.

M. PICHON observed that this matter was not within the terms of reference.

M. SONNINO said that if his Colleagues did not approve the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin in spite of the fact that it had been decided on by the Council of Heads of Governments, he could do no more. In his view the proper thing to do was to send a telegram and ask the military authorities on the spot to make proposals for dealing with the consequences.

M. PICHON said that as Mr. Balfour could not approve of the telegram, it clearly could not be sent. The Council was, therefore, at the very start precluded from doing what M. Sonnino suggested.

MR. LANSING proposed that a reply be sent on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the effect that having been asked to approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin, the Council returned the reply that it did not approve of this policy. It would, however, approve of the withdrawal of the opposing troops behind the line proposed by the Jugo-Slav Commission.

M. SONNINO said he could not agree to this. It appeared to him quite contrary to the decision of the Council of the Heads of Governments as understood by him.

M. PICHON said there was another proposal formulated by Mr. Lansing and supported by Mr. Balfour. He also concurred with it. All he could do was to put this to the vote. He thought it would be a wise decision as supplementary information just received reported disturbances in the Klagenfurt area. He quoted a telegram from the French General on the spot saying that Allied troops were urgently required to keep order.

MR. LANSING said that he thought there must be some mistake in the account given of the matter by M. Sonnino. The more natural course would have been to consult the military men on the spot before asking the Foreign Ministers for their approval.

(At this stage Mr. Balfour withdrew.)

M. SONNINO said that the news quoted by M. Pichon showed the necessity of doing something. He referred again to the history of the telegram sent on May 31st and to the subsequent events.

M. PICHON said that, to sum up, as Mr. Balfour and he himself supported Mr. Lansing's views, all he could do was to report to the Council of Four that with the exception of M. Sonnino, all supported a withdrawal of the contending armies north and south of the line shown on the map known as "President Wilson's Map".