Слике страница
PDF
ePub

M. SONNINO said that his view was that a telegram should be sent renewing the order of May 31st for the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin and that the Military authorities should be asked to make proposals for dealing with the consequences. The following resolution was then adopted :

"The Council of the Foreign Ministers decided to reply to the Council of the Heads of Governments that their interpretation of the letter addressed by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference on June 17th, 1919, regarding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was that they were asked to approve the action suggested in paragraph 3.

With the exception of Baron Sonnino, this interpretation was unanimous and, with the same exception, the answer was that the Council of Foreign Ministers could not approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin.

It was further proposed by Mr. Lansing, and approved by the other Foreign Ministers, excepting Baron Sonnino, that the troops of the contending forces be ordered to withdraw north and south respectively of the purple line drawn on the map known as President Wilson's Map.

Baron Sonnino maintained that the duty of the Council was to send a telegram ordering the total evacuation of the Basin and to ask the 4 Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the spot what proposals they had to make to deal with the consequences of the evacuation."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, June 19, 1919.

Annexure "A" IC-198 [FM-26]

Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission for Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

JUNE 18th, 1919.

The Commission were requested by a letter from Sir Maurice Hankey to submit their recommendations concerning two letters dated June 17th [7th?] from Monsieur Vesnitch.

The Commission were unable to meet earlier than June 18th, several of its members being on the Committee for revising the reply to the German Delegation.

The opinion of the Commission is as follows:

1. The two letters dated June 7th from M. Vesnitch completed by a third one dated June 9th suggest methods referring to a solution of principles which was set forth in a letter of June 3rd, and drafted as follows:

"Assignment of Zone "A" to the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene State; but the inhabitants are recognised the right to express by a plebiscite

to be held within a period of three months or six months at the most, their wish to see this territory placed under Austrian sovereignty. "Assignment of Zone "B" to Austria, but reciprocally the same right is allowed to the inhabitants of the territory in favour of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom.'

The Commission agree to this suggestion in its general line, it being understood that both zones will be placed under the control of the International Commission.

2. Regarding paragraph 1 of the letter of June 7th, the Commission unanimously recommend that the delay provided in paragraph A should start from January 1st, 1919, instead of from "the coming into force of the present Treaty". The American, British and French Delegations recommend the approval of Monsieur Vesnitch's proposals as contained in paragraphs B and C. The Italian Delegation agree to paragraph B: they request that in paragraph C the words "from August 1st 1919" should be substituted for "on a date previous to January 1st 1905".

3. Regarding paragraph 2 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter the Commission recommend an International Commission consisting of seven members, namely: five appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene State, and one by the Republic of Austria.

4. Regarding paragraph 3 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter, the American, British and French Delegations recommend that the plebiscite should be held in zone "A" three months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Italian Delegation ask that it be six months at the earliest or eighteen months at the latest, as for Upper Silesia.

As regards the date when the plebiscite shall be held in zone “A”, Monsieur Vesnitch's proposals are unanimously agreed to.

5. Regarding paragraph 4 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter, the Commission unanimously recommend that the boundaries of zone "A" such as shown on "President Wilson's map" should be maintained, which means the exclusion of the Miesthal region.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/27

FM-27

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 3 p. m.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

1. M. PICHON said that he had received a note from Mr. Balfour, stating that he would be delayed owing to other engagements and that Sir Eyre Crowe would replace him.

Political Status

of Eastern Galicia

The first question on the Agenda Paper related to the political status of Eastern Galicia. He would call on M. Cambon, the President of the Commission on Polish Affairs to whom the question had been referred on the 18th June last (I. C. 197),1 to make a verbal statement.

M. CAMBON said that a copy of the supplementary report on Eastern Galicia had been circulated to all the members of the Conference. (Appendix A). That report discussed two possible solutions for the status of Eastern Galicia, namely:

(a) A provisional administration under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, with a temporary Polish Military occupation, and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

(b) A provisional administration under the Polish Government, with full local autonomy and military occupation as for (a), and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

It would be seen that both proposals contemplated a temporary Polish military occupation, and provided for an ultimate plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes and national aspirations of the people. The two propositions merely differed in regard to the character of the Chief of the State. In the first case, the provisional administration would be under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations. In the second case, the provisional administration would be under a representative of the Polish Government. Before proceeding further, he thought the Council of Foreign Ministers might wish to give a decision on that point.

M. PICHON agreed. The question for the Council to decide was whether the provisional administration should be placed under a High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League of Nations or under the Polish Government.

MR. LANSING enquired what was meant by a "provisional administration"?

M. CAMBON explained that the administration would necessarily be "provisional", since it was agreed that sooner or later a plebiscite would be held, in order to decide the ultimate form of government desired by the inhabitants.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that, before a decision in regard to the character of the administration were given, it would be advisable to decide whether there should or should not be a plebiscite. The Report, submitted by the Commission on Polish Affairs, laid con

[blocks in formation]

siderable stress on the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and on the fact that a plebiscite might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. The Commission had thought it its duty to make the following observation:—

"A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each. other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit”.

In these circumstances, he thought it would be impossible to separate the two questions, namely, the form of government to be established in Eastern Galicia and the expediency, or otherwise, of holding a plebiscite.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Commission on Polish Affairs had made any definite proposal on that question?

M. CAMBON replied that the Commission had always been guided by the spirit which had animated the Council of Foreign Ministers when referring questions to it. The Commission had always been told to study the questions referred to it without taking a definite decision. Nevertheless, the arguments for or against the holding of a plebiscite after a short delay or after a long delay have been clearly summed up in the Report submitted by the Commission in the following terms:

"In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a short delay, that the value of such a solution would be seriously impaired by the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a long delay, that such a solution succeeding a prolonged provisional regime would obviate the disadvantages alluded to above.

On the other hand:

"A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit."

In the circumstances, he, personally, recommended that the people of Eastern Galicia should be told that a plebiscite would be taken either by the League of Nations or by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at a date to be selected later without, however, fixing any definite date.

M. PICHON thought that the Council should be asked to decide the two following questions:

1. Should a plebiscite be held?

2. If so, at what date should a plebiscite be taken?

« ПретходнаНастави »